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ABSTRACT 
 
This research is an in-depth study of Korean GTCs (General Trading Companies) 
and Japanese Sogo Shoshas (the Japanese version of General Trading Companies), 
which are unique big business conglomerates but not well-known in Western countries. 
It investigates and compares several of their features, such as their history, 
characteristics, functions, organisational structure, corporate culture, human resource 
management, their impact on national economic development, strategic management 
and decision-making process.  
 
First, it examines a wide range of literature to show the functions of Korean GTCs 
and Japanese Sogo Shoshas as transaction intermediaries, information gatherers, project 
organisers, international marketers, financial providers, etc. With these varied  
functions, they have played significant roles not only from the macro aspect, but also 
the micro aspect. To rationalise their theoretical existence, they are approached from 
four perspectives: transaction cost economics, informational economics of scale, 
international marketing, and as financial intermediaries.  
 
Second, many elements were examined to scan the general management system 
within the two groups. Compared to Western countries, both Korea and Japan 
traditionally have a collectivist culture with low individualism. However, there have 
been transformations in the culture in terms of employee values, attitude, behaviour and 
management style. These cultural changes have been reflected in human resource 
management practice. Traditional human resource management practices lost their 
effectiveness, as they proved to be unfit for the changing business environment. 
i  
 
Traditional features such as lifetime employment, seniority-based pay and recruitment 
patterns have been changing since the slower growth of these economies in the 1990s. 
Corporate governance and ownership structure were also examined. In Korea’s case, 
control power has been centralised to group owners and their excessive power over 
ownership has caused problems, especially in the decision-making process. But 
ownership and management in Japan have traditionally been separated.  
 
Third, as a main purpose of this research, a field survey was carried out to examine 
the strategic management of the two groups by analysing the relationships between the 
business environment, competitive strategy, organisational structure and performance. 
As in the previous literature, this research also found that the variables are not 
independent, but interdependent with the other variables. Environment influences a 
firm’s competitive strategy and strategy affects its organisational structure. Then, 
performance is influenced by strategy and structure. For instance, a firm’s employment 
of differentiation strategy is positively associated with environmental uncertainty and 
complexity. A differentiation strategy is positively correlated with organisational 
decentralisation. Consistent with the previous literature, a cost leadership strategy is 
statistically positive with organisational formalisation. A hybrid strategy and new 
market development are positively correlated, since the main purpose of this strategy is 
to offer high-quality products or services at lower prices than competitors do. The 
research also found that organisational decentralisation motivates and encourages 
employees’ satisfaction and retention.  
 
Fourth, the decision-making process within the two groups was compared. Top 
executives in Korean GTCs still play important roles in the decision-making process, 
 ii 
 
whilst, team leaders and middle managers are positioned as main bodies in Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas. As primary factors influencing decision-making, ownership and 
corporate culture are the most important factors in Korean GTCs, whilst corporate 
culture is a primary component in Japan. Korean decision-makers tend to be 
individualistic, but Japanese decision-makers practice collectivism. There have been 
significant changes in decision-making both in Korean GTCs and Japan Sogo Shoshas 
since the 1990s.  
 
Fifth, in totality, some differences in the general management system were found 
between the two groups. These may be caused by cultural differences, history, 
organisational size and/or the degree of business scope and diversification.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Background 
 
Before the financial crisis of 1997, Korea was routinely hailed as a textbook 
example of successful economic development and its economy came to be widely 
regarded as a possible “role model” to be followed by other newly industrialising 
economies. (Rowley, Bae and Sohn, 2001). However, the financial crisis in 1997 
shattered this image. It began with a surprise announcement by the government in late 
1997 that the country was in financial crisis and required support from outside. The 
Korean government had to ask for a combined International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
rescue package at the end of 1997, which totalled US$55billion, the biggest IMF rescue 
package ever.   
 
It is difficult to explain Korea’s financial crisis from any single perspective or 
cause. Instead, the crisis should be seen as the result of a combination of factors. The 
origin of Korea’s financial crisis can be traced to three sectors; government, financial 
institutions and the Chaebol1, which means the big business conglomerates owned and 
managed by family members. Among these three causes, the Chaebol, in particular, are 
                                            
1 The Korean term, Chaebol, can be defined as “a big business group consisting of large companies which 
are owned and managed by family members or relatives in many diversified business areas.” Chaebol refers 
to Korea’s business conglomerates. The Korean word means business group and is often used as “Big 
Business” is used in English. Chaebol refers to the several dozen large, family-controlled Korean corporate 
groups, assisted by government financing, which have played a major role in the Korean economy since the 
1960s. Some have become well-known international brand names, such as Samsung, Hyundai and LG. 
Hyundai has even played a role in the slight thawing of relations between North and South Korea since 
2000. As of April, 2008, the top 10 largest Chaebols in Korea by total revenue were Samsung (US$114.28 
billion), KEPCO (US$36.07 billion), Hyundai Motor Company (US$60.00 billion), SK (US$49.13 billion), 
LG (US$51.70 billion), Korea National Housing Corporation (US$4.72 billion), Lotte (US$22.64 billion), 
Korea Highway Corporation (US$2.39 billion), POSCO (US$22.95 billion) and Korea Land Corporation 
(US$4.94 billion) (Fair Trade Commission, 2008).  
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not free from responsibility for the crisis. The Chaebol, in many instances, simply made 
poor decisions in their management. According to Shim and Steers (2001), short-sighted 
executive decisions based on limited financial and strategic analyses led companies to 
the brink of bankruptcy with mounting debts and excess production capacity. 
 
Most Korean Chaebols have General Trading Companies (GTCs)2. These are 
positioned at the heart of the Chaebol; Korean GTCs played an important role in the 
process of the Chaebols’ development and they were functioned as financial resources 
rather than their primary functions of trading, distribution, risk hedging and providing 
information services. Albaum, Strandskov and Duerr (2002) argued that GTCs are 
engaged in a far wider range of commercial activities than simply trade and distribution. 
They play a central role in such diverse financial areas as insurance, capital investment 
in joint ventures, extending credit and providing loan guarantees to customers. In fact, it 
is the range of financial services offered that is a major factor distinguishing GTCs from 
others. However, Korean GTCs amassed huge amounts of capital, often borrowed 
heavily in international capital markets and supplied them to headquarters for internal 
use.3 Thus, the GTCs were heavily criticised for being no more than sources of finance 
for the Chaebols and they were at the centre of Korea’s financial crisis. 
                                            
2 The GTCs have originated from the Japanese concept of general trading companies, Sogo Shoshas.  
These are unique organisations which perform not only trading activities but also a variety of functions 
such as financial services, project organising activities, information-gathering activities, distribution 
function and business coordination function. Seven GTCs in Korea are the Samsung Corporation, 
Daewoo International Corporation, Hyundai Corporation, SK Networks Co., Ltd., LG International 
Corporation, Hyosung Corporation and Ssangyong Corporation (The Handbook of Korean GTCs, 2005). 
 
3 The GTCs’ primary financial services are extending credit, making loans, providing loan guarantees and 
developing venture capital to both buyers and sellers. In many cases, however, Korean GTCs diverted the 
funds internally for the purpose of letting the chaebols operate (The Handbook of Korean GTCs, 2005). 
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   The GTCs system in Korea was established in 1975, based on a Japanese general 
trading company model.  The model of the Sogo Shoshas4 was used as a means of 
overcoming Korean export stagnation and achieving economic internationalisation after 
the oil crisis in 1973. Under the motto “from a noodle to a satellite”, Korean GTCs 
progressed rapidly in scale and outcomes as they dealt with various products. Shin 
(1984) argued that Korean GTCs have played an unusually important role in export, 
import, domestic trade and third country trade. In the 1970s in particular and even in the 
face of a worldwide recession and strict import controls in industrialised countries, the 
GTCs have recorded an astonishing export growth rate average of over 40% a year. In 
1982, the GTCs’ total exports were US$15billion and their share accounts for more than 
48% of Korea’s total exports. Engaging primarily in exporting, importing, financing and 
operating in or doing business with worldwide networks, Korean GTCs were the growth 
engines of Korean business in their move toward multinationalisation.  
 
Korean GTCs have led Korean economic and export growth since the 1970s and  
maintained a positive reputation before financial crisis in 1997. However, business 
volumes conducted by the GTCs were starting to gradually decrease from the early 
1990s due to the changes in the internal and external business environment, such as 
organisational restructuring, high competition among the existing GTCs, abolition of 
assistance by government and the secession of manufacturers. For instance, in order to 
be internationally competitive, most Korean manufacturers pursued direct export or 
                                            
4 A Japanese term, the Sogo Shoshas, refers to the Japanese version of the GTCs. Many scholars and 
business people prefer to use “Sogo Shoshas” instead of the GTCs. In this thesis, the term “GTC” or 
“GTCs” will be used for the Korean General Trading Companies (i.e. the Korean GTCs) and the term 
“Sogo Shosha” or “Sogo Shoshas” will be used for the Japanese General Trading Companies (i.e. 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas). The major Japanese Sogo Shoshas are the Mitsui Corporation, Mitsubishi 
Corporation, Marubeni Corporation, Sumitomo Corporation, Itochu Corporation, Toyota Tsusho 
Corporation and Sojitz Corporation.  
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import by themselves rather than through the GTCs, since they had easy access to 
global markets and easy acquisition of information. As a consequence of these factors, 
the total export volumes conducted by seven major GTCs as of January 1997 before the 
financial crisis decreased by 19.1% compared to the previous year. In addition, most 
Korean GTCs were affiliated companies of the Chaebols and they were heavily 
dependent upon their parent company as export and import agents on its behalf. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis significantly affected Korea’s industries including the 
GTCs industry. The collapse of major Chaebols and organisational restructuring on the 
advice of the IMF threatened the GTCs’ future businesses.   
 
In contrast, the history of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas dates back to the Meiji 
Restoration in the mid-19th century. Before the Meiji period, Japan had been closed to 
the outside world and had no merchants with experience in international trade. Until the 
Meiji period, Japanese goods were traded through foreign merchants. For example, by 
the second half of the 19th century, European traders dominated Japan’s import market. 
For the purpose of protecting the national economy from Western invasion, the Meiji 
government recognised the need for Japan to have its own trading organisation. The 
Meiji government encouraged traditional Zaibatsu 5  families, such as Mitsui and 
                                            
5 A Japanese term, Zaibatsu (literally “financial cliques”) means the diversified family enterprises which 
rose to prominence in the Meiji Era. They are the great family-controlled banking and industrial 
combines of modern Japan. The leading Zaibatsu (called “Keiretsu” after World War II) are Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Dai Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo, Sanwa and Fuyo. They gained a position in the Japanese 
economy which has no exact parallel elsewhere. Most Zaibatsus developed after the Meiji restoration 
(1868), when, by subsidies and a favourable tax policy, the new government granted them a privileged 
position in the economic development of Japan. Later they helped finance strategic semiofficial 
enterprises in Japan and abroad, particularly in Taiwan and Korea. In the early 1930s the military clique 
tried to break the economic power of the Zaibatsu, but failed. In 1937 the four leading Zaibatsus 
controlled directly one-third of all bank deposits, one-third of all foreign trade, one-half of Japan’s 
shipbuilding and maritime shipping and most of the heavy industries. They maintained close relations 
with the major political parties. After Japan’s surrender (1945) in World War II, the break-up of the 
Zaibatsu was announced as a major aim of the Allied occupation, but in the 1950s and 1960s groups 
based on the old Zaibatsu re-emerged as the Keiretsu. The decision on the part of these groups in the 
post-World War II era to pool their resources greatly influenced Japan’s subsequent rise as a global 
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Sumitomo, to participate in the trading business. For example, by 1918, the Zaibatsu 
had captured 80% of Japan’s total import volume with the support of the government. 
These Zaibatsu organised vertical and horizontal combinations of companies, in 
banking, marketing and manufacturing, among others and dominated Japanese industry 
and the finance sector prior to World War II. After World War II, Japanese Zaibatsus 
were required to resolve ownership in their holding companies by anti-monopoly 
legislation. This resulted in the appearance of great number of specialised trading 
companies such as Marubeni, Tomen, Nissho-Iwai and Nichimen. The dissolution of 
the Zaibatsu was halted in 1949 and the Korean War in 1959 gave the Zaibatsu great 
opportunities for re-grouping and re-growth. Naturally specialised trading companies 
and Zaibatsu type trading companies were transformed into the contemporary Sogo 
Shosha.  
 
As engines for promoting industrialisation and economic development in the 
modern age and positioned at the heart of the Keiretsu6 together with the banks, the 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas have played an unusually important role in facilitating 
                                                                                                                                
business power. However, despite the forced dissolution of the Zaibatsu after World War II, three of the 
famous names – Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo – have survived and are now known as Keiretsu. 
(Hidemasa, 1992; Kang, 1996).  
 
6 A Keiretsu is a Japanese conglomerate like a Chaebol in Korea. The most common Japanese meaning is 
something close to the English verbs “link”, “affiliate with” or “connect to.” The prototypical Keiretsu 
are those which appeared in Japan during the “economic miracle” following World War II. Before Japan’s 
surrender in 1945, Japanese industry was controlled by large conglomerates called Zaibatsu. The Allies 
dismantled the Zaibatsu in the late 1940s, but the companies formed from the dismantling of the Zaibatsu 
re-interlinked through share purchases to form horizontally-integrated alliances across many industries. 
Where possible, Keiretsu companies would also supply one another, making the alliances to some extent 
vertically-integrated as well. Each of the major Keiretsu was centred on a  GTC and a bank, which lent 
money to the Keiretsu’s member companies and held equity positions in the companies as well. Each 
central bank had great control over the companies in the Keiretsu and acted as a monitoring entity as well 
as an emergency bail-out entity. One effect of this structure was to minimise the presence of hostile 
takeovers in Japan, because no entities could challenge the power of the banks. Although the divisions 
between them have blurred in recent years, there are six major postwar Keiretsus: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa (Miyashita and Russell, 1994) 
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international trade between Japan and the rest of the world. They exist at the centre of 
Japan’s global economic effort and serve as intermediaries for half of their country’s 
exports and two-thirds of their imports; Sogo Shoshas handle more than half of Japan’s 
total foreign trade and much of their domestic transactions. In 1984, for example, the 
largest Sogo Shosha, Mitsubishi Corporation, had total sales exceeding US$69billion, 
making it the biggest company in Japan and third largest in the entire world. According 
to Shao and Herbig (1993)7, the Sogo Shoshas have three basic functions; seeking 
export opportunities, securing necessary imported materials and acquiring technology 
for industrial development. Traditionally and still today, they are concentrated in high 
volume, low margin commodities. They handle importing, exporting and trading for 
over 20,000 items – including metals, machinery, energy and chemicals, textiles, 
foodstuffs and general merchandise. They are also actively involved in raw materials 
extraction, creation and discovery through multiple stages of production, fabrication and 
distribution, downstream to the end user. Besides the above functions, the Sogo Shoshas 
serve a multitude of functions, such as financial services, information services, 
organisation and coordination services, risk reduction services and communication 
services.  
                                            
7 They also examined the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) associated with the 
Sogo Shoshas. i) Strengths: One of the apparent strengths of the Sogo Shoshas is the chance for 
employees to travel overseas, since the trading companies’ role is to spot business trends and 
opportunities throughout the world. Another strength is that the groups encourage specialists rather than 
generalists and move employees into new jobs every five to seven years rather than two or three years in 
most Japanese companies do. Having strong local managers who have special knowledge of the local 
market is also one of the strengths of the Sogo Shoshas. ii) Weaknesses: Japanese Sogo Shoshas are 
highly vulnerable since their expertise is in commodities, not technically-oriented products. Some 
manufacturers undertake many of their own domestic and international marketing activities (Sony, Honda, 
etc.). As Japanese manufacturers gain experience in exporting, they need to rely less on the expertise of 
trading companies. iii) Opportunities: Besides their basic roles, a new role is coming to the Sogo Shoshas, 
that of manager and coordinator of projects, plant exports, financial accounts, information and other 
services. iv) Threats: The Sogo Shoshas are involved in ill-conceived or poorly implemented new 
businesses. For example, they have diversified into real estate and housing in Tokyo where real estate is 
not healthy.  
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Despite Sogo Shoshas’ continuous development, their future is not likely improve, 
due to several factors. Shao and Herbig (1993) identified the factors as follows. First, 
Non-keiretsu companies, such as Honda, Sony and Toyota are setting up their own 
direct exporting network rather than exporting through the Sogo Shoshas. Thus, the 
Sogo Shoshas handle less of Japan’s exports. Second, the growth potential inside Japan 
is limited, due to the large share of the Sogo Shoshas. Third, the rise of other countries’ 
GTCs will threat the Sogo Shoshas in the global market. For instance, Korean GTCs 
have become substantial in scope and size. Some trading companies in Europe, Hong 
Kong, Brazil and Thailand operate efficiently. Last, the Sogo Shoshas will face greater 
competition in international trade from manufacturers, smaller specialised trading 
companies and foreign companies.  
 
At the same time, the birth of World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 made 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas confront new business environments. The 
WTO deals predominantly with the actions of governments, establishing discipline over 
trade policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas, subsidies or state trading (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2001). The launching of the WTO means that the world trade system enters 
into infinite competition by reducing tariffs for imported materials or eliminating tariff 
barriers and ultimately establishing a tariff-free trade market. Moreover, China’s entry 
into the WTO in 2001 made Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas encounter many 
challenges. In particular, Korea’s exporters of textiles, electronics, home appliances, 
autos, plastics and machinery equipment, among others, stand to benefit handsomely 
from falling tariff and non-tariff barriers in China. By contrast, however, the Korean 
economy will probably run into a number of challenges, as the Western multinationals 
and the rapidly growing Chinese manufacturers are expected to further intensify 
 7 
 
competition for a bigger share of the liberalised Chinese market. Further, according to 
the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2001), Korean and Japanese firms 
may suffer setbacks in profitability amid fiercer competition from the rising ranks of 
Chinese manufacturers and expansion-minded Western companies in China. 
 
As reviewed above, the rapidly changing external and internal business 
environments have threatened the future business of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas and their future does not look bright. Accordingly, both of them are in need of 
strategic management to lead a revolution which will best position them to capitalise on 
the opportunities and threats of the global markets. Despite the growing significance of 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas in the national economic system and in world 
commerce, there has been no major study of them in English. This study is an attempt to 
introduce Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas for the first time to the outside 
world. It seeks to carefully examine several aspects of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas, such as their nature, functions, characteristics, history and development, 
management system (i.e. organisational structure, corporate culture, decision-making 
process, ownership, corporate governance and human resource management), financial 
performance, strategic management and decision-making process.  
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1.2. Research Objectives and Questions  
 
This research studies Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas in some depth. It, 
therefore, examines several things about Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 
organisations which are unique and little-known in Western countries. The reasons that 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas were chosen as study targets are as follows: i) 
both have played important roles in Korean and Japanese national economic 
development; ii) they are completely unique organisations with varied functions and 
characteristics; and iii) the nature of the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas provides an adequate 
package for research, for example, their strategic management, export and import 
activities, financial activities, human resource management, global networks and 
business group linkages, etc.  
 
The main purpose of this research is to examine the strategic management and 
decision-making process within the Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. First, the 
objective of looking at their strategic management is to examine the structural 
relationship between the business environment, a firm’s strategy, organisational 
structure and performance. In order to achieve the objective, the following sets of 
research questions is derived:  
 
1) How much do environmental variables affect competitive strategies? 
2) Is there any correlation between competitive strategies and organisational structure?  
3) How much do competitive strategies influence a firm’s performances?  
4) How far is organisational structure associated with a firm’s performances?  
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With respect to the decision-making process within the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, the 
study investigates i) the main bodies in the process of decision-making, ii) the major 
factors affecting decision-makers and their sources of power and authority, iii) whether 
corporate cultural differences exist in the decision-making process between Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas and iv) the current trend of decision-making 
processes within their organisations. In order to meet these objectives, the following 
research questions are addressed: 
1) Who are the main bodies in the decision-making process within the GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas? 
2) What are the major factors influencing decision-makers and what are their sources of 
power and authority in the decision-making process? 
3) Are there corporate cultural differences in the decision-making process between 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas? and  
4) Has there been any significant change recently in the decision-making process within 
their organisations? 
 
Another objective of this study is to examine the nature of Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas, for example, their background and development from a 
historical perspective, functions and characteristics, management style (including 
organisational structure, corporate culture, decision-making process, ownership and 
corporate governance and human resource management), financial performance and 
their roles in the process of national economic development.  
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1.3. Methodology and Data Sources 
 
Data for this research are derived from primary and secondary materials. The main 
parts of this thesis, Chapters 5 and 6, are based on primary data which include a 
questionnaire field survey of employees in seven of Korea’s GTCs and eight of Japan’s 
Sogo Shoshas and intensive interviews with team leaders and senior managers. With 
respect to the questionnaire field survey analysis, it adopted some quantitative statistical 
techniques such as Multiple Regression Analysis, Correlation Analysis, Frequency 
Analysis and Chi-square Test.  
 
The introductory and background parts of this research, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are 
mainly based on secondary materials. The secondary data sources include statistical and 
historical data, various books and articles released by the Korean and Japanese 
governments, statistical and historical data, reports and documents from Korean GTCs 
and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, private research institutes, such as Samsung Economic 
Research Institutes, Nomura Research Institutes and LG Research Institute, 
government-sponsored institutes, including the Bank of Korea (BOK), the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ),  the Korean International Trade Association (KITA) and the Japanese 
Trade Organisation (JETRO). Data have also come from Korean and Japanese 
government ministries, such as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),  the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and other international organisations, including the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU).  
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1.4. Organisation of the Thesis 
 
This study is composed of seven chapters together with this introductory chapter. 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the nature of Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas, including their characteristics and major functions. It also theoretically 
reviews the rationale for their existence from a number of different perspectives, 
including those of transaction cost economics, informational economies of scale, 
international marketing and distribution and finance.  
 
The next two chapters, 3 and 4, are devoted to describing the Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas and their impact on national economic development. Since the 
ultimate purpose of this thesis is to examine the strategic management of Korean GTCs 
and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the description of these two chapters provides a 
background for the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 examines several things about 
Korean GTCs, such as their origin and development, details of the current GTCs, 
management style, financial performance and the relationship between Chaebols, GTCs 
and the national economy. In particular, it investigates the management system within 
Korean GTCs, such as organisational structure, corporate culture, decision-making 
processes, ownership, corporate governance, cross shareholding and human resource 
management. The final section discusses the relationship between the GTCs, Chaebols 
and Korea’s economy. Chapter 4 examines overall aspects of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
using the same organisation as Chapter 3. It investigates the origin and development of 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas, details of the current Sogo Shoshas, management style, 
financial performance and the relationship between the Keiretsu, Sogo Shoshas and the 
Japanese economy.  
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(Figure 1.1. Organisation of the Thesis) 
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The strategic management of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas is 
examined in Chapter 5, which is the main part of this thesis, together with Chapter 6. 
This chapter starts by with presenting various theories from the literature and previous 
studies of strategic management within organisations. Based on this literature survey, it 
presents a research model and establishes several hypotheses, to examine the 
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relationship between the business environment and a firm’s strategy, organisational 
structure and performance. First, it examines the relationship between the business 
environment (variables: uncertainty and complexity) and the firm’s strategy (variables: 
differentiation, cost leadership and hybrid strategy). Second, it analyses the linkage 
between a firm’s strategy and organisational structure (variables: centralisation and 
formalisation). Third, it investigates the relationship between strategy and performance 
(variables: financial and non-financial performance). Last, it examines the correlation 
between organisational structure and performance.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas through a field survey. The chapter begins by presenting 
theories from the literature on decision-making within organisations. Existing theories 
are shown to be inadequate to explain the decision-making within Korean and Japanese 
firms. It is, therefore, suggested that the decision-making process within Korean and 
Japanese firms along with relevant cultural factors should be examined. Several things 
are considered, such as the main body in the decision-making process, major factors 
affecting decision-making and sources of power (i.e. power and politics, corporate 
culture, ownership and corporate governance), cultural differences in the decision-
making process between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas and recent changes 
in the decision-making process. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the major findings of the empirical research and 
considers its implications for the future strategic management and decision-making 
process within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. It also discusses the 
limitations of the thesis and offers recommendations for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE NATURE OF THE GTCs/SOGO SHOSHAS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the nature of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas. First, it summarises 
some definitions of them in previous studies. Second, it reviews their characteristics and 
various functions. In the last section, the rationale of their existence is examined from 
the perspectives of transaction cost economics, informational economies of scale theory, 
international marketing and distribution, and finance. 
 
2.2. The Nature of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas 
 
2.2.1. Definitions of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas 
 
General Trading Companies (GTCs) is the literal translation of the Japanese word 
“Sogo Shosha.” When this term was first used, there was no exact definition of what the 
term meant. In Japan, many scholars prefer to use “Sogo Shoshas” instead of “GTCs.” 
There are hundreds and thousands of ordinary trading companies in Korea and Japan 
today, but only a few hundred are engaged in trade with foreign countries. Among them 
there are only seven firms called GTCs in Korea and eight firms called Sogo Shoshas in 
Japan, as of 2006. According to Young (1979), the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, unlike ordinary 
trading companies, can be defined as being “huge wholesale intermediaries that exist 
between large manufacturers and small producers. They supply large volumes of raw 
materials and distribute goods from large manufacturers to smaller distributors to 
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numerous retailers”. Yoshino and Lifson (1986, p.2) clearly explained the GTCs as 
follows:  
 
“The Sogo Shosha (Japanese version of the GTC) is like no other type of company. 
It is not defined by the products it handles or even by the particular services it 
performs, for it offers a broad and changing array of goods and functions. Its 
business goals are equally elusive, for maximization of profits from each 
transaction is clearly not the major goal, at either the operating or philosophical 
level. There are really no other comparable firms, although important business 
and government leaders in the United States and elsewhere have become 
convinced that there should be. The six (major Sogo Shoshas)8 affect the lives of 
most participants in the world economy. From the oil used to cook French fries at 
a local fast food restaurant to the subway cars running beneath our streets, 
products passing through their hands are all around us. Collectively they are 
accounting for four percent of world trade and influencing the jobs and fortunes of 
people all over the world” 
 
Yamamura (1985) stated that “the GTCs are economic organisations whose 
functions consist of minimising risks involved in transactions through their ability to 
distribute risks, reducing transaction costs via their ability to take advantage of 
economics of scale and making efficient use of capital.” Miyashita and Russell (1994) 
argued that the Sogo Shoshas are uniquely Japanese institutions which are vital to the 
operations of the Keiretsu.  
 
As reviewed in the above, there have been various definitions of the GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas these are shown in Table 2.1. 
 
 
                                            
8 Japan’s major six Sogo Shoshas are Mitsubishi Shoji, Mitsui Bussan, Marubeni, Itochu (or C. Itoh), 
Sumitomo Shoji and Nissho Iwai. 
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(Table 2.1. Definitions of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas) 
Scholar (s) Year Definitions of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas 
Kunio, Y.  
 
1982 The Sogo Shoshas are Japan’s organisational innovation – an
innovation necessitated by the problems the country faced in 
international trade. It is a unique Japanese organisation that 
employs hundreds and thousands of people, maintains a 
network in the major cities of the world and handles such 
diverse products as iron and steel, chemicals, textiles, 
foodstuffs and machinery.  
Yamamura, K. 1985 The GTCs are economic organisations whose functions 
consist of minimising risks involved in transactions through 
their ability to distribute risks, reducing transaction costs via 
their ability to take advantage of economics of scale and 
making efficient use of capital 
Lee, S. H. 1986 The GTCs combine international and domestic trading with 
finance, communication and resource development for a 
single primary purpose; to support their buying and selling 
functions that constitute the core of the GTCs business.  
Shao, A.T. and 
Herbig, P.  
1993 The GTCs are large traders and suppliers and sales 
intermediaries, not manufacturers or financial institutions, 
although they are giant financial intermediaries for purposes 
of credit extensions.  
Miyashita, K. and 
Russell, D.  
1994 The Sogo Shoshas are uniquely Japanese institutions which 
are vital to the operations of the Keiretsu. 
Cho, D.S. 1997 The GTCs are large corporations that display a synergy 
effect by coordinating the work among products, 
geographical areas and financial functions.  
Albaum, G., 
Strandskov J. and 
Duerr E. 
2002 The GTCs are engaged in a far wider range of commercial 
and financial activities than simply trade and distribution. 
They also play a central role in such diverse areas as 
shipping, warehousing, finance, technology transfer, 
planning, resource development, construction and regional 
development, insurance, consulting, real estate and deal 
making in general. 
Japan Foreign 
Trade Council 
(JFTC) 
2008 They are involved in and contribute to each value added 
process in all phases of the flow of business, namely, from 
natural resources upstream to finished products downstream, 
from the purchase of materials to the sales of products.  
 18 
 
2.2.2. The Characteristics and Major Functions of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas  
 
The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas handle a wide range of products in most types of industry. 
Originally the Sogo Shoshas were known as trading companies, before the term evolved 
to mean general trading companies. They have now expanded and diversified their 
functions and business fields to include trading, but also investment, as well as services 
and industry development (JFTC, 2008). Thus, it is obviously difficult to explain the 
GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ functions systematically, since they undertake extremely 
variegated activities. However, the various studies all agree on certain salient and 
common features shared by most of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas. Shao and Herbig (1993) 
argued that they typically tend to have the following characteristics and serve a 
multitude of functions including: i) financial services, ii) information services, iii) risk 
reduction services, iv) organisation and co-ordination services, v) auxiliary services, vi) 
human resources, vii) financial resources, viii) global commercial networking and ix) 
communications systems. Besides the above functions, the GTCs also have 
intermediary or simple broker functions, middle-term credit offering and business 
project adjusting functions and information processing functions (Yamaji, 1991). A 
research institute of the Sogo Shoshas in Japan (1981) noted that the Sogo Shoshas have 
as central functions: a transaction function, finance function and information function 
and as auxiliary functions: industry organising functions, resource development 
functions and software and system functions. Putting all the functions of the GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas together, they can be summarised as follows: 
 
? Trading and Transactional Intermediation Function: This is the primary function of 
the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas in export, import and third-country (offshore) trade 
intermediation. They work as intermediaries between sellers and buyers and match 
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them through diverse products, from instant noodles to satellites, in a long-term 
contractual relationship. They are involved in all phases of transactions from 
upstream to downstream in almost every kind of industry: machinery, plants, 
communications equipment, metals, minerals, energy resources, chemicals, textiles, 
foodstuffs and food products. Through global market-based activities, they take risks, 
expand markets and control the balance of demand and supply of the products that 
they handle. Space and time are the two dimensions in which they operate and they 
profit from the movements of goods and services. Although they perform many 
functions, trade intermediation is their major source of income (Kojima and Ozawa, 
1984).  
 
? Financial Services Function (the Quasi-Bankers): To be an organiser, a GTCs/Sogo 
Shosha must also be a financer. These organisations offer unique financial facilities 
distinct from those of banks or other financial institutions. They have a close 
relationship with commercial banks and extend credit, make loans, provide loan 
guarantees to both buyers and sellers and develop venture capital. They are also 
involved in acquiring funding, fund management, project finance, credit support, 
international settlement, currency exchange, insurance arrangements and other risk 
hedging. They can borrow from the most advantageous sources in international 
capital markets and channels. They also can act as a risk buffer by absorbing the 
financial risks for clients, but secure competence and hence profits in foreign 
exchange handling and investment fund operations. They also provide other financial 
facilities in relation to Mergers and Acquisitions (M & A), Management Buy-Outs 
(MBO) and Employee Buy-Outs (EBO). (Marubeni Corporation, 1978; The 
Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005). 
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(Figure 2.1. A Diagram of the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ Functions) 
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(Source: Shin Jonghap Sangsaron (The New Theory of the Sogo Shoshas) (1981), Research Institute of 
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? Information and Intelligence Gathering Function: Speedy and highly reliable 
information is important not only to develop new business opportunities, but also to 
build a good relationship with customers domestically and abroad. For this purpose, 
all GTCs/Sogo Shoshas make efforts to gather firsthand and high quality information 
to equip the worldwide information network. Through their global networks, they 
collect and analyse a wide range of information from all over the world and utilise it 
for corporate strategy and management planning, as well as for promoting their daily 
business activities. This information includes worldwide political and economic 
conditions, industrial and corporate trends, advanced technology information, 
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marketing data and changes in the legal and taxation environment, etc. Additionally, 
they furnish their customers and clients with useful and timely information to support 
their business and improve business performance. With the recent information and 
technology revolution, these capabilities have been greatly improved both 
quantitatively and qualitatively, resulting in increased value-added and speedier 
service (JFTC, 2008). According to Shin (1984), the information services of 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas are not confined to economic and business information of 
immediate practical value; they extend to the global political, legal and social 
environment and to any trends that are likely to have an impact on the Korean and 
Japanese economies. They develop a globally extensive information-gathering 
infrastructure and each GTC/Sogo Shosha has spun a vast web of information 
gathering. They collect not only economic but also social and political information.  
 
? Logistics Function: They take part in the creation and running of logistics 
information network systems. They also participate in the operation of such logistics 
facilities as warehouse and distribution centres. As a further goal, they are striving to 
offer a comprehensive and optimised logistics system which will meet the customer’s 
needs at every stage of the cargo flow, including air, sea and land transportation, 
storage, processing, sorting and distribution (JFTC, 2008).  
 
? Organisation and Coordination of Complex Project Function: They combine and 
organise three basic functions; trade intermediation, financial intermediation and 
information gathering. These enable them to act in a unique way as organisers and 
coordinators of entire production systems on an international scale (Dicken and 
Miyamachi, 1998). In promoting such large-scale projects as the construction of oil 
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refineries, petrochemical plants, steel mills and natural resources development, they 
put together packages combining their various capabilities, such as information 
collection and analysis, planning for projects, scheme proposal, the selection of 
appropriate partners, formation of consortiums, arrangement of project funds, 
procurement of material and equipment, consignment of the construction, insurance 
arrangement and market promotion (JFTC, 2008; Marubeni Corporation, 1978). 
 
? Risk Management: In their daily business transactions, they utilise a wide range of 
know-how and management resources acquired over the years to keep various 
associated risks to a minimum. They are in particular capable in minimising risks in 
businesses requiring more refined risk management, such as large-scale projects in 
developing countries and venture businesses in new growth fields. Specifically, they 
make full use of their deep reservoir of know-how and expertise to minimise risks in 
such matters as the selection of appropriate partners, the formation of consortiums, 
the sharing of responsibility and the assurance of collateral; and in such other risk-
hedging practices as currency exchange transactions, forward contracts and insurance 
coverage (JFTC, 2008). 
 
? New Resources Development Function: They have been investing for a long time to 
develop foodstuffs, fuels, raw materials and natural resources; these are essential for 
economic growth (The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005). 
 
? Joint Venture Function: They establish joint venture companies throughout the world 
in order to develop and stimulate regional economic growth (The Handbook of 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005). 
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In the meantime, information and intelligence have become increasingly important 
in modern business. Information processing capability can improve an organisation’s 
strategic capability in several ways, since a large part of business activity is concerned 
with processing and transmitting information within and between organisations 
(Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2005). Among various functions of the GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas, information and intelligence gathering functions are vital in the fast changing 
modern business environment. The author presents a new model of their major 
functions as follows: 
 
(Figure 2.2. A New Model of the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ Major Functions) 
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2.3. The Rationales of the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ Existence 
 
2.3.1. Transaction Cost Economics Approach  
 
One of the most plausible explanations of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas from the 
microeconomic perspective is the transaction cost economics approach 9 . The 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can be regarded as mediators to promote transaction activities 
between sellers and buyers. As mediators, one of the most important factors in 
displaying their functional ability is the capacity to minimise transaction cost, such as  
may arise during transactions between sellers and buyers. The economist Mansfield 
(1988) explained the concept of middlemen (like the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas) with the 
transaction cost approach. He argued that middlemen play an important role in some 
real-life markets by providing a variety of services both to seller and buyer. In 
compensation for these services, the middlemen receive a share of the price paid for the 
good. The costs of these middlemen’s services are often called transaction costs. 
Bradley (1995) also stressed that transaction cost analysis must be carried out, since one 
                                            
9 A Typical Example of Transaction Services and Costs Structure (Chemical Product Export from Korea to the EU)  
Items Unit Price (US$/MT) Remarks 
The GTC “A’s” Buying Price from Korean Manufacturers  1,200 FOB 
Marine Insurance 5  
Ocean Freight 60 US$1200/Container 
Transaction  
Inland Transportation 25  
Costs 
Storage and Warehousing 25  
Preparing Trade Document  3  
Total of Transaction Costs 118  
Import Tax 108 FOB Price x 9% 
The GTC “A’s” Commission 20  
The GTC “A’s” Selling Price to the EU Customers 1,446  
As seen in the above table, the GTC “A” buys a product at US$1,200 from a Korean manufacturer and sells it to his 
EU customers at US$1,446, which includes US$118 of transaction costs. However, one of the manufacturers located 
in the EU, which produces the same product, sells its product to the EU customer at US$1,242, which does not 
include import tax (import tax is exempted for the EU members) and some transaction costs such as marine insurance, 
ocean freight and storage charge. Thus, the GTC “A” needs to minimise transaction cost to overcome the price 
difference of US$204 (US$1,446 – US$1,242) and to have competitive advantage in the market.  
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purpose of business is to reduce business costs over time. The transaction services and 
costs during the business undertaken by the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas vary from providing 
relevant information to both buyers and sellers, arranging finance, covering marine 
insurance, transportation, distribution, storage and warehousing, to the preparation of 
trade documents and payment and the management of troubleshooting.  
 
However, much neoclassical theory treats transactions as costless (Himmelweit, et 
al, 2001). According to neo-classicists, market exchange is determined by relative 
prices without regard to the costs of trading activity and there exists only production 
cost. In opposition to neoclassicism, some economists (new institutionalists) have 
become interested in the impact of the transaction costs on the pattern and level of 
economic activity. According to them, the ideal market which neo-classicists assumed is 
non-existent and any transaction activity generates costs for a number of reasons. Coase 
(1937), who is the pioneer of new institutionalism, argued that the transaction costs 
involved in transactions on markets are the price to be paid for using the price 
mechanism in a market system. In other words, when a person carries out economic 
activity by using the price mechanism, it generates various costs, called the transaction 
cost; these include the information costs, administrative costs and legal costs associated 
with finding transaction partners, negotiations and the final contract agreement. Thus, 
the cost of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction 
takes place in a market and must be taken into account.  
 
Hennart (1991) emphasised that if knowledge were perfect and individuals 
perfectly honest, market transaction costs would be zero. However, markets are never 
fully efficient and market transaction costs are positive. This is because humans have 
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bounded rationality and a tendency towards opportunism. Bounded rationality refers to 
“the cognitive limits of economic agents in relation to the complexity of the problems 
with which they are confronted.” Bounded rationality normally exists due to economic 
agents’ limited capacity for computation and information (Pearce, 1983).  
 
However, opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile in relation to 
choosing between alternative contractual relationships” (Williamson,1975). 
Williamson’s (1979) study showed that transaction costs arise from the bounded 
rationality and opportunism of all interacting parties’. In other words, the external 
environment and the limited information restrict each party’s rational behaviour, even 
though it tries to act reasonably. Moreover, each party distorts and provides wrong 
information in the pursuit of its own profits. Consequently, each party’s bounded 
rationality and opportunism causes the transaction costs. With bounded rationality, the 
value of the goods and services exchanged will never be perfectly measured; hence 
prices will provide flawed signals and a price system will not maximise the social 
product (Hennart, 1991). Furthermore, Williamson stressed that the transaction costs 
can change according to the frequency of the transaction and investment (asset) 
characteristics of the transaction and these are major factors influencing the market 
governance structure. 
(Table 2.2. Market Governance Structure)  
Investment (Asset) Characteristics of the Transaction  
Non-specific Mixed Specific 
Infrequent Market Governance 
(Classical Contracting) 
Trilateral 
Governance 
Trilateral 
Governance 
Frequency of 
the 
Transaction  Recurrent Market Governance 
(Classical Contracting) 
Bilateral 
Governance 
Unified 
Governance 
(Source: Williamson, O. E. (1979), “Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations”, 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 22, pp.233~261) 
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The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ role of lowering transaction cost can be applied to this 
framework. Within this framework, when the investment characteristic of the 
transaction is non-specific, the governance structure is market governance, regardless of 
the transaction frequency. This is a characteristic of classic contracting. In this case, 
many sellers and buyers are normally involved in the transaction and therefore, the 
GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ market arbitration function is unexpected, because there is no 
transaction distinctiveness. However, if the investment characteristic of the transaction 
is specific and the frequency of the transaction is infrequent, the transaction is made 
under the trilateral governance structure. In this case, the transaction distinctiveness 
exists and it generates huge costs to reach any complex agreement between the seller 
and the buyer. In this situation, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can minimise transaction costs 
by playing the part of arbitrator between the seller and the buyer.  
 
In conclusion, it is obviously important for firms to reduce the transaction costs 
involved in their transactions in the market. As one of the strategic ways to overcome 
transaction costs, the use of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can be an alternative measure. 
They, as arbitrators between sellers and buyers, should be able to minimise transaction 
costs in all cases, in order to display their functional ability, and rationalise their 
existence. 
 
2.3.2. Informational Economies of Scale Theory Approach  
 
Another microeconomic rationality for the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ institutional 
existence is capitalising on informational economies of scale. Whether it needs to make 
a profit or not, every firm needs information to survive in the competitive business 
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environment and information increasingly becomes one of the major factors to increase 
a firm’s competitive advantage in this environment. The concept of informational 
economies of scale is the method by which firms enjoy increasing returns from 
information. Wilson (1974) argued that the value of information may be smaller against 
the unit cost, which is invested to gather such information, under a certain threshold 
level of operation scale. The implication here is that most small-and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), which do not meet a certain threshold level of operation scale, may 
have difficulty in acquiring necessary information because such information in their 
position is imperfect and asymmetrical. In such circumstances, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas 
can be alternative means of gathering information for SMEs. 
 
The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can be regarded as information intermediaries who are 
economic agents supporting the production, exchange and utilisation of information in 
order to increase the value of the information for their end-user or to reduce the costs of 
information acquisition. Rose (1999) stressed that the central function and service of 
information intermediaries is the matching of end-user specific information needs with 
the information available in any resource or information depot. The information 
intermediary reduces the end-user’s search cost, including, for example, costs for 
communication, contact costs, costs for evaluation and in particular opportunity costs of 
time.  
 
As manufacturing firms allocate their funds to research and development to 
develop new products or improve the quality of existing ones, it is essential for the 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas to invest their funds for gathering information. Although it is 
obviously difficult to explain about the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ functions in simple terms, 
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one of the major functions that they carry out concerns information. They explore not 
only the basic information related to the market, such as market trends, competitors’ 
movements, market share and customers’ tendency, but also widespread and 
unquantifiable information related to politics, economics, culture and history. For 
instance, Mitsubishi Corporation spent 0.041% over the total sales amount on 
communication expenses (only at headquarters) to gather information in 1990 and 
Sumitomo Corporation spent 0.023% (Yamaji, 1991). They normally gather 
information through regular intra-firm communication channels, their global network, 
publications, broadcasting, public meetings and so on. In addition to these, the 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas also accumulate what may be called “human-embodied 
knowledge” (Kojima and Ozawa, 1984) in the form of individual employees’ expertise. 
Hence, labour costs are the largest component of their total operating costs.  
 
Lynch (1997) explained strategically the importance of information. From a 
strategic point of view, firms can reinforce competitive advantage with information 
resources and information technology. Specifically, information technology may 
influence competition in three ways: i) a change in industry structure, for example, the 
ticketing of airline tickets from any place with a computer network; ii) the creation of 
competitive advantage by lowering labour costs through automating manual tasks; and 
iii) the ability to reach new customers with the creation of the Internet and the 
development of new forms of telecommunications. Hopf (1983) stressed that 
information can be treated as an economic commodity. To be profitably sold in a market, 
information must possess some requirements common to all economic commodities; 
information goods have to directly or indirectly satisfy a human need, they should be 
limited and their production should compete for scarce resources with other information 
 30 
 
and economic agents (such as the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas) must have property rights on 
information goods, which must possess an exchange value.  
 
2.3.3. International Marketing and Distribution Perspective Approach  
 
People all around the globe are more connected to each other than ever before. 
Goods and services produced in one part of the world are increasingly available in all 
parts of the world. This phenomenon has been entitled ‘globalisation’ (Katsioloudes and 
Hadjidakis, 2007). In such a business environment, it is very difficult for small 
manufacturers who wish to be international firms but do not have international 
marketing experience to introduce their products abroad and to establish business 
relationships with foreign customers. Albaum, et al., (2002) defined international 
marketing as the marketing of goods, services and information across political 
boundaries. The process of international marketing is typically much more complex and 
interesting than domestic marketing. The international marketer must deal with a 
number of key factors in foreign environments which differ from those in domestic 
environments. Kotler and Armstrong (1997) argued that international markets often 
vary greatly in their economic development levels, cultures and customs and buying 
patterns. In this situation, the most appropriate alternative method of setting up a 
business for small manufacturers is to develop it through intermediaries, such as general 
trading companies, export trading companies, export brokers and sales representatives. 
Onkvisit and Shaw (1993) noted that even a good product may not be accepted by a 
market if it is not properly distributed through a competent channel. Although a 
manufacturer can sell directly to end users abroad, this type of sales channel is generally 
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not suitable for most consumer goods. It is common for a product to go through several 
parties before reaching its final consumers.  
 
Among many international business-related companies, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas 
play a unique role in international business, unlike that of other ordinary trading 
companies. Young (1979) argued that the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas are wholesale 
intermediaries which exist between large manufacturers and small producers. They 
supply large volumes of raw materials and distribute goods from large manufacturers to 
smaller distributors to numerous retailers. Shao and Herbig (1993) stated that the 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas have three basic functions; to seek export opportunities, secure 
necessary imported materials and acquire technology for industrial development. They 
handle importing, exporting and trade in various items – including metals, machinery, 
energy and chemicals, textiles, foodstuffs and general merchandise. The advantages of 
using intermediaries are many (Baker, 1991). First, manufacturers may enjoy cost 
advantages such as minimising the cost of a field sales organisation, eliminating 
warehousing and local delivery costs, reducing the risk of loss through inventory 
obsolescence and minimising inventory financing charges. Second, the use of 
intermediaries allows the producers to reach all potential users without having to incur 
the fixed costs which would arise if direct selling were used. Lastly, intermediaries can 
provide immediate availability and the necessary information associated with market 
trends, competitors’ movements and customers’ tendency.  
 
At the same time, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas promote business on the basis of two 
types of contractual structure: distributorship and agency contractual structures. A 
distributor is a merchant who takes title to the principal’s goods, whereas an agent is a 
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representative, who acts on behalf of the principal. Under the distributorship contractual 
structure, a sales and purchase contract is made between the principal and the distributor 
and a separate contract is made between the distributor and the end-user. This means 
that the principal does not have a legal right to be involved in the business between the 
distributor and the end-user.  
 
(Figure 2.3. Distributorship and Agency Contractual Structures) 
1) Distributorship Basis Contractual Structure 
Distributorship Agreement        Separate Agreement  
                
 
 
                  Sales and Purchase              Sales and Purchase 
      
      2) Agency Basis Contractual Structure 
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                            Sales and Purchase 
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(Manufacturer) 
Distributor 
(The GTC) 
Customer 
(End user) 
Principal  
(Manufacturer) 
Agent 
(The GTC) 
Customer 
(End user) 
( Designed by the author) 
 
However, under the agency contractual structure, the contract is made only 
between the principal and the end-user and the agent represents and acts on behalf of the 
principal only. Regarding the method of compensation, a distributor can take income 
from the difference between its purchasing price from the principal and its selling price 
to the end-user (trade discount guaranteed by the principal), whereas an agent is 
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compensated on the basis of a commission from the principal. The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas 
are normally involved in transactions with the distributorship contractual structure, 
which enables them to make higher profits than the agency contractual structure would.  
 
One of the key features of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas is that they normally have their 
own warehouses in major seaports throughout the world. They keep enough inventory 
in warehouses and distribute them to markets by periodically checking the status of the 
demand and supply balance. Operating warehouses has two major objectives. First, the 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas may expect stable income through quicker and on-time delivery to 
the end-user as soon as they receive an order. Second, they can maintain a long-term 
relationship with customers through the constant supply of the product. Besides 
pursuing their own profits, one of their ethical missions is the constant supply of goods 
once the relationship is established. Most employees of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas bear in 
mind that it is their responsibility to supply raw materials to manufacturing firms to 
allow the continued operation of the plants.  
 
2.3.4. Financial Perspective Approach  
 
One of the important reasons of the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ existence is their 
financial role as quasi-bankers through providing various financial services, ranging 
from extending credit, making loans and providing loan guarantees and project finance 
both to sellers and buyers, in particular to small and medium-sized firms (Yamaji, 1991). 
The banks both in Korea and Japan traditionally abhorred the risks involved in making 
loans to small and medium-sized companies by demanding unfair collateral, checking 
their financial status and vetting their current business performance and future prospects. 
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The major reason why banks insist on a conservative lending policy to small and 
medium-sized companies is that the government supervised the banks. The Japanese 
government does not want the experience of a bank’s bankruptcy, such as occurred in 
the pre-war period and the Korean government also does not want to see a repetition of 
the financial crisis period in the late 1990s when many banks went bankrupt. According 
to Miyashita and Russell (1994), the Sogo Shoshas in Japan played an extremely 
important financial role in Japanese business by providing credit to small- and medium-
sized firms. Without the Sogo Shoshas to act as financial intermediaries, these firms 
would have to deal directly with the giant city banks.  
 
Kunio (1982, pp. 215~217) described the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ financial role for 
SMEs as follows: 
 
“If small- and medium-sized companies had been satisfied with growth using their 
own funds, there would have been no financial role for trading companies (e.g. 
Sogo Shoshas) to play, but as it was, the latter functioned as conduits for the flow 
of money from banks to small-and medium-sized companies. These companies 
could borrow a certain amount from banks on their own by offering their assets as 
collateral … But banks were not willing to lend money beyond a certain percentage 
of the value of the collateral. One problem for banks was that they were supervised 
by the Ministry of Finance … Trading companies borrowed money from banks and 
lent it to the small- and medium-sized companies which had high growth potential” 
 
Still, the Sogo Shoshas played an extremely important financial role by providing 
to Japanese firms in the early stage of Japanese international trade development with 
medium-term financing, a credit with a maturity of 90 days to five years, which is a 
typical and indeed constitutive credit in a commercial economy. This became available 
very early in the form of the instruments developed in Europe and remained almost 
undeveloped in Japan. Drucker (1975) stressed that general trading companies (the Sogo 
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Shoshas) are the one way in which the Japanese economy manages its medium-term 
credit problems. They create their own money pool, or what bankers called a “float”–   
a reservoir of money which can be used whenever the need arises. From this point of 
view, he said, “in many ways, the Sogo Shoshas are not trading companies, but finance 
companies.”  
 
Of the various financing instruments, from short-term to long-term financing, 
provided to customers by the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, the most frequently provided is the 
granting of a grace period for payment in trading transactions. Albaum et al., (2002) 
emphasised that financing and payments are issues directly tied to export pricing and 
that export prices are not set in isolation but must take into account how payment is to 
be made. Generally, the exporter would prefer the most secure payment method, while 
the importer would prefer the least expensive. Since the extremes for each are at 
opposite ends of the ordering, it is obvious that some form of compromise will be 
needed. In this situation, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can be arbitrators who solve any 
conflict arising from payment arrangements between exporters and importers.  
 
The following figure presents typical examples for particular cases and it clearly 
shows the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ role as financial intermediaries. The process is as 
follows: one GTC located in Korea makes a sales and purchase contract with a producer 
in Korea payable at sight payment terms. Then the GTC makes a separate contract with 
the buyer in the United Kingdom (UK) with deferred payment terms, which grants a 
grace period in payment. After the producer’s shipment to the buyer, the buyer does not 
need to pay the GTC immediately, because of the grace period that has been granted. 
However, the GTC does need to pay the producer immediately according to the 
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contracted payment terms of at sight basis after shipment. Through its intermediation of 
the transaction, the GTC removes the producer’s major burden of extending credit 
directly to the buyer by absorbing their payment default risk which could arise due to 
the insolvency of the buyer.  
 
(Figure 2.4. Financial Service Provided by the GTCs in Trading Transactions) 
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The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas also participate in project finance, which is often used for 
capital incentive facilities such as power plants, refineries, telecommunication facilities, 
toll roads and industrial plants (Davis, 1996). The Export-Import Bank (EXIM bank) in 
Japan and Korea, the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) in the UK, Hermes 
in Germany and SACE in Italy have organised special project finance units. However, 
sources of funding have recently expanded to the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, banks and 
insurance companies. In huge projects, most foreign buyers prefer to pay on an 
instalment basis over several years or on a pro-rata basis according to the progress of 
the project. However, the exporter (the constructor) normally does not want to accept 
such a payment scheme, mainly because of the foreign exchange risks involved. In this 
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situation, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can organise the payment problems by arranging 
financing for the foreign buyer and making it possible for the exporter to obtain 
immediate payments. In the process of arranging financing for foreign buyers, the 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, with their high credit reputation and financial standing, use 
foreign banks located around the world to borrow funds.  
 
2.4. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This chapter examined the nature of the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas in terms of 
definitions, characteristics, functions and rationale.  
 
In this review, it is generally understood that the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas are unique 
organisations which have a wide range of activities from trading transactions, financing 
and information gathering to organising and coordinating projects. With respect to their 
raison d’être, the most applicable theory lies in transaction cost economics: that the 
GTCs and Sogo Shoshas act as intermediaries not only to promote transaction activities 
but also to reduce transaction costs between seller and buyers. They also pursue 
informational economies of scale as information intermediaries by providing customers 
with micro-level information as well as macro-level information such as the political 
situations, legal systems and social environments of certain countries. International 
marketing and distribution activities are their primary businesses on behalf of small 
manufacturers or their affiliate companies. Another activity – financing – makes them 
distinctive organisations compared to ordinary trading companies. They extend various 
levels of credit, short-term, medium-term and long-term, not only to sellers but also to 
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buyers as quasi-bankers. In particular, their participation in huge projects for industrial 
facilities or infrastructure construction also justifies their existence.  
 
Although it seems that many multinational enterprises or big ordinary trading 
companies such as the Volkswagen (VW) Group in Germany or the ICC Trading 
Corporation in the United States (US) carry out similar activities to those of the GTCs 
and Sogo Shoshas, fundamentally they are quite different. First, when we look at the 
foundation of the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas, both of them were artificially established by 
the government in order to protect the national economy from Western (as in the case of 
the Japanese Sogo Shoshas) or to promote national economic growth (as in the case of  
Korean GTCs), whereas most multinationals and ordinary trading companies in other 
countries are purely established on the basis of the market principle of pursuing their 
own profit maximisation and are therefore free from government intervention. Second, 
unlike the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas, multinationals and ordinary trading firms 
concentrate their businesses on one industry only or a few products or services with 
quite limited functions. For instance, the VW Group focuses on the automobile 
industry 10  and the ICC Trading Corporation puts its emphasis on chemicals or 
petrochemical businesses. Another example is financing. The VW Group, for instance, 
has 17 financial services divisions around the world. Although the Group carries out 
financial activities, they are quite unlike those of the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas.11 
                                            
10 As of 2008, VW Group has 51 automotive divisions, including nine brands, namely, VW, Audi, Skoda, 
Bentley, Seat, Lamborghini, VW Commercial Vehicles, Bugatti and Scania (Internet Web Page of VW 
Group, 2008). 
 
11 The author contacted Mr. Andreas Buchta, a manager of the Public Relations of the VW Group in 
Germany through e-mail and telephone. According to him, VW Group has no close relationship with the 
German government. Thus, the government has no right to intervene in VW’s business. Although VW has 
many sales companies around the world, it has no specialised trading firms as the GTCs or Sogo Shoshas 
have. VW’s two major fields are automobile and financial services. Financial services include banking 
work, cash management, etc. and its function is quite different from that of the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas.  
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Moreover, it is very rare for a single company (e.g. a GTC or Sogo Shosha) to take part 
in a huge industrial project (e.g. project financing) as merely a financial intermediary.  
 
Why then do other organisations not adopt the system of the GTCs and Sogo 
Shoshas, which is unique? The important thing to recall here is that the phrase “Unique 
organisations or business system” does not mean “Successful organisations or 
competitive business systems” which other organisations should adopt. Both the GTCs 
and Sogo Shoshas were established not only to pursue macro-level tasks (i.e. national 
economic development), but also to pursue micro-level activities (i.e. company-level 
business). From the internal standpoint, it was very difficult for small ordinary trading 
companies to meet the requirements stipulated by the government needed to get GTC 
status in Korea. For this reason, only a few big business groups (i.e. the Chaebol 
groups) could apply for this GTC status and it was granted by the Korean government to 
only 13 companies, which all were big business conglomerates. Furthermore, pursuing 
macro-level tasks to meet the government’s intention or policy required abundant 
capital and resources which normal companies hardly ever possessed. From the external 
standpoint, the reason why many organisations in other countries do not choose the 
GTCs system is associated with various factors, to do with the historical, political, 
economical, legal and socio-cultural environments. For instance, the historical 
background and cultural and business environments differ between Korea and European 
countries in many ways. In particular, the relationship between the government, banks 
and business groups in European countries is much weaker than it is in Korea. In 
Korea’s case, a closer tie between the government and big business groups was one of 
the major factors allowing the rapid growth of the GTCs in quantitative terms for the 
past two decades. For these reasons, other organisations in foreign countries would not 
easily adopt the GTCs system and it remains unique.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE GTCs AND THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to investigate the nature of the Korean GTCs and their impact on 
Korea’s national economy. Since the process of national economic growth started in the 
early 1960s with the implementation of a series of Five-Year Economic Plans, the 
GTCs have played an important role in various areas. First, the chapter reviews the 
history and development of the Korean GTCs. Second, the present GTCs in Korea will 
be reviewed. In this section, their strategy, major business areas, financial performance, 
number of employees and number of overseas branch offices will be examined. Third, 
the management system within Korean GTCs, such as the organisational structure, 
corporate culture, decision-making process, ownership/corporate governance and 
human resource management, will be considered. Fourth, the GTCs’ recent financial 
performance, such as revenues, profitability and stability, will be reviewed. Last, the 
relationship among the GTCs, Chaebols and Korean economy will be described.  
 
3.2. The History and Development of Korean GTCs12
 
The GTC system in Korea was modelled after that of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas. 
The GTC system in Korea began with its promulgation by the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (MCI) in MCI Notice No. 10607 in April 30, 1975. However, long 
discussions about the necessity of the GTC system had taken place  since the mid-
1960s, because Korea’s economy had grown rapidly since the early 1960s with the 
                                            
12 This part is summarised from “The Handbook of Korean GTCs, 2005” 
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implementation of a series of Five-Year Economic Plans. In the process of national 
rapid economic growth, there had been many problems due to a heavy reliance on a 
variety of governmental supports offered to many ordinary export companies. First, the 
government was not able to give financial support to all ordinary export companies. It  
could not continue to support both the increasing number and size of ordinary export 
companies with an increasing volume of subsidies. Second, the government was not 
able to give the proper incentives to make ordinary export companies self-sufficient. 
This lack of government incentives resulted in the ordinary export companies lacking 
the strength to manage export marketing. Third, the government’s support to these  
companies with participation of small-scale manufacturers in the same international 
markets caused over-competition between them. The over-competition cut export prices, 
thus decreasing profitability.  
 
In this situation, the government policy-makers had to renovate the export system 
to keep pace with the rate of increasing exports. They recognised the needs of expert 
companies in overseas markets and decided to adopt the Japanese Sogo Shosha system: 
a powerful engine of the export-led economic growth of Japan. According to Han 
(1990), the Korean government expected the GTCs to have three basic functions. First, 
the GTCs had to have strong international marketing skills. In order to overcome the 
protectionism of industrialised countries, the GTCs had to be able to approach the 
consumers in industrialised countries and exploit untapped potential. Second, the GTCs 
were meant to help produce exports from those manufacturers who had already shown 
their inefficiency in exports through unnecessary over-competition, dumping, or 
through the complications arising from the presence of too many exporters. Third, in 
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order to overcome the problems mentioned above, the GTCs had to be large in size and 
limited in number.  
 
The MCI promulgated the procedures and a set of formal requirements for GTCS 
to meet for in April, 1975. The minimum requisites initially set by the government for 
the designation of the GTCs were as follows: i) minimum capitalisation of one billion 
Korean Won (KRW), ii) an annual value of export per year of US$50 million, iii) ten 
overseas branch offices, iv) a minimum of ten countries with an export value of 
US$1million each, v) seven product categories with an export value of over 
US$500,000 each per year and vi) a public offering of the GTCs stock. Because the 
GTCs were founded by the government, the government came to specify minimum 
export targets, capitalisation requirements, number of export items, number of overseas 
branch offices and the extent of public share ownership for each GTC. Samsung was 
designated as the first Korean GTC in May, 1975, followed by Ssangyong, Daewoo, 
Kukjae and Hanil in the same year. Six more companies were designated as GTCs in 
1976: Koryo, Hyosung, Bando, Sunkyoung, Samwha and Kumho. In 1978, Yulsan and 
Hyundai were added, bringing the total number of Korean GTCs to 13. However, 
Yulsan went bankrupt in 1979, resulting in the liquidation of the Yulsan Trading 
Company. Again Hanil, Samwha and Kumho failed to retain their GTC status, due to 
their not achieving a 2% share in Korea’s total exports, which was a requisite for GTC 
designation. 
 
During the period 1975~1981, the ordinance governing the Korean GTC system 
underwent a series of amendments due to changes in the economic environment and 
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government policies. The table below shows the changes in requirements for GTC 
designation.  
 
(Table 3.1. Changes of Requirements for GTC Designation)  
 1975 1976 1978 1980 1981~83 1984 1987~ 
Annual export 
(US$ million) 
50 100 Two percent of total Korean exports 
Capital 
(KRW 100 million)
10 15 20 Not required 
Export items over 
US$1 million 
7 10 5 5 Not required 
Export countries 
over US$1million 
10 15 Not required 
Number of 
overseas branch 
offices 
10 15 20 20 Not required 
Public offering of 
stocks 
Mandatory Not 
required
(Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry) 
 
Most Korean big business groups (Chaebols) were eager to get GTC status after 
the foundation of the GTC system in Korea, because of the many incentives given13. 
First, GTC status can enhance the business group’s credibility both in Korea and in the 
world markets. Second, with GTC status, the business group can increase the 
probability of obtaining government concessions on various government-initiated 
projects, such as heavy and chemical plants. In addition to those psychological rewards, 
the GTCs had many government-offered incentives, for instance, as in trade and 
administration, financial, foreign exchange and tax. In terms of trade and administration 
                                            
13 Most of this section part draws on Chung, G. Y (1993), “The Korean General Trading Companies: 
Analysis of Process, Performance and Prospect”, DBA dissertation, Golden Gate University, San 
Francisco, California, pp.74~76 
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incentives, the GTCs were preferentially treated in international bidding offered by the 
government and they found it easy to access the import of raw materials for their own 
use. In financial incentives, they had priority in obtaining bank loans based on past 
export performance. Incentives were also given them in the areas of foreign exchange 
and tax. The government allowed the GTCs to increase the limit of foreign currency 
holdings by overseas branches and exempted them from business income tax. Beside 
the above direct incentives, some indirect incentives were also given. Each GTC had 
regular meetings with other GTCs and regular consultations with government agencies.  
 
3.3. The Present GTCs in Korea14
 
After the adoption of the GTC system in Korea, many companies were designated 
as GTCs, the total number reaching 13 in 1978. However, some companies failed to 
retain their GTC status and went bankrupt. At present, only seven companies have 
retained GTC status and are still running. This section investigates these seven GTCs 
including a brief history, strategy, major business areas, financial performance, number 
of employees and number of overseas branch offices.  
 
3.3.1. Samsung Corporation 
 
The Samsung Group was started in 1938 by Lee Byoung Chul under the name of 
Samsung Sanghae. The Samsung Group is the first and largest Chaebol in Korea in 
terms of total assets, consisting, as of 2008, of 59 affiliated companies. The Group’s 
main businesses are electronics, trading, heavy industry, chemicals, financial services, 
                                            
14 This part is summarised from various publications, including each company’s “Company Brochure, 
Annual Report, Internet Website and the Handbook of Korean GTCs.”  
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home appliances, engineering and construction and hotel operations. The Group’s 
management philosophy is to devote its human resources and technology to creating 
superior products and services, thereby contributing to a better global society. Samsung 
Group’s management philosophy represents its strong determination to contribute 
directly to the prosperity of people all over the world.  
 
Samsung Corporation is a parent firm of the Group and was designated as the first 
GTC in May, 1975. It played an important role as a GTC in the process of its Group’s 
development. The Company was awarded a US$10billon Export Tower in 1994 and a 
US$15 billion Export Tower in 1998. In 2007, its total revenue was US$10,753 million, 
gross profit was US$1,049 million and net income was US$538 million.  
 
Regarding organisational structure, the Company in 2008 has 3 administrative 
departments and 12 business departments. Under the business departments, there are 30 
different divisions dealing with a number of products and services. It has 736 
employees and 85 overseas branch offices worldwide. Samsung Corporation’s 
management philosophy and long-term business plans include risk management and 
human resource management (HRM). Detailed action plans and strategies in risk 
management are the prevention of risks in all areas. It also adopted HRM as a main 
business plan through the acquisition and development of core human resources and 
talent-oriented management.  
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(Table 3.2. Samsung Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategy 
Risk Management ? Prevent risk in all business areas 
? Take precaution against risks 
HRM ? Acquisition and development of core 
human resources  
? Talent-oriented management 
? Respect customers, shareholders and 
employees 
 
Samsung  
Corporation 
Reinforce Organisational 
Competitiveness 
? Strengthen the unity of the organisation  
(Source: Annual Report of Samsung Corporation and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
 
The Company consists of four groups, namely, a Trading Group, an Engineering 
and Construction Group, a Housing Development Group and a Retail Business Group. 
Samsung Corporation’s 1996 merger with Samsung Engineering and Construction and 
the1997 opening of the Samsung Plaza Department Store were both important 
milestones in Samsung Corporation’s emergence as a global company, in terms of scale 
and capabilities. The Company’s major business areas are trading, project organising, 
overseas investment and skyscraper construction. The Company’s synergy comes from 
three things: a global network, decades of project management know-how and world-
class financing and marketing capabilities. The Company’s main business is trading in 
numbers of products, for example, petrochemical, general chemical, steel, fibre/fabric 
products and so on. The Company’s project organising services offer a prime example 
of this synergy in action, delivering total solutions encompassing consulting, financing, 
technology and construction. Samsung Corporation is also enhancing its production and 
distribution capabilities through strategic direct investment. For example, in 1997, it 
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took charge of the privatisation of the struggling Romanian stainless steel producer 
Otelinox, helping the company to increase profits by over 1000% in just three years. 
Skyscraper construction is a new business area of Samsung Corporation. The 
Company’s project management information system, through the planning and 
engineering staff, have met the technology, experience and manpower requirements for 
erecting the world’s tallest buildings, such as Taiwan’s Taipei 101 tower.  
 
3.3.2. Daewoo International Corporation  
 
Daewoo Group was founded in 1967 as a textile trading company by Kim Woo 
Choong. Since then, the Group has become one of the world’s largest industrial 
enterprises, being listed 18th in the 1998 Fortune Global 500. The Group’s main 
businesses are vehicle manufacturing, trading, shipbuilding, engineering and 
construction, securities, consumer electronics, home appliances and hotel operations. As 
of August, 1998, before its collapse, Daewoo Group was the fourth largest Chaebol in 
Korea in terms of total assets, consisting of 33 domestic companies and 372 overseas 
subsidiaries. However, Daewoo Group announced details of its restructuring plan, 
featuring a reduction in the number of its core business operations and a drop in the 
number of its domestic companies in August, 1998 under the IMF plan.  
 
Daewoo International Corporation (formerly Daewoo Corporation) is the GTC 
within the Group; it was established in 2000 as a result of a spin-off plan of Daewoo 
Corporation. Since its foundation, Daewoo International Corporation has been growing 
as a special trader and overseas investment company all over the world under the banner 
of a “Global Trading and Investment Company.” Daewoo International Corporation was 
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the driving force for the trade and overseas investment of Korea in a variety of 
businesses, including trade, manufacturing, sales, distribution and resource development 
with about 6,000 clients world-wide, by collecting and using the optimised information 
of the global business network based on its information and technology infrastructure. 
 
In 2007, its total revenue was US$8,637 million, gross profit was US$102 million 
and net income was US$96 million. As of 2008, the Company has 4 administrative 
departments and 12 business departments. Under the business departments, there are 43 
divisions which deal with a number of different products and services. It has 1,704 
employees and 72 overseas branch offices worldwide. The Company’s corporate culture 
focuses on “Creativity, Challenge and Trust.” The Company believes that its employees 
must be creative and innovative for both personal and corporate success. The spirit of 
challenge gives ample opportunities for everyone. A corporate entity must offer clients, 
partners, shareholders and society in general ample trust and reliability. Corporate and 
public prosperity depend on honesty and transparency, as well as efficiency and 
excellence in all operations.  
 
The Company’s management philosophy and medium-and long-term business plan 
is to strengthen commodity trading and core competence, selection and concentration on 
a strategic market, natural resource development and project related business. The table 
below shows the Company’s business plans and strategies. 
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(Table 3.3. Daewoo International Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategy 
Strengthen Commodity 
Trading 
? Concentration on core commodities trading 
(Steel, chemical, metal and textile) 
Strengthen Core 
Competence 
? Undertake HRM plan (Result-based 
 evaluation) 
? Establishment of a knowledge-based 
 management system  
Selection and 
Concentration on 
Strategic Markets 
? Business expansion in the China market 
? Establishment of Task Force Team for 
strategic markets (China and the EU) 
Daewoo 
International  
Corporation 
Natural Resource 
Development and 
Project related Business 
? Investment in overseas natural resource 
development (Energy, gas and crude oil, etc) 
? Participation in project-related business 
(Infrastructure-related projects, such as 
power plants and road construction, etc) 
(Source: Annual Report of Daewoo International Corporation and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
 
The Company’s main businesses are trading, project management and overseas 
investment. Trading business deals with a number of products such as steel, metal, 
chemicals, automotive and component parts, general commodity and energy-related 
products. The Company has around 50 overseas networks. The overseas corporations 
which Daewoo International Corporation has invested in are divided largely into the 
trading corporations which provide the comprehensive trading services, such as local 
marketing, financing, logistics and others and the investment corporations which 
undertake the product manufacturing, power generation, transportation and other 
services including cement, paper, textile products, plywood, pharmaceuticals and others. 
Among these overseas investment corporations, the major fields of involvement may be 
the cement company in Shandong, a paper company in Mudanjiang, a cotton company 
in Uzbekistan, a sewing company in Indonesia and a pharmaceutical company in Sudan.  
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3.3.3. LG International Corporation 
 
In 1947 Koo, In Hwoi started the LG (Lucky Gold Star) Group business under the 
name of Lak Hui Chemical Industry (currently LG Chemicals Ltd.). The Group’s main 
businesses were electronics, chemicals, trading, telecommunication and services and 
home appliances.  
 
Lak Hui Chemical Industry changed its name to Bando Corporation (currently LG 
International Corporation) and started its trading business in 1956. In 1976, the 
Company was designated as a GTC and awarded a US$100 million Export Tower. In 
2007, its total revenue was US$5,924 million, gross profit was US$65 million and net 
income was US$53 million. Regarding organisational structure, the Company in 2008 
has 2 administrative departments and 8 business departments. Under the business 
departments, there are 28 different divisions, which deal with a number of products and 
services. It has 659 employees and 52 overseas branch offices world-wide. 
 
The Company’s medium- and long-term business plans are risk management, 
portfolio management and its management philosophy is the strengthening of 
organisational competence. The table below shows the Company’s business plans and 
strategies. 
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(Table 3.4. LG International Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategy 
Risk Management ? Strengthen the ability of risk prevention 
and management 
? Intensify information-sharing between 
headquarters and overseas offices 
? Strengthen the system of mutual assistance 
of business among business units 
Portfolio Management  ? Selection and concentration strategy 
? Allocation of management resources to 
core businesses  
LG  
International 
Corporation  
Strengthen Organisational 
Competence  
? Acquisition of core human resources 
? Raise organisational productivity 
(Source: Annual Report of LG International Corporation and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
 
The Company’s main businesses are trading, development and investment in 
overseas resources, project organising and domestic sales and distribution. With regard 
to the trading business, the Company deals with petrochemical products, metal and coal 
products, foodstuffs, energy-related products, machinery and aviation and fashion 
clothing products. The Company is participating in numbers of overseas resources 
development and investment enterprises to secure a long-term, stable supply of major 
raw materials for industrial use. For instance, it was involved in the development of the 
Ensham bituminous mines in Australia in 1993 and of the Erel bituminous mines in the 
Sakha Republic of Russia in 1996. Now, it is supplying bituminous coal to Korea and 
exporting the coal to Japan, Taiwan and other countries. LG International Corporation 
also participated in a gold copper mine development project in Rapu-Rapu, the 
Philippines in 2003 and is concerned in currently operational oil fields. 
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The Company is armed with qualities which differentiate it from its competitors, 
namely, its strengths in financing, information and networking, thus exercising 
organisational abilities which enable the company to create synergies in conducting its 
business and earn highly profitable orders. For example, in 1998, the Company secured 
a US$ 700 million refining plant order in Qatar, which was a symbolically significant 
project because it came at a time when Korea’s sovereign credibility was suffering. This 
achievement also attracted the attention of the Middle East’s plant market. Thereafter, 
the Company continued to strike deals on huge plant construction projects in the Middle 
East.  
 
3.3.4. Hyundai Corporation 
 
Hyundai Group started its business as Gyungil Sanghwoe in 1937, founded by 
Chung Ju Young. The history of the Hyundai Group is the history of the modern Korean 
economy. The Hyundai Group stood at the centre of the “Miracle of the Han River” and 
made tremendous contributions to the establishment of Korea’s economy. The Group’s 
main businesses were vehicle manufacturing, engineering and construction, 
shipbuilding, logistics, chemical, trading and so on.  
 
Hyundai Corporation is the GTC within the Group and was so designated in 1976. 
Hyundai Corporation was founded in 1976 as a trading company and was awarded a 
US$300million Export Tower on the 14th anniversary of Export Day. The Company has 
been growing since its designation as a GTC in 1978 and was awarded a US$25billion 
Export Tower in 2000. In 2007, its total revenue was US$1,844 million, gross profit 
was US$66 million and net income was US$49 million. Regarding organisational 
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structure, the Company has 2 administrative departments and 6 business departments as 
of October, 2008. It has 267 employees and 34 overseas branch offices worldwide. 
 
Hyundai Corporation’s management philosophy and long-term strategies are 
value-based management, customer satisfaction management and talent-oriented 
management. Its mid-range business strategies are selection and concentration and 
portfolio strategy.  
 
(Table 3.5. Hyundai Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management 
Philosophy 
Promoting Strategy 
Value-based 
management 
? Provide specialised products and services 
customers need (Specialisation) 
? Increase value through brand globalisation of 
products and services (Brand strategy) 
? Create new value responsive to market change 
Innovation-driven 
Management 
? Innovate existing business structure  
? Selection and concentration strategy 
(Concentrate corporate resources to four 
strategic fields; Information and 
communication, iron and steel, natural resource 
development and local business)  
? Extend value chain 
? Portfolio strategy (To diversify income 
sources, advance into new businesses) 
Hyundai 
Corporation 
Talent-oriented 
management  
? Fair compensation for the performance and 
efforts of the employees (Economic 
compensation) 
? Constantly motivate employees’ self-
development efforts and provide a sense of 
achievement (Sense of achievement) 
? Provide vision with clear and precise goal  
(Source: Annual Report of Hyundai Corporation and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
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The Company’s main business areas are trading, overseas investment, resource 
development and shipbuilding business. In its trading business, the company deals with 
machinery, automobiles, steel, chemicals, ships, plants and so on. On the basis of  
marketing know-how, financing capability and the global business networks acquired 
during 30 years of general trading activities, Hyundai Corporation has successfully 
undertaken a wide variety of overseas investment businesses around the world, 
including shipbuilding, steel processing and distribution, as well as real estate 
development and overseas energy resources development. Resources development aims 
to bolster profitability by continuing to invest in high value-added business and will 
continue to be actively engaged in natural resources development projects, making the 
most of its vast experience and know-how. In accordance with the Company’s policy 
securing a stable profit foundation and diversifying it, the Company has started to 
participate in the Drayton coal mine development in Australia in 1979 and carried out 
several successful projects, such as the Marib oil project in Yemen. Steering its business 
portfolio to something more stable in the long term, the Hyundai Corporation has 
sought to secure a manufacturing and distribution business base to take a great leap 
forward and become a world leader as a trading company.  
 
Since 2004, the Hyundai Corporation has set up five strategic new businesses, 
including a shipbuilding business, in an effort to transform the current business structure, 
which had been dependent on intermediate trading and export business, into a more 
value-added one. After acquiring the 30-year-old Qingdao Lingshan Shipyard located in 
Jiaonan City, Qindao, Shandong in China and establishing a joint venture, Qingdao 
Hyundai Shipbuilding, the Company has embarked on a shipbuilding business. This is 
significant because Hyundai Corporation is thus the first general trading company to set 
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up a business in a manufacturing industry. Eventually, this will accelerate the 
Company’s business diversification and lay a solid foundation for the Hyundai 
Corporation to become a world leading company. 
 
3.3.5. SK Networks Co., Ltd. 
 
The SK Group, founded by Choi Jong Kun, started its business under the company 
name of SunKyong Textiles Ltd. in 1953. The Group’s main businesses are 
telecommunication, trading, chemical, gas and energy, construction, life insurance, 
securities, shipping and so on and it is now Korea’s fourth largest conglomerate and one 
of the leading business organisations in Asia, with 64 affiliate companies.  
 
SK Networks is the GTC within the Group and was designated as such in 1976. 
Founded as the parent company of the SK Group in 1953, SK Networks (formerly SK 
Global) functions as a marketing arm of SK affiliates, handling some 50 products which 
it distributes under ten brands via as many as 6,000 distribution channels. In 2007, its 
total revenue was US$19,543 million, gross profit was US$1,466 million and net 
income was US$653 million. Regarding organisational structure, as of 2008, the 
Company has 7 business departments, which are divided into 13 different divisions 
dealing with a number of products and services. There are 40 overseas branch offices 
world-wide. 
 
With respect to management philosophy, the Company introduced the SK 
Management System (SKMS) in 1997; this is an all-inclusive management development 
strategy based on respecting the dignity and creativity of each employee. The details of 
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SKMS are i) to instill vision, values and goals in employees, ii) encourage people to 
achieve high performance, iii) bring together diverse groups of individuals and achieve 
consensus, iv) find, develop and reward the unique talents of all people and v) foster 
understanding and acceptance of business principles including the priority of 
maximising growth. 
 
(Table 3.6. SK Networks’ Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategy 
HRM ? Respect the dignity and creativity of each 
employee 
? Make lively organisational working 
conditions 
? Encourage people to achieve high 
performance 
 
Strengthen Current 
Business and Develop New 
Growth Engines 
? Strengthen the competitiveness of current 
business by driving productivity 
maximisation for information and 
communication, energy, export, import and 
fashion businesses 
? Increase the number of loyal customers by 
exploiting the existing customer data base 
and channel it to develop new growth 
engines 
SK  
Networks 
Co., Ltd. 
Focused on Globally 
Localised Marketing  
? Develop integrated marketing 
? Carry out customer-centred marketing and 
secure a wide range of products and global 
brands 
(Source: Annual Report of SK Networks and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
 
SK Networks’ main business is divided into two areas: global business and 
domestic business. In global business, the Company is involved in the following global 
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activities: resources and energy, chemicals and steel businesses. Resource and energy 
businesses are the Company’s main business and it revolves around oil and gas trading, 
coal trading and resources development. In regard to chemicals, the Company 
specialises in the import, export and domestic sales of various chemical products, 
including aromatic compounds, synthetic resins, chemical textile materials, solvents 
such as methanol and phosphate fertilisers. The Company also supplies global buyers 
with various domestic and foreign steel products. In regard to their domestic business, 
the Company is involved in information and telecommunication and fashion and 
convenience stores.  
 
3.3.6. Hyosung Corporation 
 
The Hyosung Group was founded with the company name of Hyosung Corporation 
as a textile exporter in 1957 by Cho Hong Jae. Since its foundation, this Group has 
grown as one of the most prestigious conglomerates in Korea. The Group’s main 
businesses are textiles, chemicals, trading, construction, information and 
communication and power and industrial systems. Hyosung Corporation is a parent 
company of the Group and was designated as a GTC in 1976. In 2007, its total revenue 
was US$5,995 million, gross profit was US$762 million and net income was US$184 
million. The Company has a harmonised combination of 7 Performance Groups and 23 
Performance Units, with 23 overseas branch offices worldwide as of 2008.  
 
The Company’s management philosophy is to ensure customers’ satisfaction and 
happiness. Thus, the Company puts human value first. With respect to promoting 
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strategy, in its management philosophy, the Company adopts risk management, 
marketing innovation and HRM. 
 
(Table 3.7. Hyosung Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategy 
Customer Satisfaction ? Respect the value of customers 
? Intensify risk management capability in 
order to achieve customer satisfaction 
? Innovate marketing strategy 
? Respect the value of employees (HRM) 
Development of New 
Growth Engines  
? Foster professionals equipped with 
information and knowledge 
? Gradually convert conventional businesses 
into new functional businesses  
Hyosung 
Corporation. 
Creating High Spirits 
Corporate Culture 
? Respect employees’ creativity and 
autonomy 
 
(Source: Annual Report of Hyosung Corporation and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
 
3.3.7. Ssangyong Corporation 
 
The Ssangyong Group was officially founded as a cement business by Kim Sung 
Kon in 1962. The Group’s main businesses are the production and sale of cement and 
ready mixed concrete, trading, recycling of waste and other environment-related 
business and chemicals. Ssangyong Corporation is the GTC and it was designated as 
such in 1975. In 2007, its total revenue was US$1,161 million, gross profit was US$54 
million and net income was US$11 million. Regarding organisational structure, in 2008 
the Company has 4 administrative departments and 13 business departments. It has  
392 employees and 21 overseas branch offices world-wide 
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Ssangyong Corporation’s management philosophy is to continue its growth and 
prosper through profitable corporate activities under the slogan (i.e. the corporate 
culture) of “Reliability, Innovation and Harmony.” With respect to promoting a strategy, 
its management philosophy is aimed at a business with solid profitability and sound 
financial structure, one which gives priority to the environment and safety, complying 
with laws and ethical standards and making a contribution to society and one which  
seeks effective cooperation between labour and management.  
 
(Table 3.8. Ssangyong Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
GTC 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategy 
Re-creation of the Company ? Focus on further growth and prosperity 
? Achieve solid profitability and maintain a 
sound financial structure 
? Comply with laws and ethical standards 
Ssangyong 
Corporation. 
Innovation of Corporate 
Culture 
? Have a ‘Can do spirit’ 
? Infuse with a sense of responsibility 
? Innovate employees’ consciousness and 
behaviour 
? Put emphasis on employees’ creativity and 
initiative 
(Source: Annual Report of Ssangyong Corporation and the Handbook of Korean GTCs) 
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3.4. The Management System within Korean GTCs 
 
3.4.1. Organisational Structure 
 
All Korean GTCs, then, were parts of large conglomerates (Chaebol Groups). In 
most cases, the GTCs were the main force of their Groups. However, each one’s 
importance in its Group was different. The roles of the GTCs in their Groups can be 
divided into three types: the GTC as an absolute main force of the Group, the GTC as 
one of the many forces of the Group and the GTC as a supplementary force of the 
Group. The first type is the GTC as an absolute main force of the Group. In the case of 
Daewoo Group 15 , the GTC (Daewoo Corporation) was a main force firm within 
Daewoo. It directed and controlled other firms’ activities in the Group. Thus, the GTC 
had great influence over the activities of other firms within the Group. The 
organisational structure of Daewoo Group is shown below.  
 
(Figure 3.1. The GTC as an Absolute Main Force of the Group: Daewoo) 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Owner 
The GTC 
Other Firms of the Group 
(Source: Adapted from Han, K.H. (1990), “Comparative Analysis of Factors related to the Success of the 
US Export Trading Companies and Korean GTCs”, D.B.A. Dissertation, United States International 
University, p.45) 
 
The second type is the GTC as one of the main forced in the firm. For example, 
such GTC as Samsung, LG and SK are one of the many main force corporations in their 
                                            
15 The Daewoo Group collapsed in August, 1998 after the Korean financial crisis. Thus, the GTC 
(Daewoo Corporation) became an independent firm with a new company name, Daewoo International 
Corporation, after this collapse. 
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Groups. Therefore, their influence over the other firms within the Groups is  somewhat 
less strong than that of Daewoo over its Group.  
 
(Figure 3.2. The GTC as One of the Main Forces of the Group: Samsung, LG and SK) 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Owner 
The GTC Other Firms of the Group 
(Source: Ibid, p.45) 
 
The third type is the GTC as a supplementary force in its Group. Such GTCs as 
Hyundai, Hyosung and Ssangyong are merely supplementary forces in their Groups. In 
these latter Groups, manufacturing companies (Hyundai Group: Automobile, Chemical, 
Electronic, etc., Hyosung Group: Chemical, Ssangyong Group: Automobile) are the 
main forces of their Groups. The GTC helps only with the export and import functions 
of the manufacturing firms.  
 
(Figure 3.3. The GTC as a Supplementary Force of the Group: Hyundai and Hyosung) 
 
 
 
 
The GTC 
 
(Source: Ibid, p.45) 
Group Owner 
Other Firms of the Group 
Main Force Firms 
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The following figure clearly shows the GTC as one of the main forces within the 
Group (Samsung Group) 
 
(Figure 3.4. The GTC as One of the Main Forces: Samsung Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samsung 
Electronics 
Samsung Life 
Insurance 
Samsung Corp. 
(The GTC) 
Samsung 
Samsung 
Research Inst.
SDS 
Samsung 
Corning 
Samsung 
Fine Chem. 
Samsung 
SDI 
Samsung 
Networks 
Samsung 
Securities 
Samsung 
Heavy Ind. 
Samsung 
Everland 
Samsung 
Techwin
Shilla 
Hotel
Petrochem. 
Samsung 
Samsung BP 
Chem. 
Cheil 
Communication
Samsung Venture 
Investment 
Samsung 
Lions 
Cheil Industries
Samsung 
Engineering 
HRM Center 
Samsung  
Samsung 
Medical Center 
Samsung 
Welfare Found. 
Samsung Marine 
and Fire Insurance 
S1 Corp. 
Samsung 
Card 
(Source: Adapted from Samsung Group Internet Web page (2008), www.samsung.com) 
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We have reviewed the Korean GTCs’ organisational structure and their position 
and role within their Groups. Now, we examine the GTCs’ internal organisational 
structure, apart from their Groups. Most of Korean GTCs’ organisational structure is 
divided into administration departments, business departments, domestic branch offices, 
overseas branch offices and factories. Administration departments include 
planning/strategy, accounting/finance, HRM, logistics, purchasing and so on. In all 
Korean GTCs, most of the staff members are assigned to business departments. In 
business departments, most members are again assigned to export activities rather than 
import or domestic activities. This is because sources of business of most Korean GTCs 
come from exports rather than import and domestic businesses.  
 
The current organisational structure of Daewoo International Corporation, for 
example, consists of 4 administrative departments and 12 business departments. The 
business departments are again divided into 43 different divisions. Basically, Daewoo 
has adopted an organisational system which is structured fundamentally on the basis of 
geography, not product lines. Daewoo divides the world into ten geographical regions: 
Asia, Japan, the Middle East, Europe, East Europe, North America, US, Central 
America, Africa and Oceania. Reporting relationships are maintained between the 
product and geographical sides of the firm.  
 
The table below shows the organisational structure of the major Korean GTCs: 
Samsung, LG and Daewoo, by the number of departments or employees.  
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(Table 3.9. Organisational Structure of Korean Major GTCs in 2008) 
 Samsung  LG  Daewoo 
Number of Administrative Departments 3 2 4
Number of Business Departments 12 8 12
Number of Divisions within the Business 
Department 
30 28 43
Number of Employees including 
Executives 
736 659 1,704
(Source: Annual Report of Each GTC, 2008; E-mail Communication with Managers at GTCs, 2008)  
 
Nonetheless, information-gathering is very important for the operation of the GTCs. 
In most GTCs, the strategy and planning department gathers information about 
overseas and domestic markets. Overseas branches also play important roles as 
information networks for overseas markets. Overseas branches are under the control of 
the headquarters in Korea. The table below shows the number of overseas branches 
and employees in major Korean GTCs.  
 
(Table 3.10. Number of Overseas Branches of Major Korean GTCs in 2008) 
 Samsung LG Daewoo 
Number of Overseas Branches 85 52 72
Resident 
Representatives 
170 N/A N/ANumber of 
Employees 
Local Employees 2,426 N/A N/A
(Source: Annual Report of Each GTC, 2008; E-mail Communication with Managers at GTCs, 2008) 
  
 
3.4.2. Corporate Culture  
 
Management literature suggests that national culture influences people in general 
and, eventually, the management style and corporate culture in most countries. Before 
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examining any Korean firm’s corporate culture, it is important to review the national 
culture of Korea.  
 
The perceptions among Koreans and foreigners of Korea’s national culture include 
family orientation rather than community orientation, the “Rush” spirit, educational 
connection, an extreme pattern of top-down decision-making, favouring seniority and 
tenure, growth orientation, a “can do” spirit and big business groups’ domination of the 
national economy. Cho and Yoon (2001) suggest that the six key components of 
Korea’s traditional cultural legacy are Confucianism, emotional harmony, hierarchy, 
discrimination against out-groups, networking and high context orientation. Of these, 
the dominant influence on Korean national culture has been Confucianism. Endorsed by 
this ethical norm, most interpersonal relationships are defined in terms of social status: 
gender, age and position in society. Confucianism emphasises five cardinal human 
relations: between the king and his subjects, between husband and wife, between father 
and son, between older and younger and between friend and friend (Chung, Lee and 
Jung, 1997). It is possible to say that Confucianist relations also exist within the 
organisation: between the corporate owner and its subordinates. Confucianism also 
places a strong emphasis on harmony, which enables Korea to be one of the strongest 
collectivist countries in the world. Hofstede (1991) suggested that Korea is the strongest 
collectivist country and the corporate culture is even more collectivist than that of 
Japan16.  
                                            
16 Cho and Yoon (2001), however, took a quite different view of this. They suggested that Korean 
corporate culture, while deemed the most collectivist by Western people, is seen as more individualistic 
by the Japanese. To explain this, they proposed the theory of ‘dynamic collectivism’. An elaboration of 
the traditional notion of collectivism, dynamic collectivism applies collectivist norms for in-group 
members and individualistic norms for out-group members. As a result, it tends to reinforce the boundary 
between in-group and out-group and to intensify competition between the two groups, which in turn 
presents Korean society as more dynamic and competitive.  
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Rowley and Bae (2003) summarised the way in which national or social values 
directly impact on corporate culture within Korean firms, as follows.  
 
(Table 3.11. Impact of Traditional Social Values on Corporate Culture) 
Traditional  
Social Values 
Impact Corporate Culture 
Characteristics 
Absolute loyalty of subjects to 
sovereigns 
Owner’s authority and 
paternalism 
Close relationship between 
father and son 
Inhwa (harmony), 
belongingness and kinship-
based relations 
Separate roles for men 
and women 
Devotion to the company 
(in particular for male 
workers) 
Precedence of elders over 
younger people 
Hierarchical system among 
members and seniorityism 
Mutual trust among friends Trustworthy relations among 
colleagues and collectivism 
Favouring eldest son, ancestor 
worship and emphasis on 
family members  
 
Kinship-based ownership 
and succession, Yongo 
(blood, geography, education 
–based connections) 
(Source: Rowley, C. and Bae, J.S. (2003), “Culture and Management in South Korea” in Warner, M. 
(ed.)., “Culture and Management in Asia”, RoutledgeCurzon, p. 194) 
 
The two basic features of Korean corporate culture are dynamic collectivism and 
the family and military adoption system (roots in the family and military). Dynamic 
collectivism is multidimensional. Its three dimensions are in-group harmony, optimistic 
progressivism and the hierarchical principle. Another important feature of Korean 
corporate culture is that Koreans have adopted a paradigm in which organisations are 
like families and also like armies (Cho and Yoon, 2001)17. Moreover, Chung, Lee and 
                                            
17 Cho and Yoon argued that the combination of in-group harmony, optimistic progressivism and the 
hierarchical principle creates internal dynamics for the in-group which run alongside the dynamics 
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Jung (1997) place their emphasis on shared values, as seen in the Korean term Sahoon, 
one of the major features of Korean corporate culture. Sahoon is what reflects the 
cultural values, personal values and beliefs of the founder and top management. Sahoon 
basically deals with employee attitudes and behaviour related to collectivism, harmony 
and order. Sahoon is the formal statement of the managerial values which a Korean firm 
considers most important. Unlike Western companies, which generally emphasise their 
values in terms of functional and technical performance, such as customer service, 
innovation and product excellence, Sahoon in Korean firms traditionally emphasises the 
attitude and behaviour expected of employees among themselves, toward the company 
and to society. The following table shows the Sahoon of the Major Korean GTCs. 
 
(Table 3.12. Sahoon of Korean Major GTCs) 
Korean GTCs  Shared Value or Official Sahoon 
Samsung Corp. Respect for Individual, Pursuit of Technology and Empowerment 
Huyndai Corp. Diligence, Thriftiness, Trust and Affection 
LG International 
Corp.  
Value Creation for Customers, Respect for Individual and 
Empowerment 
Daewoo International 
Corp.  
Creativity, Challenge and Trust 
SK Networks Humanism, Rationalism and Realism 
Hanwha Corp. Trust, Credibility, Modesty and Excellence 
(Source: Company Brochures of GTCs) 
 
                                                                                                                                
between in-group and out-group. In-group harmony is the most important and forms the keystone of 
corporate culture. For the sake of in-group harmony, people often sacrifice their own goals for collective 
ones. Another important feature is optimistic progressivism. The expectation of progress is shared as a 
social context within the organisation. Almost all companies set high growth targets and global visions. 
Optimistic progressivism creates an atmosphere of strong competition with out-group companies. 
Employees value hierarchical order and the leadership of superiors within their organisations. Another 
important feature of Korean corporate culture is that Koreans have adopted a paradigm in which 
organisations are like families and also like armies. The Korean family is the source of social bonds and it 
values higher education. Family life is the single most important way in which Koreans learn Confucian 
norms. These generate notions of proper behaviour among unequals and in running organisations. 
Moreover, all Korean men have to serve the nation in the military for at least a couple of years. Their 
exposure to military life reverberates over their whole careers. The organising principles of family and 
army reinforce in-group harmony, optimistic progressivism and hierarchy. 
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Another striking feature of Korean corporate culture is the high total of working 
hours. Traditionally, Korea has been regarded as a nation of workaholics who rarely 
take holidays. According to the OECD (2008), Korean labourers’ working hours are on 
a steady downward trend, but their hours remain the only ones to exceed 2,000 per year. 
At the same time, the absolute wage of Korean workers is grouped among the lower 
ranks, at a mere 60% level of the OECD average, which showed that wages are 
unsatisfactory compared to the number of hours worked.  
 
Korean workers’ annual average working hours have been steadily declining: 
2,447 hours in 2001, 2,390 hours in 2003, 2,351 hours in 2005 and 2,266 hours in 2007, 
but among OECD members they are the only ones to remain above 2,000. Such 
working hours are a minimum 200 hours to a maximum 900 hours longer than those of 
other OECD members. Thus, Korea combines the longest working hours among OECD 
countries with wages rank in the lower range and  below the average, reflecting that 
Koreans receive low wages for the amount of work done. According to Maeil Business 
Newspaper (2008), the average wage of a full-time working-status Korean worker in 
2006 was an annual US$25,379 per person, only 64% of the OECD member average of 
US$39,743.  
 
Since the financial crisis in 1997, many Korean businesses have initiated a 
corporate transformation. Korean businesses have broadly achieved spectacular growth 
since the 1960s and in the process they have developed strong corporate cultures. These 
cultures favoured corporate growth through diversification and suited the business 
environment of the past, characterised by a closed home market and strong 
governmental support for business.  
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As a result, many big business groups in the country now find it difficult to 
abandon their growth-oriented strategy through diversification. Park (2002) argued that 
the strong corporate culture which once led companies to grow quickly has become a 
source of new problems. For Korean Chaebols, cheap labour costs, top-down decision-
making and the government’s special treatment are no longer sources of international 
competitiveness for them.  
 
Transforming an organisation by a new culture and making the changes in 
employee values, attitude, behaviour and management style necessary for high 
performance is relatively difficult and time-consuming. This argument was supported 
by Bae, Rowley and Sohn (2002), who stressed that there are wide gaps between the old 
and the new paradigms and traditions. They argued that the Korean economy, for 
example, needs transformation in many areas including leadership, corporate culture, 
organisational structure and HRM. But Korean firms’ efforts to change their culture, for 
example, have not brought desirable outcomes. This was probably caused by the gaps 
between the new paradigms and traditional notions.  
 
Park’s research (2002, p. 106) on these efforts by Korean firms to change the 
corporate culture found that their efforts were not successful, for several reasons, as 
follows:  
 
i) inappropriate understanding of the concept of organisational 
culture, ii) lack of professional knowledge and skills among campaign 
managers, iii) hastiness in culture change movement, iv) failure in 
eliciting employees’ interest and participation, v) lack of linkage 
between strategy and culture change efforts and vi) lack of linkage 
between culture change efforts and other business innovation activities.  
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Recently, Korean firms have increasingly recognised that they must transform 
corporate cultures to maintain growth in the rapidly changing business environment. 
However, as Park (2002) argued, the culture transformation is closely linked with 
corporate strategy, other business innovation activities and the business environment. In 
sum, the success of Korean firms’ culture change may depend on their efforts to better 
reconcile the environment with their strategy, structure and culture.  
 
3.4.3. Ownership, Corporate Governance and Cross Shareholding  
 
Ownership and management are not separated in most Korean business groups, 
including the GTCs. This results in management by the family, although the proportion 
of professional managers has been increasing steadily. As a result, top-down decision-
making is common. The Korean business groups, Chaebols, are typified by a “one-
person decision-making structure.”  
 
(Table 3.13. Insider Ownership of Major Chaebols)                       (Unit: %) 
2000 2002 2006  
F R M.C T F R M.C T F R M.C T 
Samsung 0.60 1.21 41.38 43.19 0.45 1.54 38.03 40.02 0.29 0.56 48.52 49.37
Hyundai 0.92 2.87 36.00 39.79 0.99 0.63 26.20 27.82 0.82 1.36 16.96 19.14
LG 0.43 4.17 36.20 40.80 0.61 4.89 36.07 41.57 1.21 3.97 32.19 37.37
SK 3.13 1.21 51.56 55.90 2.51 0.70 51.60 54.81 0.71 0.34 60.32 61.37
Hanwha 3.35 0.84 40.09 44.28 2.96 0.77 45.98 49.71 1.91 0.61 39.02 41.54
Hyosung 6.94 9.08 18.99 35.01 7.16 11.20 22.43 40.79 7.00 16.57 24.76 48.33
(Source: Fair Trade Commission, 2008) 
(Note: F (Founder), R (Relatives), M.C (Member companies), T (Total)) 
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The Chaebols’ owners and their families held, on average, only 5.79%, 5.73% and 
5.89% of shares in 2000, 2002 and 2006 respectively (Fair Trade Commission, 2008). 
However, they exercised full power of control over group-wide management. This 
system, according to Jeong (2001), can be called “a controlling minority structure” with 
a low rate of shareholding of major shareholdings on their own, but a high rate of 
insider ownership. 
 
Nonetheless, within the Chaebols’ ownership structure a unique system of cross-
shareholding exists. The following figure illustrates how a cross-shareholding scheme 
works to help Chaebol owners and their families, despite their small shares, to control 
the whole group. In the below example, a business group has three core companies, A, 
B and C, each with an equity of 100 billion won and smaller affiliates D,E,F,G,H,I and J 
with equity of 10 billion won each. The chairman and his family own only 10% each of 
the core companies of A, B and C. Thus, company A owns 20% of company B, 
company B owns 20% of company C and company C owns 20% of company A. As a 
result, the chairman effectively owns 30% of each of A, B and C; these stakes are 
sufficient to control each firm. Moreover, A owns 50% of D, 25% of E and 25% of F, 
while B owns 25% of E, F, H and I and 50% of G. In sum, the chairman and his family 
control all the group’s affiliates with a total investment of 30 billion won, although this 
is only 8.1% of the group’s total equity.  
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(Figure 3.5. An Illustration of Cross-Shareholding in Korean Chaebols) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? Numbers in parentheses are equity capital in billion Korean won. 
? The core firm in the Chaebol is usually the GTC. For instance, Samsung Corp. (the GTC) 
is the core company of Samsung Group.  
 
? Equity owned by Chaebol family is only 30 billion (8.1% of total equity) out of total  
equity capital of 370 billion. 
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(Source: Chang, S. J. (2003), “Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall of 
Chaebols” Cambridge University Press, p. 166) 
 
3.4.4. HRM 
 
Under the influence of Confucian culture, the underlying corporate culture in 
Korean firms, to which workers were brought up from infancy, had been harmony-
oriented. These cultural traits are reflected in HRM practice. Traditional Korean HRM 
is characterised by seniority-based rewards, mass recruitment of new graduates and 
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lifetime employment (Rowley and Bae, 2004). Such traditional HRM policies were 
useful for the rapid growth of Korean firms in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 
However, these traditional HRM practices lost their effectiveness, as they proved 
to be unfit for changing business environments due to globalisation; this requires 
internationally accepted labour standards (Kim and Kim, 2003). Furthermore, the 
financial crisis of 1997 also accelerated the pace at which Korean firms adopted new 
HRM practices, characterised as an efficient and flexible utilisation of human resources. 
 
According to Rowley and Bae (2004), as one of the reconfiguration processes 
within the Chaebol groups, many ideas have been propounded in connection with HRM, 
for example, to reduce ‘rigidities’ and foster ‘flexibilities.’ They include the eradication 
of lifetime employment and seniority-based rewards, which helped to form the basis of 
the traditional HRM system18.  
 
? Recruitment and Selection  
 
Traditional employee recruitment and selection in Korean firms used to be based 
on educational achievement and yon-go (personal) relations. In these, Yon-go relations 
play an important part in employment decisions; graduates of elite universities or 
applicants from certain regions are favoured over others (Chung, Lee and Jung, 1997). 
Big business groups pursue the mass recruitment of new college graduates twice every 
                                            
18 Rowley and Bae (2004) argued that lifetime employment and seniority-based rewards were once 
regarded as strengths within Korean organisations, but now they are viewed as weaknesses. For more 
details, see Rowley, C. and Bae, J. S., (2004), “Big Business in South Korea: The Reconfiguration 
Process”, Asia Pacific Business Review, Vol. 10, No. 3/4, Spring/Summer, pp. 302~323 
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year through newspaper advertisements, TV commercials and school placement centres. 
Graduates from the top universities, such as Seoul National University, Yonsei 
University and Korea University are preferred.  
 
However, these traditional recruitment patterns have changed from the mass 
recruitment of new graduates to recruitment on demand and from a generalist 
orientation to a specialist one (Rowley and Bae, 2004). Recent dynamic changes in the 
business environments have made varied demands and many Korean firms have 
adopted this new recruitment method.  
 
Another feature of the new selection pattern is that experienced workers with 
special skills or expertise are preferred to new college graduates (Lee, 2005). In the past, 
most jobs were assigned or substitutes found internally according to the rigid 
organisational culture (Park and Noh, 2001). But as Korean businesses have expanded, 
large firms have also adopted more open and systematic recruitment methods. The 
Chaebols have recently increased the number of people recruited from abroad for both 
domestic and foreign deployment.  
 
? Training and Development  
 
According to the traditional training and development programme, once new 
employees become members of a company, they are put through an intensive training 
programme. Employee training and development have played an important role in 
Korea’s economic success during the past four decades. The traditional training and 
development focused on the instillation of core management values such as harmony, 
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teamwork and loyalty. The typical training and development methods practiced by 
Korean Chaebols are education-based training, new employee orientation, teamwork 
building, cultural indoctrination, and overseas training. Employee training and 
development programmes in most Chaebols are well organised and systematically 
designed, covering all functional areas, such as strategic management, marketing, 
production, accounting/finance, HRM and international trade. Korean Chaebols also 
have many special training programmes, for example in foreign languages, in-house 
MBA and overseas training. Employees can learn foreign languages, in particular 
English, Japanese and Chinese, in private language institutes after work with financial 
support from their companies (Chung, Lee and Jung, 1997). 
 
With the increased emphasis on ‘performance’ in HRM, training and development 
is also under the influence of the current performance-based HRM trend. Noh, Kim and 
Kim (2002) asserted that many big business groups in Korea now consider training, 
developing and nurturing specialists with specific skills related to corporate strategies, 
rather than producing generalists. They operate training programmes which are planned 
to create a specialist pool, reflecting the organisation’s vision and core competence. As 
a result, the new pattern of training and development increases the employability of 
workers and contributes to the improvement of employee satisfaction and firm 
performance for companies, by linking the purpose of training to corporate strategic 
goals.  
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? Performance Appraisal and Compensation  
 
Most Korean firms have a formal system of performance evaluation and 
compensation. Performance evaluation is taken seriously because it relates to promotion 
and to wage increases, whereas in traditional systems for performance evaluation and 
compensation, seniority is more important for promotion than official performance 
appraisal. These systems also tend to be group-oriented rather than stressing individual 
differences in performance (Chung, Lee and Jung, 1997). With regard to compensation, 
the wage structure is composed of basic pay, allowances and bonuses. The basic pay 
consists of the starting wage, annual increments and the annual increase. The starting 
pay for graduates at any level is generally determined by the external market rate. The 
annual increment is determined by age, length of service and merit. The annual increase 
is usually determined by the increase in the cost of living (Lee, 1999).  
 
Since the financial crisis, performance appraisal and compensation is the area in 
which the most significant changes have been taking place in Korean firms (2005, Lee). 
Traditionally, not much attention was paid to performance appraisal, as performance 
ratings hardly affected promotion and compensation decisions. However, Korean firms 
began to apply evaluation results directly to both employee development and 
compensation decisions. As a result, the overall direction of the change in the 
compensation system, once seniority-based, is now performance-based. For instance, in 
March 1999, Samsung SDI’s labour and management agreed to implement a profit-
sharing programme. During the 1999~2001 period, individual employees received 
profit-sharing bonuses every year roughly equal on average, to 20% of a year’s salary 
(Kim and Bae, 2005). 
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 However, according to Jung et al (2003), 56.6% of Korean firms still have a Ho-
Bong system (wage table which reflects seniority) and the fixed wage determined by 
this system accounts for 65.7% in the total wage plan. This result implies that seniority 
is still one of the major factors in the compensation practice of Korean firms.  
 
? Transformation of HRM 
 
Some Korean Chaebol groups began to transform their HRM system before the  
economic crisis in 1997 (Bae, 1997). For instance, from 1994, LG Electronics adopted a 
merit-based HRM system which replaced the traditional seniority-based one (Kim and 
Bae, 2005).  
 
But many radical structural changes within areas of Korean firms have arisen since 
1997, HRM being no exception. Since then, many firms have recognised that human 
resources are a critical source of competitive advantage (Bae and Lawler, 2000).  
 
The main direction of the changes in HRM has converged on ‘performance-based 
HRM’ (Lee, 2005). The following comparison table shows the key characteristics of 
pre-and post-financial crisis HRM within Korea’s big business groups.  
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(Table 3.14. Traditional and Newer Characteristics of HRM within Korean Big 
Business Groups)  
Area Traditional Characteristics Newer Characteristics 
Core Ideology Organisation first, Collective equality 
and Community orientation 
Individual respected, Individual 
equity and Market principle 
adopted 
Human 
Resource Flow 
Mass recruitment of new graduates, Job 
security (lifetime job) and Generalist 
oriented 
Recruitment on demand, Job 
mobility (lifetime career) and 
Professional development 
Work System Tall structure, Line and staff and 
position-based 
Flat structure, Team system and 
Qualification-based 
Evaluation and 
Reward System 
Seniority, Pay equality, No appraisal 
feedback and Single-rater appraisal 
Ability/performance, Merit pay, 
Appraisal feedback and 360 
degree appraisal 
Employee 
Influence 
Limited involvement and Restricted 
information sharing 
Involvement of workers and 
Information sharing  
(Source: Re-quoted from Rowley, C. and Bae, J. S., (2004), “Big Business in South Korea: The 
Reconfiguration Process”, Asia Pacific Business Review, Vol. 10, No. 3/4, Spring/Summer, p. 319, the 
original version: Rowley, C. and Bae, J. S., (2001), “The Impact of Globalisation on HRM: The Case of 
South Korea”, Journal of World Business, Vol. 36. No. 4, pp. 402~428) 
 
However, Kwon’s research (2006) on recent changes in Korea’s business 
environment from a foreign perspective revealed that 63 foreign respondents were 
generally of the view that HRM in Korea had changed little. The average score on six 
types of possible change in HRM19 was 2.730 on a five-point Lickert scale. Foreign 
respondents generally agreed that lifetime-employment practices were disappearing 
with a score of 3.156, whereas they disagreed that changes biased towards merit-based 
promotion and compensation (2.615), recruitment by merit (2.462) and disappearance of 
the seniority system (2.394), which were all rated below 2.700.  
 
                                            
19 The six types of possible change in HRM were i) disappearing lifetime employment, ii) increase in the 
lay-off of workers, iii) merit-based promotion and compensation, iv) willingness to hire foreign workers, 
v) recruitment by merit rather than by personal connections or university background and vi) 
disappearing seniority system.  
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Similar views were also suggested by Chen (2004); wages are generally based on 
seniority, but bonuses may be awarded on thee basis of performance in many Korean 
firms. Although a growing number of companies utilise the performance criterion in 
reward decisions, seniority still remains an important factor in most company decisions.  
 
From the recent research on HRM within Korean firms, it can be inferred that 
although some HRM practices, such as lifetime employment, are disappearing, other 
conventional HRM practices are changing little and it will take more time for Korean 
firms to fully adopt internationally accepted HRM standards.  
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3.5. The Financial Performance of the Korean GTCs20
3.5.1. Sales Volumes 
Korean GTCs have concentrated on quantitative growth since their formation, by 
putting their emphasis on sales volume in order to take a competitive advantage and 
capture shares in the market. They understood that sales volume was an important 
indicator to present their credit rating to the outside world. From 1985 to 1995, Korea’s 
seven GTCs achieved constant growth in sales volume, thanks to the government’s 
preferential treatment. In comparison with other industries, this allowed easy growth 
which was quantitatively aligned with the national economic growth policy, based on 
the export drive policy. Their quantitative growth was regarded as an important 
indicator to present their credit rating but an unjust way of gaining various privileges 
from the government; such as the extension of trade finance or credit limits from the 
bank and reduced or no import taxes for imported goods. 
 
However, the GTCs’ stable growth trend started to decline from 1997 and, since 
the national financial crisis in the same year, this situation has continued. The average 
value of the sales by the seven GTCs in 1985 was US$2,874million and in 1995 was 
US$13,627million. During this decade, they were able to maintain their constant growth, 
but have since shown a gradual decline. The fundamental reasons for this loss of sales 
volume can be summarised as: i) the disposal of non-profit business units and ii) the 
separation of inefficient business units in order to survive under the national economic 
depression and financial crisis. 
 
                                            
20 Most financial data in this part are summarised from “The Handbook of Korean GTCs” and each 
GTC’s Annual Report. 
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 (Figure 3.6. Changes of Korean GTCs’ Sales Volumes) 
(Unit: US$ million) 
Changes of Korean GTCs' Sales Volumes
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GTCs 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2005 2006 2007 
Samsung 5,002 10,463 25,053 35,846 7,616 9,262 10,380 10,753
Hyundai 3,754 8,327 21,785 35,943 1,103 1,197 1,182 1,844
LG 2,140 3,960 13,595 17,498 4,544 6,134 5,951 5,924
Daewoo 4,973 6,902 19,550 9,119 3,482 4,932 6,811 8,637
SK 2,175 2,678 5,265 12,366 10,662 14,266 16,842 19,543
Hyosung 872 1,676 3,317 3,447 3,556 4,658 5,105 5,995
Ssangyong 1,206 2,309 6,824 2,219 1,012 1,415 999 1,161
Average 2,874 5,188 13,627 16,634 4,568 5,981 6,753 7,694
 
(Source: The Handbook of Korean GTCs (2005), Annual Report of Each GTC (2005, 2006 and 2007)) 
 
? Currency Conversion Rates: 1985: KRW760.00/US$, 1990: KRW760.00/US$, 1995: 
KRW768.53/US$, 2000: KRW1, 133.78/US$, 2003: KRW1,186.39/US$, 2005: KRW1,043.00/US$, 
2006: KRW937.20/US$, 2007: KRW904.98/US$ (The Interactive Currency Table: 
http://www.xe.net) 
 
? Simple intermediary businesses were excluded from 2003 because of the changing ‘Accounting 
Standard’  
Regarding Korean GTCs’ sales structure, they, unlike the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 
originally focused on exports only and have developed abnormally since their 
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foundation. This caused the government’s export-dive policy with a view to accelerating 
national economic growth. As a result, the sales structure of the Korean GTCs did not 
balance their exports, imports, domestic sales and offshore dealings properly, but 
mostly centred on exports. For example, in 1980, Korean GTCs’ exports shared 88.2% 
out of total sales, imports shared 6.9%, domestic sales shared 4.6% and offshore 
dealings shared only 0.3%, while the Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ exports shared 19.1%, 
imports shared 24.3%, domestic sales shared 46.4% and offshore dealings shared 
10.2 % (Hur, 1983). However, the sales structure of Korean GTCs started gradually to 
diversify to imports, domestic sales and offshore dealings in their development stage. In 
1992, for example, exports still shared 65%, but imports shared 29.1%, domestic sales 
shared 3.1% and offshore dealings shared 2.7%, while Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ exports 
shared 13.8%, imports shared 16.4%, domestic sales shared 45.1% and offshore 
dealings shared 24.7 % respectively (Kim and Kim, 2000).  
With respect to the major items composing Korean GTCs’ sales, they are  
centralised to a few items, such as electrical and electronic equipment, industrial 
machinery and automobiles21, while Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ sales are well diversified 
with machinery and construction, fuel and chemicals, metals, foodstuffs and textiles. 
This has meant that Korean GTCs are heavily dependent on their affiliates’ products. 
For example, Samsung Electronic Ltd. and LG Electronic Ltd. produce various kinds of 
electrical and electronic appliances and Hyundai Automobile Company produces 
automobiles. Then, the GTCs, such as the Samsung Corporation, the LG International 
Corporation and the Hyundai Corporation deal with the above items as their major 
products and act as the export agents of their affiliates.  
                                            
21 In 2001, these three items shared 75.4% of all Korean GTCs’ dealings. 
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3.5.2. Profitability  
One notable feature of Korean GTCs’ business is that profitability is significantly 
low in every sale. Their low profitability has probably resulted from the following 
factors. The first may be their deep dependence on intermediaries, or the simple broker 
function between sellers and buyers. The first earning source of GTCs is dependent on 
the function of their intermediaries. They obtained a commission fee for this function. 
The commission fee may occupy even now the largest part of the revenue earned by the 
GTCs. The Commission fee is usually decided between the GTCs and the confronting 
firms on the basis of numerous factors, such as types of product, quantity, final 
destination, quality of the products and the business relationship between two firms. 
The second is, on the surface, a purely technical accounting issue (Yamaji, 1991). In 
reality, the GTCs usually record as sales the trading amounts which they made for the 
tariff procedure in substitute for the manufacturing firms. Hence, the sales amounts of 
the GTCs do not always represent the real business activities. Unlike manufacturing 
companies, the GTCs’ profitability is affected by numerous factors. Factors affecting 
the GTCs’ profitability include the type of product and service, geographical 
diversification, ratio of export items manufactured by the GTCs group firms and 
affiliates and degree of domestic business operations.  
In 2007, Korean GTCs achieved a gain of 2.94% of net income over revenues. But 
they showed a 3.20% deficit in 2000 and a 1.70% deficit in 2002 over revenue. These 
results denote that Korean GTCs have difficulty in achieving constant profitability. 
However, most GTCs have by restructured their organisations and changed their 
management strategies from quantitative growth to profit-based and cash flow-oriented 
businesses since the financial crisis. For example, Samsung Corporation and Daewoo 
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International Corporation adopted cash flow-oriented management as their management 
strategy and Hyundai Corporation and LG International Corporation focused on profit-
based management.  
 
(Table 3.15. Profitability of Korean GTCs in 2007)                (Unit: US$ million) 
 
Name of GTCs Revenues Gross Profit Net Income 
Samsung 
(Profit rate) 
10,753 1,049
9.75%
538
5.01%
Hyundai 
(Profit rate) 
1,844 66
3.56%
49
2.63%
LG 
(Profit rate) 
5,924 65
1.09%
53
0.89%
Daewoo 
(Profit rate) 
8,637 102
1.18%
96
1.12%
SK 
(Profit rate) 
19,543 1,466
7.50%
653
3.34%
Hyosung 
(Profit rate) 
5,995 762
12.70%
184
3.07%
Ssangyong 
(Profit rate) 
1,161 54
4.64%
11
0.91%
Average  
(Profit rate) 
7,694 509
6.61%
226
2.94%
The Rate of Net Income
-0.90
0.10
-1.30
-3.20
1.08
-1.70
-0.27
2.94
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007
Year
%
 
 
(Source: Annual Report of each GTC, 2007)  
 
? Currency Conversion Rates: KRW904.98/US$ (2007)) 
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3.6. The GTCs, Chaebols and the Korean Economy  
 
3.6.1. The Relationship between the GTCs and the Chaebols   
 
One of the most significant measures taken by the Korean government in the 
export drive was the creation of the system of GTCs, which were the major source of 
the Chaebols’ growth. Most Korean GTCs belonged to the Chaebols and they played a 
vital role in the operations of the Chaebols. It is essential to consider the Chaebols in 
order to understand Korean business and the country’s economic growth. They featured 
a variety of distinctive characteristics, such as a family controlled business, dominance 
of the domestic economy, rapid expansion and diversification through close ties with 
the Korean government and financial institutions. It is, therefore, crucial to review the 
relations between the GTCs and the Korean Chaebols before examining Korean 
business and economic affairs.  
 
In its Chinese character, the Chaebol is identical to the well-known Japanese 
Zaibatsu and is a combination of the character expressing “wealth” or “finance” and the 
character for “clique.” The Japanese pronunciation of these two characters is Zaibatsu, 
which is defined as a system of highly centralised family control through holding 
companies. The word Chaebol is the only word which has migrated to Western 
countries from Korea, apart from Kimchi, a Korean dish made of vegetables. Both 
quickly became naturalised as words in the English language. In the academic arena, 
several definitions of Chaebol are available. For instance, Oh and Park (2001) defined it 
as “a resilient organisation that tries to retain its main characteristics of family 
ownership and control, centralised decision-making mechanism, highly diversified 
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structures and highly complex network of subsidiaries and suppliers.” Hattori (1986) 
suggested that there are two requisite dimensions inherent in the various 
conceptualisations of the Chaebol; ownership by family and diversified business 
operations. Other characteristics typically associated with the Korean Chaebols are i) 
quantum growth stemming from unrelated diversification, ii) a monopolistic position in 
the marketplace, iii) close relations with government, iv) a highly centralised structure 
with top-down decisions, v) low formalisation and standardisation, vi) flexible lifetime 
employment practice and vii) paternalistic leadership practices. Yoo and Lee (1987) 
also defined the Chaebol as a business group consisting of large companies which are 
owned and managed by family members or relatives in many diversified business areas. 
Thus, to be a Chaebol or a Zaibatsu, an organisation should satisfy two conditions: i) it 
should be owned by family members or relatives and ii) it should have diversified 
business operations.  
 
Besides academic definitions, there are some technical definitions of the Chaebol 
for the purpose of policy regulation (Kang, 1996). Beginning in the early 1980s, the 
term Chaebol acquired technical connotations as the government decided to i) restrict 
big business groups’ undisciplined expansion through interlocking and cross-
shareholding structures and ii) control the growing concentration of bank credits in big 
business groups. To address these two major concerns over the Chaebols’ activities, the 
government and the central bank defined the Chaebol as follows. First, the government 
defined a Chaebol in terms of combined total assets including those of its subsidiaries. 
The threshold level is 400 billion Korean won (equivalent to US $550 million). Second, 
the central bank defined the Chaebol in terms of combined bank credits (i.e. borrowings 
and guarantees). Business groups with combined bank credits in excess of 150 billion 
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Korean won (equivalent to about US $200 million) are ranked on the basis of combined 
total assets and the top 30 such groups are put on a credit control list.  
 
(Table 3.16. The Top 30 Korean Chaebols in 2008)                (Unit: US$ billion) 
2008 
Ranking 
Biz. Groups No. of 
Affiliate 
Firms 
Assets 
 
Equity 
 
Debt 
 
Debt – Equity 
Ratio (%) 
 
1 Samsung 59 90.09 60.28 29.81 49.45 
2 KEPCO 12 80.11 50.44 29.67 58.84 
3 Hyundai Motor 36 50.75 25.85 24.90 96.31 
4 SK 64 51.00 25.60 25.39 99.17 
5 LG 36 40.64 23.19 17.46 75.29 
6 KNHC 2 36.38 7.95 28.43 357.52 
7 Lotte 46 30.28 20.46 9.81 47.96 
8 KHC 4 27.62 14.93 12.69 85.00 
9 POSCO 31 27.36 20.35 7.00 34.41 
10 KLC 3 23.72 4.49 19.23 428.31 
11 GS 57 22.09 9.56 12.53 131.09 
12 Hyundai Heavy Ind.  9 21.22 7.36 13.86 188.35 
13 KT 29 19.19 9.87 9.32 94.37 
14 Kumho Asiana 52 18.72 6.63 12.09 182.51 
15 Hanjin 27 18.71 6.81 11.89 174.52 
16 Hanwha 40 11.70 4.69 7.01 149.36 
17 Doosan 21 11.95 4.23 7.72 182.68 
18 Hynix 8 10.67 6.45 4.21 65.30 
19 KRC 15 10.32 5.90 4.42 74.87 
20 KGC 3 9.02 2.76 6.26 226.30 
21 STX 15 7.75 2.87 4.88 170.28 
22 Shinsaegae 15 7.62 3.53 4.09 115.85 
23 CJ 66 6.88 3.48 3.40 97.55 
24 LS 24 6.80 3.25 3.55 109.35 
25 Dongbu 29 5.97 1.80 4.17 231.50 
26 Daelim 14 6.41 3.09 3.32 107.67 
27 Hyundai  9 5.33 2.07 3.26 157.71 
28 Daewoo Shipping 8 6.15 1.34 4.81 358.75 
29 KCC 7 5.70 3.60 2.10 58.41 
30 GM Daewoo 3 5.68 1.99 3.69 185.74 
Top 30 Average 25 22.53 11.49 11.03 146.48 
(Source: Fair Trade Commission, 2008)  
 
? Currency Conversion Rates: KRW1,405.80/US$ (Average value of 2008) 
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3.6.2. The Evolution of the Chaebols and Korean Economy 
 
i) 1945~1960: The Birth of the Chaebols with Primitive Accumulation of Wealth  
 
The origin of some Chaebols is traced back to the late Chosun dynasty before 
Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. However, many of the biggest Chaebols of today 
began their first ventures after Korea emerged from Japanese colonial occupation in 
1945. Following Korea’s independence, the Korean War (1950~1953) destroyed the 
entire industrial base of the country. War damage to industrial offices, plant and 
equipment, public facilities, private dwellings and transport equipment in South Korea 
cost approximately US$3billion. This was almost equal to the estimated Gross National 
Product (GNP) for 1952 and 1953 combined (Frank et al., 1975). After the war, the 
Rhee Sung Man government immediately made plans to rebuild the infrastructure and 
industrial facilities which had been destroyed. The reconstruction project after the 
Korean War was a good opportunity for some business groups to turn themselves into 
Chaebols by being involved in various projects, in particular in the product 
manufacturing sectors. 
 
Although the post-war reconstruction project helped some business firms to gain 
wealth, the Rhee government’s offer of political privileges to a small number of 
entrepreneurs was a decisive factor in their accumulation of wealth within a short period. 
The government’s special policies for this privileged minority can be summarised as i) a 
preferential disposal of vested properties owned by the former Japanese and ii) a license 
to trade in imports and preferential access to bank loans and iii) the unfair allocation of 
aid funds and materials (Kang, 1996). 
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? Disposal of Vested Properties Owned by the Former Japanese 
 
Among the most important sources of the Chaebols’ wealth in this period were the 
vested properties which had belonged to the Japanese during their colonisation of Korea 
(1910~1945). Frank et al. (1975) argued that the Korean economy became highly 
dependent upon Japan for capital, technology and management under colonial rule. Of 
the total authorised capital of business establishments in Korea, the Japanese owned 
approximately 94% in 1940. After Korea gained independence from Japan in 1945, 
Korea came to acquire 166,301 assets which had been Japanese possessions. These 
vested properties, which included 3,551 operating plants and firms, land, infrastructure 
and inventories, accounting for approximately 30% of the nation’s total wealth – were 
first entrusted to the American Office of the Property Custodian (AOPC) and were later 
distributed to Koreans (Kang, 1996). By 1948 the AOPC had disposed of 2,268 items of 
vested properties, including 513 firms and 839 land items. The rest of the vested 
properties, which accounted for 21.6% of the total number of factories, 80% of the large 
corporations hiring more than 30 employees each and 59.6% of the nation-wide 
employees, were passed over to the Rhee government in August, 1948 and the 
distribution work continued until 1957 (Lee, 1995). 
 
In the process of this disposal, a few entrepreneurs who had political connections 
with the Rhee government became beneficiaries. The disposal price was fixed at the 
pre-1945 book value, which was remarkably lower than the real value at the time and 
some items were disposed of at an even lower price than book value. Moreover, the 
government granted generous payment terms with a long grace period (15-year deferred 
payment of 90% of the total amount). Therefore, the beneficiaries could acquire 
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properties with only 10% of their own capital. Given the hyperinflation of 600% 
between 1945 and 1950, it was nearly a free distribution.  
 
? License of Import Trading and Preferential Access to Bank Loans 
After Rhee was elected as the president in 1948, he launched an import substitution 
policy. The government invested most of its aid funds in import substitution industries 
such as fibre, sugar, cement, flat glass and milling and these industries were completely 
protected by the government, with lower tax rates, interest and preferential finance. For 
instance, Cheil Textile and the Cheil Sugar Company, the predecessors of Samsung, 
founded by Lee, Byung Chul achieved remarkable profits and became emblems of 
success in the import substitution industries (Kim, 1998). To foster these industries, the 
government allowed only raw materials to be imported. At this time, the Korean won 
was not convertible to other currencies and the government allocated foreign currency 
paid as aid funds only to those who held import licenses. Thus, such import licenses 
from the government were an important source of profits. Any firm could apply for an  
import license, but the government allocated them mostly to those who had political 
linkage with the Rhee regime. 
Moreover, there was a continuous shortage of finance in the 1950s due to the high 
inflation and the low interest rate policy. In this situation, any entrepreneur who 
acquired a bank loan was able to earn profit from the negative real interest rate22. 
During this period, the Ministry of Finance, according to macro-planning, determined 
the priorities in the allocation of industrial credit and bank loans. In this process, the 
                                            
22 The real interest rate between 1954 and 1957 was as follows: 1954: - 13.5%, 1955: - 43.8%, 1956:  - 
15.7% and 1957: - 3.9% (Lee, 1995). 
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Chaebols enjoyed a preferential allocation of bank loans and industrial credit, a 
situation which reached its peak in 1956 (Lee, 1995). 
? Government’s Unfair Allocation of Aid Funds and Materials 
 
In addition to the government’s allocation of vested properties to a small number 
of privileged capitalists, the Rhee government’s unfair allocation of aid funds and 
materials was also one of the easiest ways of accumulating wealth. Since the volume of 
Korean exports in the 1950s was small, Korea acquired foreign exchange, which was 
needed for imports, mainly from the inflow of foreign aid from the US and the United 
Nations (UN). During 1945~1965, the US and the UN provided economic aid worth 
US$3.8billion to the Korean government. 
 
Acquiring such aid funds and material from the government was at the time an 
important element in turning a few private entrepreneurs into Chaebols, because Korea 
had a severe shortage of material and capital in the 1950s. When the government began 
to allocate foreign aid, the beneficiaries of these funds were able to build plants or 
manufacturing facilities using only 15%~25% of their own capital. However, many of 
those entrepreneurs who made enormous profits from the government’s unfair 
allocation of foreign aid and material were accused by the Park regime in 1961 of 
acquiring wealth unlawfully from this preferential treatment (Kang, 1996). 
 
ii) The 1960s: The Consolidation Period with Economic Development Plans of 
Park’s Military Regime 
 
Korea’s rapid economic growth began after the launch of the military government 
headed by Park, Chung Hee.  He was a general who succeeded in a military coup 
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d’état on 16th May, 1961. The Park government’s primary concerns were to stabilise the 
people’s livelihood through developing the economy and strengthening the national 
security, following the tragedy of a civil war (1950~1953) which destroyed two-thirds 
of Korea’s productive capacity and killed almost a million civilians. After Park’s 
inauguration, the government, to ensure Park’s political legitimacy, immediately 
concentrated on the national economic development as its priority. 
 
? Preparation of a Foundation for Driving Economic Development  
 
In order to achieve the ambitious goal of national economic growth, the 
centralisation of power became Park’s primary political concern and he resolutely took 
the following measures to achieve it. First, the government established the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) to reinforce centralisation in policy making and granted the EPB 
absolute power not only in planning and budgeting but also in inspection and mediation 
of other government administrative organs. Second, the military government carried out 
financial reform. It established the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation to 
enhance the social and economic status of member farmers and founded a small and 
medium-sized Industrial Bank to promote the growth of SMEs. In particular, the 
government planned to invite foreign capital through the Korea Development Bank for 
the sake of national economic development.      
 
The government also made it clear that it would use the BOK as a financial 
resource to safeguard any deficit in the process of economic development. Third, the 
government tried to make take over some commercial banks through the redemption of 
the shares of heavy shareholders (the Chaebols). Through such a reform of 
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administrative structure, the military government prepared a foundation on which to 
execute mighty policies for economic development. 
 
? Treatment of Illicit Wealth Accumulators 
 
Another issue which the Park government faced was to meet the public demand 
that illegal wealth accumulators under the Rhee government should be punished. To this 
end, the government arrested some entrepreneurs, including Lee, Byung Chul, the 
founder of Samsung Group and the best-known entrepreneur at the time, together with 
government and military officials who were accused of illicit wealth accumulation 
under the Rhee government. After Lee’s arrest, he had an opportunity to negotiate with 
Park over three things. First, the government was to lift the restriction, stipulated in the 
anti-corruption law, on the movement of the accused businessmen, by protecting their 
right to free movement. Second, the fine for their illicit accumulation of wealth was to 
be adjusted significantly downwards. Last, in exchange for this adjustment, the entire 
adjusted fine would be invested in key industries. The government had only to identify 
the key industries and the businessmen would be free to coordinate the division of the 
resources according to their specific capabilities, in order to get the key industries going. 
(Lim, 2002) 
 
Park realised soon after the meeting that it was essential to cooperate with the 
Chaebol owners if it wanted to achieve its ambitious goal of national economic growth. 
As part of Lee’s proposal, Park modified the restrictions to the Chaebol owners, for 
example, extending the deadline for paying the fine and reducing the amount of the fine 
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to almost half the original amount (from 8,312 million hwan23 to 4,228 million hwan) 
(Shim, 2002). 
 
(Table 3.17. Convictions by the Park Regime for Illicit Wealth Accumulation) 
(Unit: Million hwan) 
Amount of Fine Reasons for Fine Founder and 
Business Group Planned Adjusted Tax Evasion Kickback Property-related 
Scandal 
Others
Lee (Samsung) 2,400 800 736 64 - -
Chung (Samho) 1,000 361 349 102 66 -
Lee (Gaepung) 550 387 125 153 109 -
Seol (Daehan) 330 481 272 39 62 108
Lee (Tongyang) 170 128 - 40 - 88
Kim (Goldstar) 240 143 119 24 - -
Park (Hwashin) 97 10 - 10 - -
Koo (Lucky) - 96 96 - - -
Kim (Samyang) - 36 36 - - -
Lee (Dongah) 400 211 201 10 - -
Other 20s  3,125 1,575
Total  8,312 4,228
(Source: Shim, J.S. (2002), “The Evolution of the Korean Economic System”, PhD Dissertation, The 
School of Public Policy, The University of Birmingham, p.124) 
 
After laying a foundation for the nation’s economic development and an 
appropriate compromise with the Chaebols, the government launched the first Five-
Year Economic Development Plan in 1962. During this period, the Chaebols were able 
to build up huge amounts of capital by playing a major part in implementing the 
government-led policies for economic development.  
 
The following seven factors enabled the Chaebols to achieve rapid quantitative 
expansion and diversification. First, Park’s lifting of the restrictions on the Chaebol 
                                            
23 The currency unit “hwan” was used between 1953 and 1962 before the Park government’s currency 
reform to “won” 
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owners allowed them to develop rapidly and become major players in Korea’s 
industrialisation. Through this decision, the Chaebols were able, through joining various 
projects, to achieve quantitative expansion and diversification during the first Five-year 
Economic Development Plan (1962~1966) and the second (1967~1971). The released 
Chaebol owners formed the Economic Development Promotion Committee (it later 
became the Federation of Korea Industries (FKI), which still exists), which selected 6 
key industries: synthetic fibre, cement, electricity, chemical fertilizer and steel and oil 
refining. They concentrated on these industries with strategic financial support from the 
government. Between the government and the FKI, a communication system was 
established. The FKI regularly reported their processing of projects and made requests 
to the government. The government mostly accepted the FKI’s requests and used their 
suggestions as footholds in the government’s policy decision-making. In an interview 
with Sisa-Journal (7th May, 1992), Jung, Ju Young, the former chairman of the Hyundai 
group, said, “the government selected most industrial policies in consultation with the 
Chaebols.” Second, the government’s special favours accelerated the Chaebols’ capital 
accumulation. The Chaebols were given incentives such as the preferential allocation of 
resources, bank loans with lower interest rates and priority in the allocation of foreign 
capital. The Chaebols could borrow money at a 5~6% interest rate when the domestic 
interest rate was 25~30%. Third, the government also supported the Chaebols with 
various measures in taxation and tariffs to promote the country’s  exports. The 
government’s preferential financing policy to export firms enabled the Chaebols to 
become export-oriented firms. Fourth, the Chaebols accumulated capital through a 
profit monopoly in the incomplete market of their underdeveloped country. Fifth, 
special procurements took place due to the Vietnam War. This war let the Chaebols 
accumulate foreign capital in particular in the transportation and construction industries 
 96 
 
(Lee, 1995). Domestically, the construction industry was prosperous due to the 
expansion of social overhead capital. Sixth, the Chaebols were able to make  
extraordinary profits from the rapid rise of real estate caused by high inflation. Last, the 
geopolitical environment for Korea at the time was also favourable. The US provided it 
with significant aid and Japan also loaned it funds after they re-established a diplomatic 
relationship in 1965. The government thereupon set up ambitious targets and allocated 
foreign loans for investment (Chang, 2003)  
 
iii) The 1970s: The Expansion Period for Heavy and Chemical Industries and the 
Formation of the GTCs  
 
There were two impetuses in the early 1970s for the accelerated growth of Korean 
Chaebols. One was the government’s policy emphasis on heavy and chemical industries 
and the other was the establishment of the GTC system in 1975 using the Japanese Sogo 
Shosha as a model in order to expand Korean exports worldwide and achieve economic 
internationalisation after the oil crisis in 1973.  
 
? Emphasis on Heavy and Chemical Industries 
 
During the third Five-year Economic Development Plan (1972~1976), Park’s 
government tended to achieve economies of scale. It therefore focused on a small 
number of the Chaebols with preferential financial assistance and designated heavy and 
chemical industries (steel, petrochemicals, machinery and shipbuilding) as “strategic 
industries”. From 1975 to 1979, the Korean government allocated 70% of its economic 
development funds to these industries. According to Chang (2003), the Korean 
government allocated licenses to only a few Chaebols in order to achieve economies of 
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scale. For instance, Hyundai and Daewoo were chosen to develop power plant facilities 
and Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo to build ships. As a result, from 1971 to 1979, the 
proportion of heavy equipment and chemical industries to total manufacturing 
shipments increased from 39% to 55% while the proportion of exports to GNP 
increased from 16% to 36%. 
 
During this period, the government encouraged large-scale projects through 
planning and subsidisation (Kang, 1996). Thus, there was fierce competition in the 
private sector to participate in these projects. As a result, large corporations were able to 
grow rapidly as the main beneficiaries of projects planned by the government, whereas 
SMEs remained unaffected by them. In these circumstances the Chaebols undertook to 
achieve unprecedented expansion and focused on borrowing money in order to do so. In 
this process, the Chaebols gained the disgraceful nickname of “Octopus Legs”24 (Kim, 
1998) 
 
? Formation of the General Trading Companies 
 
In addition to the emphasis on heavy and chemical industries, the government also 
began to sponsor the creation of the GTC system in order to devote its total strength to 
exports. Korean GTCs, modelled on the Japanese Sogo Shosha, were officially launched 
in 1975.  
 
                                            
24 This denotes that the Chaebols recklessly diversified their businesses into all industries and areas. As 
octopuses spread out their many tentacles in search of food, so the Chaebols expanded their businesses 
into all areas in order to make more profit. This earned them their shameful nickname.  
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In the initial stage after establishing the GTC system, the primary roles of the 
GTCs were i) to expand national exports, in particular heavy and chemical products, ii) 
to enter into new markets, iii) to provide a more rational export channel for Korean 
SMEs, iv) to increase the size of exporters in order to achieve economies of scale and v) 
to shift some of the burden of export assistance from the government to the Chaebols 
(Chung, 2000). To tell the truth, the GTCs devoted themselves to the economic growth 
of Korea after their formation and their export performance was impressive. For 
instance, the GTCs’ share of all Korea’s exports increased from 12.4% in 1975 to 
41.0% in 1980 (Handbook of Korean GTCs, 2005).  
 
(Table 3.18. The Amount of Exports made by the GTCs)              (Unit: US$ million)  
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Samsung 205 333 390 493 772 1,237
Ssangyong 106 101 117 264 422 642
Kukje 64 194 297 472 564 744
Hyosung 36 106 153 338 584 764
Bando (LG) 31 134 199 330 469 493
SK 52 107 176 283 322 430
Hyundai - - 323 260 493 1,028
Koryo 10 17 24 31 51 67
GTCs Total (a) 671 1,329 2,177 3,434 5,102 7,177
Korea Total (b) 5,427 8,115 10,046 12,711 15,055 17,505
a/b (%) 12.4 16.4 21.6 27.0 33.9 41.0
(Source: Lee, S.H (1986), “The Role of the Korean GTCs as an Export-Window for the Korean 
Economy”, The Department of International Trade, Kyoungbook National University Press, Korea, p. 37) 
 
iv) The 1980s: The Structural Adjustment Period with Diversification and Entry 
into Financial Sectors 
 
The 1980s in Korea began with a military coup d’état by Chun, Doo Whan, just 
like the previous president’s, Park, Chung Hee. Park was assassinated by his close 
associate Kim Jae Kyu, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1979. Upon 
its inauguration, Chun government proposed economic policies which were very 
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different from those of the preceding regime. The government, first, enacted the Anti- 
Trust and Fair Trade Act in 1980, to monitor collusion and unfair behaviour by firms. 
Second, it set up the Fair Trade Commission which was to be supervised by the EPB in 
1981. Third, it introduced the Consumers’ Protection Law. Last, as Shim (2002) noted, 
the government introduced import liberalisation and tariff reduction in order not only to 
improve the Chaebols’ structure but also to raise their competitiveness in the world 
market. However, the external environment also constrained the Korean economy. 
According to Woo (1991, p. 57): 
 
“The IMF and the World Bank pressured the Korean government to reduce 
government expenditures, tighten the money supply and pursue economic 
stability. Korea, at that time, was one of the largest foreign debtors and the 
international financial community were concerned about its financial health. 
Furthermore, because of its economic success, Korea became a target of US 
trade wars. Faced with pressure from the US, the government had to open up 
its barriers to imports and foreign direct investment” 
 
The changes in the internal and external environment, such as the government’s 
several attempts to regulate the Chaebols, as advised by the international financial 
community and the pressure from the US made the Chaebols adjust their structure as 
follows.  
 
? Qualitative Growth through Diversification  
 
Unlike the 1970s, the Chaebols emphasised qualitative growth in the 1980s rather 
than visible quantitative expansion. Although the Chaebols also achieved remarkable 
quantitative growth in the 1980s, it was crucial for them to seek qualitative growth 
because the Korean economic structure was becoming mature. There was little change 
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in the number of the Chaebols’ affiliated companies in the 1980s, although the 1970s 
had shown a remarkable increase. For instance, there was only a 10% increase in the 
number of top 10 Chaebols’ affiliated companies from 242 in 1980 to 266 in 1987. The 
Chaebols attempted to diversify through expanding business areas within the existing 
affiliated companies, rather than through increasing the number of affiliated firms. 
During this period, the Chaebols exerted themselves in high-tech industry, producing 
such things as semiconductors, new materials, precision instruments, fine chemicals, 
computers, aero and space engineering and telecommunications. As a result, Research 
and Development (R&D) expenses for these high-tech industries increased dramatically 
from US$109 million in 1980 to US$2,463 million in 1990 (FKI). 
 
? Foray into the Financial Sectors 
 
The government in 1980 began financial liberalisation and started privatising 
banks which had been owned by the government for the past two decades. Then the 
Chaebols enlarged their business to financial sectors and their share in the commercial 
banks increased. Although the Chaebols were forbidden to own more than 8% of any 
one bank’s shares25, it was enough to give them influence in the banks’ decision-making.  
 
Moreover, the Chaebols diversified their business in non-banking financial 
institutions (the so-called second-tier financial sector) such as insurance, securities, 
short- or medium-term financing and investment trusts. As Kang (1996) argued, the 
Chaebols which owned non-bank financial institutions used them not only as an 
                                            
25 This was to prevent the Chaebols from ever becoming as formidable as the pre-World War II Zaibatsu 
of Japan, which owned both financial institutions and industrial enterprises (Shim, 2002). 
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effective means by which to mobilise funds but also as an effective means by which to 
expand the Chaebol structure by circumventing government regulations.  
 
(Table 3. 19. The Chaebols’ Ownership of Commercial Banks in 1997)         (Unit: %) 
Chaebols Bank 
Hyundai Samsung Daewoo LG SK Top 5 
Chaebols
Choheung 1.24 3.05    4.29
Commercial 0.97 6.91    7.88
Cheil 0.16 0.18  0.19  0.53
Hanil 2.73 4.90  2.48  10.11
Foreign Exchange 1.24   0.44 1.68
Kookmin 2.02 0.96 0.42 0.40 0.48 4.28
Shinhan 0.42 3.49   3.91
Koram 18.56 18.56   37.12
Hana 3.61   3.61
Boram 1.16 0.21 7.57 0.24 9.18
Korea Peace 0.37 1.28 0.82 0.73 0.92 4.12
 
 
 
 
Nationwide 
Commercial 
Bank 
Housing  0.55    0.55
Daeku 5.30    5.30
Pusan 1.31    1.31
Cheju 2.17    2.17
Chunpuk 1.50    1.50
Kangwon 11.89 1.54  0.63  14.06
Kyungnam 2.68    2.68
 
 
Regional 
Bank 
Chungbuk 0.92    0.92
Government-
owned Bank 
Long-term Credit 0.12 5.31  1.82 0.67 7.92
(Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Korea)  
 
? The Three Lows  
 
Besides the Chaebols’ diversification and their infiltration into the financial sector, 
the changing external environment in the 1980s also promoted their growth. First, due 
to an appreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar after the Plaza Accord26 in 
                                            
26 This was an agreement signed on 9th September, 1985 in the Plaza Hotel, New York, US, to increase the 
value of the Japanese yen. An agreement reached by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan and 
the US to drive down the price of the dollar. By 1985, the dollar had reached an all-time high relative to 
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1985, Korean products competed against Japanese products, including TVs, VCRs, 
chemicals, cars, ships and steel, and they remained internationally competitive in the 
world market (the low US Dollar). Second, the low oil prices, due to an international 
economic downturn, were favourable to the Chaebols’ growth (the low oil price). Last, 
the low interest rate was also one of the important elements in the Chaebols’ growth 
(low interest rate). Thanks to these three lows, Korea achieved a trade surplus of US 
$4.6billion in 1986 (Lim, 2002) and the Chaebols were able to gain international 
competitiveness with their products in the world market.  
 
v) 1990~1996: The Liberalisation and Globalisation Period of a Widening 
Domestic Market and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Until 1985, the Korean government had been lukewarm about the execution of an 
import liberalisation policy, even though it had prudentially debated this as part of 
economic liberalisation since early in the 1980s. However the rapid changing 
international environment forced Korea to open its trade and capital markets. For 
instance, Korea’s surplus in the international balance of payments attributed to the 
Three Lows (low US dollar, low oil price and low interest rate)27 and a trade surplus 
with the US from 1986 pressured the Korean government to put the import liberalisation 
policy into operation (Ministry of Finance and Economy (MIFE)). At this, the Roh 
                                                                                                                                
many major currencies and the US was experiencing a large trade deficit. The coordinated efforts by 
these countries resulted in a 30 percent decline in the dollar over the next two years. With this agreement, 
the exchange rate of the Japanese yen to the US dollar in January, 1988 was adjusted 260 to 1 
(JPY260/US$1) and the rate was decreased (i.e. the value of the Japanese yen increased) 127 to 1 
(JPY127/US$1).  
 
27 The late 1980s were the most prosperous days in Korean history. Due to the Three Lows, the Korean 
economy achieved an annual average growth of 12.8% from 1986 to 1988. Between 1986 and 1987, it 
recorded US$10 billion of trade surplus. Moreover, Korea improved its position in the international 
market by holding the Asian Games in 1986 and the Olympic Games in 1988 (MIFE) 
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government rapidly put the policy into action by drastically reducing the import 
restriction items and simplifying import procedures with confidence, having the Three 
Lows on his side. However, many economists criticised the Roh government’s 
execution of the import liberalisation policy before eliminating the Three Highs (high 
prices for commodities, high wages and the high price of land), which impaired Korea’s 
international competitiveness, tended to damage the national economy and was taken by 
the Chaebols as unpatriotic. Although the Chaebols were discontented with the 
government’s policy, they had to try to seize any business opportunity that was created 
by the import liberalisations.  
 
In contrast, Roh Tae Woo, who became the 13th Korean president with only 30% 
of the lower political support ratio in the presidential election, tried to capture the 
support of the middle class to ensure his political legitimacy (Lee, 1999). To do so, the 
government enforced a strong policy of restricting the Chaebols’ economic 
centralisation by prohibiting mutual investment and cross payment guarantees between 
or within affiliated companies28, the strengthening of fair trade, control of credit and the 
disposal of non-commercial real estates. However, due to the Roh government’s 
impetuous decision to liberalise imports liberalisation and strict regulation of the 
Chaebols, the Korean economy promptly plunged in 198929 with a record US$2billion 
deficit in international payments and receipts in 1990 (BOK). 
                                            
28 Cross payment guarantee: When one firm borrows money from a financial institution, another firm 
guarantees its payment if the former becomes is insolvent. Under this system, the Chaebols were able to 
maintain their scale through payment guarantees from their affiliated companies. However, this system 
interferes with the withdrawal of insolvent enterprises from the market and causes a series of 
bankruptcies once one firm becomes insolvent.  
 
29 In 1989 Korea’s annual economic growth crashed to 6.5% from an annual average growth of 12.8% 
from 1986 to 1988. Additionally, the market share of Korean products in the US decreased to 3% in 1993. 
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In Kim Young Sam’s inauguration speech in 1992 as the 14th president, he 
proclaimed thorough political and economic reforms without exception under the motto 
of “New Korea Construction”. As a part of its political reform, Kim’s government 
eradicated the corruption and illegality of former politicians and broke the power of the  
military, which had dominated Korea politically and economically for the past 30 years. 
In this process, the previous presidents Chun and Roh were imprisoned for building up  
slush funds during their years of office. In connection with economic and Chaebol 
issues, the Kim government enforced the Real-name Financial Transaction System30 to 
block various financial abuses caused by transactions under unregistered or assumed 
names. It also executed political revenge on Jung Ju Young, the chairman of the 
Hyundai group who had fought against Kim during the presidential election in 1992.  
Approximately 100 of Hyundai’s employees and executives were accused in 1993 of 
violating the election law. 
 
In the early stage of Kim’s government, it achieved a surplus both in the trade 
balance and international payments and receipts. However, the Korean economy began 
to decline after 1994, mainly due to the crash in the price of semiconductors, Korea’s 
major export item31 and the Chaebols’ overlapping investment in the same industries 
(BOK). In these circumstances Kim tried to overcome the national economic slump and 
                                            
30 In August 1993, the Kim government enforced the Real-name Financial Transaction system. Previously, 
individuals or enterprises in Korea made many financial transactions such as opening bank accounts, 
transferring money or investment in securities under unregistered or assumed names. This enabled the 
Chaebols to maintain closer ties with the government by supporting these huge amounts of illicit funds in 
unregistered or assumed names. 
 
31 Korea recorded a deficit of US$4.5 billion in 1994, US$8.9 billion in 1995 and US$23.7 billion in 1996 
in international payments and receipts. The semiconductor price also slumped from US$50 to US$4 
during this period (BOK).  
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to recover his plunging political support ratio through lifting various regulations on the 
Chaebols which involved half of the national economy. As a first step, Kim declared the 
Globalisation Plan for Korea in the meeting of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) in 1994 and provided a base for the Chaebols to achieve quantitative growth. 
As Stephan and Mo (1999) noted, the Korean Development Bank increased loans to the 
Chaebols by 26.1% in 1994 and by 24% in 1995. Consequently, the Chaebols’ 
investment in the manufacturing sector significantly increased and it reached a 38.5% 
annual growth rate between 1994 and 1996. However, the Chaebols’ excessive 
overlapping investment, in particular their debts in car manufacture, petrochemicals, 
steel and electronics worsened their financial structure. Moreover, the government’s 
impatient opening of financial and capital markets to foreign countries without enough 
preparation led Korea to face the financial crisis of 1997.  
 
? Increasing of Foreign Direct Investment  
 
During this period, the Chaebol began large-scale Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
to overseas markets by raising huge loans from both the domestic and international 
capital markets. The history of Korean FDI has been rather short. It began in 1968 with 
a forestry development project in Indonesia. From 1968, the modest growth of FDI 
continued until 1986, when Korea’s first balance of payments surplus was achieved 
(Sakong, 1993). However, since the middle of the 1980s, when Korea first experienced 
double-digit economic growth, its investment has significantly increased. For instance, 
Korea’s outward investment increased 62.4% to US$5.8 billion in 1997 from US$3.5 
billion in 1994. Among many Chaebols, Daewoo was the most active participant in the 
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FDI. It built motor and electronics manufacturing facilities in foreign countries 
including Poland, Rumania, India, Vietnam and Sudan.  
 
(Table 3.20. Korea’s FDI by Destination)                       (Unit: US$ thousand)  
 1994 1995 1996 1997 Cumulative 
Share (%) 
Southeast Asia 1,684,920 2,455,389 3,076,893 2,483,018 44.4
Middle East 164,904 3,591 41,462 49,323 2.97
Europe 638,676 705,754 1,322,526 1,046,463 15.8
North America 824,820 1,438,949 1,195,755 1,207,973 25.77
Latin America 96,208 246,179 421,578 627,805 6.0
Africa 132,186 20,448 37,325 184,201 2.0
Oceania 39,368 78,227 122,448 220,399 3.13
Total  3,581,081 4,948,537 6,217,986 5,819,181 100
(Source: MIFE, Various Years) 
 
At this time, the Chaebols were free to issue bonds and stocks (Chang, 2002) and 
were able to raise funds in overseas markets on their own credit without a payment 
guarantee from the government. Banks also became free to borrow short-term money 
from international money markets. Thereby, the foreign supplies of funds to Korean 
enterprises and financial institutions rapidly increased and these enabled the Chaebols’ 
to participate in the FDI. Moreover, the excessive competition among existing Chaebols 
also stimulated FDI. However, the Chaebols’ excessive borrowing in overseas markets 
and the high competition between them became one of the most important causes of 
their collapse.  
 
? Emergence of Derivative Chaebols 
 
In the 1990s, many new derivative Chaebols were born. For instance, the Halla, 
Kumkang and Sungwoo Groups branched off from the Hyundai Group and Hansol and 
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Shinsegae came from the Samsung Group. In the course of the spin-off, ownership 
passed down to the second and third generation of the founders. Although the new 
owners of derivative Chaebols achieved visible quantitative growth with aggressive 
diversification before long, some new Chaebols brought collapse upon themselves 
because they mainly relied upon imprudent borrowed monies from international capital 
markets. For example, Chang Jin Ho, a son of the Jinro group’s founder, led the group 
to bankruptcy through irrational diversification of its business to construction, 
distribution and electricity rather than investing in its core business of liquor 
manufacturing. Kirk (2000) argued that its figures were the worst of any Chaebol. With 
assets totalling KRW3.8 trillion, it had shareholders’ equity of KRW99 billion for a 
ratio of debt to equity of an astonishing 40 to 1. Jinro’s collapse was only the start. 
Followed by Jinro, Sammi, Haitai and Newcore, Daenong and Halla went into 
insolvency file by file. As a result, 16 Chaebols out of the top 30 Korean business 
groups suffered the most disgraceful fate in their group’s entire history through 
bankruptcy and legal management. After the collapse of the minor groups, the gap 
between the Big Three (Samsung, LG and SK) and the minor Chaebols steadily 
widened. For instance, the Big Three in 2000 achieved a net profit of KRW11 trillion 
whereas the 30 minor Chaebols recorded a deficit of KRW8 trillion (Dong-A Daily 
Newspaper, 2001). 
 
3.6.3. The Chaebols and Korean Financial Crisis 
 
Before the financial crisis in the late 1990s, many countries had paid keen attention 
to the miraculous economic success of certain East Asian countries, such as Korea, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. However, the great Asian crisis which hit 
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the major East-South Asian industrial countries between 1997 and 1998 was already a 
record, notwithstanding what was to come. According to the Financial Times (1998), 
Thailand’s economy was expected to shrink by between 5% and 8% in 1998 whereas 
Indonesia’s national income was likely to fall by 12~13% in the same year. Krugman 
(1998) stressed in Fortune Magazine that Asia was nowhere near having hit bottom; 
even when the region’s currencies seemed to have stopped plunging for the moment, its 
real economies were getting weaker, not stronger. Hong Kong announced that its 
economy had shrunk by 2.8% in the first quarter of 1998, its worst recession since 
World War II. Economists predicted that Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
would fall an astonishing 15.1% in 1998. And it turned out that Japan’s bad bank debt 
was not US$550 billion, as previously reported, but the immense sum of US$1 trillion.  
 
Every crisis may be unique and each country within a region may have unique 
factors that no other country in crisis has. However, one can find some common factors 
and a logic of development to explain why the Asian financial crisis developed as it did. 
Lee (1998) argued that the common factors involved in the development of Asian crisis 
were; i) excessive short-term borrowing in international markets, ii) misallocation of 
investment, in particular in speculative real estate, iii) weak domestic financial systems, 
iv) irrational pessimism or herd mentality, v) relatively small economies exposed to 
disruptive international market forces, vi) government guarantees of loans, vii) 
excessive rapid financial liberalisation without a commensurate strengthening of 
regulation and supervision and viii) lack of transparency and inaccurate information.  
 
The crisis began in Korea with a surprise announcement by the government in late 
1997 that the country was having financial problems and required support from outside. 
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This announcement plunged Korea’s economy into great chaos. Foreign exchange rates 
soared from 848 Korean won per US dollar (KRW848/US$1) in January 1997 to 1,715 
Korean won per dollar (KRW1,715/US$1) by January 1998. The Korean stock 
exchange index tumbled from 699 in January 1997 to 310 in September, 1998 and the 
number of Korean companies going bankrupt increased from 1,000 per month to 3,500 
per month (BOK).  
 
(Figure 3.7. Movements of Exchange Rates and Stock Market Index and Number of 
Bankruptcies) 
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The Korean financial crisis was the product of a combination of accumulated 
economic structural problems and several short-term trigger factors. One of the major 
causes of the crisis was Chaebols’ excessive investment and over-expansion, called Dae 
Ma Bul Sa32; a Big Horse Never Dies. Steers (1999) argued that there were several 
common characteristics among Korea’s most successful business leaders during the 
1970s and 1980s. They are as follows: i) clear-cut vision and goals, ii) considerable 
foresight, iii) strong ambition, iv) rapid decision-making and implementation, v) 
commitment to the national interest and vi) communal spirit. However, regardless of 
these abilities, Korean Chaebols seldom succeed on their own in any culture; they 
require outside support and opportunities through close ties with government and banks. 
The close ties between the Chaebols, the government and the financial institutions 
enabled the Chaebols to pursue their “Dae Ma Bul Sa” policy. Due to this, loans and 
investments were determined not by decisions on the economic profitability of 
businesses, but rather by favouritism and short-sighted executive decisions. In many 
instances, Korean Chaebols simply made poor decisions (Shim and Steers, 2001). For 
instance, the decision by both Samsung and Ssangyong to build luxury passenger cars in 
a market that was already glutted was based more on the whims of corporate leaders 
than on any real need for or competence in such automobiles. Short-sighted executive 
decisions based on limited financial and strategic analyses led both companies to the 
brink of bankruptcy with mounting debts and excess production capacity.  
 
                                            
32 In Chinese characters, Dae Ma Bul Sa, denotes “ a big horse never dies”. It is close to the English 
phrase “too big to fail.” This consensus among the Chaebols surged in the three decades before the 
financial crisis in 1997. Under this policy, most Chaebols focused on external growth through closer ties 
with the government and financial institutions. However, after the bankruptcies of some Chaebols, such 
as Hanbo, Jinro, Kia, Daewoo and Dongah, the consensus began to fade.  
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Lee (1998) argued that Korean government has been a major navigator in the credit 
allocation to certain industries and even to particular companies. The Korean 
government has held its power over big businesses (i.e. the Chaebols) by maintaining 
permission and license rights and other complex regulations. The allocation of resources 
became increasingly distorted in favour of the Chaebols, while the financial sector 
remained underdeveloped and heavily influenced by government and political decisions 
rather than market forces. This created symbiotic relations between the government and 
the Chaebols and as the Chaebols got bigger and bigger, it became increasingly hard for 
the government to stop intervening in the market whenever a particular Chaebol got into 
financial trouble. This relationship created the myth that Korean Chaebols were “Dae 
Ma Bul Sa”. The Western press (The Economist, 1998 and Business Week, 1998) and 
the financial community (IMF, 1998) blamed the Chaebols for being the main culprits 
of the Korean crisis. The Economist (1998) said that the excesses of Korea’s 
conglomerates had helped to bring its economy to near-collapse. The IMF’s assessment 
(1998, p.1) also identified as the root cause of the crisis in the unholy alliance of the 
debt-ridden Chaebols with financial institutions. It said;  
 
“In 1994~1996, Korean conglomerates undertook an aggressive investment 
drive financed by large increases in borrowing from domestic banks, which, in 
turn, sharply increased short-term external borrowing. During 1997, an 
unprecedented number of highly leveraged conglomerates went into 
bankruptcy as the build-up in capacity proved unviable owing to the 
depreciation of the yen, a sharply adverse movement in Korea’s terms of trade 
and the slowing of domestic demand in 1996. The bankruptcies resulted in a 
severe deterioration in the balance sheets of Korean financial institutions” 
 
Korea’s high performing exports in the 1990s were led by semiconductors, steel, 
automobiles, petrochemicals and shipbuilding. The Chaebols in these industries 
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enormously expanded production and investment and as a result their financial structure 
weakened. The Chaebols also increased their investment in foreign countries. Financed 
by foreign credit, the Chaebol’s investment, mostly in Southeast Asia and Europe, 
expanded by 33% in 1995 and 36% in 1996. With these over-borrowings by the 
Chaebols, the external liabilities of domestic firms amounted to US$35.6billion, of 
which US$22 billion was short-term at the end of 1996. The external liabilities of 
domestic firms increased to US$42.3 billion (US$24.7 billion short-term) by the end of 
1997 (Fair Trade Commission).  
 
(Table 3. 21. Total External Liabilities of Korea)                   (Unit: US$ billion)  
 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Financial Institutions 13.9 19.6 27.7 50.4
Private Firms 9.0 10.5 13.6 17.6
Public Sector 3.6 3.0 2.4 18.0
Mid- and Long-
term External 
Debt  
Sub-Total 26.5 33.1 43.7 86.0
Financial Institutions 19.4 29.7 39.9 43.8
Private and Non Financial 
Sector  
11.0 15.6 22.0 24.7
Short-term 
External Debt 
Sub-Total 30.4 45.3 61.0 67.4
Total External Debt 56.9 78.4 104.7 154.4
(Source: Fair Trade Commission) 
 
3.6.4. The Restructuring of Chaebols and Korea’s Economic Reforms 
 
After the Korean government applied for emergency funds from the IMF, the 
guidelines imposed by the IMF and the World Bank greatly influenced the Korean 
government’s subsequent restructuring policies. The IMF rescue loans were not without 
price. The IMF’s conditions for financial support ranged from macroeconomic policy 
frameworks to structural policies including both financial and corporate sector reforms.  
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According to article 32 and 37 of the agreement contracted between the Korean 
government and the IMF, the IMF required the Korean government to implement the 
followings things. First, the IMF demanded liberalisation of foreign investment in the 
Korean equity market by increasing the ceiling on aggregate ownership from 26% to 
50% by the end of 1997 and to 55% by the end of 1998. Second, the IMF demanded an 
improvement in corporate governance structures, that the government should adopt 
international accounting principles to enhance the transparency of the Korean 
accounting system. Third, the IMF ordered no government interference with banks’ 
business operation and lending decisions. Fourth, the IMF demanded a reduction of debt 
levels among Korean firms. Fifth, the IMF demanded changing to the system of mutual 
guarantees within Chaebols to reduce the risk which these guarantees entail (IMF, 
1997).  
 
The government’s response to the crisis, which embraced the restructuring of the 
government, corporate sector and financial sector, was swift and impressive in its depth 
and extent.  
 
? Corporate Sector Reform (Chaebol Reform) 
 
Corporate restructuring was the most urgently needed move, deemed formidable by 
domestic as well as international economic specialists, given the tight relations of the 
government with the Chaebols and their powerful position in the Korean economy. 
 
The Chaebols have been always at the core of the economic problem. Thus, unless 
the Chaebols are reformed, the Korean economy can hardly be restored to international 
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competitiveness. For this reason, Kim’s government immediately followed the IMF 
demands to streamline the Chaebols’ ever-expanding businesses, acknowledging that 
they had been principally to blame for the nation’s economic crisis (Lee, 2000).  
 
As a means of restructuring the Chaebols’, financial restructuring and business 
reforms were recommended. Financial restructuring has focused on five main reforms: 
i) reducing debt-equity ratios to less than 200%, ii) eliminating cross-debt guarantees 
among their affiliates, iii) improving management accountability, iv) enhancing 
management transparency and v) improving smaller Chaebols’ financial structures 
through corporate workout programmes (Chang, 2003; Lee, 2000). The government has 
stipulated that the five rules are pivotal in any full recovery from the country’s 
economic crisis and that they will be a platform for transforming the corporations into 
globally competitive firms.  
 
Under the government-led corporate restructuring plan, substantial progress was 
made in reducing bloated corporate debts. During this period, the top five Chaebols 
reduced their average debt-equity ratios from 477.9% in 1997 to 329.5% in 1998 and 
144.9% in 1997. In 2008, the ratio was finally reduced to 80.06%, which is a significant 
trend over the past ten years (Fair Trade Commission). The following statistics show the 
dramatic reduction of debt-equity ratios over a short period.  
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(Table 3. 22. Changes in the Debt-Equity Ratios of the Top Five Chaebols)  
 
? 1997                   
 Hyundai Samsung LG Daewoo SK Average 
Debt-Equity 
Ratios (%) 
576.6 370.4 504.7 469.2 468.6 477.9  
Number of 
Affiliates 
62 61 52 37 45 51 
 
? 1998                    
 Hyundai Samsung LG Daewoo SK Average 
Debt-Equity 
Ratios (%) 
484.0 252.6 316.5 353.8 240.4 329.5  
Number of 
Affiliates 
57 62 48 36 41 49 
 
? 1999                   
Daewoo  Hyundai Samsung LG SK Average 
Debt-Equity 
Ratios (%) 
152.0 146.0 147.8 133.7 144.9 
Number of 
Affiliates 
35 45 43 
 
Bankrupt
 
39 41 
 
? 2008                    
Daewoo  Hyundai Samsung LG SK Average 
Debt-Equity 
Ratios (%) 
96.31 49.45 75.29 99.17 80.06 
Number of 
Affiliates 
36 59 36 
 
Bankrupt
 
64 49 
(Source: Fair Trade Commission) 
 
? Big Five Reform  
 
The president Dae Jung Kim convened a meeting with the heads of the top five 
Chaebols (Hyundai, Samsung, LG, Daewoo and SK) on January 13, 1998, to come to 
an agreement on “Five Principles” of corporate restructuring: i) enhancing the 
transparency of corporate management, ii) clearing cross-debt guarantees and cross-
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ownership, iii) improving the corporate financial structure, iv) focusing on core 
competent businesses and encouraging cooperation among businesses regardless of their 
size and v) tightening the control on major shareholders’ accountability (Kim, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, from September, 1998, the government implemented the “Big Deal 
Programme” in seven major industries, namely, oil refining, semiconductors, railroad 
vehicle, aerospace, power generation equipment, ship engine and petrochemicals.  
 
(Table 3. 23. Big Deals Programme in Industries)  
 
Industry  Big Deal Programme Date of Completion
Oil Refining Hyundai Oil Co. took over Hanwha Energy Co. June, 1999 
Semiconductor Hyundai Electronics Co. took over LG 
Semiconductor Co. 
July, 1999 
Railroad 
Vehicles 
Hyundai Precision and Industries Co., Daewoo 
Heavy Industries Co. and Hanjin Heavy Industries 
Co. were unified into one company 
July, 1999 
Aerospace Samsung Aerospace Industries Co., Daewoo 
Heavy Industries Co. and Hyundai Space and 
Aircraft Co. were unified into one company 
October, 1999 
Power 
Generation 
Equipment 
Korea Heavy Industries Co. took over Samsung 
Heavy Industries Co. and Hyundai Heavy 
Industries Co.  
November, 1999 
Ship Engines Korea Heavy Industries Co. took over Samsung 
Heavy Industries Co. 
November, 1999 
Petrochemicals The Merger and Acquisition plan between 
Samsung Chemical Co. and Hyundai 
Petrochemical Co. failed due to the failure of 
hosting foreign capitals 
 
(Source: Jeong, J. I. (2006), “Yaehwanwegi Ehoo Giupgujojojeongwe Tooja mit Goyongae Michin 
Younghyang (A Study of the effect of the Korean Firms’ Restructuring Programme on Investment and 
Employment after the Financial Crisis, Press Release Report, The Bank of Korea, p. 5) 
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The purpose of this programme was to reduce dual investment within the same 
industry and to enhance international competitiveness. The programme began with the 
mutual agreement between the Chaebol groups and their creditor banks; six industries 
out of seven successfully completed the programme by the end of November, 1999 
(Jeong, 2006).  
 
As a result of unprecedented corporate restructuring, Korea was praised by the IMF 
and the World Bank as an exemplary model of successful reform. With a remarkable 
turnaround in one and a half years, Korea’s vulnerability to external factors seemed to 
improve greatly: the government strengthened the institutional framework for regulating 
Chaebols’ activities as well as controlling reform processes and financial conditions and 
the corporate structure of the Chaebols also improved.  
 
? Financial Sector Reform  
 
In addition to the reform of the Chaebols, the financial sector also had to be 
restructured. No matter how difficult or how long it would take, restructuring had to be 
done under market mechanisms between financial institutions and business firms (Lee, 
2000).  
 
Before the crisis, Korea’s financial institutions were vassals of the authorities and 
acted as the private cashbox of the Chaebols. It was the creditor banks that Kim’s 
administration used to implement the reform of the Chaebols. In 1998, the government 
required  the Chaebols to sign the “Capital Structure Improvement Agreements” with 
their main creditor banks. But this policy was doomed from the start to fail, in particular 
vis-à-vis the chief Chaebols such as Hyundai and Daewoo. The creditor banks were 
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themselves in serious trouble and they were the targets of Kim’s other reform, financial 
sector restructuring (Lim, 2003).  
 
 
According to the Committee of Public Fund Management, an affiliated firm of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (2008), from November 1997, the government 
started to channel public funds to the financial sector, including commercial banks and 
second-tier financial institutes such as merchant banks, security firms, insurance firms, 
trust banks and savings banks. At the end of October 2006, the total public funding 
infused into the financial sector was KRW168.5 trillion (equivalent to about 
US$147,081 million).  
 
The government transferred public funds in various ways. For instance, the 
government transferred a total KRW86.9 trillion (equivalent to about US$75,808 
million) to banks in the following ways; investment KRW34 trillion (equivalent to 
about US$29,660 million), donations KRW13.9 trillion (equivalent to about US$12,126 
million), purchasing of assets KRW14.4 trillion (equivalent to about US$12,562 
million) and the purchase of bad loans KRW24.6 trillion (equivalent to about 
US$21,460 million). This helped the financially sound commercial banks to exceed the 
“Banks for International Settlement (BIS)” ratios of 10%, which is the international 
standard. 
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(Table 3. 24. Infusion of Public Funds to the Financial Sector: November, 1997 ~ October, 2006)         
(Unit: KRW trillion) 
 Investment Donation Paying 
Deposits  
(on behalf 
of)  
Purchase of 
Assets 
Purchase of 
Bad Loans 
Grand Total 
 Bank 34.0 
(U$29,660m) 
13.9 
(U$12,126m)
- 14.4 
(U$12,562m)
24.6 
(U$21,460m) 
86.9 
(U$75,808m) 
Merchant 
Bank 
2.7 
(U$2,355m) 
0.7 
(U$611m) 
18.3 
(U$15,964m)
- 1.5 
(U$1,309m) 
23.2 
(U$20,239m) 
Security 10.9 
(U$9,509m) 
0.3 
(U$262m) 
0.01 
(U$9m) 
1.9 
(U$1,657m) 
8.5 
(U$7,415m) 
21.6 
(U$18,852m) 
Insurance 15.9 
(U$13,871m) 
3.1 
(U$2,704m) 
- 0.3 
(U$262m) 
1.8 
(U$1,570m) 
21.2 
(U$18,407m) 
Trust 
Bank 
- - 4.8 
(U$4,187m) 
- - 4.8 
(U$4,187m) 
Saving 
Bank 
- 0.4 
(U$349m) 
7.3 
(U$6,368m) 
0.6 
(U$523m) 
0.2 
(U$174m) 
8.4 
(U$7,415m) 
The 
Second-tier  
Financial 
Institutions. 
Sub-total 29.5 
(U$25,735m) 
4.6 
(U$4,013m) 
30.3 
(U$26,433m)
2.9 
(U$2,530m) 
12.0 
(U$10,468m) 
79.3 
(U$69,178m) 
Financial Institutes 
located in Foreign 
Countries 
- - - - 2.4 
(U$2,094m) 
2.4 
(U$2,094m) 
Grand Total 63.5 
(U$55,395m) 
18.5 
(U$16,139m)
30.3 
(U$26,433m)
17.3 
(U$15,092m)
39.0 
(U$34,022m) 
168.5 
(U$147,081m)
(Source: The Committee of Public Fund Management, Ministry of Finance and Economy, 2008) 
 
? Currency Conversion Rates: KRW1,146.31/US$ (Average values from 1997 to 2006) 
 
 
3.7. Conclusion and Discussion  
 
This chapter examined the nature of Korean GTCs, the Chaebols and their impact 
on Korea’s national economic development. Indeed, the Korean GTCs – the growth 
engines of the Korean Chaebols, with a number of unique characteristics and a variety 
of functions – played an important part in the process of national economic growth.  
 
In the process of Korea’s national economic development, mention of the Korean 
GTCs is inevitable. Since the early 1960s, exports have been a primary growth engine 
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for the Korean economy. During this period, the GTCs have complied quite 
successfully with the Korean government’s goal of achieving rapid export growth. The 
reason for their success is that most of them were functioning as trading firms when 
they were appointed as GTCs. Thus, they had already accumulated substantial know-
how and experience in export operations.  
 
The initial goal of the Korean government was to develop the GTCs as giant 
enterprises pursuing economies of scale with highly diversified products and services in 
the world market. Since their foundation, Korean GTCs have met the government’s 
specification and, as a result, they have enjoyed a great reputation, receiving various 
preferential treatment from the government. Despite their devotion to the national 
economic growth for the past three decades, however, they together with their parent 
companies, the Chaebols, have been criticised as a cause of the national economic crisis 
which occurred in 1997.  
 
The national economic crisis in 1997 was a turning point for most Korean big 
business groups, including the GTCs. In particular, many Chaebol groups undertook 
organisational reconstruction in accordance with the guidelines imposed by the 
government. The GTCs were no exception. External and internal conditions also 
threatened the GTCs future business. In view of their situation, now is the right time for 
the GTCs to retrieve their reputation through strategic management, including effective 
decision-making.  
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CHAPTER 4. THE SOGO SHOSHAS AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to investigate the nature of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas and their 
impact on Japan’s national economy. First, it reviews the history and development of the 
Sogo Shoshas. Second, the present Sogo Shoshas in Japan will be reviewed. This section 
will investigate their strategies, major business areas, financial performance, the number 
of their employees and the number of their overseas branch offices. Third, it reviews the 
management system within the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, such as the organisational 
structure, corporate culture, the decision-making process, ownership/corporate 
governance and human resource management. Fourth, the Sogo Shoshas’ recent 
financial performance, for example, their revenues, profitability and stability, will be 
reviewed. Last, it studies the relationship between the Zaibatsu, Keiretsu, Sogo Shoshas 
and the Japanese economy.  
 
4.2. The History and Development of the Sogo Shoshas33
 
The origin of the Sogo Shosha dated back to the early days of the Meiji Era 
(1868~1912)34, when Japan was about to transform itself from an aging feudal state to a 
                                            
33 This part is summarised from “The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005” 
 
34 The Meiji period denotes the 45-year reign of the Meiji Emperor, running from 8 September 1868 to 30 
July 1912. During this time, Japan started its modernisation and rose to world power status. It was a time 
of rapid modernisation and Westernisation. Feudal domains were abolished and replaced with prefectures; 
daimyo and samurai were relieved of their special privileges. To secure a strong central government, a 
national army was formed and universal conscription was enacted. A new agricultural tax was instituted 
to finance the new government and a decimal currency was introduced. Eager to encourage economic 
growth, the government aided the textile industry, established railways and shipping lines and founded an 
ironworks industry. Education was also reformed and compulsory coeducational elementary schools were 
introduced. Economic reforms included a unified modern currency based on the yen, banking, 
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modern nation. With the change from the Edo period to the Meiji era in 1868, Japan 
started to enter international markets. Before this time, Japan had been closed to the 
outside world for nearly 200 years, because there had been no merchants with 
experience in international trade. In those two centuries, Japanese goods were traded 
through foreign merchants; thus, trading was often disadvantageous to the Japanese 
(Yoshihara, 1987). The European traders first reached Japan toward the beginning of the 
17th century. The East India Companies of the Dutch and the British arrived in Japan in 
1609 and 1613 respectively. By the second half of the 19th century, European traders 
dominated Japan’s import market. In order to protect the national economy from 
Western invasion, Japanese government policy makers and business people recognised 
the need for Japan to organise its own trade.  
 
Competing with Western traders was not easy, but with the blessing and active 
assistance of the government, Japan’s first trading firms found ways to improve their 
competitive skills. One of the main strategies employed was to concentrate trading 
functions in a limited number of specialised companies. Major business interests, such 
as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, established specialised trading houses to master the 
techniques of international trade and by so doing fulfilled one of the most important 
tasks of the time, namely the importing of modern technology, plants and equipment in 
order to raise Japan’s profile as a modern industrial state. To compete with foreign 
                                                                                                                                
commercial and tax laws, stock exchanges and a communications network. Establishing a modern 
institutional framework conducive to an advanced capitalist economy took time but was completed by the 
1890s. By this time, the government had largely relinquished direct control of the modernisation process, 
primarily for budgetary reasons. The government was initially involved in economic modernisation, 
providing a number of “model factories” to ease the transition to the modern period. After the first twenty 
years of the Meiji period, the industrial economy expanded rapidly until about 1920 with inputs of 
advanced Western technology and large private investments. Stimulated by wars and through cautious 
economic planning, Japan emerged from World War I as a major industrial nation. After the death of the 
Meiji Emperor in 1912, the Taisho Emperor took the throne, thus beginning the Taisho Period (Japan 
Reference, 2006). 
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merchants, trading companies had to be large in scale. Government assistance and 
protection were offered to willing merchants. Therefore, the Meiji government 
encouraged the traditional Zaibatsu (large Japanese conglomerates controlled by 
powerful families) to participate in founding trading companies. Three Zaibatsus 
complied with the government’s offer. They were Mitsui, C.Itoh and Suzuki Shoten. 
They established trading companies in 1876, 1872 and 1877 respectively. The result 
was entirely satisfactory to the government. By 1918, the three companies had captured 
80 percent of Japan’s total import volume. With the support of the government, these 
Zaibatsus organised vertical and horizontal combinations of companies, including 
banking, marketing and manufacturing. Control of these conglomerate-style business 
groups resulted in family ownership of firms through holding companies. Some of the 
companies concentrated on one or a few sectors, such as textiles, metals, or mining: 
others, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, expanded to include a variety of industries and 
activities. These Zaibatsus dominated Japanese industry and the finance sector until 
World War II.  
 
However, after World War II, the Zaibatsu were dissolved through anti-monopoly 
legislation. In 1946, holding companies were declared illegal by the Allied Occupation 
Authorities as incompatible with a free market economy. The Zaibatsu were required to 
dissolve their ownership in their holding companies. This produced a great number of 
specialised trading companies, such as Marubeni, Tomen, Nissho-Iwai and Nichimen. 
The dissolution of the Zaibatsu was halted in 1949 and the Korean War in 1959 gave 
the Zaibatsu great opportunities for re-grouping and re-growth. Specialised trading 
companies and Zaibatsu type trading companies were naturally transformed into the 
contemporary Sogo Shosha.  
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Cho (1987) and Murofushi (1998) analysed the evolutionary process of Sogo 
Shoshas after World War II in terms of function, as follows:  
 
i) The 1950s (Period of Growth):  
The Korean War revealed Japanese trading companies’ vulnerability to sudden 
changes in the external economic environment and confirmed the importance for 
their future of widely-based internationalisation. Continued stagnation in the trade 
sector forced the Japanese government to contemplate public support programmes. 
The result was the implementation of various government subsidies for Japanese 
trading companies in 1953. Active government support programmes helped the 
Sogo Shoshas to rationalise their traditional operations and to increase their product 
range (Cho, 1987). 
 
ii) The 1960s (Period of Decline):  
Due to the manufacturing firms’ direct participation in trading, as well as 
diseconomies of scale resulting from too diversified product ranges, the Sogo 
Shoshas experienced a sharp decline as trading institutions. To stop this decline 
becoming permanent, the Sogo Shoshas searched for a new function. Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi are examples of functional diversification (Cho, 1987). 
 
iii) The 1970s (Period of Criticism):  
There was, first, a slowdown in the rate of growth of the Japanese economy. Second, 
there was a shift in the economic and industrial structure of Japan. Third, export 
activities after the fluctuation of currencies in 1971 made exports less predictable. 
Increased competition among the Sogo Shoshas fuelled inflation in Japan. As a 
result, they became the subject of public criticism (Cho, 1987). 
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iv) The 1980s (Period of Uncertainty):  
Small and medium sized companies and technology-intensive industries in Japan 
started gaining direct access to financial institutions and international markets, 
effectively undermining the traditional role of the Sogo Shoshas. Many, though not 
all, changed their strategic decisions by emphasising third-country trade, foreign 
direct investment and investment in research and development (Cho, 1987). 
 
v) The 1990s (Period of Management Reform for Globalisation):  
The Sogo Shoshas came to grips with the task of reforming their management 
structure. They shared the agenda items of giving the company a constitution which 
would ensure profits even at times of low growth, building a management system 
adapted to the hyper-information society and globalisation and refining their 
capabilities and functions (Murofushi, 1998). 
 
4.3. The Present Sogo Shoshas in Japan35
 
4.3.1. Mitsui and Co., Ltd. 
 
Mitsui Group is one of the largest corporate conglomerates (Keiretsu) in Japan and 
one of the largest publicly traded companies in the world. It was founded by Takatoshi 
Mitsui (1622–1694), who was the second son of a shopkeeper in Matsuzaka. His father 
originally sold miso, a fermented soybean paste and ran a pawn shop. Later, the family 
built a second shop in Edo (now called Tokyo). Takatoshi moved to Tokyo when he 
was 14 years old and was later joined by his elder brother. He had shown outstanding 
business talent even when very young. But his brother’s jealousy sent him back to Mie 
                                            
35 This part is summarised from various data such as Company Brochures, Annual Reports, Internet 
Websites and “The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas” 
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when he was 28 years old. He waited for 24 years until his older brother died before he 
could take over Echigoya. He opened a new branch in 1673; a large gofukuya (kimono 
shop) in Nihombashi, a district in the heart of Tokyo. Later the Gofukuya division 
separated from Mitsui and is now called Mitsukoshi. In 1683, Takatoshi opened a 
money exchange in Tokyo. Soon the shop began providing dry goods to the government 
of the city of Edo. At the time, the Edo authorities had struck a business deal with 
Osaka that it could pay its land tax by selling crops and other materials. The money was 
then sent to Edo – but moving money was dangerous in feudal Japan. The “exchange 
shop” facilitated transfers without the risk. In July, 1876, the Mitsui Bank, Japan’s first 
private bank, was founded, with Takashi Masuda (1848 -1938) as president. The Mitsui 
Bank, which after a merger with the Taiyo-Kobe Bank in the mid-1980s became part of 
Sakura Bank, survives as part of the Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation. The group 
currently associated with the Mitsui family includes Mitsui and Co. Ltd., Mitsui 
Construction Co., Mitsui engineering and Shipbuilding Co., Mitsui Mining and 
Smelting Co., Mitsui Mining Co., Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd. and Mitsui Petrochemical 
Industries Ltd.  
 
Within the Mitsui Group, Mitsui and Co. Ltd. is the Sogo Shosha, which was 
established in 1947 under its original name of Daiichi Bussan with a capitalisation of 
JPY195,000 and 37 employees. In 1949 it was listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and 
throughout the 1950s contributed significantly to Japan’s postwar economic recovery 
through its advances into foreign trade. In 1959, the Company integrated with other 
trading companies and changed its name to Mitsui and Co., Ltd. It now has almost 
6,000 employees and a total of 158 branch offices around the world.  
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In 2007, its revenue was US$99,367 million, gross profit was US$1,857 million 
and net income was US$1,033 million. Its major stockholders are the Master Trust Bank 
of Japan, Japan Trustee Services Bank, Mitsui Life Insurance Company, Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking Corporation, The Chuo Mitsui Trust and Banking Company, State 
Street Bank and Trust Company and Nippon Life Insurance Co., Ltd. 
 
The Company’s main businesses include sales, manufacturing, exports/imports and 
international trade and services in the following fields: metal products and minerals, 
machinery, electronics and information, chemicals, energy, consumer products and 
services (retail), foods, textiles and fashion, general merchandise and various services, 
financial markets and logistics and transportation. Mitsui Co., Ltd. is also diversifying 
services, exploring and developing natural resources, making commercial investments, 
developing technologies in new businesses and much more.  
 
With respect to its medium-term management plan and management philosophy, 
the Company adopted in 2004 a new medium-term management outlook for the next 
three to five years. The key elements of the approach outlined in the new plan are i) 
building a business portfolio which meets the needs of customers and of society, ii) 
leveraging business engineering across the Group and optimising the allocation of 
resources and iii) prioritising the development of human resources. The table below 
shows the Company’s management philosophy. 
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(Table 4.1. Mitsui and Co., Ltd.’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management 
Philosophy 
Promoting Strategies 
Portfolio Strategy ? Selection and concentration 
? Reorganisation of business units (old and new 
business units) 
? Investments in strategic areas (core areas: mineral, 
energy and plant project, key area: foods and retail 
business, lifestyle related business and motor and 
vehicle related business) 
? Reallocation of human resources (reallocation 
within Mitsui group and among business units)  
Value Chain 
Strategy 
? Optimise value chain 
? Value chain integration among upstream, middle 
stream and downstream 
Mitsui and Co., 
Ltd. 
Human Resource 
Policy 
• Cultivating the next generation of global 
executives and leaders 
• Offering managerial training opportunities 
• Development of regional human resources 
(Source: Annual Report of Mitsui and Co., Ltd. and The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
 
4.3.2. Mitsubishi Corporation 
 
The Mitsubishi Group, Mitsubishi Group of Companies, or Mitsubishi Companies, 
all refer to a large grouping of independently operated Japanese companies which share 
the Mitsubishi brand name. While the companies are autonomous, they share the brand 
name and trademark, as well as a common legacy. The first Mitsubishi company was a 
shipping firm which Yataro Iwasaki established in 1870. In 1873 it took the name 
Mitsubishi Shokai. The name Mitsubishi has two parts: “mitsu” means “three” and 
“bishi” means “water chestnut” and hence “rhombus”, which is reflected in the 
company’s logo. Another translation is “three diamonds”. The company bought into 
coal mining in 1881 by acquiring the Takashima mine, using the produce to fuel their 
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extensive steamship fleet. They also diversified into shipbuilding, banking, insurance, 
warehousing and trade. Later diversification carried the organisation into such sectors as 
paper, steel, glass, electrical equipment, aircraft, oil and real estate. Mitsubishi’s  
broadly based conglomerate played a central role in the modernisation of Japanese 
industry. At the start of the 20th century the company, which by itself accounted for 
over half of the Japanese merchant fleet, entered into a period of diversification that 
would eventually result in the creation of three entities: a) Mitsubishi Bank (now a part 
of the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group. After its mergers with the Bank of Tokyo in 
1996 and UFJ Holdings in 2004, this became Japan’s largest bank, b) Mitsubishi 
Corporation (founded in 1950, Japan’s largest Sogo Shosha) and c) Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries.  
 
Within the Mitsubishi Group, Mitsbishi Corporation is the Sogo Shosha, which 
was established in 1950. It now has almost 5,500 employees and 123 branch offices 
around the world. In 2007, its revenue was US$94,861 million, gross profit was 
US$1,666 million and net income was US$1,570 million. Its major stockholders are the 
Master Trust Bank of Japan, Japan Trustee Services Bank, Tokyo Marine and Nichido 
Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company, Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries, State Street Bank and Trust Company, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, 
the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Nomura Trust and Banking Co., Ltd. 
 
Mitsubishi Corporation is involved in a broad and diverse range of businesses. 
These include domestic and overseas transactions of products in the fields of energy, 
metals, machinery, chemicals and living-essentials. The Company also provides diverse 
types of business services in the areas of information, financing, logistics and others, 
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while investing in business projects on a global scale. With respect to its medium-term 
management plan and management philosophy, Mitsubishi Corporation announced its 
plan, “Innovation 2007: opening up a new era”. The main goal of this plan was 
numerical targets and investment plans.  
 
(Table 4.2. Mitsubishi Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategies 
Strengthen Core Business ? Natural resource development (gas, 
crude oil, metal) 
? Financial services 
? Automobile operations 
? Foods 
Develop Human Assets ? Motivate employees and enhance their 
business sensitivity 
? Nurture and retain human resources 
? Revise personnel evaluation system 
(performance-based evaluation) 
Portfolio Management  ? Selection and concentration strategy 
? Low risk and medium return strategy 
Mitsubishi 
Corporation 
E-commerce Strategy ? Establishment of business model 
integrating IT (information technology), 
FT (financial technology), LT (logistics 
technology), MT (marketing 
technology) 
(Source: Annual Report of Mitsubishi Corporation and The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
 
The following is an outline of the key points of the Company’s revised plan: i) 
three basic concepts (grasp change and open up a new era for Mitsubishi Corporation, 
develop human assets and reinforce internal systems), ii) consolidate net income of at 
least JPY400 billion or more in the fiscal year ending March 2009 and onward to the 
subsequent “jump” period, iii) an Return on Equity (ROE) of 15% over the medium and 
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long terms, iv) investing JPY1,200 billion over the 2-year period covering the fiscal 
year ending March 2007 and the fiscal year ending March 2008, mainly in strategic 
fields, v) investment assets of within 1.5 times the shareholders’ equity and vi) a 
consolidated payout ratio of 15% or more. The table below shows the Company’s 
management philosophy. 
 
4.3.3. Sumitomo Corporation 
 
The Sumitomo Group is a family of related Japanese companies, or Keiretsu. It is 
named after its founder, Masatomo Sumitomo and started as a store selling medicine 
and books in 1630. Masatomo Sumitomo’s brother-in-law, Riemon Soga, who ran a 
copper smelting and smithing business at the time, soon developed a new smelting 
technique called Nanban-buki which extracted the silver from raw copper. Tomomochi 
Sumitomo, the eldest son of Riemon Soga, disclosed this technique to other copper 
smelters and made a name for the Sumitomo family as the origin of the Nanban-buki 
technique. This gave Sumitomo the ability to rise to the top in copper mining and 
refining until the late 1800s when the company began to enter other industries, such as 
banking, warehousing, electric cable production and more. Today, the Sumitomo Group 
is still run according to the “Founder’s Precepts” written by Masatomo Sumitomo in the 
seventeenth century. The Group consists of 44 companies (chemicals, machinery, 
finance and insurance, steel, nonferrous metals, commerce, mining, warehousing and 
transportation, ceramics, construction, rubber products, electronics, electric equipment, 
services, real estate, etc.) and the main firms of the Group are Sumitomo Corporation 
(Sogo Shosha), Sumitomo Bank and Sumitomo Metal Mining Co., Ltd.  
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Sumitomo Corporation is the Sogo Shosha within the Group; it was founded in 
1919. It now has around 5,000 employees and 122 brach offices around the world. In 
2007, its revenue was US$49,935 million, gross profit was US$1,669 million and net 
income was US$612 million. Its major stockholders are the Master Trust Bank of Japan, 
Japan Trustee Services Bank, Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd., Sumitomo Life 
Insurance Company, Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company, The Chase Manhattan 
Bank and Nippon Life Insurance Company. Sumitomo Corporation aims to be a global 
organisation which constantly stays a step ahead in dealing with change, creates new 
value and contributes to society. Its management philosophy is threefold: i) ‘to achieve 
prosperity and realise dreams’ through sound business activities, ii) to place prime 
importance on integrity and sound management with the utmost respect for individual 
and iii) to foster a corporate culture full of vitality and conducive to innovation.  
 
With respect to the Company’s business activities, the Sumitomo Corporation 
engages in diverse business activities throughout its world-wide network. These include 
various domestic and overseas transactions and the import and export of a wide range of 
goods and commodities and also a wide range of services and investments, in such 
fields as metals, transportation and construction systems, machinery and electricity, the 
media, electronics and networks, chemicals, mineral resources and energy, consumer 
goods and services, materials and real estate and finance and logistics. In addition, the 
Company has been selecting its core businesses for high profitability and growth 
potential since 1988. It has engaged in downstream retailing directly to consumers and 
in the communications business, Portal services and Electronic Commerce as strategic 
business areas.  
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Regarding the Company’s medium-term management plan, the Sumitomo 
Corporation launched its two-year medium-term management plan (FY2005 ~ FY2006) 
in 2004, named the “AG Plan.”36 Under this plan, the Company set quantitative targets 
of i) a risk-adjusted return ratio of over 7.5% and ii) net income of JPY230 billion. In 
addition to pursuing these quantitative targets, in order to build a foundation for 
sustained growth, Sumitomo Corporation adopted a set of basic policies to implement 
on a globally consolidated basis under the AG Plan, namely, i) the expansion of its 
earnings base through dynamic growth strategies, ii) implementation of human resource 
strategies matching its growth strategies and iii) the pursuit of soundness and efficiency. 
 
(Table 4.3. Sumitomo Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategies 
Expansion of the Earning 
Base  
? Strategic move to the future by 
maximising ‘integrated corporate 
strength’ 
? Exploring and developing various 
businesses  
? Tackling new technology, potential 
market and region 
HRM ? Optimal configuration of human 
resources 
? Utilising management and human 
resources to the fullest extent  
Sumitomo 
Corporation 
Enhancing Corporate 
Strength  
? Enhance corporate strength with 
efficiency and soundness 
? Efficient group operation on a global 
basis 
? Advancing risk management 
(Source: Annual Report of Sumitomo Corporation and The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
 
                                            
36 “AG” is short for “Achievement and Growth.” 
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4.3.4. Marubeni Corporation  
 
The Marubeni Corporation was founded in 1949. It now has over 5,000 employees, 
13 domestic offices and 48 overseas branches and offices and 23 overseas corporate 
subsidiaries with 73 offices for a total of 121 offices in 72 countries. In 2007, its 
revenue was US$54,754 million, gross profit was US$1,075 million and net income was 
US$400 million. Its major stockholders are the Japan Trustee Services Bank, the Master 
Trust Bank of Japan, Sompo Japan Insurance Company, The Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Tokyo Marine and Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., Nippon Life Insurance Company 
and Goldman Sachs International. 
 
The major activities of Marubeni Corporation’s business group are sales and trade 
in a wide range of products and commodities. In addition, the Company offers various 
financing and project-organising services to customers and also works in diversified 
businesses such as natural resource development and investment in leading-edge 
technologies. The Company breaks its operating segments into 12 segments, identified 
by product and service, agric-marine products, textiles, forest products and general 
merchandise, chemicals, energy, metals and mineral resources, transportation and 
industrial machinery, power projects, information and communication, plant, ship and 
infrastructure projects, development and construction and finance, logistics and new 
business. 
 
With respect to Marubeni Corporation’s medium-term management plan and 
management philosophy, it announced its “G Plan” in 2005. “G Plan” is a two-year plan 
(FY2006 ~ FY2007) for Marubeni to accelerate its growth toward further achievement.  
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(Table 4.4. Marubeni Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management 
Philosophy 
Promoting Strategies 
Commodity Trade ? Advancement and combination of trading house 
functions (organising, planning, financing, 
logistics, etc) 
? Quick response to change in industrial structure
Project Solution 
Services 
? Offer solution services to customers with 
accumulated and integrated expertise as an 
organiser, developer and consultant 
? Promote superior new projects and increase 
related businesses 
? Arrange structured finance or third-party 
partnerships 
? Organise first stage of feasibility study 
Portfolio 
Management 
? Selection and concentration strategy 
? Allocation of management resources with 
priority (expansion, growth, support, 
restructuring and withdrawal)  
Marubeni 
Corporation 
Cash Flow 
Management 
? Increase net profit 
? Reduction of working capital 
? Prevention of bad debts 
? Reduction of fixed assets 
(Source: Annual Report of Marubeni Corporation and The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
 
While it firmly maintains a position of “defence” through refining its management 
system, through the G Plan, the Company will shift to the “offence” posture by 
expanding its business domain, further sophistication and diversification of their 
function as a Sogo Shosha and aggressive investment in strategic fields. The Company 
achieves sustainable growth, with its diverse human resources challenged positively and 
vitally. While maintaining a balance between “offence” and “defence”, the Company 
works to selectively apply management resources in priority fields (through a new 
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investment of JPY500~600 billion over two years), to continue thoroughly 
implementing portfolio management, strengthening risk management, promoting human 
resource deployment and education and leveraging overall strengths through lateral 
collaboration (collaboration between divisions, etc.) The quantitative targets are to limit 
risk assets to within the size of shareholders’ equity, achieve a two-year consolidated 
net income of JPY220 billion, a risk-return of over 10%, an Return on Assets (ROA) of 
over 2% and total assets of approximately JPY5trillion. The table below shows the 
Company’s management philosophy. 
 
4.3.5. Itochu Corporation 
 
Itochu Group, formerly C. Itochu, was initially founded as a kimono retail store in 
1858 by Chubei Ito. It gradually evolved from pure buying and selling to manufacturing, 
supplying, exporting and investments. After various mergers and acquisitions, it was 
incorporated in 1949. It now ranks as one of the largest Sogo Shosha companies in 
Japan and among the world’s largest companies; it has 1,027 subsidiaries and associated 
companies operating in over 80 countries. Itochu Corporation currently has seven major 
divisions or business groups: textiles, foods, grain and canned goods, aerospace, 
electronics and multimedia, financial, realty insurance and merchandise services, such 
as foreign exchange and leasing, petroleum and nuclear energy.  
 
Within the Group, Itochu Corporation is the Sogo Shosha founded in 1949. It now 
has over 4,000 employees, 18 domestic offices and 135 overseas branches and offices 
around the world. In 2007, its revenue was US$51,699 million, gross profit was 
US$1,367 million and net income was US$824 million. Its major stockholders are the 
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Japan Trustee Services Bank, the Master Trust Bank of Japan, Mitsui Sumitomo 
Insurance Co., Ltd., Nippon Life Insurance Company, Tokyo Marine and Nichido Fire 
Insurance and Nipponkoa Insurance Co., Ltd. The major activities of Itochu 
Corporation’s business are engaged in the domestic trading, import/export and overseas 
trading of various products such as textiles, machinery, information and 
communications-related products, metals, products related to oil and other energy 
sources, general merchandise, chemicals and provisions and food. With respect to 
Itochu Corporation’s medium-term management plan, it pursues the three principles of 
“Challenge, Create and Commit.”  
 
(Table 4.5. Itochu Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategies 
Development of New 
Earnings and Growth 
Engines 
? Expand earnings and develop new 
businesses 
? Gradual shift to new businesses for 
future  
? Focus on ‘Super Powerful and Attractive 
Business Areas’ such as IT and the 
media, natural resources, solutions, 
synthetic fibre and foodstuffs 
Solid and Sound 
Management 
? Greater financial soundness 
? Enhancing the capacity for risk 
management 
? Setting up transparent corporate 
governance 
Itochu 
Corporation 
Flexible HRM ? Motivating and encouraging employees 
? Providing employees with appropriate 
rewards 
? Optimal configuration of human 
resources 
(Source: Annual Report of Itochu Corporation and The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
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The Company’s major strategies are i) a shift to aggressive business (expand 
earnings and creating new business) and ii) establishing solid management (further 
improvement of financial position, enhancement of risk management, establishment of 
highly transparent corporate governance and reinforcement of internal control). 
 
4.3.6. Sojitz Corporation (Nissho Iwai and Nichimen) 
 
The Sojitz Corporation is a Sogo Shosha created through the merging of Nichimen 
Corporation and Nissho Iwai Corporation in 2003, both of which had over a century of 
trading history. The Nichimen Corporation was founded in 1892 and the Nissho Iwai 
Corporation in 1928. It now has almost 2,000 employees, 8 domestic offices and 64 
overseas branches and offices around the world. In 2007, its revenue was US$24,680 
million, gross profit was US$567 million and net income was US$183 million. Its major 
stockholders are the Japan Trustee Services Bank, the Master Trust Bank of Japan, 
Morgan Stanley Japan Securities Co., Ltd., Lehman Brothers Asia Capital Company 
and the State Street Bank and Trust Company. Sojitz’s business activities are wide-
ranging, covering machinery and aerospace, energy and mineral resources, chemicals 
and plastics, real estate development and forest products, consumer lifestyle-related 
business and new business development.  
 
With respect to its medium-term management plan (FY2006 ~ FY2008), it 
announced the fundamental policy of a new stage to deliver sustained growth through 
specific measures which included i)  further enhancing growth strategies, ii) 
accelerating capital and financial strategies and iii) upgrading risk management. 
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(Table 4.6. Sojitz Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategies 
Growth Strategies ? Reaching  a stage of sustained growth 
by leveraging the company’s strengths 
to expand functions and business 
investment 
Capital and Financial 
Strategies 
? Speeding up financial restructuring and 
further stabilising the funding structure 
Sojitz 
Corporation 
Upgrading Risk 
Management 
? Enhancing and upgrading the 
company’s risk management structure 
and maintaining a high-quality portfolio
(Source: Internet Web Site of Sojitz Corporation, 2008) 
 
4.3.7. Tomen Corporation (Toyota Tsusho Corporation)  
 
The Tomen Corporation started its business in 1920 as Toyo Menka Kaisha Ltd. by 
spinning off the cotton division of Mitsui & Co., Ltd.  The Company merged with the 
Toyota Group and changed its name to Toyota Tsusho Corporation in 2006. However, 
the name Tomen Corporation is widely used in Japan as well as in overseas markets. 
The Company engages in business activities in a variety of fields across the globe. 
These business activities include sales transactions relating to a broad range of products 
and also the manufacturing, processing, investing and servicing of such products. 
Tomen Corporation’s business activities are wide-ranging, covering metals, machinery 
and electronics, automotive, energy and chemicals and foodstuffs.  
 
In 2007, its revenue was US$36,558 million, gross profit was US$1,004 million 
and net income was US$292 million. With respect to the Company’s management 
strategies, it aims to make further growth by creating next-generation businesses in six 
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business domains, namely, metals, machinery and electronics, automotive, energy and 
chemicals, food and consumer products. In order to implement its management 
strategies, it announced ‘Three G Values’ – Global, Growing and Generating.  
 
(Table 4.7. Tomen (Toyota Tsusho) Corporation’s Management Philosophy)  
Name of the 
Sogo Shosha 
Management Philosophy Promoting Strategies 
Global  ? Development of the Company’s 
activities on the global stage 
Growing ? Sustaining a healthy yet growing 
morale and passion 
Tomen (Toyota 
Tsusho) 
Corporation 
Generating ? Constant generation of new businesses 
(Source: Internet Web Site of Toyota Tsusho Corporation, 2008) 
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4.4. The Management System within the Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
4.4.1. Organisational Structure 
 
Before examining the organisational structure of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, it is 
essential to review the position of the Sogo Shosha in its Keiretsu group. Each Keiretsu 
has one Sogo Shosha, which is positioned at the heart of the Keiretsu. Most Sogo 
Shoshas are considered so important that they are part of the nucleus of the group, 
together with the main bank; in the Mitsui Group, indeed, the Sogo Shosha was 
traditionally more influential than the bank. In all six Keiretsu groups, the Sogo Shoshas 
play the same critical role, helping to coordinate group activities through every aspect of 
commerce. In the Mitsubishi Group, for example, there are main three firms: Mitsubishi 
Corporation, Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry. Mitsubishi Shoji – in    
English, Mitsubishi Corporation – is the Sogo Shosha.  
 
In their organisational structure, all Sogo Shoshas are divided into administrative 
and product departments. The former are engaged in support activities (finance, 
shipping, etc) and housekeeping activities (accounting, auditing, etc.). The latter 
undertake business operations. Their number varies somewhat from one Sogo Shosha to 
another, but most Sogo Shoshas have 10 to 15 departments (iron and steel, textiles, non-
ferrous and light metals, machinery, energy, chemicals, etc.). Each department is further 
divided into divisions, for example, the chemicals department is divided into inorganic 
chemicals, organic chemicals, fine chemicals, plastics, etc. (Kunio, 1982). 
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(Figure 4.1. The Position of the Sogo Shosha in the Keiretsu: Mitsubishi Group) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Internet Web Site of Mitsubishi Group, 2008) 
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industry 
Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi  
Mitsubishi Corp. 
(Sogo Shosha) 
Mitsubishi 
Gas Chemical
Mitsubishi Steel 
Mfg.   
Nippon 
Oil 
Mitsubishi 
Materials 
Mitsubishi 
Aluminum 
Mitsubishi 
Construction 
Mitsubishi 
Rayon 
Mitsubishi 
Estate 
Kirin 
Holdings
Nikon 
Mitsubishi 
Chemical 
Mitsubishi 
Logistics 
Mitsubishi 
Electric 
Asahi 
Glass 
Mitsubishi 
Research Inst. 
Nippon 
Yusen 
Mitsubishi 
Mitsubishi 
Plastic  
Mitsubishi 
Paper Mills 
Tokio Marine & 
Fire Insurance 
Mitsubishi 
Cable 
Kakoki 
Mitsubishi 
Motor 
 
 
In most Sogo Shoshas, all products departments are profit centres and the head of 
department manages a department as if it was an independent company. Departmental 
heads are responsible to either executive managing directors or vice-presidents and the 
president presides over all. Thus, the chain of command runs from the president to the 
executive managing directors or vice-presidents, to departments heads and then to 
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division heads. This organisational structure of the Sogo Shosha is the structure which 
Mitsui developed for itself at the beginning of the twentieth century. Certainly, the 
number of products handled and the volume of trade have increased and the 
organisations have become much bigger, but the essential organisational features have 
remained the same.  
 
The current organisational structure of Sumitomo Corporation, for example, 
consists of 5 corporate/administrative groups and 8 business groups. The  business 
groups (for metal products, transportation and construction, machinery and electrical 
goods, media and network, chemicals, mineral resources and energy, consumer goods 
and services, and finance and logistics) make up 37 departments or divisions. The table 
below shows the organisational structure of the major Sogo Shoshas by the number of 
departments or employees.  
 
(Table 4.8. Organisational Structure of Japanese Major Sogo Shoshas in 2008) 
 Sumitomo Mitsubishi Mitsui 
Number of Corporate/Administrative 
Groups/Units 
5 N/A N/A
Number of Business Groups/Units 8 6 14
Number of Department/Divisions under 
Business Groups/Units 
37 37 N/A
Number of employees including 
executives 
5,008 5,454 5,869
(Source: Annual Report of each Sogo Shosha, 2008) 
 
With respect to global networks, most Sogo Shoshas divide the world into seven 
geographical regions: Japan, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, the US and North America, 
Central America and South America and Oceania. The table below shows the numbers 
of Sogo Shoshas’ overseas branches and employees.  
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(Table 4.9. Number of Overseas Branch of Major Japanese Sogo Shoshas in 2008) 
 Sumitomo Mitsubishi Mitsui 
Number of Overseas Branches 122 123 158
Resident 
Representatives 
786 588 758Number of 
Employees 
Local Employees 593 1,212 1,152
(Source: Annual Report of each Sogo Shosha, 2008) 
? Note: Number of employees according to data of 2005 
 
4.4.2. Corporate Culture  
 
The underlying Japanese societal culture is that Japanese people believe the self to 
be deeply embedded in social relationships. Hamaguchi (1988) argued that there is little 
confidence in the power of the individual to devise, control and execute his or her own 
destiny, in particular if the planning runs counter to the prevailing external social and 
structural norms and conditions. Debroux (2003) further stressed that social structures 
have generated a durable cohesion in all periods and places throughout Japan’s history. 
As Hayashi (1988) suggested, from an historical perspective, Japanese management can 
be regarded as an evolutionary product of the ‘rice culture’. Group effort, diligence and 
consensual decision-making can be regarded as practices which have evolved out of 
Japan’s rice culture. In the interaction between national/social values and corporate 
culture, the Japanese corporate culture is based on its societal culture. In the company, 
members can count on the mutual support of the others with a high degree of 
interdependence (Debroux, 2003).  
 
The Japanese corporate culture is based on collectivism and wholism (Hofstede, 
1991 and Ouchi, 1981). According to Hofstede’s survey (1982, 1983 and 1991) of five 
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major dimensions of culture in various countries, Japan placed low value on 
individualism, but high value on power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and 
long-term orientation. The low value on individualism entails, in other words, the high 
value on collectivism. Relating to wholism, Ouchi (1981), in his book of Z theory, 
argued that Japanese organisations form inclusive relationships between employees and 
employer (wholistic concern for people). A set of mechanisms provides the social 
support and emotional release necessary for emotional equilibrium.  
 
(Table 4.10. Five Major Dimensions of Culture: Japan, Korea and the UK) 
Factor 
Country 
Power 
Distance 
Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Long-term 
Orientation 
Japan High Low High High High 
Korea High Low High High High 
UK Low High High Low Low 
(Source: Summarised from Hofstede, G. (1982), “Culture’s Consequences”, Sage Publications, Abridged Edition, 
Hofstede, G. (1983), “The Cultural Relativity of Organisational Practices and Theories”, Journal of International 
Business Studies, Vol.14, No.2 and Hofstede, G. (1991), “Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind”, 
McGraw-Hill Book Company) 
 
The distinctive differences between Japanese firms’ corporate culture and that of 
the West which are often cited are lifetime employment, job rotation, promotion based 
on seniority, group consensus, just in time (JIT) and Kaizen.  
 
Lifetime employment brings job security, job enrichment and the career 
development of employees. The organisation demands loyalty of its employees and in 
return it offers job security for so-called “organisation men” (Chung, Lee and Okumura, 
1998). The candidate takes a significant risk in betting his future on a particular 
company. If a Japanese leaves in mid-career or is fired from a large company, he will 
have a much harder time than his Western counterpart (e.g. American or English) in 
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being hired by another large company (Chen, 2004)37. Job rotation in Japanese firms is 
valued as the best means of increasing the motivation of the workers, improving their 
performance and thus achieving better efficiency and productivity38 (Kahal, 2005). In 
the process of decision-making, the starting point in a typical Japanese corporation is 
input on the bottom line of the organisation. Since everyone at all levels is involved, the 
system ensures their commitment (i.e. group consensus decision-making).39  
 
JIT, a system developed by Tai Chi Ohno, vice-president of Toyota, is a Japanese 
management philosophy and culture, which has been put into practice since the early 
1970s in many manufacturing companies. The primary objective of this system is to 
meet consumers’ demand with minimum delay. From the Sogo Shosha’s perspective, 
although JIT is quite difficult to apply there; the system is appropriate for manufacturing 
organisations, even though the objective is in accord with the one pursued by the Sogo 
Shoshas. Another important concept in Japanese corporate culture is Kaizen 
(improvement). The basic concept of Kaizen is that everyone’s way of life (e.g. working 
life, social life or home life) deserves constant improvement. Thus, this concept can be 
applied to every aspect of everyone’s activities (Kahal, 2005).  
 
As in Korea, another feature of Japanese corporate culture is the longer working 
hours than other OECD nations show. Although the number of working hours has 
                                            
37 Although lifetime employment is the most distinctive feature of Japanese culture, it is now under 
pressure to be modified. For more details of this, see the next section, 4.4.4. HRM.  
 
38 Kahal (2005) pointed out that the drawback of the job rotation system is the potential de-skilling of the 
workforce itself. Workers may be gaining new expertise in various fields, but these are often limited to 
the company’s specific operations and production techniques and may not be valuable for employment 
elsewhere. This restricts workers’ chances for a career move outside the firm.  
 
39 For more details of the decision-making process within Japanese firms, see Chapter 6 
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recently dropped, Japan was ranked higher than most European countries, including the 
UK and Germany, in the average hours worked per year. According to the OECD’s 
statistical data (2008), Korea ranked as the nation with the longest working hours (2,266 
hours in 2007), followed by Mexico (1,933 hours in 2007), the Czech Republic (1,914 
hours in 2007) and Japan (1,808 hours in 2007).  
 
(Figure 4.2. Average Annual Working Hours per Worker) 
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(Source: OECD, 2008) 
 
Paton (2006) argued that Japan has a notorious corporate culture which can make it 
difficult for employees to ask for more time off than their bosses, who are themselves 
often stuck in the office. For white-collar employees, it has become harder to take 
holidays than before because of the tight work schedules since companies cut down on 
staff to save on costs in recent years. Thus, the Japanese government has long tried to 
encourage workers to take their holidays in the hope they will spend more on leisure 
activities and boost the economy. The country’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
is proposing a law which would force companies to encourage people to take their full 
vacation allowance. One unique feature of Japanese corporate culture among salary men 
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is the drinking culture which prevails after working hours. According to Hofstede 
(1991), these men have the outlet of getting drunk along with colleagues or superiors 
after work. At such times, men release their pent-up aggression, even towards 
superiors40, but, the next day business continues as usual. Such drinking bouts represent 
one of the major institutionalised places and times for anxiety release.  
 
(Table 4.11. Comparison of Corporate Culture and Management System: Korea, Japan 
and the West Firms) 
 Korea Japan The West 
Overall Corporate 
Culture 
Collectivism, humanism, 
familism, abilitism and 
efficiencism 
Collectivism, rationalism, 
traditionalism and 
efficiencism 
Individualism, 
rationalism and 
equalitarianism  
Decision-making Individual decision-
making centralised in one 
leader 
Group decision-making with 
shared information 
Individual decision-
making or decision 
by majority 
Employment  Lifetime employment 
 
Lifetime employment41  No specific guarantee 
of employment 
Settlement of 
Problem 
Settlement with authority 
and power of superiors 
and leaders 
Arbitration of problems in 
advance and emphasis on 
harmony and loyalty 
Perfect and thorough 
discussion when 
there are problems 
Loyalty High Very High Low 
Collectivism and 
Individualism  
Collectivism and 
individualism  
Collectivism  Individualism  
Relationship with 
the Government 
Intimate and collaborative 
relationship 
Intimate and collaborative 
relationship 
No direct relationship
Reward System Combination of seniority 
system and performance-
based system  
Seniority system Performance-based 
system 
Overall 
Management Mode 
Leadership-driven 
authoritarian mode 
Environment-driven 
adaptive mode 
Structure-driven 
mechanistic mode 
(Source: Adapted from Chang, C.S. (1983), “Comparative Analysis of Management System: Korea, Japan and the 
USA”, Korean Management Review, Vol. 13, p. 99 and Chung, K.H, Lee, H.C. and Okumura, A. (1988), “The 
Managerial Practices of American, Japanese and Korean Firms”, Journal of East and West Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2) 
                                            
40 The same drinking culture exists within Korean corporations as well. However, the big difference 
between Japan and Korea is that inferiors in Korea hardly ever release their pent-up aggression towards 
superiors. 
 
41 According to Bailey (2004), one of the traditional strengths of the Japanese economy is lifetime 
employment, with the interaction of the main bank system, the Keiretsu system and the higher education 
system. Approximately 33% of Japanese firms guarantee lifetime employment to their employees.  
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Corporate culture and the management system, including decision-making, in 
Korean, Japanese and Western firms can be summarised as the above table. 
 
4.4.3. Ownership, Corporate Governance and Cross Shareholding  
 
Although Korean Chaebols and Japanese Zaibatsu were both big business groups 
dominated by their founding families, in most Japanese business groups ownership and 
management are normally separated. According to Shim (2002), the best-known 
Japanese Zaibatsu, the Mitsui and Sumitomo families, do not participate actively in 
management but entrust it to professional managers. The separation of ownership from 
management has continued in present-day Keiretsu. In both Zaibatsu and Keiretsu, most 
decisions are made by professional managers rather than shareholders, in particular, the 
dominant families.  
 
A unique system in Japanese firm’s ownership structure, however, is cross-
shareholding. In his book, “Cross Shareholding in Japan”, Okabe (2002, p.2) argued 
that  
 
“One of the distinctive features of corporate ownership in Japanese firms is 
that Japanese firms have a strong tendency to have their equity owned by the 
counter party corporation with which the firm has business transactions, on 
the one hand and to own the equity of the counter party corporation, on the 
other. That is, two companies hold stakes in one another, by way of mutual 
shareholding or cross shareholding”  
 
This being so, how do Japanese firms see the benefits of cross shareholding? The 
survey result conducted by the Japanese Economic Planning Agency in 1999 gave a 
 150 
 
clear answer to this question. A survey of 1,361 non-financial Japanese business firms 
listed on the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya Stock Exchanges in 1998 indicated that 
Japanese firms regard the benefits of cross shareholding as i) long-term stability of the 
share price (69.9%), ii) stability of the firm’s transactional relationship (52.3%) and iii) 
the prevention of hostile takeovers (33.0%)42.  
 
However, critiques of cross shareholding have emerged since the 1990s, because 
many business leaders and politicians believe that the long-term Japanese economic 
depression is fundamentally attributable to the mistrust of corporate governance. 
According to Narusawa, Emori and Ohmori (2001) in the Nomura Research Institute, 
the change has been occurring in the governing structure in Japanese firms and the 
shareholder composition of Japanese companies has been rapidly changing over the past 
few years. One important factor accelerating this trend has been the rush by banks and 
related companies to shed cross-held shares and back away from the practice altogether. 
Japanese companies, including insurance firms, have been trying to dissolve such 
relationships since 1995 and the ratio of cross shareholding to total holdings has 
declined to 21% in 2002. However, after falling for a decade, the level of cross 
shareholding has crept up since 2004. Cross shareholdings make it harder to work with 
firms outside the circle, reinforcing the inflexibility of Japan’s business environment 
(The Economist, 2008). 
 
 
                                            
42 This survey also showed the costs of cross shareholding. The three major costs related to cross 
shareholding are i) the possibility of incurring hidden losses when the share price decreases (58.6%), ii) a 
decreasing liquidity of funds (37.8%) and iii) a decreasing efficiency of capital by weakening the 
awareness of the cost of funds (11.5%) (quoted from Okabe, M. (2002), “Cross Shareholdings in Japan: 
A New Unified Perspective of the Economic System”, Edward Elgar, pp. 37~40). 
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(Figure 4.3. Changes in the Cross Shareholding Ratio among Japanese Firms) 
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Shareholdings is Causing Problems”, The Economist Internet Edition, 06/11/2008) 
 
 
Since the crash of the bubble economy, Japanese firms have been working to 
overcome their indolent performance through reforms in management strategies. As one 
of the corporate structural reforms, the reform of corporate governance became 
increasingly important. According to Tsuru (2000), Japanese corporate governance is in 
transition. The bubble crash and long-lasting stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 
1990s have prompted criticism of the effectiveness of the existing Japanese corporate 
governance system, in particular the main bank functions.43 Komiyama and Masaoka 
                                            
43 Tsuru argued that the main bank mechanism has been out of order, to an extent. Ever-increasing non-
performing loans and a decline in the net worth of banks over the past several years have caused 
significant changes in lending behaviour. The growth of total bank loans has remained weak and scarce 
funds have increasingly been allocated to high-quality borrowers. Some banks gave up rescuing and 
rushed to withdraw their funds from financially distressed client firms, who had maintained a long-term 
business relationship with them. The change in the behaviour of a main bank might be a rational response 
to its deteriorating asset quality, but this may also create negative externalities. Because a borrower and 
other banks would reasonably understand this as a breach of trust, once reputation as a main bank has 
been lost, it is not easily recovered. Therefore, a long-term relationship between a main bank and a 
borrower, which gives a strong basis for the main bank governance, might have been significantly 
weakened. The recent rapid dissolution of cross shareholding between banks and business groups may 
well explain such a phenomenon.  
 
 152 
 
(2002) further stressed that corporate governance in Japan is undergoing dramatic 
changes which reflect the transformation of the capital market, such as globalisation and 
borderless capital markets. As a way of reforming corporate governance, many 
proposals have been introduced recently and finally an amendment to the Japanese 
Commercial Code44 was passed in April 2002. The main feature of this amendment was 
to introduce a new corporate governance regime modelled on the American-style board 
of directors (Executive Officer System) and to permit Japanese firms to choose either 
the conventional or the new approach. A new corporate governance system will be 
called “companies with three committee boards (Audit, nominations and 
compensation)”. Additionally, in order to expedite management decisions, provisions 
are made for the establishment of a decision-making subcommittee regarding major 
assets, which can be mandated to consider some of the issues hitherto assigned solely to 
the board of directors (Hashimoto, 2002)45.  
 
But in a corporation where ownership and management are separate, as in most 
large firms in the West and Japan, there is always the possibility of agency problems – 
conflicts between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents).  
 
 
 
                                            
44 Before the Commercial Code was officially passed in April 2002, the corporate sector had already 
started to act on the board reforms. The survey on board reforms conducted by the Japanese Economic 
Newspaper (Nihon Keizai Shimbun) in 2001 showed that 35.7% of the companies surveyed had already 
introduced an executive officer system and 14.1% were studying its introduction. The total for these two 
groups was close to 50%. Of the companies surveyed, 38.8% had already appointed outside directors and 
24.2% were reviewing such appointments (Komiyama and Masaoka, 2002).  
 
45 For more details, see Hashimoto, M. (2002), “Commercial Code Revisions; Promoting the Evolution of 
Japanese Companies”, Nomura Research Institute, pp. 1~15 
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(Figure 4.4. Comparison of the Agency Problem) 
 1) Western and Japanese companies  
 
 
 
 
  
 2) Korean Chaebols 
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 (Fragmented Shareholders) 
Principal 
Delegation 
(Source: Chang, S. J. (2003), “Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Rise and Fall of 
Chaebols” Cambridge University Press, p. 173) 
 
Chang (2003) argued that salaried professional management manages Keiretsu 
affiliates in Japan where ownership and management are separate. However, the 
situation is somewhat different within Korean Chaebols, where the chairman plays the 
dual role of owner and manager. This is closely related to the nature of Chaebols’ bank 
loan-based financing and the government’s protection of the Chaebols46. The chairman 
                                            
46 Hong and Ahn (2000) argued that the structure of Korean Chaebols’ shareholding has not diversified as 
much, although they have expanded their size very rapidly. This is related to the Chaebols’ financing 
method and the state’s policy of protecting them. Owing to the centralised financing mechanism 
supported by the state, the Chaebols could finance their funds by loans, which enabled the Chaebol 
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of the Chaebols acts as if he were their chief executive officer, even though all the 
affiliates are legally independent entities with their own boards of directors and 
presidents. As illustrated in the above figure, fragmented shareholders (principals) in 
Western companies delegate their authority to professional managers (agents), who 
sometimes pursue their personal interest at the expense of shareholders’ interests. 
However, large shareholders in Korean Chaebols, who are often top managers, play the 
dual role of agent and principal, sometimes pursuing their own interests to the detriment 
of minority shareholders. Therefore, principal-agent problems in Chaebols do not 
assume the same form as they do in Western firms.  
 
4.4.4. HRM  
 
The traditional key feature in Japanese firm’s HRM is lifetime employment and a 
seniority-based promotion system. This system was useful when Japan was in the midst 
of rapid economic growth and companies were competing for new employees for their 
expanding businesses. However, this system has some drawbacks and has been under 
increasing pressure to change since the mid-1980s. With slower economic growth, the 
competitive advantages of the system have declined (Chen, 2004).  
 
As one of their measures, large Japanese firms, from the early 1990s, pursued a 
multi-pronged HRM strategy with early retirement schemes and growing use of 
outsourcing and flattening of the organisational hierarchy (Debroux, 2004).   
                                                                                                                                
families to maintain their control with a relatively small amount of investment. Moreover, the 
government’s protection of the Chaebols owners’ control rights created the unique system of non-
separation of ownership and management. However, the relationship between the government and the 
Chaebols has relaxed since the middle of the 1980s and the Chaebols have become independent in their 
financing and acquisition of information.  
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The Sogo Shoshas also followed traditional HRM policy, as other firms did, and 
they also faced need to transform their HRM policy. From the Sogo Shosha’s 
perspective, human resources are the most precious management resource. It is the 
people who sell, buy and coordinate the various activities who contribute to the 
corporate objective. Kuino (1982) argued that, unlike manufacturing companies which 
are essentially joint ventures between people and machines, people are the sole 
determinant of the success or failure of the Sogo Shosha. This implies that an effective 
HRM is closely correlated to the Sogo Shoshas’ performance.  
 
The following section examines both Japanese historical HRM policies and its new 
HRM practices suited to the global economy.  
 
? Recruitment and Selection  
 
In Japan, HR managers traditionally prefer to recruit graduates from high-ranking 
universities, thereby showing trust not only in the ranking system itself, but also in the 
long-term potential assumed to exist among graduates. Thus the tradition for graduate 
recruitment and selection dovetails with the traditional experience of high school and 
university education (Jackson and Tomioka, 2004).  
 
The Sogo Shoshas are no exception to this recruitment pattern. The Sogo Shosha’s 
core staff is literally an elite group drawn from an elite group. The firms recruit only 
from a limited number of universities, all of which are highly selective institutions. The 
employers who are regarded as most prestigious – a few ministries in the national 
 156 
 
government, the biggest banks, the large Sogo Shoshas, airlines and large newspapers – 
recruit only from the very top-ranking schools.  
 
The large Sogo Shosha receives thousands of applications a year. Both 
standardised testing and interviewing are used as part of the elimination process. The 
standardised tests often include both achievement and psychological personality tests. 
The interviewing process is multistage as well. Candidates are usually exposed to three 
groups within the company: top management, which devotes an impressive amount of 
time to interviewing candidates, professionals from the personnel function, who are 
experts at recruiting and members of line management, in particular those with several 
year’s experience but not yet of executive rank. Thus, it is necessary for a cross section 
of the firm to approve someone’s candidacy before he is taken on. All Sogo Shoshas 
place special emphasis on seeking recruits who will be compatible with their own 
corporate culture. There are many subtle differences among the Sogo Shosha companies. 
In general, however, their corporate cultures stress initiative – such as is needed to 
develop new businesses – cooperation and teamwork (Yoshino and Lifson, 1986). 
 
However, the emerging strategic environment challenges the ability of Japanese 
HR managers to predict what types of staff skills and qualities their organisation will 
need in the near to mid-term. The recruitment and selection processes thus become more 
complex. According to Kono and Clegg (2001), current recruitment patterns in Japanese 
firms show that large companies are becoming more discerning and less general in their 
recruitment processes. There is an increasing reluctance to offer new entrants a firm 
prospect of lifetime employment and career progression. The environment for graduate 
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recruitment and selection in Japan is thus undergoing a fundamental shift in values and 
priorities.  
 
? Training and Development  
 
According to human capital theory, human capital is accumulated through formal 
schooling or on-the-job training (OJT). This theory suggests that workers with more 
years of education or a longer OJT period accumulate more human capital and earn 
higher wages accordingly. Debroux (2003) argued that companies have to train new 
employees systematically and intensively in order to transfer the accumulated stock of 
knowledge.  
  
The Sogo Shoshas have well-organised training programmes. As a first step in their 
training, for example, all recruits gather at headquarters, where an entire day typically is 
devoted to entrance ceremonies and lectures on company history and philosophy. 
Particular emphasis is given to the concept that the recruits are entering an entire new 
life: no longer are they students, they are members of adult society and part of the 
“family” of the Sogo Shosha. After the initiation day ceremonies, more days may be 
spent at headquarters learning about company policies, organisation, employee benefits 
and other basic information. Following this, in one representative firm the recruits 
spend a week together at a conference retreat located in a relatively remote and isolated 
area. Team sports and group discussions are the major features of this firm’s orientation. 
Nothing specifically job-related is touched on. The emphasis is completely on building 
morale and rapport among the recruits. During the first year new members are allowed 
or required to attend management education courses in such basic business skills as 
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accounting, commercial law and international trade practices. After the first year 
optional continuing education courses are offered and are usually well attended 
(Yoshino and Lifson, 1986). 
 
But the main training takes place on the job. In Japanese firms, training is 
conducted specifically for knowledge and skill acquisition, using OJT to provide the 
necessary skills for short-term improvement. According to the HRM System 
Development Centre at the Sanno Institute of Management in Tokyo (2000), OJT 
activities provide the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes through daily contact 
from instructors, supervisors and seniors in the workplace. Most Japanese firms engage 
in OJT because: i) it is efficient in terms of time and cost, ii) work that is difficult to 
explain clearly in writing can be learned through observation and iii) flexible OJT can 
develop staff for the big picture.  
 
Kawaguchi (2006) also emphasised the importance of firm-initiated training 
programmes by stressing that OJT is more common and intense in Japan than in other 
countries. Through his research on analysing the relationship between firm-provided 
training and wages, he found that training participation and wages are positively 
correlated. This means that workers with stronger educational backgrounds are more 
likely to participate in firm-initiated training activities. The participation in firm-offered 
training increases participants’ wage in a causal sense.  
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?  Performance Appraisal and Compensation   
 
A traditional feature of Japanese firm’s personnel management is the use of 
seniority as the basis for salary and promotion. In most Japanese companies, the critical 
factor in determining wages is the age and experience of the worker (Sam and 
Hiromitsu, 1990). 
 
 Japanese firms’, including the Sogo Shosha, compensation system contrasts with 
Western practices in a number of ways. A person is hired for lifetime potential, not for 
specific skills or a particular job slot. The compensation model is based on the amount 
and pattern of compensation to be received over an entire career. Equal pay for equal 
work applies to a career but is not necessarily true at any given point. A younger person 
and an older person doing the same specific tasks will receive very different salaries, 
due to the emphasis on seniority; but over their career lifetimes they could receive 
comparable compensation (adjusted for inflation, changes in the standard of living, the 
rank reached by retirement, etc.). Base salary is the largest determinant of overall 
compensation. For approximately the first 15 years, an employee’s age, position in the 
hierarchy and base salary are in virtual lockstep. An employee with ten years’ seniority 
will receive approximately double the base salary of a new recruit (Yoshino and Lifson, 
1986). However, there is considerable pressure to reduce the influence of seniority on 
compensation.  
 
The traditional compensation system is under pressure to change. In many 
Japanese companies the commonly used term of kyuryo (salary) is replaced by the term 
hoshu (compensation) which in the past was applied to the directors only. Kyuryo has 
 160 
 
the connotation of pay received automatically by the employee, not relating to 
performance (Debroux, 2003) 
 
Suda’s (2007) research on Japanese firms’ pay systems found that they have been 
changing from organisation-based systems to market-based pay systems since the mid- 
1990s. He carried out a case study by analysing 10 Japanese firms, all of which had 
changed their pay system. The most notable change was from a person-based system to 
a job-based system47. Among the ten firms studied, four introduced a job-based system 
for all employees and three firms adopted the same system for managers. However, 
compared with the job-based system, market pay is not widespread. Five firms in the 
study used a market-based pay system for at least some employees. Three firms 
implemented market pay, using market salary surveys. The main reason is the difficulty 
in gathering pay data.  
 
? Transformation of HRM 
 
Overall, Japanese traditional HRM features such as lifetime employment, 
seniority-based pay and recruitment pattern have been undergoing transformation since 
the slower economic growth in the 1990s. Among these, there were considerable 
pressures on the lifetime employment system to be modified. According to Morris, 
Hassard and McCann (2006), some Japanese firms were encouraging managers to take 
                                            
47 According to Milkovich and Newman (2002), there are two basic types of pay structure; job-based and 
person-based. In the job-based structure, the pay rates may be determined by reference to relative internal 
value (established by job evaluation) and external relativities (established by market pat data). Therefore, 
the job and the market are the factors which determine pay structures. In the person-based structure, 
personal performance and personal attributes such as skills, knowledge and behaviour determine pay 
rates and pay structures.  
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early retirement at a fairly young age, for example, 45 onwards in one company. 
Another firm offered old managers financial assistance to start up their own business.  
 
There were changes in recruitment pattern, too. Some firms have dramatically 
reduced their entry-level recruitment numbers. For example, one company’s graduate 
recruitment fell from 80 to 30 per annum. This was to reduce employee numbers and 
ultimately to save costs. This implies that Japanese firms prefer ‘mid-career’ employees 
with specific skills to new graduates with generic potential skills. This was also an 
attempt to bring in human resources from outside the organisation (Morris, Hassard and 
McCann, 2006). 
 
With respect to the compensation system, some firms introduced a performance-
related compensation system by reducing age-related pay through direct links between 
Management by Objective, appraisal and pay. However, after establishing performance-
based HRM, some firms had problems because high performers who worked on more 
difficult tasks than their grade and pay level considered the system to be unfair. For 
example, the objectives set to higher-grade employees are not necessarily more difficult 
than those set to lower grade employees, even though the objectives are bases for 
measuring performance (Suda, 2007). Debroux (2003) suggested that automatic pay 
increases based on age and tenure are fundamentally incompatible with the planned 
HRM reform. The only reasonable option is to restructure the employment portfolio and 
differentiate pay by linking it more closely to the contribution of each category of 
worker to corporate performance. On this basis, Japanese firms may need to tune the 
pay distribution by a system covering all employees equally and to design a means of 
providing appropriate compensation for different categories.  
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4.5. The Financial Performance of Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
4.5.1. Sales Volumes  
Japanese Sogo Shoshas have been concentrating on quantitative growth since their 
formation by focusing on sales volumes. 
(Figure 4.5. Changes of Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ Sales Volumes)         (Unit: US$ million )  
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Sogo Shsosha 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Mitsui 149,001 203,001 147,644 98,248 76,090 93,506 97,156 124,771
Mitsubishi 164,268 166,140 135,203 96,647 78,230 84,602 94,591 109,967
Itochu 140,772 205,327 156,053 94,497 66,499 57,749 51,069 57,104
Sumitomo 131,348 214,036 143,202 89,041 68,479 58,966 54,847 64,856
Marubeni 135,639 182,482 140,674 81,656 59,632 55,305 53,092 62,873
Nissho Iwai 85,524 150,475 90,810 55,273 30,070 - - -
Tomen 45,033 63,243 62,100 22,017 14,844 10,304 - -
Sojitz - - - - - - 11,357 35,331
Toyota Tsusho - - - - - - 25,855 49,357
Average  121,655 169,243 125,098 76,768 56,263 60,072 55,424 72,037
 
(Source: JFTC (2008), “Financial Results of Sogo Shoshas”)  
 
? Currency Conversion Rates: 1985: JPY100.00/US$, 1990: JPY100.00/US$, 1995: JPY102.16/US$, 
2000: JPY108.49/US$, 2002: JPY122.24/US$, 2004: JPY106.27/US$, 2006: JPY117.12/US$, 2008: 
JPY98.51/US$ (The Interactive Currency Table: http://www.xe.net) 
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    From 1985 to 1990, seven Japanese Sogo Shoshas achieved a constant growth of 
sales volumes (on average 13.7%) on the back of brisk domestic investment. However, 
the Sogo Shoshas’ stable growth trend suddenly headed toward a drastic decline 
deadlock in 1990 and this situation has continued, due to the collapse of Japan’s bubble 
economy in the early 1990s. The average value of the seven Sogo Shoshas’ sales 
volume in 1985 was US$121,655 million. However, it has been gradually declining 
since 1990 and amounted only to US$56,263 million in 2002. The fundamental causes 
of the reduction in  sales volume were the height of the Japanese yen against the US 
dollar, disposal of non-profit business units and separation of inefficient business units 
due to the national economic depression and downturn.   
 
The structure of Sogo Shoshas’ sales is divided into four areas; domestic sales, 
exports, imports and offshore dealings (or third country trading). The following figure is 
the structure of sales from 1992 to 2003. During that period, domestic sales shared 45%, 
imports shared 17%, exports marked 13% and offshore dealings shared 25%. One 
notable thing here is that the structure of the Sogo Shoshas’ sales has been well-
balanced and dispersed with domestic sales, imports, exports and offshore dealings 
since their foundation – a typical sales structure for Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Through 
this structure, the Sogo Shoshas gain the advantage of balancing up losses. For example, 
if there have been big losses in exports, they are compensated by imports, domestic 
sales and offshore dealings. The income sources, in the case of Sumitomo Corporation 
from 2007, are roughly divided into nine segments; metal, transportation & construction, 
infrastructure, media & networks, chemicals, mineral resources, general products and 
logistics & finance. By geographical region, Sumitomo Corporation’s income in 2007 
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was derived from Japan (37%), Asia (21%), Americas (18%), Europe (11%), China 
(4%), Oceania (3%) and other regions (6%).  
(Figure 4.6. The Structure of Sogo Shoshas’ Business)  
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(Source: The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005; Sumitomo Corporation’s Annual Report, 2008) 
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4.5.2. Profitability  
One notable feature of Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ business is that profitability over 
the sales amounts is significantly low. This low profitability has probably resulted from 
the following factors. The first may be their huge dependence on an intermediary or 
simple broker function between sellers and buyers. The first earning source of Sogo 
Shoshas derives from their function as intermediary, which has been used as the most 
important one. It earns them commission fees. The commission fee may even now 
compose the largest part of the revenue earned by trading firms. The commission fee is 
usually decided between the Sogo Shoshas and the confronting firms through numerous 
factors, such as type of product, quantity, final destination, quality of the products and 
business relationship between two firms. The second is, on the surface, a purely 
technical accounting issue (Yamaji, 1991). In reality, Sogo Shoshas usually record as 
sales the trading amounts which they made for the tariff procedure in place of 
manufacturing firms. Consequently, the sales amounts of the Sogo Shoshas do not 
always represent the real business activities. Unlike manufacturing companies, the Sogo 
Shoshas’ profitability is affected by numerous factors. Factors affecting their 
profitability include type of products and services, geographical diversification, ratio of 
export items manufactured by the Sogo Shoshas group firms and the affiliates and the 
degree of domestic business operations.  
In 2007, the average gross profit and net income of seven Sogo Shoshas totalled  
US$1,316 million (2.24% over revenues) and US$702 million (1.19% over revenues) 
even though they achieved US$58,836 million in revenues. Moreover, the average net 
income from 1997 to 2003 was -0.88 % over revenues. The highest was only 1.08% and 
the lowest one was –3.20% over revenues. These results denote that Japanese Sogo 
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Shoshas still have difficulties in freeing themselves from quantitative growth based on 
revenues. Some primary factors, such as fierce competition among the Sogo Shoshas, 
changes in the business environment and heavy competition against ordinary trading 
companies, may cause the profitability of Sogo Shoshas to be low. Therefore, they 
largely tend to expand their revenues at the cost of profitability and commission fee.  
(Table 4.12. Profitability of Japanese Sogo Shoshas in 2007)      (Unit: US$ million) 
Sogo  
Shsosha 
Revenues Gross Profit Net Income 
Mitsui 
(Profit rate) 
99,367 1,857
1.87%
1,033 
1.04% 
Mitsubishi 
(Profit rate) 
94,861 1,666
1.76%
1,570 
1.66% 
Itochu 
(Profit rate) 
51,699 1,376
2.66%
824 
1.59% 
Sumitomo 
(Profit rate) 
49,935 1,669
3.34%
612 
1.23% 
Marubeni 
(Profit rate) 
54,754 1,075
1.96%
400 
0.73% 
Sojitz 
(Profit rate) 
24,680 567
2.30%
183 
0.74% 
Toyota Tsusho 
(Profit rate) 
36,558 1,004
2.75%
292 
0.80% 
Average  
(Profit rate) 
58,836 1,316
2.24%
702 
1.19% 
The Rate of Net Income
-0.90
0.10
-1.30
-3.20
1.08
-1.70
-0.27
1.19
-3.50
-3.00
-2.50
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2007
Year
%
 
(Source: JFTC (2008), “Financial Results of Sogo Shoshas”)  
? Currency Conversion Rates: JPY114.80/US$ (2007)) 
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4.5.3. Stability  
A firm’s financial stability can be analysed through the reciprocal relationship 
between assets, debt and equity. A typical method of ascertaining a firm’s stability is to 
analyse the debt ratio, equity ratio and current ratio. Debt ratio indicates what 
proportion of debt a company has relative to its assets. A debt ratio of greater than 1 
indicates that a company has more debt than assets: a debt ratio of less than 1 indicates 
that a company has more assets than debt. This ratio can help investors determine a 
company’s level of risk.  
 
The equity ratio, for its part, indicates what proportion of equity capital a firm 
has relative to its assets. A higher equity ratio indicates that a firm’s stability is sound. 
The current ratio, also known as the liquidity ratio, measures a company’s ability to pay 
short-term obligations; it is calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities. 
The ratio is mainly used to get an idea of the company’s ability to pay back their short-
term liabilities (debt and payables) with their short-term assets (cash, inventory, 
receivables). The higher the current ratio, the more capable the company is of paying its 
debts. 
 
The following table shows the debt ratio, equity ratio and current ratio of Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas in 2007.  
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(Table 4.13. Comparison of Stability between Major GTCs and Sogo Shoshas in 2007) 
 Debt Ratio
48
(%) 
Equity Ratio49
(%) 
Current Ratio50
(%) 
Samsung 101.80 48.50 100.20 
SK  283.00 26.09 77.00 
LG 152.83 39.55 134.26 
Korean GTCs 
Average 179.21 38.04 103.82 
Mitsui 365.02 21.50 133.16 
Mitsubishi 289.22 25.69 130.00 
Sumitomo 472.30 17.47 134.06 
Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas 
Average 375.51 21.56 132.41 
(Sources: Calculated by the author on the basis of ‘Balance Sheets’ of each company, 2007) 
 
According to this table, the debt ratio and equity ratio of Korean GTCs were much 
healthier than those of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas. But the current ratio was the 
opposite. In 2007, the average debt ratio of the major Sogo Shoshas was 375.51%, 
which was much higher than the Western management concept. However, the average 
equity ratio was only 21.56%, which was almost as same as the average equity ratio of 
all Japanese industries, 20%. With such a low equity ratio, Sogo Shoshas had no 
difficulty in raising funds from domestic and international money markets. In the 
process of fund raising, most funds are raised by a loan from money markets based on a 
borrower’s level of credit. This capability of raising funds and running effective 
business activities, with low equity and high credit, may be an intrinsic management 
                                            
48 Debt ratio = (debt/equity) x 100 
49 Equity ratio = (equity/assets) x 100 
50 Current ratio = (current assets/current liabilities) x 100 
 
 
 169 
 
skill of the Sogo Shoshas. An extremely high percentage of the liabilities of the Sogo 
Shoshas is composed of current liabilities, in particular, accounts payable, which make 
up almost half of all liabilities. By carrying such a high percentage of accounts payable, 
the Sogo Shoshas are actually net financiers of trade. What makes it possible, then, for 
Sogo Shoshas to act as financing intermediaries and how do they raise funds from 
money markets with such a low equity ratio? The reason is their confidence in 
extending credit stems from the existence of business groups, within each of which is a 
major bank and general trading company, coupled with their ceaseless creation of 
diversified new businesses without confining simple intermediaries and broker activities 
for export and import. In this context, the Sogo Shoshas are maintaining financial 
stability and soundness with a low equity ratio.  
 
With regard to the current ratio, that of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas was slightly 
sounder than that of the Korean GTCs’. The average ratio of the Sogo Shoshas was 
132.41%, which was slightly higher than the average ratio for all Japanese industries, 
110%~120%. The current ratio, as noted above, is mainly used to get an idea of the 
company’s ability to pay back their short-term liabilities (debt and payables) with their 
short-term assets (cash, inventory, receivables). The higher the current ratio, the more 
capable the company is of paying its obligations.  
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4.6. The Zaibatsu, Keiretsu, Sogo Shosha and the Japanese Economy 
 
All Japanese Sogo Shoshas belonged to Zaibatsu groups (before World War II), or 
Keiretsu groups (after World War II), just as all Korean GTCs belonged to Chaebols. 
Therefore, it will be helpful to review the nature of the Zaibatsu and Keiretsu and their 
development, since both of them were developed to discharge the role of Sogo Shosha. 
This section examines several aspects of the Zaibatsu and Keiretsu, such as their nature, 
formation, development and characteristics. It also investigates their relationship with 
the Sogo Shosha and its impact on Japan’s national economic growth.  
 
4.6.1. The Nature of Zaibatsu  
 
? Formation and Development of Zaibatsu 
 
The Japanese term, Zaibatsu (literally “financial clique”) refers to the great family-
controlled banking and industrial combinations of modern Japan. For more than 100 
years, Japan’s economy was dominated by the Zaibatsu and then, after World War II, 
by the Keiretsu. The Zaibatsu emerged in the course of Japan’s modernisation during 
the Meiji era and grew rapidly under the patronage of the government. In 1868, the 
Meiji Restoration took place in Japan, one of the most dramatic turning points in world 
history. The Meiji leaders noted that in the capitalist nations which they studied wealth 
was often concentrated in the hands of a few families. As a result, the Zaibatsu were 
able to grow prominently under the patronage of the government. The leading Zaibatsus 
are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Dai Ichi Kangyo, Sumitomo, Sanwa and Fuyo. They gained 
positions in the Japanese economy which have no exact parallel elsewhere. Although 
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the Mitsui were powerful bankers under the shogunate, most of the other Zaibatsus 
developed after the Meiji restoration, when, by subsidies and a favourable tax policy, 
the new government granted them a privileged position in the country’s economic 
development. Later they helped finance strategic semi-official enterprises in Japan and 
abroad, in particular in Taiwan and Korea (Hidemasa, 1992).  
 
In 1937 the four leading Zaibatsus directly controlled one-third of all bank deposits, 
one-third of all foreign trade, half of Japan’s shipbuilding and maritime shipping and 
most of the heavy industries. They maintained close relations with the major political 
parties. They also contributed to the Japanese war effort in cooperation with the military 
government from 1931. After Japan’s surrender (1945) to the allied forces in World 
War II, the Zaibatsus were eventually dissolved between 1945 and 1947, as part of the 
resolution of war crimes, but in the 1950s and 1960s groups based on the old Zaibatsu 
re-emerged as the Keiretsu. The decision on the part of these groups in the post-World 
War II era to pool their resources greatly influenced Japan’s subsequent rise as a global 
business power. 
 
? Characteristics of the Zaibatsu 
 
The major Zaibatsus, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, have different 
origins and they also differ in the precise details of their internal constitution and 
structure. But all were closely linked to the government and military and contributed to 
the policy of creating a “rich country and a strong army.” Zaibatsu were the financial 
face of monopoly capital, whose purpose was to minimise the risks of investment by 
spreading their capital over a wide and diverse range of industrial sectors rather than 
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concentrating it in a single area of production (Kang, 1996). The Zaibatsu had a number 
of distinctive features which differentiate them from the forms of finance capital in 
other developed capitalist nations. At the centre of each Zaibatsu was the honsha or 
holding company. The ownership structure was that of a pyramid.  
 
(Figure 4.7. The Ownership Structure of Zaibatsu: Pyramid Structure)  
 
Holding Company 
C B A 
a b c 
Subsidiaries or 
affiliated 
companies 
Owner Family 
(Source: Shim, J. S. (2002), “The Evolution of the Korean Economic System: Government, Chaebol, 
Financial Institutions and the Influence of Japan, PhD Dissertation, The School of Public Policy, The 
University of Birmingham, p. 97) 
 
Each Zaibatsu dominated vertically the business management of its affiliated firms 
and their subsidiaries through the holding company. The holding company owned most 
of the stock of the directly affiliated companies and financed them through its own bank. 
Zaibatsu usually owned financial institutions such as banks, trust companies and 
insurance companies and also the general trading company (Sogo Shosha). The financial 
institutions played the role of capital pipeline for each affiliated firm and the Sogo 
Shosha acted as proxy for the manufacturers in the Zaibatsu by purchasing raw 
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materials and by selling products. In group management, even though Mitsui and 
Sumitomo families participated in company management, the actual power was wielded 
by professional managers. In the case of Mitsubishi, the heads of families held 
management power, but the group was also managed by professional managers.  
 
? The Dissolution of the Zaibatsu  
 
Before World War II, the Japanese economy was dominated by four large 
Zaibatsus – Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda. They were involved in most key 
sectors of industries, including steel, banking and international trading and controlled by 
a holding company which established financial links between the different members (Ito, 
1992).  However, a dissolution of the Zaibatsu was instituted in 1945-7. The main 
elements of the Zaibatsu dissolution programmes were as follows. First, the Zaibatsu 
holding companies and a number of other large holding companies were selected for 
dissolution. Their stocks were taken over under the occupation policy of the Supreme 
Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and sold to the public. In all, 83 companies 
were dissolved in this way, including the holding companies of Mitsui, Mitubishi, 
Sumitomo, Yasuda, Fuji, Nissan, Asano, Okura and Nomura. By offering the stocks of 
these companies to the public, it was hoped that the Zaibatsu would be broken into their 
component parts, which would then become independent, unrelated companies (Toshio, 
1989). Second, members of the old Zaibatsu families were prohibited from resuming 
positions as company officers in the ex-Zaibatsu enterprises. This restriction was aimed 
at breaking the human nexus of semi-feudal control which had lain at the centre of the 
Zaibatsu structure. Third, not only the Zaibatsu themselves but even some of their 
largest component firms were subject to dissolution. For example, the giant Zaibatsu-
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related Sogo Shoshas, Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji were divided into many 
small enterprises. Last, the 1945 Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies 
and Maintenance of Fair Trade Practice (usually referred to as the anti-monopoly law) 
was enacted, with the intention of preventing a future rebirth of the Zaibatsu (Kang, 
1996). After the dissolution of the Zaibatsu by the SCAP, six big business groups 
emerged in their place. They were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa and Dai-
Ichi Kangyo Bank (DKB). Each of these firms has vertically or horizontally aligned 
affiliate and subsidiary firms, a pattern called Keiretsu.  
 
4.6.2. The Nature of Keiretsu  
 
? The Emergence of the Keiretsu 
 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Zaibatsu, in 1948 the allied forces realised 
that they needed a strong Japan to fight the Korean War and international communism. 
The policy of weakening the Japanese economy was dropped and substantial aid 
pumped in. Following amendments to the anti-trust laws, many Zaibatsus were re-
established (Morikawa, 1992). This time, companies grouped round the banks, which 
were again allowed to hold shares in other companies and this made the establishment 
of financial links easier (Vohara, 1999). These conglomerates were now called Keiretsu. 
Some (Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo) emerged out of the former Zaibatsu, but 
others (Fuyo, Sanwa, DKB, etc.) were just new groupings of companies. Among the big 
six, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo grew directly out of Zaibatsu groups. However, 
the three other groups – Fuyo, Sanwa and DKB – grew up in the post-war period around 
prominent city banks; these new groups are sometimes known as the bank groups. Fuyo 
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was built around the former Yasuda Group of companies and DKB inherited many 
firms from the Fujisawa and Kawasaki Groups. According to Kang (1996), in addition 
to the “Big Six”, there are also other smaller independent business groups which came 
into being somewhat later. These include Toyota, Nissan, Hitachi and Shinnitetsu, 
which are based in manufacturing and Tokyu and Seibu, which are based in the 
distribution and service sector. These independent industrial and financial groups 
represent a network vertically integrated in one or more industrial sectors. Independent 
groups are organised as Keiretsu, each consisting of a large, highly successful parent 
company and vertically aligned subordinate companies. These independent groups 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s, while Japan’s economy grew rapidly.  
 
? Types of Keiretsu  
 
There are various ways to classify Keiretsu, but the two most common 
classifications cover all the groups. They are yoko (horizontal) Keiretsu and tate 
(vertical) Keiretsu. A horizontal Keiretsu is essentially similar to the structure of the 
Zaibatsu, consisting of a group of large firms in different industries with common ties to 
a powerful bank, united by shared stockholdings and trading relations. A vertical or 
pyramid Keiretsu is made up of one very large firm and hundreds or thousands of 
smaller companies subservient to it (Miyashita and Russell, 1994).  
 
i) Horizontal Keiretsu 
 
A horizontal Keiretsu is a “financial Keiretsu” with horizontal relationships across 
industries. The Big Six (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, DKB and Sanwa) belong 
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to this grouping, with close-knit relationships among group members. According to 
Miyashita and Russell (1994), at the centre of a horizontal Keiretsu, there is always a 
main bank and a Sogo Shosha and these are equivalent in influence. There may even be 
a third firm, a giant manufacturer. Around these two or three giants circle the core 
members, usually three financial firms – a life insurance company, a non-life insurance 
company and a trust bank – and one or two very large manufacturers.  
 
(Figure 4.8. The Structure of a Horizontal Keiretsu) 
 
Main 
Bank 
Giant 
Manufacturer 
Sogo 
Shosha 
? Financial firms (life insurance, trust bank, etc.) 
? Large manufacturers 
? Various firms in different industries 
(Source: Adapted from Miyashita, K. and Russell, D. (1994), “Keiretsu: Inside the Hidden Japanese 
Conglomerates”, McGraw-Hill, P.84) 
Together, the financial firms, the Sogo Shosha and the group’s key manufacturers 
give the Keiretsu its identity. In particular, the Sogo Shosha is obviously concerned with 
commerce. It has the vital role of coordinating trade, not only within the group, but 
among different groups and even with foreign customers. The Sogo Shosha also holds 
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equity in many of the group’s firms and provides financing in other ways than the 
banks’. 
 
ii) Vertical Keiretsu 
 
Another form is the vertical or Pyramid Keiretsu,  made up of one very large 
company and hundreds or thousands of small companies subservient to it. Generally 
vertical Keiretsu are less influenced by a bank. The advantage of this structure lies in the 
fact that many subcontractors work as “buffers” for the core firm in economic 
downturns. According to Miyashita and Russell (1994), vertical Keiretsu are more 
common in manufacturing industries. They are in particular prominent in the electronic 
and automobile industries, although almost every other field has its own vertical 
Keiretsu, including advertising, publishing, broadcasting and other non-manufacturing 
businesses. 
 
The figure below shows how vertical Keiretsu are organised. In electronics, at the 
top of the pyramid, there is a giant manufacturer and a key bank, which is more or less 
equal in status with the manufacturer. According to Shim (2002), the parent firm at the 
apex of the manufacturing pyramid is responsible for coordinating the vast, complex 
system of design, manufacture and assembly inside the pyramid and then for advertising 
the finished products and delivering them to the market. The first-tier subcontractor 
handles many of the final steps in the production process and also plays an important 
role in coordinating the second- and third-tier subcontractors. The second-tier 
manufacturers play an intermediary role between the first- and third-tier manufacturers 
 178 
 
and the third-tier manufacturers are involved in assembling parts for some electronic 
devices.  
 
(Figure 4.9. The Structure of a Vertical Keiretsu: Electronic Firm) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Adapted from Shim, J. S. (2002), “The Evolution of the Korean Economic System: Government, 
Chaebol, Financial Institutions and the Influence of Japan, PhD Dissertation, The School of Public Policy, 
The University of Birmingham, p. 101) 
Giant manufacturer and key bank 
Third-tier manufacturers 
(Smallest affiliates which hardly deserve to be 
called companies: they assemble parts for  
electronic devices)
Second-tier manufacturers 
(Play an intermediary role between 
first- and third-tier manufacturers)
First-tier manufacturers 
(Coordinate the second-
and third-tier) 
 
? The Characteristics of Keiretsu 
 
The major characteristics of the horizontal Keiretsu are cross shareholding within 
group members, mutual appointment of officers and key personnel, existence of the 
Sogo Shosha and the formation of presidential councils.  
 
 
 179 
 
i) Cross Shareholding51  
 
A unique system in the Keiretsu’s ownership structure is cross shareholding. The 
major objective of cross shareholding is to protect each group company from outside 
control or takeover threats.  
 
(Figure 4.10. Crossholding of Shares among Four Major Mitsubishi Group Firms) 
 
 
Mitsubishi 
Bank 
 
Mitsubishi 
Corp. 
Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries 
Tokyo Marine 
and Fire 
Insurance 
4.65 
2.17 
3.43 2.40 
5.00 
5.28 
1.93 
2.59 
1.30 2.04 
6.45 4.53 
Unit: %  
(Source: Kim, Y.Y. (2007), “Pro-business Policy and Institutional Change of Japan”, Korea Economic 
Research Institute, Research Paper (December), p. 52) 
 
In the Mitsubishi Group, shares of Mitsubishi Corporation (Sogo Shosha) are held 
by its member companies, such as Mitsubishi Bank, Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance 
and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. For instance, Mitsubishi Bank holds 5.28%, 5.00% 
and 4.53% of Mitsubishi Corporation’s, Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance’s and 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ shares, respectively. Mitsubishi Corporation, Tokyo 
Marine & Fire Insurance and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries hold 2.17%, 4.65% and 
                                            
51 For more details of cross shareholding in Japanese firms, see section 4.4.3. Ownership, Corporate 
Governance and Cross Shareholding 
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3.43% of Mitsubishi Bank’s shares respectively (Kim, 2007). As a result, Mitsubishi 
Group companies account for about one-third of its total portfolio.  
 
This interlocking shareholding binds Japanese firms into cohesive, horizontal 
communities. Most of the shares are in the hands of group member firms which are 
assumed to be cooperative and stable and unwilling to sell the shares to outsiders; if the 
shareholders were foreign companies, it would be much more difficult to acquire 
enough shares to gain control of the Japanese firms (Ito, 1996).  
 
ii) Existence of the Sogo Shosha  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the major characteristics of the horizontal Keiretsu is 
the existence of the Sogo Shosha, which acts as the trading arm of the group, achieving 
huge economies of scale. Not only as a trading arm within the group, but also as a major 
shareholder of the shares of group members, the Sogo Shosha is centred at the heart of 
the Keiretsu together with the bank. In both Zaibatsu and Keiretsu, one main bank and 
one Sogo Shosha play central roles. The Sogo Shoshas originated as trading arms in the 
international market as well as wholesalers and distributors in the domestic market, due 
to the huge economies of scale which the Zaibatsu and Keiretsu could make.  
 
There is one giant Sogo Shosha in each of the Big Six Keiretsu (i.e. Mitsubishi 
Group: Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui Group: Mitsui and Co., Ltd., Sumitomo Group: 
Sumitomo Corporation, Fuyo Group: Marubeni Corporation, Sanwa Group: Nissho Iwai 
Corporation, DKB Group: Itochu Corporation). In all Big Six groups, the Sogo Shosha 
plays the same critical role, helping to coordinate group activities through every aspect 
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of commerce. Most intra-group transactions involve the Sogo Shosha. With ties to tens 
of thousands of Japanese companies, including the Keiretsu, the Sogo Shoshas play a 
significant role in Japan’s exports and imports, including domestic distribution activities. 
They are essentially gatekeepers for Japan’s economy. According to JFTC’s report 
(2000), in 1993, the nine top Sogo Shoshas handled US$124 billion (34.8%) of Japan’s 
exports and US$134 billion (60.8%) of Japan’s imports. Their total trade accounted for 
US$258 billion (44.7%) of Japan’s total worldwide trade of US$577 billion. The Sogo 
Shoshas, along with the banks and insurance companies, provide both horizontal and 
vertical leadership and integrated functions to the Keiretsu.  
 
iii) Mutual Appointment of Officers and Key Personnel  
 
The other feature common to the Keiretsu is a mutual appointment of officers and 
other key personnel within the group. Major Japanese Keiretsus send their staff 
members to their subsidiaries and affiliates as top ranking officers. The cross movement 
of personnel within the group, in particular senior personnel, makes it possible to 
transfer expertise when member firms move into new areas of operation or occasionally 
as a source of external discipline (Sheard, 1994). Personnel transfers form a dense and 
multi-tiered network of labour flows which facilitates information exchange, control, 
training and learning. Personnel transfers also redistribute labour to balance out 
surpluses and shortages (Lincoln and Gerlach, 1992).  
 
In addition to capital participation and financing, this system is often used in 
vertically-integrated groups as a way of strengthening group cohesiveness and control 
these companies. Horizontally-integrated groups adopt this practice as one of the major 
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centripetal forces. Often, when a member company faces financial difficulty, the major 
bank of the group sends a member of its staff to the firm as a top executive officer. The 
average ratio of presidential council members with directors sent by members to the 
total members varied widely, from just over 40% to almost 100%. The average ratio of 
directors sent by group members among the six major groups in 1990 was about 60%, 
with the highest ratio of 97% for Mitsubishi and the lowest of 40% for Mitsui (Dodwell 
Marketing Consultants, 1994).  
 
iv) Formation of Presidential Councils  
 
The presidents or CEOs within the different members of the Keiretsu gather and 
discuss their business issues in presidential councils known as “Shacho-Kai”. They 
convene once a month to exchange information and hear lectures on contemporary 
topics, such as general economic issues, labour problems, public relations activities, the 
approval of key personnel appointment at member firms, etc. For instance, 29 company 
presidents of Mitsubishi group meet every Friday (known as the “Friday Club”) (Ito, 
1992). However, this council does not want to be a policy-making body for the whole 
group, a role that the pre-war Zaibatsu headquarter or family took on, but instead to  
be a council which only provides a forum for regular meetings to foster friendship 
among the presidents of the group. Every member is independent and no one is bound 
by the decisions or recommendations made by the council (Dodwell Marketing 
Consultants, 1994). 
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4.6.3. Japanese Post-War Economic Miracle and the Keiretsu 
 
The primary characteristic of Japan’s post-war economy is the 15-year period of 
high growth, beginning in the mid-1950s, which enabled it to catch up with the 
developed economies of Europe and the US. Japan was a major beneficiary of the swift 
growth attained by the post-war world economy, under the principles of free trade 
advanced by the IMF and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During 
this period of high growth, the competitive strength of Japanese industry rose 
steadily.  From the mid-1960s a current balance surplus was achieved throughout the 
year, with the exception of those years following the oil crisis of 1973.  In 1985, with 
net external assets of US$129.9 billion, Japan moved ahead of the UK to become the 
world leader (BOJ).  During this same period, the US led the world in net external 
liabilities. Except for 1990, when it was surpassed by Germany, Japan has maintained 
this position as world leader. 
 
After World War II, East Asia was the only region of the world that experienced 
continual substantial economic growth and no other East-Asian country enjoyed more 
economic success than Japan. The Japanese economic pie grew at an annual rate of 10% 
from the mid-1950s until the Arab oil shocks of the early 1970s. The Japanese then 
managed to maintain much more modest but steady growth rates until the early 1990s 
(Ellington, 2004). Many factors have contributed to Japanese economic growth, such as 
the international environment, America’s contribution, the role of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), the role of the Keiretsu, state-assisted 
capitalism, the Korean War, the world free trade boom, the surplus of well-educated 
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workers and a stable political situation. The following are the major contributory factors 
to Japan’s post-war economic growth.  
 
? The International Environment of Growth52 
 
Among the many factors of influencing Japan’s post-war national rapid growth, the 
international environment had an extreme influence. According to UN statistics, the 
volume of world trade tripled between 1955 and 1970, with a growth rate of 7.6%, 
while it grew at 3.5% from 1870 to 1913 and at only 1.3% in the years from 1913 to 
1950 (Maddison, 1964). The worldwide increase in this growth rate had an extremely 
beneficial effect on Japan’s growth. Technological progress and industrial development 
were of course responsible for the high rate of growth in the world economy. But 
underlying this was the establishment of the IMF system the purpose of which was to 
provide infrastructural support for this progress. The IMF system was conceived as a 
global currency mechanism to replace the international gold standard which had been in 
use up until that time. The IMF system almost completely correlated with the changes in 
Japan from the latter half of the 1960s. Japan re-entered the world economy in 1949 and 
from the time the JPY360/US$1 rate was established until the yen revaluation upward in 
1971, this rate was consistently maintained. With the JPY360/US$1 rate as the 
standard 53 , Japan’s objective at this time was to strengthen its international 
                                            
52 Most of this section draws on “The Postwar Japanese Economy: Its Development and Structure” by 
Nakamura, T. (1981).  
 
53 One of the major objectives of the IMF was to promote global monetary and exchange stability and it 
acted as a monitor of the world’s currencies by helping to maintain an orderly system of payments 
between all countries. The main feature of the IMF system was to establish fixed exchange rates between 
the key currency and the currency of each member country, with a very narrow band within which each 
of these rates could fluctuate. These fixed rates were not to be changed except for reasons such as a 
fundamental disequilibrium in the international balance of payments.  
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competitiveness. During this period, Japan’s growth rate gradually rose and it was 
possible to secure a firm balance of payments surplus.  
 
A further aspect of the international environment beneficial to Japan was the US’s 
contribution. Japan’s postwar inflation, unemployment and shortages in all areas 
seemed overwhelming. It seemed that Japan’s immediate economic improvement was 
not to be achieved on its own. The American government, under the auspices of the 
SCAP, played a crucial role in Japan’s initial economic recovery. SCAP believed that 
economic development could not only democratise Japan but also prevent the 
reemergence of militarism. Military hostilities in the Korean peninsula further boosted 
the economy in 1950 because the US government paid the Japanese government large 
sums for Special Military Procurement. These payments amounted to 27% of Japan’s 
total export trade. The US also insisted that Japan be admitted to GATT as a temporary 
member – against British opposition. During the Korean War, SCAP departed and full 
sovereignty was returned to the government of Japan. Further, a great deal of Japan’s 
trade was with the US, which conducted the largest volume of trade in the world. From 
the latter part of the 1950s, both export and import trade with the US exceeded 30% of 
Japan’s total export and import trade.  
 
Another aspect of the international environment beneficial to Japan was the 
availability of cheap and stable supplies of the raw materials and energy needed for 
heavy and chemical industrialisation. The large-scale development of the most 
important energy source, oil, began in the Middle East in the 1950s. An adequate 
volume was taken for granted, for which the price was either stable or falling. Prices of 
all primary products, in particular iron ore, were also relatively steady. For these reasons, 
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Japan’s net terms of trade improved considerably in the latter part of the 1950s, a state 
of affairs which continued during the 1960s and until the beginning of the 1970s.  
 
? The Role of the MITI and Keiretsu  
 
In the process of Japan’s economic development, the MITI54 was instrumental and 
it exercised strong administrative leadership over industries in Japan’s post-war 
economic recovery (Nakamura, 1981). The Ministry coordinated various industries, 
including the emerging Keiretsu, toward a specific end, usually toward the intersection 
of national production goals and private economic interests. In 1954, the economic 
system which MITI had cultivated from 1949 to 1953 came into full effect. Prime 
Minister Ikeda Hayato pursued a policy of heavy industrialisation. This policy led to the 
emergence of over-loaning in which the BOJ issued loans to city banks, which, in turn, 
issued loans to industrial conglomerates. Because there was a shortage of capital in 
Japan at the time, industrial conglomerates borrowed beyond their capacity to repay, 
often beyond their net worth, causing city banks in turn to overborrow from the BOJ. 
This gave the national BOJ complete control over dependent local banks. The system of 
over-loaning, combined with the government’s relaxation of anti-monopoly laws (a 
remnant of SCAP control) also led to the reemergence of conglomerate groups called 
Keiretsu which mirrored the wartime conglomerates, or Zaibatsu. The Keiretsu 
efficiently allocated resources and became internationally competitive. 
 
Moreover, the distinguishing characteristics of the Japanese economy during the 
“economic miracle” years included: the cooperation of manufacturers, suppliers, 
                                            
54 The MITI was reorganised to the METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) in 2001.  
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distributors and banks in closely-knit groups called Keiretsu,  powerful enterprise 
unions, cosy relations with government bureaucrats and the guarantee of lifetime 
employment in big corporations. Although some of these reasons are more important 
than others, many people agree that the Keiretsu significantly contributed to Japan’s 
economic rise. The Keiretsu are a key feature of Japan’s economy, directly or indirectly 
affecting the economic transactions in both upstream and downstream channels, within 
and across industries. At the heart of the Keiretsu conglomerates’ success are the city 
banks, which lent generously, formalising cross-share holdings in diverse industries. 
The Keirestsu spurred both horizontal and vertical integration, locking out foreign 
companies from Japanese industries. The Keiretsu had close relations with MITI and 
each other through the cross-placement of shares, providing protection from foreign 
take-overs. For example, 83% of Japan’s Development Bank’s finances went toward 
strategic industries: shipbuilding, electric power, coal and steel production. The 
Keiretsu proved crucial to the protectionist measures which shielded Japan’s sapling 
economy. They also fostered an attitude shift among Japanese managers which tolerated 
low profits in the short run because the Keiretsu were less concerned with increasing 
stock dividends and profits than with interest payments. Approximately only two-thirds 
of the shares of a given company were traded, cushioning the Keiretsu against market 
fluctuations and allowing their managers to plan for the long term and maximise market 
shares instead of focusing on short-term profits. 
 
? Rapid Growth Era and Mature Economy 
 
In the post-war period, the road to economic recovery had begun with the 
occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces and with the ability of General Headquarters, 
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also known as the SCAP, to exercise indirect control through Japanese government 
structures. However, when SCAP judged that the Occupation policies could not be 
implemented through existing government structures, it asked the Japanese government 
to develop new organisations. The Economic Stabilisation Board (ESB) was thus 
established in August 1946 and became the “General Headquarters” for economic 
planning during the critical period immediately after the war. The ESB undertook the 
tasks of general economic coordination and development of a broad range of policies, 
covering everything from economic planning, control and prices to food, industry and 
trade. To begin with, the ESB consisted of five departments and some 300 staff 
members. But in May 1947, it was expanded to eleven divisions and a permanent staff 
of about 2,000 and was granted formidable control over the economy (Ishikawa, 1995).  
 
With strong leadership by the ESB, the rare period of worldwide rapid economic 
growth from the 1950s to the early 1970s was also a period which produced striking 
changes in Japan’s economy, both domestically and in its relationship with the world 
economy. The following figure shows Japan’s real GNP since 1951 and private firms’ 
real investment in plant and equipment. Until the oil shock of 1973, the post-war 
Japanese economy did not change in an uneven way, but showed virtually a straight line 
of economic growth (an average annual growth rate of 10%).  
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(Figure 4.11. Japan’s Post-war Economic Growth)  
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(Source: Japanese Economic Planning Agency (1976), National Incomes Statistics Annual Report) 
 
During this growth period, private firms’ investment in plant and equipment 
showed large increases, growing at a rate of 22% from 1951 to 1973. This was the 
driving force behind the domestic demand which induced rapid growth and, at the same 
time, provided the additional productive capacity commensurate with it (Nakamura, 
1981). Chemical and heavy industrialisation was, however, the prime mover behind the 
private firms’ investment which supported national economic growth. While chemical 
and heavy industrialisation itself produced a huge investment demand, it also had a far 
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greater impact than ever before in terms of the derived demand which it generated. 
Whereas agriculture and light manufacturing had been the mainstay of the economy in 
the past, this shifted to heavy industry and services.  Dominating the industrial sector 
were iron and steel, ship-building, machine tools, motor vehicles and electronics. With 
its high economic growth, Japan became the first country in the post-war era to move 
from “less-developed” to “developed” status.  In 1968, Japan’s economy became the 
world’s second largest, behind only that of the United States. The percentage of 
Japanese living in cities almost doubled between 1950 and 1970, thus increasing the 
demands for services.  During the 1960s, Japan’s average for exports grew by 18.4% 
per year (JETRO). This economic growth accompanied tremendous changes in Japan’s 
industrial structure.   
 
Although high growth rates were predicted for the 1970s, double-digit inflation, 
the Middle East oil crisis and other factors caused a recession which lowered future 
growth expectations.  This caused a reduction of private investment and economic 
growth slowed to an average of 3.6% from 1974 to 1979 with, however, a slight 
increase in the 1980s to 4.4%. In spite of the oil crisis, Japan’s major export industries 
remained competitive by cutting costs and increasing efficiency.  The energy demands 
were reduced and the automobile industry was able to improve its position globally, by 
manufacturing lighter and more economical vehicles.  The second oil crisis in 1979 
created a shift in Japan’s industrial structure from its former emphasis on heavy industry 
to the development of new fields, such as computers and semiconductors, along with 
other technology and information-intensive industries.   
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? Bubble Economy and Its Causes  
 
Following the 1985 Plaza Accord, in the fixed exchange rate system the Japanese 
yen rose sharply in value over the next few years, to three times its value in 1971. With 
the increase in the price of Japanese exports, the competitiveness of Japanese products 
overseas declined, although government financial measures increased demand 
domestically. Corporate investment rose sharply in 1988 and 1989.  New equity issues 
rose in value as a result of higher stock prices, thus making them an important source of 
financing for corporations (BOJ).  In the meantime, banks sought funds in the outlet of 
real estate development.  In turn, corporations used their real estate holdings as 
collateral for stock market speculation.  A direct result of this was the doubling of land 
value prices and a 180% rise in the Tokyo Nikkei Stock Market Index. In May 1989, the 
government tightened its monetary policies to damp down a rise in value of assets, such 
as land.  However, higher interest rates sent stock prices on a steady spiral down.  By 
the end of 1990, the Tokyo Stock Market had fallen 38%, thus effectively wiping out 
JPY300 trillion (US$2.07 trillion) in value and land prices dropped steeply from their 
speculative peak. In May 1991, Japan’s “Bubble Economy” of inflated land and stock 
prices came to a crashing halt, sending the country into a prolonged recession from 
which it has still not recovered (Kojima, 1999).  
 
Now the causes of Japan’s economic depression need to be examined. One of the 
major reasons for Japan’s economic crisis is the hollowing out of its manufacturing base 
(Bailey and Sugden, 2007). Hollowing out55 (Kudoka or de-industrialisation) has been a 
                                            
55 For more information about “Hollowing Out”, see the book “Crisis or Recovery in Japan: State and 
Industrial Economy” edited by Bailey, D., Coffey, D. and Tomlinson, P., Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2007, pp. 61~81 and 133~156 
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key feature of Japan’s economic depression during the 1990s and early 2000s. The 
problems afflicting the Keiretsu and the hollowing out of Japanese manufacturing have 
been widespread across the nation; during the 1990s, all industrial sectors experienced a 
significant decline in real output (approximately 10%), the number of business 
establishments (a fall of 15%) and employment (a fall of 15%). (Cowling and 
Tomlinson, 2007).  
 
Opinions differ about the causes of Japan’s hollowing out. Ozawa (1996, 1997) sees 
Japan as suffering from the “Japan disease” caused by excessive government 
involvement. The problem is seen as something caused by a long-term, sustained rise in 
the value of the Yen, leading to over-appreciation. This has been stimulated by the 
export competitiveness of manufacturing sectors, coupled simultaneously with barriers 
to imports arising from government intransigence against deregulation. Eventually, this 
has led to outward FDI and hollowing out. Ozawa (1997) argued that an industrial 
policy aimed at building up manufacturing at home under protection and promotion was 
ultimately “futile” because this competitiveness drove up the value of the Yen and of 
wages, eventually making home production less attractive and forcing domestic firms to 
relocate their production activities overseas.  
 
However, in contrast to the view that the depression was caused by government 
failures, Cowling and Tomlinson and Bailey (2007) laid the blame on Japan’s 
multinational enterprises, whose strategy failed in the hollowing out process. They 
argued that Japan’s economic crisis was a classic example of the deficiencies associated 
with transnational monopoly capitalism. The government policy deliberately focused on 
strategic decision-making in elites within giant firms. These elites were then able to 
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capture aspects of policy in the pursuit of their corporate strategic goals. This allowed 
firms to become transnational and to shift operations to lower-cost locations, while 
keeping their home markets protected through import controls. This was what led to the 
hollowing out of Japan’s economy (Bailey and Sugden, 2007).  
 
4.6.4. Future Growth of Japan’s Economy  
 
Since the recession bottomed out in 1993, Japan’s economy has been making a slow 
recovery. For the prospect of Japan’s future growth, economists and scholars have 
suggestions both from the government policy aspect and from the industrial sectors 
aspect.  
 
Katz (1998) suggested that “development state” policies should be avoided. In other 
words, avoiding strategic failure requires setting in train a framework for developing in 
a way which reflects broader community interests. According to Bailey and Sugden 
(2007), the strategy in the interests of Japanese multinational corporations was not in 
the interests of the wider community or in the public interest. They emphasised the 
importance of reinforcing a common end-goal, to move Japan away from the 
government-backed, transnationals-inspired strategic failure experienced through the 
hollowing out of its manufacturing base, towards an economic system characterised by 
a more decentralised governance structure, which recognises the positive freedom of 
varied decision-making. These suggestions need to be consistent with moves to 
deregulate carefully the inner-dependent sectors, so as to open up to imports and thus to 
alleviate the problems of perennial trade surpluses and Yen appreciation.  
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From the viewpoint of industrial sector, Odagiri (2007) suggested the importance to 
this sector of science-based innovations. As business environments changed, Japanese 
firms started to realise that it was no longer possible to depend upon technologies 
imported from abroad and that they had to pursue further growth with their own 
innovatory products and processes. He further stressed the importance of i) university-
industry collaboration as essential for science-based innovation, ii) the promotion of 
start-ups provided with debt guarantees and subsidies and iii) the need of R & D in, for 
example, the biotechnology or pharmaceuticals industries.  
 
These suggestions taken together could ultimately contribute to sustainable 
economic development in Japan.  
 
4.7. Conclusion and Discussion  
 
Like Korean GTCs, Japanese Sogo Shoshas have also have devoted themselves 
from their earliest stages to protecting their country’s industry from the West and to 
further developing the national economy. However, Japanese Sogo Shoshas have also 
been faced with reorganising themselves through strategic management since the 
collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s.  
 
As reviewed, both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas since their foundation 
have been constantly developing in alignment with the government’s economic policy. 
But rapidly changing business environments did not favour their future business 
activities. In the case of the Korean GTCs, the national economic crisis treated Korea’s 
industries, including the GTCs industry, harshly. As a step to surviving in such business 
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conditions, Korean GTCs have been forced to restructure their organisational system to 
increase their competitiveness. Furthermore, the government has not been very much 
involved in the GTCs business and even small and medium-sized manufacturers were  
often able to manage their international exports or imports business by themselves and 
not through GTCs. Similarly, the Japanese Sogo Shoshas have been faced with such  
difficulties since the early 1990s.  
 
As in the introduction and background sections, this chapter, together with Chapter 
3, was devoted to analysing Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, for example, 
their origin, development, characteristics, management system, financial performance 
and contribution to national economic growth. Since the ultimate purpose of this study 
is to examine the strategic management and decision-making process of Korean GTCs 
and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the descriptions in these two chapters provide the 
background for subsequent chapters.  
 
With this in mind, the next chapter will examine the strategic management of the 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas and seek to show how they became 
competitive organisations in the rapidly changing business environment of the global 
markets.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF  
KOREAN GTCS AND JAPANESE SOGO SHOSHAS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The modern business environment of the organisations can be described as 
“uncertain” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1972; Pennings, 1981; Milliken, 
1987; Krickx, 2000) and “complex” (Hage and Dewar, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). Like many other organisations, the Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
have been surrounded by environmental uncertainty. Although they devoted various 
activities to further national economic growth, the macro and micro environmental 
variables did not favourably influence their strategic management. The major macro 
environmental variables affecting their business can be summarised as:  i) the financial 
crisis in the late 1990s in Korea, ii) the collapse of the bubble economy which started in 
the early 1990s in Japan, iii) the globalisation and liberalisation of the national economy 
and iv) the abolition of assistance by the governments. Micro environmental variables, 
such as high competition between the existing firms and SMEs’ independent business 
also influenced the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ management.  
 
The environment for the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas does not tend to be stable, but is 
perpetually changeable. Once the environment changes, the existing strategy and 
structure may no longer be an effective means for creating competitive advantage over 
rivals. Thus, a firm’s managerial strategy and organisational structure should be re-
designed to fit the changed environment. Even if the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas have any 
specific type of strategy for achieving their managerial goals effectively, their success 
may greatly depend on whether the chosen strategy is fit for the environment at the time. 
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Moreover, supposing that the strategy is designed to fit the environment, it is crucial to 
construct a suitable structure to fit the chosen strategy. Lynch (2000) stressed that there 
needs to be a matching process between the organisation’s strategy and its structure and 
these two elements should be consistent with each other in order for a firm to be 
economically effective. The characteristics of Korean GTCs’ structure are centralisation 
and formalisation. They are power-centralised, vertically and hierarchically organised 
entities. Most decision-making power and authority are concentrated in top management. 
This system may hinder the free flow of opinions and ideas from low-level employees 
and the centre of the organisation becomes increasingly isolated from the place where 
decisions are needed and can best be made. These GTCs also emphasise formalisation. 
Employees within them are controlled by job, workflow and rules.  
 
The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ performance is not, of course, the work of a single 
factor, but achieved by a combination of diverse elements: the environment, strategy 
and structure. With this argument in mind, this chapter attempts to examine how Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas have become competitive organisations in the global 
market and how they can achieve their management goals. First, it reviews the  
theoretical background and literature to establish a conceptual framework of this study. 
Second, it addresses the research objectives and questions and presents a model. Third, 
it derives hypotheses based on the literature survey. Fourth, it introduces the research 
design and methodology. Last, it presents the results of the data analysis.  
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5.2. Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
 
Analysing the relationship between the business environment, competitive strategy, 
organisational structure and performance has traditionally been considered one of the 
main tasks in the area of strategic management. A number of studies have been 
established to explore the structural relationship of these four elements: between the 
environment and strategy (Miller, 1988; Govindarajan, 1988; Krickx, 2000), between 
strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962, Lynch, 2000), between strategy and 
performance (Gyampah and Acquaah, 2008), the linkages between the environment, 
strategy and structure and the impact of fit between these three constructs on a firm’s 
performance. (Grinyer, Ardekani and Bazzaz, 1980; Miller, 1988; Chang and Choi, 
1988; Kwon et al., 1999; Kang, 2002; Chathoth and Olsen, 2007).  
 
Most previous studies have emphasised the importance of strategic fit between all 
of elements. Strategic fit is developing strategy by identifying opportunities in the 
business environment and adapting resources and competences so as to take advantage 
of them (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2005). For a firm to be economically 
effective, it needs to ensure that all elements are consistent with each other. For example, 
a firm’s performance is not dependent on one element only, but can be achieved through  
combination of all elements. Chathoth and Olsen (2007) used a co-alignment 
framework to explain strategic management. Their model postulates that performance is 
dependent on all such factors as environmental risk, corporate strategy and capital 
structure. In turn, the environment influences strategy and strategy then impacts on 
capital structure.  
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(Figure 5.1. A Co-alignment Model of Performance)  
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Chathoth, P.K. and Olsen, M. D., (2007), “The Effect of Environment Risk, Corporate Strategy 
and Capital Structure on Firm Performance”, Hospitality Management, Vol. 26, p. 504) 
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This section reviews some research relating to each element that affects a firm’s 
strategic management. First, it reviews the literature relating to the concept and process 
of strategic management, which is the basic framework of this research. Second, 
literature relating to four elements: the environment, competitive strategy, 
organisational structure and firm’s performance is reviewed. Finally, some earlier 
studies will be examined.  
 
5.2.1. Literature relating to the Strategic Management: Concept and Process56
 
First of all, the nature of strategic management in general should be reviewed in 
order to establish the overall framework before discussing each element of this research 
– the environment, strategy, organisational structure and performance.  
 
Strategic management is that set of managerial decisions and actions which  
determines the long-run performance of a corporation. It includes environmental 
                                            
56 Most of this section draws on “Exploring Corporate Strategy” (7th Edition, Prentice Hall) by Johnson, 
Scholes and Whittington (2005). 
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scanning (both external and internal), strategic formulation (strategic or long-range 
planning), strategy implementation and evaluation and control. Therefore, the study of 
strategic management emphasises the monitoring and evaluating of external 
opportunities and threats in the light of a corporation’s strengths and weaknesses 
(Wheelen and Hunger, 2007). Strategic management includes understanding the 
strategic position of an organisation, strategic choices for the future and turning strategy 
into action. It is concerned with deciding on strategy and planning and the way in which 
the selected strategy is to be put into effect through three basic management concepts: 
the strategic position, strategic choices and strategy into action. 
 
The strategic position, one of the elements of the strategic management process, is 
concerned with the impact of strategy on the external environment, internal resources 
and competences and the expectations and influence of stakeholders. The sort of 
question which this raises is central to future strategy. What changes are going on in the 
environment and how will they affect the organisation and its activities? What are the 
resources and competences of the organisation and can these provide special advantages 
or yield new opportunities? What is it that those people and groups associated with the 
organisation aspire to and how does this affect what is expected to be the future 
development of the organisation?  
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(Figure 5.2. The Elements of Strategic Management Process)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, (2005) “Exploring Corporate Strategy”, 7th edition, Prentice 
Hall, p. 16) 
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? Note: Each element circled with a dotted line on the above diagram is a main element in the present  
study. Hypotheses for each subject are to be derived on the basis of the literature survey. For more details, 
see section 5.3.2. Research Model. 
 
Strategic choices involve understanding the underlying bases for future strategy at 
both the corporate and business unit levels and the options for developing strategy, in 
terms of both the directions in which strategy might move and the methods of 
development.  
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There are three levels of strategy in the typical large multidivisional business 
corporation: corporate-level strategy, business-level strategy and operational/functional 
strategy. Corporate-level strategy is concerned with the overall purpose and scope of an 
organisation and how value will be added to the different parts of the organisation. This 
could include issues of geographical coverage, diversity of products/services or business 
units and the way in which resources are to be allocated between the different parts of 
the organisation. Corporate-level strategy typically fits within the three main areas of 
stability, growth and retrenchment. Carpenter and Sanders (2007, pp. 9~10) argued that 
this strategy addresses issues related to three fundamental questions; i) In what 
businesses will we compete? ii) How can we add value to our various lines of business? 
and iii) How will diversification or our entry into a new industry help us to compete in 
our other industries? 
 
Business-level strategy, often called competitive strategy, is about competing 
successfully in particular markets and how to improve the competitive position of a 
firm’s products or services within the specific industry or market segment. Business-
level strategy usually operates at the business unit or product level and it emphasises the 
improvement of the competitive position of a corporation’s products or services in the 
specific industry or market segment served by that business unit. This level of strategy 
may fit within the two overall categories of competitive or cooperative strategies. 
Porter’s (1980) generic strategies – low price strategy, differentiation strategy and focus 
strategy – are typical examples of business-level or competitive strategies.  
 
Operational/functional strategy is concerned with the way in which the component 
parts of an organisation effectively deliver the corporate- and business-level strategies 
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in terms of resources, processes and people. This level of strategy is concerned with 
developing and nurturing a distinctive competence to provide a company or business 
unit with a competitive advantage.  
 
Strategy into action is concerned with ensuring that strategies are working in 
practice. To support successful performance, it is necessary to structure the organisation. 
This includes functional structures, organisational processes, boundaries and 
relationships and the interaction between these elements. Strategy very often involves 
change. Therefore, it is crucial to manage change. This includes the need to change day-
to-day routines and cultural aspects of the organisation and to surmount political 
barriers to change.  
 
From the GTCs’ and Sogo Shoshas’ viewpoint, planning the strategy can become 
complex and time consuming because they are large and multidivisional organisations. 
According to Wheelen and Hunger (2007), it often takes slightly more than a year for a 
large organisation to move by strategic planning from situation assessment to a final 
decision agreement. Because of the relatively large number of people affected by a 
strategic decision in a large firm, a formalised, more sophisticated system is needed to 
ensure that strategic planning leads to successful performance. Otherwise, top 
management becomes isolated from developments in the business units and lower 
managers lose sight of the corporate mission and objectives.  
 
So far, this chapter has scanned the nature of the strategic management process, 
which is the basic framework of this research. Within this framework, it selected four 
elements – the environment, business-level/competitive strategy, organisational 
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structure and performance – as the subjects of research. These elements are to be 
applied to Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas in order to analyse the structural 
relationship between them. The following section will focus on reviewing texts which 
relate to these four elements. 
 
5.2.2. Literature relating to the Environment  
 
The modern business environment for firms can be summarised as uncertain, 
complex, dynamic, diverse and rapidly changing. Thus, the environment for most 
organisations will become less predictable in the future. Such uncertainty, degree of 
complexity and degree of change are threats to all managers attempting to think 
strategically and the success of an organisation’s future will heavily depend on the right 
and immediate responses to external environmental changes. Wheelen and Hunger 
(2007, pp. 89~90) explain today’s business environment as follows:  
 
“Most industries today are facing an ever-increasing level of environmental 
uncertainty. They are becoming more complex and more dynamic. Industries 
that used to be multidomestic are becoming global. New flexible, aggressive, 
innovative competitors are moving into established markets to erode rapidly 
the advantages of large previously dominant firms. Distribution channels vary 
from country to country and are being altered daily through the use of 
sophisticated information systems. Companies learn to quickly imitate the 
successful strategies of market leaders and it becomes harder to sustain any 
competitive advantage for very long”.  
 
Environmental uncertainty is the degree of complexity plus the degree of change 
existing in an organisation’s external environment. Wheelen and Hunger (2007) stressed 
that, as more and more markets become global, the number of factors which a company 
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must consider in any decision increases, making the decision more complex. 
Environmental uncertainty is a threat to strategic managers because it hampers their 
ability to develop long-term plans and to make strategic decisions to keep the 
corporation in equilibrium with its external environment. Yet environmental uncertainty 
can be an opportunity, because it creates a new playing field in which creativity and 
innovation can play a major part in strategic decisions. Dynamism or volatility is the 
frequency of environmental change coupled with the unpredictability of market factors. 
Complexity refers to the number and diversity of competitors, suppliers, buyers and 
other environmental actors which firm decision-makers must consider in formulating 
their strategies (Kabadayi, Eyuboglu and Thomas, 2007).  
 
The effect of uncertainty in organisations was recognised by Barnard (1938), 
March and Simon (1958). Earlier studies focused on the role of uncertainty in shaping 
structure and organisational processes (Cyert and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967). More 
recent work on uncertainty attempted to dimensionalise the concept in order to 
recognise its complex and multidimensional nature (Krickx, 2000). According to 
Grinyer, Ardekani and Bazzaz’s (1980), who analysed the linkages between the 
environment, strategy, structure and financial performance in 48 UK companies, a 
firm’s performance is not determined by a single factor, but achieved by a combination 
of very diverse elements; the environment, strategy and structure. Therefore, the 
environment surrounding organisations is one of the most important elements in 
strategic management and it is vitally important to analyse the environment surrounding 
the firm because environmental analysis helps to develop sustainable competitive 
advantage, identifies opportunities and threats and may provide opportunities for 
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productive co-operation with other organisations when the firm establishes a specific 
corporate strategy. 
 
Uncertainty is a key concept for organisation theory and strategic management 
(Krickx, 2000). The three most common definitions of “environmental uncertainty” 
cited by organisation theorists are:  
 
1. An inability to assign probabilities as to the likelihood of future events (Duncan, 
1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pennings, 1981),   
2. A lack of information about cause-effect relationships (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Duncan, 1972) and/or 
3. An inability to predict accurately what the outcomes of a decision might be 
(Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck and Pennings, 1971; Duncan, 1972). 
 
Milliken (1987) identified three types of perceived uncertainty about the 
environment: state uncertainty, effect uncertainty and response uncertainty. Uncertainty 
about the state of the environment means that one does not understand how the 
components of the environment might be changing. Effect uncertainty is defined as an 
inability to predict what the nature of the impact of a future state of the environment or 
environmental change will be on the organisation. Finally, response uncertainty is a lack 
of knowledge of response options and/or an inability to predict the likely consequences 
of a response choice.  
 
Environmental variables can be divided into two categories: those from the 
external environment and those from the internal environment. The external 
environment again consists of two elements: the societal environment, often called the 
 207 
 
macro environment and the task environment, often called the micro or competitive 
environment.  
 
External environment scanning is concerned with macro environment analysis, 
competitor analysis, market analysis, governmental analysis, supplier analysis and 
interest group analysis. Mavondo (1999) pointed out that the macro environment is 
generally divided into the demographic, political/legal, technological and natural 
environment. The basic assumption is that what happens in the broader environment has 
significant implications for organisational functions. The macro environment introduces 
a degree of homogeneity in a given industry through similarities in regulatory pressures, 
strategic alliances, human capital transfers, social and professional relationships and 
competency blueprints. (Oliver, 1997). Internal environment scanning is concerned with 
identifying and assessing the strengths and weakness of an organisation. In an internal 
environment scanning process, the organisation needs to be carefully examined so as to 
identify and assess resources and capabilities/competences (Slater, 2005).  
 
One of the techniques for scanning the macro environment is the PESTEL analysis, 
which consists of political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, environmental and 
legal variables. This helps managers gain a better understanding of the opportunities and 
threats which they face and consequently aids them in building a better vision of the 
future business landscape (Carpenter and Sanders, 2007). According to Johnson, 
Scholes and Whittington (2005), the potential benefits of macro environmental scanning 
are, inter alia, as follows: it increases managerial awareness of environmental changes, 
it enhances strategic planning by enriching market analysis and it provides time to 
anticipate changes and develop responses to them.  
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In addition to the macro environmental analysis, there is a need to focus more 
closely and move from environmental to industry analysis. Porter (1980, 2008) argued 
that the essence of formulating competitive strategy is relating a company to its 
environment and the key aspect of the firm’s environment is the industry or industries in 
which it competes. The state of competition in an industry depends on five basic 
competitive forces, which are shown in the following figure. 
 
(Figure 5.3. The Five Forces which Shape Industry Competition) 
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(Source: Porter, M.E. (2008), “The Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy”, Harvard Business 
Review, January, 2008, p. 80) 
 
From a strategic management perspective, it is useful for managers in any 
organisation to understand the competitive forces acting on and between organisations 
in the same industry. This may inform important decisions about product, market 
strategy and whether to leave or enter an industry. According to Porter (2008), 
understanding the competitive forces and their underlying causes reveals the roots of an 
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industry’s current profitability while providing a framework for anticipating and 
influencing competition over time. New entrants to an industry bring new capacity and 
a desire to gain market share which puts pressure on prices, costs and the rate of 
investment necessary to compete. Rivalry among existing competitors takes familiar 
forms, including price discounting, new product introducing, advertising campaigns and 
service improvements. Rivalry occurs because one or more competitors either feels 
under pressure or sees the opportunity to improve his position. Moreover, all firms in an 
industry are competing with industries producing substitute products and buyers and 
suppliers also compete with the industry by forcing down prices for higher quality 
goods and services or raising prices for goods of lower quality.  
 
From the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ point of view, both have been surrounded by 
macro and micro environmental uncertainty and complexity. For instance, the financial 
crisis in the late 1990s in Korea and the collapse of the bubble economy starting in the 
early 1990s in Japan as major macro environmental variables greatly influenced their 
performance. The globalisation and liberalisation of the national economy and the 
abolition of government assistance also affected them. Micro environmental variables, 
such as high competition between existing firms and SMEs’ preference for their own 
independent business also influenced the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ management.  
 
5.2.3. Literature relating to Competitive Strategy 
 
The ultimate goal of an organisation is to create and retain competitive advantage 
over its competitors. Competitive strategy, often called business-level strategy, is the 
basis on which a business unit may achieve competitive advantage in its market and is 
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concerned with developing market opportunities, new products and services. At the 
same time, there are many sources of competitive strategies to achieve, develop and 
sustain competitive advantage. The concept of competitive advantage has been 
examined by many people in the following theories; generic strategy theory (Porter, 
1985, 1986), global management strategy theory (Kogut, 1985; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1998), resources-based theory (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Johnson, Scholes and 
Whittington, 2005; Enz, 2008) and FDI theory (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969; 
Dunning, 1980; Wells, 1983). 
 
? Generic Strategy Theory 
 
To exceed average performance within an industry, Porter (1985, 1986) argued that 
a firm should possess firm-specific advantages: low cost or differentiation. According to 
him, the nature of competitive advantage is a function of either providing comparable 
buyer value more efficiently than competitors (low cost), or performing activities at 
comparable cost but in unique ways which create more buyer value than competitors do 
and hence, command a premium price (differentiation). The source of a firm’s 
competitiveness in an industry springs from its specific competitive advantage, which is 
one of two possible basic types: low cost and differentiation. These two basic 
competitive advantages originate from a firm’s activities and linkages within the value 
chain.57 Through optimisation, configuration and coordination within the value chain, a 
                                            
57 Porter argued that the value chain provides a systematic means of displaying and categorising activities. 
The activities performed by a firm in any industry can be grouped into nine generic categories. These 
generic categories of activities can be grouped into two broad types: primary activities (inbound logistics, 
operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and service) and support activities (firm infrastructure, 
human resource management, technology development and procurement). Activities in a firm’s value 
chain are not independent, but connected through linkages. The way in which one activity is performed 
frequently affects the cost or effectiveness of other activities. For instance, if more is spent on the 
purchasing of a raw material, a firm may lower the cost of its fabrication or assembly.  
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firm is able to achieve low cost and differentiation advantages. Therefore, a firm must 
optimise, configure and coordinate such linkages according to its strategy in order to 
achieve competitive advantage in global strategy. In order for a firm to achieve above-
average performance in an industry, the two basic types of competitive advantage are 
divided into three generic strategies: cost leadership, differentiation and focus. 
 
Cost leadership refers to the ability of a firm to establish a clear cost advantage 
relative to its competitors. A firm which can produce substantially similar products at 
lower costs has a significant competitive advantage. With a cost advantage, a firm can 
sell products for less while still maintaining the same margins as rivals (Carpenter and 
Sanders, 2007). Porter (1985, 1986) argued that the sources of cost advantage include 
the pursuit of economies of scale, proprietary technology and preferential access to raw 
materials. The strategic logic of cost leadership requires that a firm be the cost leader, 
not one of several firms vying for this position. Differentiation is based on the product 
itself, the delivery system by which it is sold, the marketing approach and a broad range 
of other factors. In order to achieve an above-average performance through 
differentiation in its industry, a firm’s price premium should exceed the extra costs. If a 
firm markets products whose quality, reliability or prestige is higher than its 
competitors’ and if its customers are willing to pay for this uniqueness, the firm has a 
competitive advantage based on differentiation. Successful differentiation enables a firm 
to gain market share or raise prices over competitors (Carpenter and Sanders, 2007). 
The focus strategy is quite different from the others because it rests on the choice of a 
narrow competitive scope within an industry. A firm can achieve a competitive 
advantage in its target segments by optimising its strategy for the target segments, even 
though it does not possess a competitive advantage overall.  
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Porter’s original approach to competitive strategies is that firms can be successful 
only if they adopt either a cost or a differentiation strategy (i.e. they must choose one of 
the two). If they mix them, they end up with low perceived value and high price (stuck 
in the middle). This is another possible competitive strategy but one which, according to 
Porter, will ultimately fail. Porter made the assumption that a better product costs more 
to produce, but that consumers will pay more in some market segments for what they 
perceive as better. This is the basis of the differentiation strategy. In other markets or 
segments, consumers may be interested only in buying something at the lowest price, 
subject to some minimum quality. This is the basis of cost strategy.  
 
 
However, previous researchers have established that Porter’s generic strategies are 
not mutually exclusive – a firm can pursue several simultaneously. It may be true, as 
Porter argued, that cost leadership and differentiation are generally incompatible, but 
they are not opposite ends of the same continuum. Hambrick (1983, p. 690) pointed out 
that a defender, for example, who maintains a stable offering may choose to exploit its 
stability in the form of low costs (cost leadership), product quality (another form of 
differentiation), or some combination of competitive weapons. The two typologies are 
not incompatible. Dess and Davis (1984, p.484) also supported this argument. An 
important finding of their study was the apparent lack of singularity in strategic 
orientations which characterises the highest performance group. The group was 
identified as primarily oriented toward an overall low cost strategy. However, this group 
also emerged with the highest centroid score on the focus strategy. Given Porter’s 
(1980) caution against being committed to multiple generic strategies, the high 
performance exhibited by the members of this group may appear inconsistent. Miller’s 
(1988) study also claimed that a firm can adopt more than one generic strategy at once. 
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He made a study of 89 Canadian firms in order to investigate the relationships of 
Porter’s business strategies to the structures and environment. Miller (1988, 
pp.284~285) proposed the following hypotheses: 
 
“Hypothesis 2: Marketing differentiation will be positively associated with 
environmental uncertainty. 
 
 Hypothesis 3: The strategy of cost leadership will be inversely associated 
with environmental uncertainty” 
 
Investigators have concluded that the strategies are in fact dimensions on which 
firms can score high or low (Miller, 1988). Based on those previous researches, this 
present research also adopts this position.   
 
Now, we examine each element of Porter’s three generic strategies from the 
GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ point of view. The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas may use their diverse 
functions to achieve cost advantage. First, making economies of scale is one of the 
routes to cost reduction. For example, the SMEs’ independent small scale of 
transactions may incur high cost and is confronted with a limit in the penetration of 
international markets due to their lack of information, knowledge and personnel. This 
being so, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas may be efficient at reducing cost for SMEs through 
their economies of scale. They may overcome such obstacles by organising SME’s lack 
of information, knowledge and personnel together and ultimately succeed in reducing 
costs. Second, large companies such as the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas can achieve cost 
reduction through marketing. Lynch (2000) argued that large companies are able to 
aggregate separate advertising budgets into one massive fund and negotiate extra media 
discounts which are simply not available to smaller companies. Third, the GTCs/Sogo 
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Shoshas also can be a cost leader by rationalising insurance, transportation, storage and 
warehousing facilities. For example, most Korean GTCS and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
have their own insurance or transportation companies and are equipped with many 
storage and warehousing facilities near major seaports in order to meet customers’ 
needs quickly.  
 
The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas are also able to create competitive advantage through 
their differentiation strategy. A typical example of their differentiation strategy is their 
integrated services: information gathering, organising, coordinating, marketing, 
financing, transaction and troubleshooting are simply not provided by ordinary trading 
companies. With regard to the focus strategy, some GTCs/Sogo Shoshas may prefer to 
provide specific services and products to specified regions rather than global markets. 
They, thus, become niche traders. However, in general, this strategy may not create 
competitive advantage, because most GTCs/Sogo Shoshas are highly diversified in 
terms of markets, products and services. This is best expressed in their motto of “from 
noodles to satellites.”   
 
? Global Management Strategy Theory 
 
Global management strategy theory presents the concept of a firm’s strategic 
management in a changing environment. In order to obtain and sustain competitive 
advantage, which is required for global management, a firm needs to cope strategically 
with the rapidly changing business environment since the source of competitive 
advantage is continuously changing. Kogut (1984, 1985) established a global 
management strategic theory by combining comparative advantage (a country-specific 
advantage) with competitive advantage (a firm-specific advantage). Comparative 
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advantage is normally determined by the difference of factor costs (e.g. wages, 
materials and capital charges) between two nations, whereas competitive advantage is 
determined by the difference of technology, brand and information within a firm. 
Therefore, in order to create competitive advantage it is necessary for a firm to design a 
global strategy based on the interplay between the comparative advantages of countries 
and the competitive advantages of firms, because competitive and comparative 
advantage are not completely independent of each other.  
 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) looked at a multinational firm which used an 
integrated networks perspective as a means of building competitiveness. By using 
integrated networks, networks with each specialised unit linked to the others worldwide, 
a firm can achieve multidimensional strategic objectives of efficiency, responsiveness, 
innovation and competitive advantage. Bartlett and Ghoshal argued that the strength of 
this integrated network comes from the following three elements: geographical 
dispersion of assets, specialised operations and interdependent relationships. A 
dispersed configuration of assets and resources allows a firm to capitalise on factor cost 
differentials and still have a chance to access low-cost labour and materials. Dispersed 
operations are also vital in an international environment where the concentration of 
assets would expose companies to intolerable political and economic risk. Moreover, 
today’s worldwide competitive environment demands collaborative information sharing 
and problem solving, cooperative resource sharing and collective implementation.  
 
From the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ perspective, they create and sustain their own 
competitive advantage through information management for, as Kogut emphasised, 
information is vitally important in creating a firm’s competitive advantage. Mitsui 
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Corporation, for instance, focused on “Information Management”, which enables the 
new business opportunities to be created by gathering information about the physical, 
human and financial flow of each country through its global networks. Regarding the  
dispersion of assets, as Bartlett and Ghoshal argued, Nissho Iwai Corporation, for its 
part, selected “Dispersion of Management Resources” as one of its business portfolio 
strategies for 2003~200658.   
 
? Resource-based Theory 
 
A firm’s major concern in strategic management is to acquire and maintain 
sustainable competitive advantage. However, the continued increase of environmental 
uncertainty over time makes it difficult for a firm to sustain competitive advantage. 
Consequently, since the 1980s people have started to pay attention to the internal 
resources of a firm in order to find the source of competitive advantage and this has 
stimulated the emergence of resource-based theory.  
 
                                            
58 Nissho Iwai Corporation’s Business Portfolio Strategies for 2003~2006  
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 segments   
 
- Establishing a basic strategy for each  
 Segment 
(Source: The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005, pp. 38) 
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The internal perspective on competitive advantage is often called the resource-
based view of the firm. It holds that firms are heterogeneous bundles of resources and 
capabilities (Carpenter and Sanders, 2007). Resourced-based theory emphasises a firm’s 
physical resources and importantly deals with a firm’s human or intangible resources, 
which were comparatively neglected by previous studies. The idea of looking at firms 
as a broader set of resources goes back to Penrose (1980). Since her study, the 
framework of resource-based theory to explain a firm’s source of competitive advantage 
has continued to develop and it has become a new area of research in strategic 
management.  
 
Among the factors in a firm’s growth, resources were used by Penrose (1980) to 
present a resource-based approach looking at a firm’s administrative organisation and 
collection of physical, human and intangible assets. Penrose stressed that most resources 
can provide a variety of different services, a fact which is very important for the 
productive opportunities of a firm; it is the heterogeneity, not the homogeneity, of the 
productive services available or potentially available from its resources which gives 
each firm its unique character. Penrose saw a firm as “flesh and blood”, consisting of 
human and non-human resources under administrative authoritative coordination and 
communication. Human and in particular managerial, resources are the most important 
of these. Resources provide multiple potential services.  
 
Mahoney and Pandian (1992) also looked at the concept, arguing that a firm’s 
distinctive competence can create competitive advantage. For instance, top management 
in a diversified enterprise can be a significant and distinctive resource if it uniquely 
contributes to the sustained profitability of the enterprise. Barney (1991) defined a 
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firm’s resources to include all assets, capabilities, organisational processes, information,  
and knowledge controlled by a firm which enable it to conceive of and implement 
strategies to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Barney designated value, rareness, 
imitability and substitutability as major resources for creating a firm’s sustained 
competitive advantage. In other words, a firm’s resources must have four attributes: i) 
they must be valuable, in the sense that they exploit opportunities and neutralise threats 
in a firm’s environment, ii) they must be rare among a firm’s current and potential 
competitors, iii) they must be imperfectly imitable and iv) there must be no strategically 
equivalent substitutes which are valuable but neither rare nor imitable.  
 
Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2005) stressed that unique resources and core 
competences can generate competitive advantage for a firm. Unique resources are those 
which critically underpin competitive advantage, whereas core competences are 
activities or processes which critically underpin a firm’s competitive advantage. Unique 
resources sustain the ability to provide value in the product better than any competitor’s 
resources and are difficult to imitate. At the same time, core competences create and 
sustain the ability to meet the critical success factors of particular customer groups 
better than other providers in ways which are difficult to imitate.  
 
According to Slater (2003), tangible resources may include financial and physical 
resources, whereas intangible resources may include reputation, technology and culture. 
Skills and knowledge, adaptability, communication and interactive abilities and 
motivation are human resources. However, it is better if these resources are unique since 
unique resources are difficult for competitors to imitate and offer potential competitive 
advantage. Corporate culture, for example, can be one of the unique resources. 
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Corporate culture, which is defined as the collection of beliefs, expectations and values 
learned and shared by a corporation’s members and transmitted from one generation of 
employees to the next (Wheelen and Hunger, 2007), fulfils several important functions 
in an organisation. According to Slater (2003), corporate culture gives a positive effect 
or a negative effect according to the situation. Corporate culture may, if appropriate, 
convey a sense of identity and belonging, generate employee commitment, add to 
organisational stability and serve as a frame of reference for decision-making. If 
inappropriate, however, it may give rise to alienation, demotivate employees, destabilise 
an organisation, frustrate communication and delegation and generate resistance to 
change. For instance, a Japanese corporation’s peculiar culture of a guaranteed lifetime 
job can be a unique resource for enhancing their competitive advantage.  
 
Enz’s (2008) case study of Outback Steakhouse in Korea suggests that firms, in 
order to sustain competitive advantage, must manage and blend resources in the 
following five categories; financial resources, physical resources, human resources, 
organisational knowledge and learning and general organisational resources, including 
brand names and relationships with stakeholders. A firm’s differentiation rests most 
heavily on such intangibles as human resources and operational processes. If human 
resource development is neglected, learning and innovation will cease and the 
organisation will eventually lose its market position.  
 
The following figure shows the bundle of resources at Outback Steakhouse in 
Korea.  
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(Figure 5.4. A Combination of Five Resources) 
 Human
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? Customised and rigorous 
training programme  
? Innovative HR practices 
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General Organisational Physical 
? Strong brand and ? Superior functional reputation  processes ? Competitive pricing ? Superior products and ? Strong stakeholder  services  relationships with local ? Site selection (ground floor 
location and suburban bed 
towns)
  community 
  
 
 
 
(Source: Enz, C.A. (2008), “Creating a Competitive Advantage by Building Resource Capability: The 
Case of Outback Steakhouse in Korea”, Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, Vol. 49, Iss.1, p. 75) 
 
As regards the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’, they have hitherto been prone to depend 
upon external environmental features, rather than depending upon their internal 
resources to enhance competitive advantage. However, the modern business 
environment, with its free competition, increased uncertainty, similarity of strategies or 
policies among the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas and market globalisation of market, makes it 
difficult for them to sustain competitive advantage. Therefore, they need to emphasise 
cultivating a long-term insight into internal core competences and resources. For 
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instance, Mitsui Corporation selected the “Establishment of a New System of Fostering 
Competent Employees” as its medium-term business plan.59
 
? FDI Theory  
 
The root of competitive advantage can also be found in FDI theory, because FDI 
theory examines which competitive advantages are required in order for an investing 
firm to be successful while competing against locally existing firms, foreign investors 
and potential competitors in the host country. The concept of competitive advantage in 
FDI theories was mainly analysed by Hymer (1960), Kindleberger (1969), Dunning 
(1980) and Wells (1983). 
 
The theoretical base of competitive advantage in FDI theory started from Hymer 
and Kindleberger, who used the phrase ‘monopolistic advantage’. Hymer (1960) 
stressed that a firm’s possession of specific advantage can cause international operations 
and the origins of monopolistic advantage are the ability to produce at  lower cost, 
knowledge or control of a more efficient production function, distribution ability and 
product differentiation. To explain monopolistic advantage, which produces FDI, 
Kindleberger (1969) presented the ability to differentiate products, special marketing 
skills, retail price maintenance, superiority of management and economies of scale.  
Dunning’s (1980) eclectic theory, however, identified that a firm will engage in FDI if 
the following three conditions are satisfied: i) A firm must have some firm-specific 
assets which its competitors do not possess, ii) there should be a reason for the firm to 
                                            
59 The specific action plans include: i) promotion of competent employees for global management, ii) 
confirming a performance-based reward system, iii) cultivating new global leaders with an age range 
from the late thirties to the early forties, iv) promotion of tailor-made leaders, v) joint ownership and 
sharing of knowledge with important customers and vi) establishing face to face relationships with 
important partners (Source: The Handbook of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, pp. 24) 
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use such assets abroad rather than in the home country and iii) the firm must also be 
induced to internalise such assets. These three are known respectively as ownership-
specific advantage (O), location-specific advantage (L) and internalisation (I). Scholars 
also called ownership-specific advantage monopolistic or competitive advantage. 
According to Wells (1983), a firm must have some advantages over other firms before it 
can operate successfully abroad. Such competitive advantages include: technology, 
marketing skills, ability to collect information and the ability to avoid risk.  
 
5.2.4. Literature relating to Organisational Structure 60
 
The purpose of building organisational structure is to generate and develop 
strategies. Whether strategy comes before or after structure, every organisation needs to 
formulate an optimal structure in order to achieve its strategic goals. Chandler (1962) 
defined the structure as the design of organisation through which the enterprise is 
administered. This design, whether formally or informally defined, has two aspects. It 
includes, first, the lines of authority and communication between the different 
administrative offices and officers; and, second, the information and data which flow 
along these lines of communication and authority. Lynch (2000) argued that the 
organisational structure should be consistent with organisational mission and objectives. 
Before considering the possible structures in detail, some basic questions need to be 
asked: what kind of organisation are we? what is our purpose? which people will carry 
                                            
60 Most of this section draws on the following books: “Designing Organisations” (4th Edition, Richard D. 
Irwin) by Robey, D. and Sales, C.A. (1994), “Exploring Corporate Strategy” (7th Edition, Prentice Hall)” 
by Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005), and “Corporate Strategy” (2nd Edition, Pearson 
Education)” by Lynch, R. (2000).  
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out certain activities? and which form of control, reporting or supervision is most 
appropriate?  
 
Robey and Sales (1994) classified organisational structure into two kinds: 
mechanistic structure and organic structure. Under the mechanistic or bureaucratic 
structure, every task is well defined by rules, responsibilities are clear, a clear hierarchy 
of authority exists to control and coordinate the work, rewards are tied directly to job 
performance and employees are selected on the basis of their ability. However, organic 
structure adapts more readily to a changing environment. For example, with organic 
structure jobs are broadly defined, tasks are not governed by standard rules or 
procedures, responsibilities are somewhat ambiguous, the hierarchy is often bypassed or 
ignored even if it exists, the formal reward system is little emphasised and employees 
are selected on the basis of both objective and intangible criteria.  
 
With respect to the basic principles and components in the process of an 
organisational design, the classical organisation structure designers presented eight 
principles of organisational structure: division of labour, standardisation of tasks, 
hierarchy of authority, equal authority and responsibility, unity of command, limited 
span of control, separation of line and staff and decentralisation. Mintzberg (1979) 
emphasised the importance of the formalisation of behaviour as a basic element in the 
organisational design. More recently, Lynch (2000) presented the main elements of 
organisation design as age, size, environment, centralisation/decentralisation decisions, 
culture and leadership. The section below focuses on two basic elements: 
centralisation/decentralisation and formalisation, which are most relevant to the 
objectives of the present research.  
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? Centralisation and Decentralisation 
 
As an organisation becomes more diverse in its products or markets, there is a 
great likelihood that it will need to consider its structure. Specifically, more complex 
forms of organisational structure may be necessary because the centre becomes 
increasingly isolated from the place where decisions are needed and can best be made. 
Separate divisions within the organisation may need to be set up and some power 
delegated to them. When an organisation changes from being a one-product company to 
including these more complex elements, it may need to move from centralisation to 
decentralisation (Lynch, 1997) 
 
When all the power for decision-making rests at a single point in the organisation, 
we shall call the structure centralised; to the extent that power is dispersed among 
many individuals, we shall call the structure decentralised. There are some advantages 
in centralised organisation: it is possible to produce a consistent strategy across the 
organisation, it allows faster decision-making with less compromise and it facilitates 
the co-ordination of sub-units. However, a move to decentralisation is necessary when  
the organisation becomes more diverse. Mintzberg (1979) suggested three reasons why 
an organisation should decentralise. First, there are too many decisions to be 
understood at one centre, by one brain. Sometimes the necessary information simply 
cannot be brought to that centre. Perhaps too much of it is soft or difficult to transmit. 
Second, decentralisation allows the organisation to respond quickly to local conditions. 
Third, it stimulates motivation. Creative and intelligent people require considerable 
room to manoeuvre. The organisation can attract and retain such people and utilise 
their initiative, only if it gives them considerable power to make decisions.  
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Wickman (2008) adopts a position of neutrality by suggesting the need for 
centralisation and decentralisation to coexist. Giving the example of Scotiabank, he 
argues that firms, to be effective in today’s global business environment, are 
embracing elements of centralisation and decentralisation which allow them to act 
quickly at the local level while leveraging best practices at the corporate level. A vice- 
president of the global performance office at Scotiabank says (Wickman, 2008, p. 46); 
 
“We are a global company and a highly matrixed organisation. The 
hybrid model allows us to be nimble enough to respond to the needs of the 
business quickly and efficiently. At the same time, because we have a 
centralised unit, we can make sure of economies of scale. We can identify 
and use synergies wherever possible and it allows us to provide an 
infrastructure to make the whole thing run.”  
 
The following table shows the balancing considerations between centralisation and 
decentralisation.  
 
(Table 5.1. The Balancing Considerations between Centralisation and Decentralisation) 
Advantages of Centralisation Elements favouring Decentralisation 
It is possible to produce a consistent 
strategy across the organisation. 
Enables a strong response to be made to 
local circumstances. 
The greater likelihood of economies of 
scale. 
When decisions are very complex or 
localised, centralised decision-making 
may not be sensible. 
It facilitates the co-ordination of sub-
units. 
It is difficult to provide high-quality 
customer services from the centre. 
Simpler control system than with a 
decentralisation structure. 
Provide opportunities to develop general 
management talent. 
Faster decision-making, with less 
compromise. 
Motivates staff in locations outside the 
centre. 
Limited geographic distance between 
headquarter and subsidiary. 
A more diversified product range. 
High degree of inter-relationship between 
sub-units. 
A stable environment. 
High technology content. It is appropriate when a unit is 
unimportant to the centre.  
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For GTCs and Sogo Shoshas, the centralisation/decentralisation issue is one of the 
most important to resolve for effective management. A basic dilemma for a 
multinational corporation61 is how to organise authority centrally so that it operates as 
a vast interlocking system which operates a strategy and at the same time decentralise 
authority so that local managers can make the decisions necessary to meet the demands 
of the local market (Wheelen and Hunger, 2007). To deal with this problem, GTCs and 
Sogo Shoshas tend to structure themselves along geographic areas, i.e. Asia, West 
Europe, East Europe, North America, South America, Oceania, Middle East and Africa.  
 
? Formalisation 
 
Formalisation is defined as the degree to which formal rules and procedures 
govern decisions and working relationships. Rules and procedures provide a means for 
prescribing appropriate behaviours and addressing routine aspects of a problem. 
According to Mintzberg (1979), formalisation of behaviour is the design parameter by 
which the work processes of the organisation are standardised. He classified the 
behaviour of formalisation in three ways: formalisation by job, formalisation by work 
flow and formalisation by rules. In case of formalisation by job, the organisation 
attaches the behavioural specifications to the job itself, typically documenting it in the 
formal job description. The incumbent may be told what steps to take in his work, in 
what sequence, when and where. In case of formalisation by work flow, instead of 
linking the specifications to the job, the organisation can attach them to the work itself. 
Finally, rather than formalising by job or work flow, the organisation may instead 
                                            
61 It is hard to see GTCs and Sogo Shoshas as multinational corporations because most of them do not 
have manufacturing facilities in the local markets where they have offices. However, they have almost 
same functions as multinational corporations in terms of organisational structure, operating offices in a 
local market and hiring local people, etc. Nowadays, some GTCs and Sogo Shoshas tend to invest in 
manufacturing business in local markets.  
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institute rules for all situations – all jobs, all work flows and all workers. These may 
specify who can or cannot do what, when, where, to whom and with whose permission. 
As Bjork (1975) suggested, organisations formalise behaviour to reduce its variability 
and ultimately to predict and control it. One prime motive for doing so is to coordinate 
activities. The fully formalised organisation is the precise organisation, in which there 
can be no confusion. Formalisation is also used to ensure the machinelike consistency 
which leads to efficient production. Tasks are specialised in the horizontal dimension 
to achieve repetition; formalisation is then used to impose the most efficient 
procedures on them.  
 
At the same time, according to Kim’s study (2007) of a set of best organisational 
structures for efficient Supply Chain Management (SCM), although excessive 
formalisation and centralisation of the SCM department within a firm may interrupt the 
complete integration of the supply chain and performance improvement, a certain range 
of control by the SCM department is inevitable in building the fundamentals of 
integrated SCM. Therefore, the temporary pursuit of intensive formal control focused 
on organisation type, such as integrated line organisation, may be considered, depending 
on firm characteristics and environmental changes.  
 
? Types of Organisation  
 
There are many types of organisational structure: simple structures, functional 
structures, multidivisional structures, holding company structures, matrix structures and 
so on. Each type of structure has different characteristics. Thus, it is important to be 
familiar with the strength and weakness of each type when formulating the structure.  
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First, a simple structure can be thought of as something without formal structure, 
because the organisation is run by the personal control of an individual.  
 
Second, a functional structure is based on the primary activities to be undertaken 
by an organisation, such as production, finance and accounting, marketing, human 
resources and information management. There are some advantages in the functional 
structure including the fact that it allows central strategic control at a senior level and 
provides clear responsibilities to organisation members. However, senior managers will 
be overburdened with routine matters as the organisation becomes larger or more 
diverse, it will be difficult to cope with diversity and strategic change may be slow.  
 
(Figure 5.5. A Functional Structure)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Executive 
Marketing 
Department 
Finance/accounting 
Department 
Personnel 
Department 
Production 
Department 
(Source: Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2005), “Exploring Corporate Strategy”, 7th Edition, Prentice 
Hall, p. 399) 
 
 
Third, a multidivisional structure is built up from separate divisions on the basis of 
products, services or geographical areas. As organisations grow, they may need to 
subdivide their activities in order to deal with the great diversity which can arise in 
products, geography or other aspects of the business. The major advantages of this 
structure are: it allows a focus on a particular business area and facilitates the 
measurement of unit performance. But there will be conflict between divisions when 
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they compete with each other, the complexity of cooperation will increase if there are 
too many divisions and it is an expensive structure to maintain. 
 
(Figure 5.6. A Multidivisional Structure)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Ibid, p. 401) 
Head Office 
Division B Division C Division D Division A 
Function Function Function Function 
 
Fourth, a holding company structure is an investment company consisting of 
shareholders in a variety of separate business operations. This structure may enhance 
new market entry, spread risk for conglomerates and allow for the complexity of 
modern ownership. Disadvantages are: there is little control at the centre and problems 
will arise if two partners cannot cooperate or one partner loses interest.  
 
Fifth, a matrix structure is a combination of structures, which could take the form 
of product and geographical divisions or functional and divisional structures operating 
in tandem. 
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 (Figure 5.7. A Matrix Structure: Multinational Organisation)  
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(Source: Ibid, p. 403) 
 
This structure helps quality decision-making where interests conflict and increases 
managerial motivation through manager’s close involvement with organisational issues. 
However, there is a high degree of conflict and it takes time to make decisions because 
all participants have to reach agreement.  
 
From the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ point of view, both Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas are highly multidivisional structures. For example, Mitsubishi 
Corporation consists of six different business groups: the new business initiative group, 
the energy business group, the metals business group, the machinery business group, the 
 231 
 
chemicals business group and the living essentials business group. Each group focuses 
on its core areas. For instance, the energy business group concentrates on natural gas, 
petroleum and carbon development, while the living essentials business group concerns 
itself mainly with foods and textiles businesses. This structure allows each group to 
achieve maximum profits and effectiveness by concentrating on its main business area 
and it also facilitates the measurement of group performance.  
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(Figure 5.8. Organisational Structure of Mitsubishi Corporation)  
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(Source: Mitsubishi Corporation Annual Report, 2008, p. 3)  
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5.2.5. Literature relating to Business Performance   
 
A firm’s performance is reaped from its effective management of physical and 
human resources. As a tool for measuring a firm’s performance, financial performance 
measurements, such as Return on Investment (ROI), Earnings per Share (EPS), 
profitability, productivity, growth rate and sales amount, have traditionally been used as 
key performance indicators. However, it has been recognised that no one performance 
measure can adequately meet the needs of management in a competitive environment. 
Brown and McDonnell (1995) argued that the traditional use of profit-based 
performance measures by many organisations can be criticised on a variety of 
fundamental grounds – for instance their relative incompleteness and lack of accuracy 
and neutrality, their encouragement of short-terms and their lack of balance. Moreover, 
Newing (1995, p. 22) claimed: 
 
“In particular, it places too much emphasis on pure profit measures and too little 
on the customer, staff, risk process and control aspects of the organisation’s 
operations, although these are the key drivers of the financial results” 
 
Niven (2008) also pointed out that previous measurement systems have failed to 
keep pace with the rate of change occurring in the workplace. The performance 
measurement system focuses almost exclusively on financial measures and more 
specifically, it relies on counting countable things. 
 
Major limitations of traditional financial performance measurement systems can be 
summarised as follows. First, they have limitations in forecasting a firm’s future 
performance and its potential to create value, since they are based merely on actions 
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taken in the past, i.e. lagging indicators. They excessively emphasise short-term 
financial indicators, but tend to ignore long-term potential performance. For example, if 
firms neglect the driving forces which create future value for them, such as core 
competencies, R & D and learning, they will ultimately fail to sustain their 
competitiveness. Second, as Amaratunga et al. (2002) argued, traditional performance 
measurement systems appear not to be providing managers with the information that 
they need to measure and manage the all-important competencies which drive 
competitive advantage. Third, they ignore customers and competition. Traditional 
financial performance measures do not give any information on how customers see a 
firm, or how a firm creates competitive advantage over its competitors. Fourth, as 
Kaplan and Norton (1992) argued, traditional financial accounting measures can give 
misleading signals for continuous improvement and innovation activities in today’s 
competitive and demanding environment.  
 
Due to the reasons mentioned above, many organisations have realised that the 
traditional financial orientation of their performance measurement systems are no longer 
adequate and they want a balanced presentation of both financial and operational 
measures. In 1992, Kaplan and Norton devised a “Balanced Scorecard (BSC)” – a  
leading indicator of a firm’s performance and a new measurement system of both 
financial and non-financial elements. It includes financial measures which tell the 
results of actions already taken. And it complements the financial measures with 
operational measures of customer satisfaction, internal processes and the organisation’s 
innovation and improvement activities – operational measures which are the drivers of 
future financial performance. The BSC allows managers to look at the business from 
four important interlinked perspectives – financial, customer, learning and growth 
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perspective and internal-business process. The main aim of the BSC is to address the 
problem of organisations relying too heavily on traditional financial outcome measures, 
which tend to focus on past performance rather than on performance metrics to help 
predict an organisation’s future success (Meyer, 2005). By focusing not only on 
financial outcomes but also on their operational, marketing and developmental inputs, 
the BSC helps provide a more comprehensive view of a business, which in turn helps 
organisations to act in their best long-term interests. 
 
The BSC provides answers to four basic questions its four perspectives of the BSC 
are illustrated in the figure below.  
 
(Figure 5.9. The Four Perspectives of the BSC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vision and 
Strategy 
Customer
Objectives, Measures, 
Targets, Initiatives 
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To succeed financially, how should 
we appear to our shareholders? 
To achieve our vision, 
how should we appear to 
our customers? 
To satisfy our customers, 
what business processes 
must we excel at? 
To achieve our vision, how will 
we sustain our ability to change 
and improve? 
(Source: Kaplan, R. S. and Norton, D. P. (1996), “Using the Balanced Scorecard as a Strategic 
Management System”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 1, Jan./Feb. p. 76) 
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? Financial Perspective 
 
Financial performance measures indicate whether the organisation’s strategy, 
implementation and execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement. Typical 
financial goals have to do with profitability, growth and shareholder value (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992; Carpenter and Sanders, 2007). Smith (2007) suggests that the strategic 
objectives of financial perspective are maintaining financial integrity, generating 
revenue, managing budget and managing investments.  
 
 
? Customer Perspective 
 
Customer perspective captures the ability of the organisation to provide quality 
goods and services, the effectiveness of their delivery and overall customer service and 
satisfaction (Amaratunga et al., 2002). To this effect, many firms today have a corporate 
mission focused on their customers. The BSC demands that managers translate their 
general mission statement on customer service into specific measures which reflect the 
factors that matter most to customers (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). When choosing 
objectives for the customer perspective, firms must answer three critical questions; 
“Who are our customers?” “What do our customers expect from us?” and “What is our 
value proposition in serving them?” (Niven, 2008, p. 17). According to Smith (2007), 
increasing stakeholder satisfaction, promoting a positive image of the firm and 
enhancing customer communication would be the strategic objective from this 
perspective.  
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? Learning and Growth Perspective 
 
The customer-based and internal business process measures on the BSC identify 
the parameters which the organisation considers most important for competitive success. 
But the targets for success continually change. Intense global competition requires 
companies to make continual improvements to their existing products and processes and 
to learn to introduce entirely new products which can do more. In this context, the 
learning and growth perspective looks at such issues, which include the ability of 
employees, the quality of information systems and the effects of organisational 
alignment in supporting the achievement of organisational goals (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992). Smith (2007) gives some objective examples of the learning and growth 
perspective; developing a positive culture, improving internal communication and 
managing technological resources.  
 
? Internal-Business Process Perspective 
 
Managers need to decide which operations, processes, competences and skills their 
organisations must excel at if customer demands are to be met adequately (Brown and 
McDonnell, 1995; Niven, 2008). This perspective is primarily an analysis of the 
organisation’s internal processes. Internal business processes are the mechanisms 
through which organisational performance expectations are achieved. Customer-based 
measures are important, but they must be translated into measures of what the 
organisation must do internally to meet its customers’ expectations. After all, excellent 
customer performance derives from the processes, decisions and actions occurring 
throughout an organisation. This perspective focuses on the internal business results 
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which lead to financial success and satisfied customers. Thus, managers need to focus 
on those critical internal operations that enable them to satisfy customer needs 
(Amaratunga et al., 2002). Smith (2007) suggests that streamlining key processes and 
optimising contract management would be a good example for the objectives of this 
perspective.  
 
From the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ point of view, the BSC may be an integrated new 
tool for measuring both financial and non-financial performance. The financial 
perspective has traditionally been used as a primary indicator to measure the 
GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ performance. In the stage when they are growing quantitatively, 
their financial performance is a major performance indicator of their success, without 
paying special attention to other perspectives, such as customer satisfaction or retention, 
employee satisfaction or education and effective decision-making, etc. But  as the 
business environment surrounding the GTCs became more intense, they realised that  
they needed to have a balanced presentation of both financial and non-financial 
measures. In addition to the financial emphasis, they needed to have a balanced strategic 
insight as to what was needed by their customers, their employees and the internal-
business process. The following figure illustrates four perspectives of the BSC applied 
to the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas. 
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(Figure 5.10. The Four Perspectives of the BSC applied to the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Developed by the author based on Kaplan and Norton) 
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5.2.6. Review of Selected Previous Studies  
 
? A Study by Chandler (1962): The Relationship between Strategy and 
Structure62 
 
The first study to investigate the relationship between a firm’s strategy and 
structure was carried out by the US strategist Alfred Chandler, Jr. In the early 1960s, 
Chandler examined how some leading North American companies, including Ford and 
General Motors, had developed their strategies in the first half of the twentieth century. 
On the basis of this empirical study, he concluded that it was first necessary for the firm 
to develop its strategy. After this task was done, the firm should devise the structure to 
deliver the strategy. As a company grows in size and complexity, the company needed a 
general office to handle the main planning and co-ordinating work of the various 
functions of a business, including the marketing, finance, operations and human 
resources. The general office was concerned with the long-term health of the firm: it 
devised the firm’s strategy. Once the strategy was formulated, the general office then 
implemented it by designing a suitable organisational structure and allocating capital 
and human resources to the various parts of the organisation.  
 
Chandler’s study was in fact the forerunner for many organisational strategists. 
However, it is necessary to examine whether its conclusions are still relevant in the 
modern business environment.  
 
 
                                            
62 nd This part is re-summarised from the book “Corporate Strategy (2  Edition, Pearson Education)” by 
Lynch, R. (2000). pp. 717~718 
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? A Study by Mintzberg (1979): The Links between Strategy and Structure63 
 
In the process of designing organisational structure, it is necessary to consider the 
complicated links between strategy and structure. In this regard, Mintzberg provided a 
process. He argued that the six basic parts of every organisation: its operating core, 
strategic apex, middle line, techno-structure, support staff and ideology have to be 
connected together, because between them they add value to the organisation. 
Furthermore, he presented six co-ordinating methods for linking together the above six 
parts of the organisation: mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardisation of work 
processes, standardisation of outputs, standardisation of skills and standardisation of 
norms. Using these parts and methods, Mintzberg then developed six main types of 
organisational strategy and structure which combine the environment, internal 
characteristics of the organisation and the key part of the organisation for delivering its 
objectives. The six main types of organisations or strategic configurations are the 
entrepreneurial organisation, machine organisation, professional organisation, 
divisionalised structure, innovative organisation and missionary organisation. Using this 
classification, the organisation’s strategy and its likely structure can be interrelated. In 
this sense, strategy is linked to structure. Although most organisations do not match the 
six different configurations precisely, they do provide guidelines for linking strategy to 
structure.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
63 nd This part is re-summarised from the book “Corporate Strategy (2  Edition, Pearson Education)” by 
Lynch, R. (2000). pp. 734~738 
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? Research by Grinyer, Ardekani and Bazzaz (1980): The Relationships between 
the Environment, Strategy, Structure and Financial Performance  
 
Grinyer, Ardekani and Bazzaz (1980) undertook an empirical study to analyse to 
test hypotheses relating to the links between the environment, strategy, structure and 
financial performance. The hypotheses relate to the correlates of strategy and structure; 
relationships between strategy, structure and environmental hostility; and relationships 
between strategy, structure and their match and measures of performance. Data were 
collected during interviews with senior managers within 48 large UK companies. Of the 
companies, 25% were in service industries, 43% were in manufacturing and 32% were 
in both.  
 
First, regarding the relationship between strategy, structure, size, sites and 
dispersion, it found that there were positive correlation between strategy and structure, 
site and structure and geographical dispersion and structure. However, there was no 
correlation between the size of company and its diversification strategy. Second, 
regarding the relationship among strategy, structure and financial performance, it found 
that there is little support for the view that ROI and growth (Financial Performance) are 
positively correlated with the degree of diversification (Strategy). Often, growth and 
diversification were found to have a negative correlation. Furthermore, regarding the 
structure and financial performance, there is no evidence to support any hypothesis that 
companies with a divisional structure tend to outperform others in general. Lastly, 
regarding the relationships between the environment, strategy, structure and financial 
performance, it was found that diversification has advantages in in particular difficult 
environments (Environment). However, no significant correlations between 
diversification and any measure of performance were found. With respect to structure 
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and financial performance, more highly divisionalised companies (Structure) seem to 
outperform others in terms of growth in sales, capital employed and number of persons 
employed. However, there was a negative correlation in the growth of ROI.  
 
(Table 5.2. The Hypotheses and Results Summarised)  
Hypothesis Analysis  Result 
H.1: Degree of diversification and degree of 
divisionalisation are positively correlated 
Strategy/Structure Supported 
H.2: The number of sites and the degree of 
divisionalisation are positively correlated 
Sites/Structure Supported 
H.3: The geographical dispersion of major sites 
and the degree of divisionalisation are positively 
correlated 
Dispersion/Structure Supported 
H.4: Size of companies is positively correlated 
with their degree of diversification 
Size/Strategy No correlation 
H.5: ROI and measures of growth are positively 
correlated with degree of diversification 
Strategy/Performance Little supported 
H.6: ROI and growth are greater for divisionally 
structured companies 
Structure/Performance No correlation 
H.7: In unstable environments, ROI and growth 
are positively and variability of ROI is 
negatively correlated with diversification 
Environment/Strategy/ 
Performance 
Not supported 
H.8: In unstable environments, ROI and growth 
are positively and variability of ROI is 
negatively correlated with divisionalisation 
Environment/Structure/ 
Performance 
Confirmed for growth 
in sales, capital 
employed and number 
employed. Rejected for 
growth in ROI where 
correlation is negative 
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? Research by Miller (1988) relating to Porter’s Business Strategies, to the 
Environment and Structure: Analysis and Performance Implications 
 
Miller’s (1988) study investigated the relationship of Porter’s (1980) business 
strategies to the structures and environments of Canadian firms. This study dealt with 
strategy at the top levels of un-diversified autonomous companies, there being no real 
difference between business and corporate strategies in such organisations. The sample 
consisted of 89 firms selected randomly from lists published in the magazine 
“Commerce and Les Affaires”, which represent a fairly exhaustive inventory by 
industry of significant firms in Québec. Most companies were quite small and many of 
them were tightly controlled by a single owner, a family, a group of partners, or a 
holding company. A diversity of industries was represented. They included electronics, 
financial services, home appliances, food and beverages, industrial equipment, 
construction and mining. Data were collected from the CEO and by the most senior vice 
president or general manager through the questionnaire. With respect to variables, four 
of the most commonly researched elements were selected in the part devoted to the 
environment: uncertainty, unpredictability, dynamism and heterogeneity; three elements 
emerged in the strategy part: differentiation, cost leadership and focus; and four 
elements in the structure part: delegation, formal control, specialisation and integration.  
 
The first analysis sought the relationship between the environment and strategy. 
According to the results, marketing differentiation (Strategy) positively correlated with 
uncertainty, predictability and dynamism (Environment). However, cost leadership 
(Strategy) correlated negatively with uncertainty, predictability and dynamism. The 
second analysis was the relationship between strategy and structure. The result showed 
that innovative differentiation (Strategy) correlated significantly with the use of liaison 
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devices, technocrats and delegation (Structure). However, there was a low-order 
correlation between marketing differentiation and the use of liaison devices. 
Furthermore, the relationship of cost leadership to the use of liaison devices, technocrats 
and delegation was negative. The third analysis assessed the relationship between 
strategy, structure and performance. The hypothesis stated that strategies or structures 
alone – not matched to one another – will not contribute to performance. The result 
showed that strategy or structure alone actually could influence performance. Thus, it 
confirmed the hypothesis. The last analysis was the relationship between the 
environment and structure. The result stated that the relationship between environment 
and structure was not significant. 
 
(Table 5.3. The Hypotheses and Results Summarised)  
Hypothesis Analysis  Result 
H.1: Marketing differentiation will be positively 
associated with environmental uncertainty, 
predictability and dynamism 
Environment/Strategy Supported 
H.2: The strategy of cost leadership will be 
negatively associated with environmental 
uncertainty, predictability and instability 
Environment/Strategy Supported 
H.3: The strategy of innovative differentiation 
will be positively associated with the use of 
liaison devices, technocrats and delegation 
Strategy/Structure Highly supported 
H.4: The marketing differentiation strategy will 
not be associated with the use of technocrats, 
liaison devices or delegation of authority 
Strategy/Structure Supported 
H.5: The association of strategy and structure 
with performance will not be significant 
Strategy/Structure/ 
Performance 
Supported 
H.6: The association between environment and 
structure will not be significant 
Environment/Structure Supported 
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? Research by Kotha and Nair (1995): Strategy and Environment as 
Determinants of Performance in the Japanese Machine Tool Industry 
 
This study examined the effect of strategy and environment on performance using 
data from a sample of 25 Japanese machine tool industries. The result indicated that 
both firm strategies and the environment play significant roles in influencing 
performance – in profitability and growth.  
 
First, in the relationship between environment and performance, this study predicted 
that environmental munificence will be positively related to firm-level performance. 
Results showed that munificence is positive and significantly related to both Return on 
Sales (ROS) and growth. It also hypothesised that technological change will be related 
negatively to firm-level performance. It found that the technological change has no 
effect on ROS, but has a positive effect on growth.  
 
Second, in the relationship between strategy and performance, it found that cost-
efficiency strategy is negative and significantly related to ROS. Moreover, the results 
showed that a differentiation strategy based on “advertising intensity” is negatively 
related to ROS. However, even though the relationship between advertising-driven 
differentiation strategy and growth is positive, it is not statistically significant. 
 
This study suggested the following implications. A firm which matches its strategies 
with the requirements of the environment will achieve better performance, as many 
studies argued. Technological change does not always lead to poor performance, but 
ultimately may lead to superior performance in long-term.  
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? Research by Kwon, Kim, Kim and Limb (1999): The Relationships between  
the Environment, Competitive Strategy and Organisational Structure: 
Performance Implications 
 
This research investigated the relationships between the environment, competitive 
advantage and organisational structure and the impact of this relationship on a firm’s 
performance. Data were obtained through questionnaires from the 250 subsidiaries of 
50 Korean diversified enterprises. The study found that a firm’s employment of a 
differentiation strategy positively correlated with the environmental uncertainty. More 
specifically, it divided the differentiation strategy into two categories: innovative 
differentiation and marketing differentiation. Both innovative and marketing 
differentiation strategies were positively associated with environmental uncertainty. 
However, unlike the hypothesis, the cost leadership strategy also positively correlated 
with environmental uncertainty, although the result was not significant statistically. 
With respect to the relationship between the competitive strategy and organisational 
structure, the results showed that a differentiation strategy was statistically significant 
with organisational delegation. In addition, the cost leadership strategy was positively 
associated with organisational formalisation.  
 
Empirical results showed that the fit between the environment, strategy and 
structure was still important for subsidiaries of diversified firms, even after controlling 
diversification effects such as resource sharing among subsidiaries. It found that firms 
with high fit between the environment, strategy and structure performed significantly 
better than firms with low fit. However, significant performance differences between 
high and low performance did not exist for bivariate fits (fit between environment and 
structure, fit between strategy and structure and fit between environment and strategy). 
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An important finding of this study was that, for subsidiaries of diversified firms, 
theories of business-level strategy are still applicable and have an important 
performance implication. It is also important that fit between environment, strategy and 
structure is not universally applicable for all types of strategy. For example, high 
performers with innovative differentiation strategy achieved both external fit 
(environment-strategy) and internal fit (strategy-structure), while high performers with 
cost leadership strategy pursued internal fit only.  
 
? Research by Kang (2002): Relationships between the Environment, 
Competitive Strategy and Organisational Structure and Performance 
 
This study was carried out in order to examine the relationship between the 
environment, firm strategy and organisational structure and performance in the Korean 
hotel industry. The super deluxe hotels located in Seoul participated in this research. 
This study investigated how the environment and the strategy are related to the 
formulation of organisational structure, decentralisation, degree of compensation and 
systematic decision-making and how the influence of the productivity of an industry is 
different according to its suitability. The results showed that, first, environmental 
uncertainty had more significant results in differentiation strategy than in overall cost 
leadership strategy. Second, regarding the relationship between strategy and structure, 
differentiation strategy showed significant positive influences on decentralisation, 
degree of compensation and systematic decision-making, while overall cost leadership 
strategy showed significant positive influences on formalisation. Third, in the 
relationship between the environment and performance, the results showed that 
environmental uncertainty does not have direct influence on a hotel firm’s performance.  
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? Research by Chathoth and Olsen (2007): The Effect of Environmental Risks, 
Corporate Strategy and Capital Structure on Firm Performance 
 
This research, using a sample from the US restaurant industry, tested the 
simultaneous impact on firm performance of surrogates from constructs identified as 
part of the co-alignment model, i.e. environment, strategy and structure.  
 
Environmental risk was conceptualised as the impact of the firm’s external 
environment on the firm, from a cash flow and profitability perspective. Corporate 
strategies were captured by two variables, i.e. growth-related and liquidity-related ones. 
The capital structure was defined using the resource-based view of strategy relative to 
the way in which a firm finances its investment using debt and equity instruments. Firm 
performance is conceptualised from the accounting and finance standpoints. 
 
The relationships between the constructs were tested using the measures of the firm 
performance construct as the dependent variable and the variables of the environmental 
risk, corporate strategies and capital structure constructs as independent variables. The 
main objective of this study was to test if the firm performance-related model which 
includes the key alignment constructs of environmental risk, corporate strategies and 
capital structure holds good. The study confirmed that the variables which represent the 
constructs of the co-alignment model simultaneously help explain a significant variance 
in firm performance.  
 
According to regression analysis, the full model (environmental risk, corporate 
strategy, capital structure and firm performance) explained 59% of the variance of the 
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firm’s ROE. This clearly was the best model, as compared to other incremental models 
which explained 35% (environmental risk, corporate strategy and firm performance) 
and 51% (environmental risk, capital structure and firm performance) of the variance in 
firm performance.  
 
? A Study by Gyampah and Acquaah (2008): Manufacturing Strategy, 
Competitive Strategy and Firm Performance 
 
This study examined the relationship between manufacturing strategy and 
competitive strategy and their influence on firm performance. It tested how competitive 
strategy influences manufacturing strategy and also examined the impact which 
manufacturing strategy and competitive strategy have on firm performance among 
Ghanaian manufacturing firms.  
 
First, it examined the relationship between competitive strategy and manufacturing 
strategy with a hypothesis – that competitive strategy influences manufacturing strategy. 
The study found significant positive relationships between competitive strategy and 
manufacturing strategy. It confirmed that all four manufacturing strategies (cost, 
delivery, flexibility and quality) are means through which a firm can implement its 
competitive strategies. It also investigated the relationship between manufacturing 
strategy and firm performance with a prediction – that manufacturing strategy has a 
positive influence on firm performance. This was also supported. Of the four 
manufacturing strategy components, only quality was positively linked to market share 
and sales growth in both the differentiation and cost leadership models.  
Second, in the relationship between competitive strategy and performance, it 
predicted that competitive strategy has a direct positive influence on firm performance. 
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The study did not find any direct statistical relationship between competitive strategy 
and firm performance. However, competitive strategy influences firm performance 
through quality. Quality improves firm performance significantly, regardless of which 
competitive strategy a firm chooses to emphasise. This is perhaps true because of the 
impact which quality has on the other manufacturing strategy components.  
 
The implication of this study was that, whether a firm chooses to pursue a cost 
leadership or a differentiation strategy, an emphasis on quality provides the most 
benefits with regard to firm performance. An emphasis on quality appeared, for instance,  
to provide a means by which companies could mitigate the effects of increased 
competition resulting from the economic reforms within the Ghanaian manufacturing 
environment.  
 
5.3. Research Objectives, Questions and Model   
 
The previous section surveyed the literature relating to the business environment, 
competitive strategy, organisational structure and a firm’s performance. By reviewing 
the existing literature, we can see that a firm’s performance is not achieved by a single 
factor, but accomplished through a combination of all the elements or the strategic fit 
between all of them. In other words, the business environment directly affects a firm’s 
competitive strategy and the strategy influences the design of organisational structure, 
but at the same time structure can constrain and guide the choice of strategy. 
Performance, then is directly affected by the strategy and structure. Based on this 
theoretical foundation, this study attempts to examine the structural relationship 
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between the business environment, competitive strategy, organisational structure and 
the performance of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
 
5.3.1. Research Objectives and Questions 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the strategic management of Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. As a means of accomplishing the objective, it 
attempts to analyse the structural relationship between the business environment and a 
firm’s strategy, organisational structure and performance. In order to achieve the 
objective, the following sets of research questions have been devised and methods are 
presented of finding answers to those questions;  
 
RQ 1. How much do environmental variables affect competitive strategies? ⇒ 
Analysis of the relationship between business environments and competitive 
strategies, 
RQ 2. Is there any correlation between competitive strategies and organisational 
structure? ⇒ Analysis of the relationship between competitive strategies and 
organisational structure,   
RQ 3. How much do competitive strategies influence a firm’s performances? ⇒ 
Analysis of the relationship between competitive strategies and performances,  
RQ 4. How far is organisational structure associated with a firm’s performances? ⇒ 
Analysis of the relationship between organisational structure and performances.   
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5.3.2. Research Model 
 
(Figure 5.11. A Research Model)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environment 
? Uncertainty 
? Complexity 
Strategy 
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? Cost Leadership 
? Hybrid Strategy 
Structure 
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? Formalisation 
Performance 
? Financial 
? Non-financial 
H.1.1~H.1.2 
H.2.1~H.2.2 
H.3.1~H.3.3 
H.4.1~H.4.3 
 
The above figure illustrates the model of this study; that is, the relationship 
between the environment and strategy (H.1.1~H.1.2), strategy and organisational 
structure (H.2.1~H.2.2), strategy and performance (H.3.1~H.3.3) and organisational 
structure and performance (H.4.1~H.4.3).  
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5.4. Hypotheses 
 
5.4.1. The Relationship between Environment and Strategy  
 
Both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas are surrounded by an uncertain and 
complex business environment. In these circumstances it is crucial for them to choose a 
suitable strategy in order to create and sustain competitive advantage over their 
competitors. Based on this argument, hypotheses H.1.1~H.1.2 attempt to analyse the 
structural relationship between the environment and strategy of Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
 
Many people (for example, Barnard, 1938; March and Simon, 1958; Duncan, 
1972; Grinyer, Ardekani and Bazzaz, 1980; Pennings, 1981; Krickx, 2000; and Wheelen 
and Hunger, 2007) argued that environmental uncertainty is a key concept for 
organisational theory and it has traditionally been considered a significant factor in the 
process of strategic management. Environmental uncertainty is the degree of complexity 
and the degree of change existing in an organisation’s external environment. So, it is a 
vitally important task for managers to make sense of the uncertain world surrounding  
their organisation. Another issue in organisational management is complexity. 
Complexity is the number of different occupational specialities and the degree of their 
heterogeneity and number of elements within the organisations’ environment (Hage and 
Dewar, 1973). Managers are no different from other individuals in the way that they 
cope with complexity; they try to simplify what is happening by focusing on those few 
aspects of the environment which have been important historically. Hence, it is 
important to find ways to avoid these tendencies when seeking to understand the 
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environment, which are both usable and oriented towards the future (Johnson, Scholes 
and Whittington, 2005).  
 
However, there are many sources of competitive strategies by which firms may 
create and sustain competitive advantage. As sources of a firm’s competitive advantage, 
Porter (1980, 1985) identified three generic ways in which a firm can gain a sustainable 
competitive advantage over other firms in its industry: low cost, differentiation and 
focus. Kogut (1984, 1985) argued that, in an industry, technology, brand and 
information will do this and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) stressed three other elements 
for this purpose: geographic dispersion of assets, specialised operations and 
interdependent relationships. Furthermore, the source of competitive advantage was also 
reviewed using resource-based theory. Major elements are distinctive competence 
(Mahoney and Pandian, 1992), value, rareness, imitability and substitutability and 
unique resources and core competences (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2005).  
  
Of the many ways suggested of creating a firm’s competitive advantage, this 
research chooses to use Porter’s generic strategies of low cost and differentiation. 
However, Porter’s original approach to competitive strategies was that firms can only be 
successful if they adopt either a differentiation or low cost strategy (i.e. they should 
choose only one of these). If they mix them, they end up with low perceived value and 
high price (i.e. stuck in the middle). However, both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas are highly diversified enterprises. In the world of business, within diversified 
firms, a firm or a Strategic Business Unit (SBU) may choose one or two strategies 
simultaneously from generic strategies according to their own business situation and 
environment. This research is based on such an assumption.  
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A number of studies have been established to investigate the relationship between 
the environment and strategy. Most previous studies (Porter, 1980; Hambrick, 1983; 
Dess and Davis, 1984; Govindarajan, 1988; Miller, 1988; Chung and Chung, 1997; 
Kwon, Kim, Kim and Limb, 1999; Kang, 2002) demonstrated that a differentiation 
strategy is positively correlated with uncertain environments and it is more closely 
correlated with uncertain environments than low cost strategy is. Govindarajan (1986) 
supplied the following theoretical argument that the choice of a differentiation strategy 
rather than a low cost strategy would increase uncertainty in an SBU’s task environment. 
A differentiation SBU, with its primary focus on uniqueness and exclusivity, is likely to 
engage in product innovation, whereas a low-cost SBU, with its primary emphasis on 
cost reduction, prefers to keep its product offerings stable over time. According to 
Miller (1988), the strategy of innovative differentiation is most likely to be pursued in 
uncertain environments and the strategy of cost leadership is associated with stable and 
predictable environments. The study by Chung and Chung (1997) of 169 Korean firms 
(not including the GTCs) also revealed that there has been a positive relationship 
between the environment and differentiation strategy.  
 
In support of the above sets of arguments, the following hypotheses are 
formulated:  
 
H. 1.1 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a differentiation strategy will be 
positively associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity. 
H. 1.2 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a cost leadership strategy will be 
inversely associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity.  
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5.4.2. The Relationship between Strategy and Structure  
 
First, however, some arguments should be developed concerning strategy and 
structure. Chandler (1962) recommended that the formulation of strategy be studied 
before the development of the organisational structure to implement this strategy. 
However, some organisational theorists have argued that it is incorrect to describe the 
relationship between strategy and structure as being one-way only. According to them, 
strategy and structure are more closely interrelated. Thus, structure needs to be 
considered as strategy is being developed (Lynch, 2000).  
 
Employing the differentiation strategy has many implications for organisational 
structure. New product development and implementation are highly dependent upon 
creative ideas from members involved in the organisation (Porter, 1980) and also 
require the collaboration and close contact of managers from different departments 
(Miller, 1988). Thus, it is necessary to allow the free flow of ideas from all members 
rather than centralising the decision-making process. Miller (1988) argued that 
complexity and changes in product designs create the need to delegate authority to the 
experts most capable of making critical decisions. Top executives may be too remote 
from a situation or too untrained to make the necessary judgments. Prior research has 
found that high decentralisation is an appropriate response to increased uncertainty 
(Govindarajan, 1988; Kang, 2002). Govindarajan (1988) argued that as a task’s 
environment becomes more uncertain, there will be need for more information.       
Centralisation is possible at low levels of uncertainty because the information processed 
does not overburden the organisation’s hierarchy. However, as uncertainty increases, 
more exceptions arise, which must be referred upward in the hierarchy. As more 
exceptions are referred upward, the hierarchy becomes overloaded. As a result, serious 
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delays develop between the upward transmission of information about the new situation 
and a downward response to that information. An effective way to deal with such a 
situation is to move the level of decision-making to where information exists rather than 
to bring it upward in the hierarchy.  
 
A firm pursuing low cost strategy normally tends to focus on an internal issue of 
cost reduction and controls. Thus, there will be a strong emphasis on formal profit and 
budget controls – an aspect of formalisation – in order to keep costs and thus prices, at a 
minimum (Miller, 1988). According to Porter (1980), cost leadership strategy requires 
tight control of costs and overheads and a great deal of managerial attention to cost 
control is necessary to carry out this strategy. Furthermore, Miller (1988) argued that the 
cost leadership strategy requires that product lines remain rather stable. Unvarying 
products and procedures allow the division of work into its elementary components, 
those which are routinised, standardised and ideal for unskilled personnel. Therefore, 
there is little need for experts such as scientists and engineers who are most useful for 
handling complex and unstructured problems. Rather, top management can solve most 
of the administrative problems by themselves without specialists. In this case, liaison 
devices such as task force teams and cross-functional committees are costly luxuries and 
most decision-making is centralised upward. Based on the above sets of arguments,  
the second hypotheses relating to the linkages of strategy and structure are as follows:  
 
H.2.1 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a differentiation strategy will be 
positively associated with the delegation of power (decentralisation).  
H.2.2 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a cost leadership strategy will be 
positively associated with formal controls (formalisation).  
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5.4.3. The Relationship between Strategy and Performance  
 
Each GTC/Sogo Shosha may select a specific strategy by considering its 
environment and undertake the selected strategy in order to enhance business 
performance. In this, their pursuit of performance goal will differ according to the 
strategy selected. In the process of choosing a specific strategy, some GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas may fail to achieve any of the strategies that are called “stuck in the middle.” 
Becoming stuck in the middle is often a manifestation of a firm’s unwillingness to 
choose how it will compete. It possesses no competitive advantage and this strategic 
position is usually a recipe for below-average performance (Porter, 1985). To avoid 
these situations, each GTC/Sogo Shosha may select an appropriate strategy which fits 
its business situation.  
 
The first hypothesis concerns the relationship between a differentiation strategy 
and gaining market shares and customers. A firm pursuing a differentiation strategy, in 
particular a differentiated prospector strategy, may concentrate its efforts on gaining 
market share and new customers rather than profitability, by exploiting new markets and 
developing new products or services in order to preoccupy markets at its competitors’ 
expense. This argument was also presented by Miles and Snow (1978). They stressed 
that the differentiated prospector’s prime capability is to find and exploit new markets 
and products and enact dynamically by continually modifying its product-market 
domain to take advantage of perceived opportunities and by emphasising flexibility in 
its technology and administrative system in order to facilitate rapid adjustment. Its 
growth primarily results from the location of new markets and the development of new 
products or services. Olson, Slater and Hult (2005) also supported this argument with 
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the contention that differentiated prospectors are the most marketing- oriented of all the 
types of strategists and the key to their success is the development of new products and 
entry into new markets.  
 
The second hypothesis concerns the relationship between a low cost strategy and 
profitability. The main purpose of the low cost strategy is to increase profitability and 
business effectiveness rather than gaining a bigger market share, based on stable 
existing markets, accumulated technologies and sophisticated labour power through 
internal formal budget controls. Miller (1988) argued that a firm tends to undertake low 
cost strategy under stable and predictable environments with a strong emphasis on 
profitability by controlling the budget. A similar argument was also presented by Miles 
and Snow (1978). According to them, low cost defenders typically grow by penetrating 
deeper into their current markets. This type of growth is facilitated by a narrow and 
stable domain which allows the organisation to become thoroughly familiar with client 
or customer needs. Consequently, firms pursuing low cost defender strategy concentrate 
on profitability rather than gaining market share, by emphasising existing and stable 
markets.  
 
The third hypothesis relates to a hybrid strategy. According to Porter’s original idea 
(1985), a firm must adopt either cost leadership or differentiation. Achieving cost 
leadership and differentiation are usually incompatible, because differentiation is 
usually costly. But reducing cost does not always involve a sacrifice of differentiation. 
If a firm can achieve cost leadership and differentiation simultaneously, the rewards are 
great. Bowman (1995) named eight different ways (on a strategy clock) in which 
managers might think about competitive strategy. They are no frills, low price, hybrid, 
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differentiation, focused differentiation, increased price/standard value, increased 
price/low value and low value/standard price. The success of the hybrid strategy 
depends on the ability both to understand and to deliver enhanced value in terms of 
customer needs, while also having a cost base which permits low prices and is sufficient 
for reinvestment to maintain and develop the bases of differentiation (Johnson, Scholes 
and Whittington, 2005). A good example is Japanese saloon car manufacturers’ strategy 
in the late 1980s in the European market. They provided cars to customers with better 
quality at competitive and reliable prices which were better than their rivals’. The 
hybrid strategy could be advantageous as an entry strategy into a new market. This 
strategy could be the strategic approach to new market development which Japanese 
firms have used in the past.  
 
Based on the above sets of arguments, the following hypotheses relating to strategy 
and performance are formulated:  
 
H.3.1 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a differentiation strategy will be 
positively associated with gaining market shares and new customers.  
H.3.2 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a cost leadership strategy will be 
positively associated with profitability. 
H.3.3 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a hybrid strategy will be positively 
associated with new market development. 
 
5.4.4. The Relationship between Structure and Performance 
 
The major dimensions which characterise an organisation’s structure are its degree 
of centralised decision-making, the formalisation of its rules and procedures and 
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structural differentiation (John and Martin, 1984). As subjects of organisational 
structure, centralisation/decentralisation and formalisation have been treated as major 
topics in recent studies.  
 
Centralisation refers to whether decision authority is closely held by top managers 
or is delegated to middle-and lower-level managers. Many studies have been carried out 
to analyse the relationship between centralisation and performance and three distinct 
views are evident. Most studies found that there were negative associations (McMahon, 
1976; Pennings, 1976; Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2005; Olson, Slater and Hult, 
2005), or zero association (Stathakopoulos, 1998; Dalton et al., 1980) between 
centralisation and performance. Mintzberg (1979) mentioned that decentralisation can 
stimulate employees’ motivation. The organisation can attract and retain its staff and 
utilise their initiative if it gives them considerable power to make decisions. Conversely, 
Hage’s (1965) study argued that centralisation increased production, efficiency and 
formalisation since the centralised organisation tended to very quickly develop a 
formalised procedure for passing messages. This argument was also supported by Kim 
(2000), who carried out a study of 47 listed Korean companies. Although 
decentralisation is positively associated with the increase of employee satisfaction and 
commitment, it inversely influences the firm’s profitability. Tata and Prasad (2004) 
carried out further study of the relationship between two types of decentralisation, i.e. 
macro-level decentralisation and micro-level decentralisation64 and job effectiveness in 
                                            
64 According to Tata and Prasad (2004), organisational centralisation/decentralisation can be shown to 
have two components. Participation in decision-making (macro-level decentralisation) is the degree of 
distribution of organisational decision-making processes in regard to policy decisions. It describes the 
extent to which employees have the authority for policy decisions and the power to make decisions about 
selection, promotion, new policies and new programmes. Authority hierarchy (micro-level centralisation) 
is the degree of concentration of decision-making in regard to task performance. It describes the extent to 
which authority over day-to-day task decisions is concentrated in a few hands, with employees having to 
defer to superiors when making decisions about their jobs.   
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team-self-management companies. They found that teams with high levels of self-
management are more effective in organisations where the authority to make decisions 
about task performance, i.e. micro-level decentralisation, is distributed. However, the 
effectiveness is not influenced by the extent to which the authority to make decisions in 
policies and procedures, i.e. macro-level decentralisation, is concentrated in a few hands.  
 
Formalisation is defined as the degree to which formal rules and procedures govern 
decisions and working relationships. Rules and procedures provide a means for 
prescribing appropriate behaviours and addressing routine aspects of a problem. These 
also can lead to increased efficiency and lower administrative costs (Olson, Slater and 
Hult, 2005). There have been some arguments over the relationship between 
formalisation and performance. The first argument is that formalisation is positively 
associated with a firm’s performance. Without a minimum level of formalisation, role 
ambiguity may occur. Moreover, role ambiguity may affect members’ attitude and 
performance (Rizzo, House and Lirtzman, 1970). But a second argument presented the 
view that formalisation adversely affects a firm’s performance if it is excessive. 
Formalisation may limit job scope, resulting in boredom, alienation, job dissatisfaction, 
absenteeism, high turnover and low output (Hackman and Lawler, 1971). Furthermore, 
Tata and Prasad (2004) found similar results, in that organisational formalisation 
moderates the influence of self-management on the judgments of team effectiveness. 
Formalised mechanisms of control restrict team members’ ability to perform a variety of 
tasks as well as the degree to which they can exercise authority while carrying out these 
tasks. Consequently, this may cause lower performance. The last argument 
demonstrated that there is no significant association between levels of formalisation and 
performance (Dalton et al., 1980; Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). Putting all the 
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arguments together, it can be concluded that, in order to achieve higher performance, a 
firm needs an optimal level of formalisation, but not excessive formalisation which may 
limit job scope and cause job ambiguity.  
 
The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ are traditionally and culturally centralised and 
formalised organisations. Although many Korean firms have recently been pursuing 
decentralisation or de-formalisation, centralisation and formalisation are still dominant 
organisational characteristics in many companies. As Kim (2000) found, 
decentralisation in Korean firms is inversely associated with a firm’s profitability.  It 
even positively influenced employee’s satisfaction and commitment. This implies that a 
centralised structure would be more effective than decentralised structure, at least in 
Korea. This result, unlike the majority of studies, may originate from traditional top-
down decision-making processes and highly centralised organisational structures. This 
leads to the three next hypotheses: 
 
H.4.1 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational centralisation will be inversely 
associated with overall performance. 
H.4.2 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational decentralisation will be positively 
associated with employee satisfaction and retention. 
H.4.3 The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational formalisation will be inversely 
associated with the speed of job handling. 
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5.5. Research Design and Methodology  
 
5.5.1. Data Collection  
 
The principal means of data collection for this study was a questionnaire survey 
undertaken between September and December 2006 in both Korea and Japan. Data were 
collected only from the Marketing and Sales SBUs of seven Korean GTCs and eight 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Both hand-delivered and mailed questionnaire surveys were 
conducted. In particular, it was possible to hand-deliver the questionnaires to Korean 
GTCs, because all of them were centrally located in Seoul. This undoubtedly helped to 
increase the rate of response to the questionnaires. Further, the personal relationship 
between the author and the respondents also encouraged an increased response rate 
since the author had nine years of business experience with them as a marketing and 
sales manager at a Korean multinational petrochemical enterprise. With the mailed 
questionnaires, a cover letter was sent explaining the purpose of the study and assuring 
the confidentiality of the responses. Respondents received return envelopes in which to 
send the completed questionnaires directly back to the author, in order to minimise 
response bias.  
 
The questionnaire was designed to survey the strategic management and decision-
making process within both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas on the basis of 
various previous studies. In the questionnaire design, the research followed the typical 
procedure of developing questionnaires offered by Churchill and Brown (2004)65 in 
                                            
65 They offered the following nine steps to take in preparing a questionnaire. i) specify what information 
will be sought, ii) determine the type of questions and method of administration, iii) determine the 
content of individual questions, iv) determine the form of response to each question, v) determine the 
wording of each question, vi) determine the question sequence, vii) determine the physical characteristics 
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their book “Marketing Research.” The questionnaire was prepared only in English for 
both Korea and Japan, because it was believed that a single language would minimise 
misunderstanding and complications. Another reason was that all respondents or 
employees in Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shosha who participated in the 
questionnaire survey were good at English. They would have had enough language 
ability to comprehend the questionnaire, because this ability was one of the most 
important components when they were recruited. Even though the author was convinced 
that all respondents both in Korea and Japan were able to comprehend all the questions 
including their academic terminology, he inserted some explanatory words in Korean 
and Japanese into the questionnaires before distributing them. This was in order to 
removing any chance of the respondents’ misunderstanding the full meaning of 
questions, including their academic terms.  
 
The population and sample of this research was restricted to employees in 
Marketing and Sales SBUs only. The reasons for restricting the population and 
sampling to employees associated with marketing and sales SBUs were two: i) one of 
the aims of this research is to examine only business-level strategy (competitive 
strategy) and ii) being limited to a single function of SBUs might increase data 
consistency. When questionnaires were distributed, the job position allowed a division 
into four groups; general staff, assistant manager, manager and senior manager and the 
period of working experience allowed another division into four groups: those with less 
than five years’, five to ten years’, ten to 15 years’ and over 15 years’ experience. In the 
case of the Korean GTCs, 158 questionnaires in total were distributed on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                
of the questionnaire, viii) re-examine steps 1~7 and revise if necessary and ix) pre-test the questionnaire 
and revise if necessary (pp. 282~309). 
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the sample selection calculated from the population (for details of a sample calculation, 
see the next section). Of the 158 marketing and sales SBU members who received 
questionnaires, 129 (81.65%)66 responded. In the case of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, a 
total of 168 questionnaires were distributed. Of the 168, 77 (45.83%)67 responded.  
 
(Table 5.4. The Formation of the Sample)  
? Response Rate of Questionnaire 
 No. of 
Questionnaires 
Distributed 
No. of 
Questionnaires 
Collected 
No. of 
Questionnaires 
Unusable 
Response 
Rate 
Korean GTCs 158 129 0 81.65% 
Japanese S.S. 168 77 0 45.83% 
? Job Position of Respondents 
 General Staff 
Assistant 
Manager 
Manager Senior 
Manager 
Others Total 
Korean 
GTCs 
27.3% 22.7% 25.0% 21.9% 3.1% 100% 
Japanese 
S.S. 
24.7% 33.8% 23.4% 16.9% 1.3% 100% 
? Working Experience of Respondents 
 Less than 5 years 
5 ~ 10 years 10~15 years Over 15 
years 
Total 
Korean 
GTCs 
38.0% 30.2% 21.7% 10.1% 100% 
Japanese 
S.S. 
26.0% 24.7% 24.7% 24.7% 100% 
 
                                            
66 According to Churchill and Brown (2004), in Korea, businesspeople are reluctant to answer any survey 
questions about their company – it is considered disloyal to divulge any type of information to 
“outsiders.” However, the personal relationship between the author and respondents allowed an increased 
rate of response.  
 
67 The response rate of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas was lower than that of Korean GTCs. However, in an 
examination of published studies in the field of organisational research in the years 1979~1983, Mitchell 
(1985) found a range of response rates of 30 to 94% (Bryman, 2004). Furthermore, Churchill and Brown 
(2004) argued that most Japanese businesspeople are hesitant to take part in surveys during business 
hours – taking time away from one’s work for a survey is like “stealing” from one’s employer.  
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After the questionnaire survey, in-depth interview survey was also carried out to 
supplement the data collection and as a means of cross checking the questionnaire 
survey against other sources of data. The purpose of the interviews was to have a more 
objective understanding of the questionnaire survey results and to learn more about 
strategic management and the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
 
With regard to the number of interviewees, four manager-level members of staff 
associated with marketing and sales from Korean GTCs and two senior manager-level 
members of staff from Japanese Sogo Shoshas were interviewed. In order to arrange 
interview meetings, the author had to make many phone calls to these managers before 
they would agree to participate in interviews. Around seven Korean managers showed 
their intention to take part in the interview survey, whilst almost all the Japanese 
managers in Sogo Shoshas politely refused to do so.   
 
In particular, for instance, a manager in Itochu Corporation said:  
 
“According to my company’s regulation, any individual who has 
private business is strictly prohibited to visit my office. Even those who 
have official businesses should report to the reception desk at the 
lobby of the building before entering the office.”   
 
For several reasons, the author was able finally to arrange interview appointment  
with only two Japanese managers, but he arranged interviews with seven Korean 
managers. However, considering the balance of number between Korean and Japanese 
interviewees, the author decided to select only four managers from Korea.  
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Although the sample of interviewees was small and maybe not fully representative, 
they were selected on the basis of a wide range of factors, such as their expertise in 
business, position and role within their organisations, in order to remove sample error or 
bias as far as possible. With sufficient time, the author would have tried to arrange 
interviews with more managers. However, as mentioned earlier, the principal method of 
data collection for this study is a questionnaire survey, not an interview survey. As the 
author was fully convinced by the data collected in the questionnaire survey, it seemed 
to be safe to conduct interviews with only six managers for the purpose of cross 
checking the questionnaire survey data with the interview survey data.   
 
The interviews were all on different dates. Interviewees were invited to give their 
comments on the strategic management and decision-making process within their 
organisations. Before each interview, the interviewee was given interview materials (see 
Appendix 3) prepared by the author. Interview material was prepared only in English. 
However, the actual interviews used both Korean and English for the Korean managers, 
but only English for the Japanese managers. Although the interview was conducted in 
English with Japanese managers, they had no significant problems of understanding 
academic or management terms because the author inserted some explanatory words in  
Japanese into the interview material. Interviewees were given discretion in expressing  
their feelings by filling up the blanks in interview material in their own handwriting. 
The theme of the interview was very similar to that of the questionnaire and each 
interview lasted one to two hours. 
 
In the process of arranging interviews, the author noted the cultural difference 
between Korean and Japanese businessmen. According to Churchill and Brown (2004), 
 270 
 
both Korean and Japanese businesspeople are reluctant to answer any survey questions 
during business hours. Although employees in both countries were reluctant to take part 
in the survey, the refusal rate of the Japanese businesspeople was much higher than that 
of the Koreans.  
 
5.5.2. Population and Sample Selection 
 
The population and sample of this research was restricted to employees in 
marketing and sales SBUs only within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. In the 
case of the seven Korean GTCs, it was possible to know the exact numbers of all 
employees and the total number of marketing and sales employees. This allowed an 
easy calculation of a sample of the population. There were in total 4,699 employees as 
of 2005. Of the 4,699, there were 2,224 (approximately 47% of all employees) 
marketing and sales staff in the seven Korean GTCs. However, when it came to the  
Japanese Sogo Shoshas, it was possible to know only the total numbers of employees, 
but difficult to find how many marketing and sales staff there were. Thus, the numbers 
of marketing and sales persons in the eight Japanese Sogo Shoshas are based on those in 
the Korean GTCs. As mentioned earlier, the marketing and sales staff in the seven 
Korean GTCs occupied approximately 47% of the total. In order to anticipate the 
numbers of marketing and sales persons in Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the same ratio of 
47% was applied. It can be seen as reasonable to apply this ratio, because the 
organisational structure (i.e. the allocation of human resources among different SBU 
functions) between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas is very similar in many 
ways since the Korean GTCs were fundamentally modelled on the Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas. Using this ratio, the numbers of marketing and sales persons was calculated to 
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be approximately 13,938. (There was a total of 29,655 employees in the eight Sogo 
Shoshas as of 2005. Of this 29,655, it was calculated that approximately 47% were 
marketing and sales persons = 13,938 persons). 
 
(Table 5.5. Population Numbers: Total Marketing and Sales Employees within Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
Korean GTCs Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Samsung Corp. 451 Mitsubishi Corp. 2,964
Hyundai Corp. 156 Mitsui and Co., Ltd. 2,944
Daewoo International Corp. 430 Sumitomo Corp. 2,242
LG International Corp. 296 Itochu Corp. 2,046
SK Networks 588 Marubeni Corp. 1,839
Hyosung Corp. 145 Nissho Iwai Corp. 898
Ssangyong Corp.  158 Tomen Corp. 526
Nichimen Corp.  479Total 2,224
Total 13,938
(Source: The Handbook of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 2005) 
 
Note:  
? Korean GTCs: i) Employees in overseas offices are excluded, ii) SK Networks: Employees in 
domestic regional branch offices are excluded. 
 
? Japanese Sogo Shoshas: i) There were 6,307 employees in Mitsubishi, 6,264 in Mitsui, 4,772 in 
Sumitomo, 4,355 in Itochu, 3,914 in Marubeni, 1,911 in Nissho Iwai, 1,120 in Tomen and 1,012 in 
Nichimen respectively. Based on these exact numbers, the approximate numbers of marketing and 
sales persons in each Sogo Shosha could be forecast by applying the ratio of 47%, ii) Employees in 
overseas offices are excluded. 
 
Regarding the sample selection from the population, an Simple Random Sampling 
(SRS)68 was used, which is one of the methods of probability sampling. The calculation 
formula of the sample size in SRS is adapted from the book “Sampling: Design and 
Analysis” by Lohr (1999, p. 40).  
 
                                            
68 A SRS is a sample selected in such a way that every possible sample with the same number of 
observations is equally likely to be chosen (Keller and Warrack, 2000).  
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where;  
n: Sample size, 
s : Sample variance, 2
e: Maximum tolerance error,  
N: Population number, 
2/az : the value that has a/2 area to the right in standard normal distribution and 
a: Significance level. 
 
Based on the above formula, the sample size (n) of Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas can be calculated as follows:  
 
? Sampling of Seven Korean  GTCs 
 
n = =
+
224,2
)1.()96.1()15.0(
)1.()96.1(
22
2
22
158 
 
? Sampling of Eight Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
n =  =
+
938,13
)1.()96.1()15.0(
)1.()96.1(
22
2
22
168 
 
* According to the table of standard normal distribution,  is 1.96 when the significance level (a) 
is 0.05 (5%), which is the most commonly used level in the social sciences.  
2/az
 
                                            
69 This formula is a frequently used equation in scientific sample size estimation. It considers the 
maximum tolerance error that might occur between population and sample, although it does not consider 
non-responses. From the statistical standpoint, it is natural to assume non-responses. Furthermore, if the 
total number of the sample collected exceeds 30, it is classified as a “huge volume of data” and it allows 
statistical normality. Therefore, the total number of questionnaires collected from Korean GTCs (129,) 
and Japanese Sogo Shoshas (77) both have a significant value as they provide a  huge volume of data. 
Consequently, it was expected that this equation would yield reliable results.  
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With regard to the sample selection for the interview survey, a judgment or 
purposive method of sampling was used, which is one of the methods of non-probability 
sampling. Judgment sampling or purposive sampling is one which hand-picks sample 
elements, in the expectation that that they will serve the research purpose. In judgment 
sampling, the researcher selects the sample on the basis of a judgment about the 
appropriate characteristics required of the sample member. Most typically, the samples 
selected are believed to represent the population of interest. However, sometimes this 
selection is not made on this basis, but rather because they can offer the required 
attributes (Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002). 
 
In the present research, the primary justification for using judgment sampling was 
that the interview survey was only a supplementary tool for data collection. Another 
reason was time and cost issues. According to Bryman (2004), social research is 
frequently based on non-probability sampling methods such as convenience sampling, 
judgment sampling and quota sampling, since probability sampling involves much 
preparation and is therefore frequently avoided because of its difficulty and costs.  
 
5.5.3. The Formulation of the Questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire is divided into four sections covering strategic management of 
the Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Section one measures the business 
environment of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas industry. In this study, two factors – uncertainty  
and complexity – were selected as variables to measure the environment. To measure 
environmental uncertainty and complexity, 12 items were cited or modified on the basis 
of previous studies (Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005; Kang, 2002; Sul, 2002) and some of 
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them were developed by the author. Section two is designed to measure the strategy 
variables.  
 
This study used Porter’s (1980, 1985) generic strategies (i.e. a differentiation 
strategy and a cost leadership strategy) and Bowman’s (1995) hybrid strategy (i.e. a 
mixed strategy of a differentiation and a cost leadership). To measure them, a total of 24 
items were designed on the basis of Miller’s (1998) and Kang’s (2002) scales. Section 
three measures variables concerning organisational structure. To measure them, 17 
items were adapted and developed, on the basis of studies by Olson, Slater and Hult 
(2005), Govindarajan (1988) and Lee (1998) to measure decentralisation and 
formalisation. Finally, section four was developed to measure organisational 
performance. 13 items were developed to cover the variables with respect to 
performance these were divided into overall performance, financial performance and 
non-financial performance on the basis of the BSC perspectives. 
 
5.5.4. The Measurement of Variables 
 
? Measuring the Environment 
 
The modern business environment for firms can be summarised as delivering 
uncertainty, complexity and dynamism. The definition of environmental uncertainty is 
an inability to assign probabilities as to the likelihood of future events (Duncan, 1972; 
Pennings, 1981). Wheelen and Hunger (2007) stressed that environmental uncertainty is 
a threat to strategic managers because it hampers their ability to develop long-range 
plans and to make strategic decisions to keep the corporation in equilibrium with its 
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external environment. Complexity is the number of different occupational specialities 
and the degree of heterogeneity and number of elements within an organisation’s 
environment (Hage and Dewar, 1973). Within a complex environment, an organisation 
tends to establish an elaborate information-processing mechanism in order to scan the 
environment more effectively (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Environmental dynamism 
has been defined as discontinuous changes within the environment. Hyper-competitive 
environments tend to be dynamic and their direction of change difficult to predict 
(Modarres, Beheshtian and Ispahani, 2003).  
 
In this study, two factors – uncertainty and complexity – were selected as variables 
to measure the environment. To measure environmental uncertainty and complexity, 12 
items were cited or modified on the basis of previous studies (Olson, Slater and Hult, 
2005; Kang, 2002; Sul, 2002) and some were developed by the author. Olson, Slater and 
Hult (2005) measured the environment with two items – changes in customers’ product 
preference and customers’ tendency to look for new products or services to satisfy their 
needs. Kang (2002) used ten items to measure the environment with a seven-point 
Likert scale and Sul (2002) used 11 items with a seven-point Likert scale. In this study, 
the questions were, however, re-worded to accommodate the use of a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from ① agree strongly to ⑤ disagree strongly.  
 
The following questions were designed to measure the environment with reference 
to Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
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(Table 5.6. The Environment Scale) 
Variables Items 
Uncertainty 1. It is difficult to predict market trends (A). 
2. It is difficult to forecast customer’s needs and tastes (A).           
3. In our business, customers’ product preferences change a lot over time 
(C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
4. Our customers tend to look for new products and services to satisfy 
their needs (C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
5. Actions of competitors are difficult to predict (R: Sul, 2002).         
6. The life cycle of our products and services at present is short (C: 
Kang, 2002). 
7. Competitors’ new products and services frequently come to   market 
at present (A). 
Complexity  8. In our business, the channel of distribution is complex (A). 
9. It is complex for us to develop new products and services (A). 
10. The market is highly competitive (A).  
11. There are many competing products and services (A).  
12. Potential entrants threaten the market (C: Kang, 2002). 
(Source: Cited by or adapted from Olson, Slater and Hult (2005), Kang (2002) and Sul (2002)) 
(A): Items developed by the author. 
(C): Items cited or adapted from the previous studies. 
(R): Reverse-coded items.  
 
? Measuring Competitive Strategy 
 
To measure strategy variables, this study selected Porter’s (1980, 1985) generic 
strategies and Bowman’s (1995) hybrid strategy. In a differentiation strategy, a firm 
seeks to be unique in its industry along some dimensions which are widely valued by 
buyers. Cost leadership refers to the ability of a firm to establish a clear cost advantage 
relative to its competitors (Porter, 1985). A hybrid strategy seeks simultaneously to 
achieve differentiation and a price lower than that of its competitors (Johnson, Scholes 
and Whittington, 2005).  
 
To measure a differentiation strategy, seven items were designed on the basis of 
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Miller’s (1998) and Kang’s scales (2002) and three items were developed by the author. 
Miller (1998) used six items to measure innovative differentiation. The first, measuring 
the use of product-service innovation, was scaled from ① = we do not use this strategy 
to ⑦ = this is a very important strategy. The second item measured annual R & D costs 
as a percentage of sales, standardised to range over a seven-point scale. The third item 
measured the annual percentage of sales spent on initiating and implementing product-
market innovations. The fourth measured the tendency to beat competitors to the 
markets. The fifth gauged innovative orientation and the last one measured competitive 
aggressiveness. In this study, five items were adapted from Miller’s scales (1988) to 
measure differentiation. Kang (2002) used 13 items to measure differentiation on a 
seven-point Likert scale. In this study, two items were adapted from Kang’s scales 
(2002) to measure differentiation. 
 
With reference to the cost leadership strategy, seven items altogether were 
designed. Three items were developed on the basis of Miller’s study (1998) and four 
items were developed by the author. Miller (1998) used six items to measure cost 
leadership. They are: the use of a cost centre for cost control, the use of fixing standard 
cost by analysing variance for cost control, price cutting for advertising expenditure, 
minimising advertising expenses, a proclivity for projects and boldness of decisions. In 
this study, three items were adapted from Miller (1998).  
 
The hybrid strategy attempts to reduce cost while simultaneously improving quality. 
To measure the variables of a hybrid strategy, seven items were developed by the author 
on the basis of Johnson, Scholes and Whittington’s strategy clock (2005): competitive 
strategy options. 
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(Table 5.7. The Strategy Scale) 
Variables Items 
Differentiation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. We use product/service innovations as a means of competing (C: Miller, 1988). 
2. Our annual R & D costs for development of products and services are high (R: 
Miller, 1988). 
3. Our annual percentage of sales spent on costs of initiating and implementing 
product-market innovation is high (C: Miller, 1988). 
4. We always try to be ahead of competitors in product novelty or speed of 
innovation (C: Miller, 1988). 
5. We pursue a tough “undo the competitors” philosophy (C: Miller, 1988). 
6. We rapidly respond to customers’ changing of needs and tastes (A). 
7. We develop new products and services to meet customers’ needs (A). 
8. We invest heavily in advertising, sales promotion and public relations (A). 
9. We try to enhance our corporate image (C: Kang, 2002). 
10. We frequently analyse competitors’ strategy (C: Kang, 2002). 
Cost 
Leadership 
11. We use cost centres and fix standard costs by analysing variances for cost 
control (C: Miller, 1988).  
12. We try to minimise advertising expenditures (C: Miller, 1988).  
13. We have a strong proclivity for low-risk projects with normal and certain rates 
of return (C: Miller, 1988).  
14. We try to control levels of inventory (A). 
15. All employees are appointed to their posts considering productivity (A). 
16. We try to cut administrative expenses (A). 
17. All employees fully understand the need for cost reduction (A). 
Hybrid 
Strategy 
(Differentiation 
and Low cost) 
 
 
18. We use a high-quality & low price strategy when entering into new markets (A)
19. We offer a wide range of good quality products and services at lower prices 
than our rivals (A).  
20. We always try to find suppliers who offer us high-quality products and services 
at lower price (A). 
21. We maintain long-term relationship with our regular suppliers who offer us 
high-quality products and services at lower price (A). 
22. Our regular buyers purchase our products and services on the basis of high 
quality and lower price (A). 
23. We are able to offer high-quality products and services to our customers based 
on our competitive distribution channel, logistics and transport systems that 
reduce costs (A). 
24. To deliver high-quality products and services to our customers at low cost, we 
reinvest in R & D (A). 
(Source: Cited by or adapted from Miller (1988) and Kang (2002)) 
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? Measuring Organisational Structure 
 
Variables with respect to organisational structure, in total 17 items, were adapted 
and developed on the basis of studies by Olson, Slater and Hult (2005), Govindarajan 
(1988) and Lee (1998) to measure decentralisation and formalisation.  
 
Decentralisation is the degree of transferring decision-making power to lower 
levels. In order to measure it, this study used Olson, Slater and Hult’s (2005) and 
Govindarajan’s (1988) scales. Olson, Slater and Hult (2005) used seven items to 
measure decentralisation. They are i) the degree of decision-making at high levels, ii) 
the degree of individual decision-maker’s latitude, iii) manager’s flexibility in getting 
work done, iv) the degree to which  individual decision-making is discouraged, v) the 
degree of decision-making in small matters and vi) the autonomy of middle- and lower-
level managers.  
 
Formalisation is the degree of emphasis on specific rules and procedures in 
carrying out tasks. To measure formalisation, two items were adapted from Olson, Slater 
and Hult’s (2005) study, two items were developed based on Lee’s (1998) study, which  
also measured all constructs on seven-point Likert scales and three items were 
developed by the author.  
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(Table 5.8. The Structure Scale) 
Variables Items 
Decentralisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. In your company, decisions tend to be not made at a high level (R: 
Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
2. The individual decision-maker has wide latitude in the choice of means 
to accomplish goals (C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
3. Middle-and lower-level managers are allowed flexibility in getting 
work done (C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
4. A person who wants to make his decision would not quickly be 
discouraged (R: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
5. Small matters are not referred to someone higher in your company for a 
decision (R: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
6. Many important decisions are made locally rather than centrally (R: 
Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
7. Middle-and lower-level managers have substantial autonomy (C: Olson, 
Slater and Hult, 2005). 
8. Middle-and lower-level managers are allowed to increase the level of 
expenditure for advertising and promotion (C: Govindarajan, 1988). 
9. Middle-and lower-level managers are allowed to change the selling 
price on a major products or services (C: Govindarajan ,1988). 
10. Middle-and lower-level managers are allowed to increase the number 
of employees in a business unit (C: Govindarajan, 1988). 
Formalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. If employees wish to make their own decisions, they are quickly 
referred to a policy manual. (C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005).  
12. Individuals in your company frequently refer to it as a “bureaucracy” 
(C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005).  
13. Our company attaches importance to basic principles and all 
instructions are made through formal documentation (A). 
14. Regardless of changing conditions, our company has faith in past 
management principles which have proven effectiveness (A). 
15. The communication channel in our company is very formalised (A). 
16. Employees have only restricted access to financial and management 
information (C: Lee, 1998). 
17. Our company persists with the same management style rather than 
diversifying its management style (C: Lee, 1998). 
(Source: Cited by or adapted from Olson, Slater and Hult (2005), Govindarajan (1988) and Lee (1998))  
(A): Items developed by the author. 
(C): Items cited or adapted from the previous studies. 
(R): Reverse-coded items.  
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? Measuring Performance 
 
Variables with respect to performance are divided into overall performance, 
financial performance and non-financial performance, on the basis of the BSC approach. 
To measure overall performance, three items, based on Olson, Slater and Hult’s (2005) 
study, were used to ask whether overall performance met expectations, exceeded 
competitors’ and satisfied top management. To measure financial performance, it used 
typical financial indicators such as sales amounts, profitability and cash flow; three 
items were developed by the author. To measure non-financial performance, it took 
three perspectives – customer perspective, learning and growth perspective and internal-
business process perspective; and seven items were developed by the author.  
 
(Table 5.9. The Performance Scale) 
Variables Items 
Overall  
performance 
1. The overall performance of our company met expectations last year (C: 
Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
2. The overall performance of the business last year exceeded that of our 
major competitors (C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
3. Top management was very satisfied with the overall performance of the 
business last year (C: Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005). 
Financial 
performance 
4. The sales of our company increased in the last financial year compared 
to the previous one (A). 
5. The profitability of our company increased in the last financial year 
compared to the previous one (A). 
6. The cash flow of our company is stable compared to last year (A).  
Non-financial 
performance 
7. The market share increased in the last financial year compared to the 
previous one (A). 
8. The number of new customers increased in the last financial year 
compared to the last one (A).  
9. Employee satisfaction and retention has increased (A).  
10. Employees’ speed of job handling has increased (A). 
11. Employees are more responsive toward customers (A). 
12. Employee empowerment has increased (A). 
13. Employee productivity has increased (A). 
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5.5.5. Statistic Data Analysis Instrument 
 
The instrument of data analysis in this research was largely dependent on statistical 
methods and used the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) for Windows 
program. Regression analyses (simple and multiple) and the Pearson coefficient of 
correlation analysis were mainly used to analyse the questionnaire survey data. In 
addition, descriptive statistics was also used to check mean and standard deviation. The 
following table shows the statistical techniques which were used for each hypothesis. 
 
(Table 5.10. Statistical Techniques used for each Hypothesis)  
Hypothesis Variables to be tested Statistical Tools 
H.1.1 ? Differentiation/Uncertainty and  
Complexity 
? Correlation Analysis70 
H.1.2 ? Cost leadership/Uncertainty and 
Complexity 
? Multiple Regression71 
H.2.1 ? Differentiation/Decentralisation ? Simple Regression (Korea) 
? Correlation Analysis (Japan)
H.2.2 ? Cost leadership/Formalisation  ? Correlation Analysis (Korea)
? Simple Regression (Japan) 
H.3.1 ? Differentiation/Market shares and 
New customers 
? Multiple Regression  
H.3.2 ? Cost leadership/Profitability ? Correlation Analysis 
H 3.3 ? Hybrid/New market development ? Correlation Analysis (Korea)
? Simple Regression (Japan) 
H.4.1 ? Centralisation/Overall performance ? Correlation Analysis 
H.4.2 ? Decentralisation/Employee’s 
satisfaction and retention 
? Correlation Analysis 
H.4.3 ? Formalisation/Speed of job handling ? Correlation Analysis 
 
                                            
70 Correlation, also called the correlation coefficient, indicates the strength and direction of a linear 
relationship between two random variables. Correlation refers to the departure of two variables from 
independence, although correlation does not imply causation. 
 
71 Simple linear regression and multiple linear regression are related statistical methods for modelling the 
relationship between two or more random variables, using a linear equation. Simple linear regression 
refers to a regression of one variable on one other variable while multiple regression refers to a regression 
of the dependent variable on two or more variables. The use of linear regression assumes that the best 
estimate of the response is a linear function of some variable(s). 
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5.6. Statistic Data Analysis Results  
 
5.6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The table below shows the value of Mean and Standard Deviation of each variable. 
Both in Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the value of the mean ranges from 
2.19 to 2.78 and the value of Standard Deviation ranges from 0.46 to 0.83.  
 
(Table 5.11. Mean and Standard Deviation of Variables) 
Variables N Mean S.D 
Korean GTCs 
Differentiation (present) 129 2.68 0.47 
Differentiation (future) 129 2.45 0.54 
Uncertainty (present) 128 2.78 0.60 
Uncertainty (future) 126 2.62 0.67 
Complexity (present) 129 2.19 0.66 
Complexity (future) 129 2.37 0.62 
Cost leadership (present) 129 2.47 0.48 
Cost leadership (future) 127 2.46 0.50 
Decentralisation 129 2.76 0.63 
Formalisation 129 2.78 0.52 
Market share 129 2.58 0.84 
Acquisition of new customers 129 2.58 0.70 
Profitability 129 2.58 0.90 
Hybrid strategy (present) 129 2.45 0.46 
Hybrid strategy (future) 127 2.31 0.55 
Overall performance 129 2.63 0.77 
Employee’s satisfaction and retention 129 2.74 0.73 
Speed of job handling 129 2.57 0.69 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Differentiation (present) 76 2.72 0.46 
Differentiation (future) 77 2.48 0.53 
Uncertainty (present) 75 2.86 0.59 
Uncertainty (future) 77 2.66 0.62 
Complexity (present) 77 2.19 0.70 
Complexity (future) 77 2.43 0.62 
Cost leadership (present) 76 2.54 0.47 
Cost leadership (future) 74 2.51 0.47 
Decentralisation 77 2.72 0.52 
Formalisation 76 2.34 0.62 
Market share 77 2.52 0.70 
Acquisition of new customers 77 2.49 0.74 
Profitability 77 2.32 0.83 
Hybrid strategy (present) 75 2.52 0.57 
Hybrid strategy (future) 76 2.34 0.62 
Overall performance 77 2.54 0.60 
Employee satisfaction and retention 77 2.73 0.64 
Speed of job handling  77 2.56 0.66 
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5.6.2. Correlation Matrix  
 
The following tables show the result of correlation analysis between each variable in 
the matrix.  
 
(Table 5.12. Correlation Matrix: Korean GTCs) 
 
PRESENT  
DI UN CO CL FO DE PR HS MD 
Differentiation (DI) 1.000 0.306 0.315       
Uncertainty (UN) 0.306 1.000        
Complexity (CO) 0.315  1.000       
Cost Leader (CL)    1.000 0.317 0.195 0.105   
Formalisation (FO)    0.317 1.000     
Decentralisation 
(DE) 
   0.195  1.000    
Profitability (PR)    0.105   1.000   
Hybrid Strategy 
(HS) 
       1.000 0.252
 
P 
R 
E 
S 
E 
N 
T 
 
Market Devel. (MD)        0.252 1.000
 
FUTURE  
DI UN CO CL FO DE PR HS MD 
Differentiation (DI) 1.000 0.457 0.293       
Uncertainty (UN) 0.457 1.000        
Complexity (CO) 0.293  1.000       
Cost Leader (CL)    1.000 0.374 0.155 0.125   
Formalisation (FO)    0.374 1.000     
Decentralisation 
(DE) 
   0.155  1.000    
Profitability (PR)    0.125   1.000   
Hybrid Strategy 
(HS) 
       1.000 0.140
 
F 
U 
T 
U 
R 
E 
 
Market Devel. (MD)        0.140 1.000
 
PRESENT  
DE OP ES FO SJ RC 
Decentralisation (DE) 1.000 0.273 0.352    
Overall Perform (OP) 0.273 1.000     
Employee Satisf. (ES) 0.352  1.000    
Formalisation (FO)    1.000 0.063 0.191 
Speed of Job (SJ)    0.063 1.000  
P 
R 
E 
S 
E 
N 
T 
Response to Customers. 
(RC) 
   0.191  1.000 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (p<0.05), 2-tailed 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
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(Table 5.13. Correlation Matrix: Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
 
PRESENT  
DI UN CO DE CL PR 
Differentiation (DI) 1.000 0.321 0.352 0.341   
Uncertainty (UN) 0.321 1.000     
Complexity (CO) 0.352  1.000    
Decentralisation 
(DE) 
0.341   1.000 0.134  
Cost Leader (CL)    0.134 1.000 0.053 
P 
R 
E 
S 
E 
N 
T Profitability (PR)     0.053 1.000 
 
FUTURE  
DI UN CO DE CL PR 
Differentiation (DI) 1.000 0.392 0.478 0.124   
Uncertainty (UN) 0.392 1.000     
Complexity (CO) 0.478  1.000    
Decentralisation. 
(DE) 
0.124   1.000 0.140  
Cost Leader (CL)    0.140 1.000 0.110 
F
U
T
U
R
E 
Profitability (PR)     0.110 1.000 
 
PRESENT  
DE OP ES FO SJ RC 
Decentralisation (DE) 1.000 -0.035 0.324    
Overall Perform (OP) -0.035 1.000     
Employee Satisf. (ES) 0.324  1.000    
Formalisation (FO)    1.000 0.248 0.176 
Speed of Job (SJ)    0.248 1.000  
P 
R 
E 
S 
E 
N 
T 
Response to Customers 
(RC) 
   0.176  1.000 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (p<0.05), 2-tailed 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
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5.6.3. Testing of Hypotheses 
 
? Hypothesis 1.1: A Differentiation Strategy/Environmental Uncertainty 
Complexity 
 
Hypothesis 1.1 relates to a firm’s strategy and the business environment. (H.1.1: 
The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a differentiation strategy will be positively 
associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity). It examined not only the 
respondents’ feeling at present, but also their expectations in the future. The results of 
the Pearson coefficient of correlation for H.1.1 are as follows:  
 
(Table 5.14. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.1.1) 
Korean GTCs 
Present Future  
 
 
Differentiation/
Uncertainty 
Differentiation/ 
Complexity 
Differentiation/ 
Uncertainty 
Differentiation/
Complexity 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.306 0.315 0.457 0.293 
p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Present Future  
 
 
Differentiation/
Uncertainty 
Differentiation/ 
Complexity 
Differentiation/ 
Uncertainty 
Differentiation/
Complexity 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.321 0.352 0.392 0.478 
p-value 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
 
 
 
 
 287 
 
The significant and positive correlation between a differentiation strategy and 
environmental uncertainty and complexity found by many previous studies is found 
here too. With respect to Korean GTCs respondents’ feeling at present, the result shows 
that a differentiation strategy is positively correlated with environmental uncertainty (r 
= 0.306, p<0.01) and complexity (r = 0.315, p<0.01), as predicted. It also examined the 
respondents’ expectations in the future and found that there is no significant difference 
in respondents’ feeling at present and their expectations in the future. As at present, both 
environmental uncertainty (r = 0.457, p<0.01) and complexity (r = 0.293, p<0.01) are 
positively correlated with a differentiation strategy in the future. In the case of Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas, almost the same result is obtained. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 is accepted.  
 
? Hypothesis 1.2: A Cost Leadership Strategy/Environmental Uncertainty 
Complexity 
 
Hypothesis 1.2 also relates to a firm’s strategy and the business environment. 
(H.1.2: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a cost leadership strategy will be 
inversely associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity). To analyse the 
data, multiple regression was used.  
 
In Korea’s case, the value of Coefficient of Determination (R²) is 0.237 (23.7%) at 
present and 0.246 (24.6%) in the future. This means that a regression model explains 
that a cost leadership strategy is inversely associated with environmental uncertainty 
and complexity in both the present and the future (Uncertainty Present: Regression 
Coefficient (R.C.) = 0.331, p < 0.01; Uncertainty Future: R.C. = 0.114, p < 0.01; 
Complexity Present: R.C.= 0.138, p < 0.05; Complexity Future: R.C. = 0.047, p < 0.05).  
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(Table 5.15. Results of Multiple Regression for H.1.2) 
 
Korean GTCs 
  Strategy 
  Cost Leadership 
Independent Variables Present 
Future 
(square root transformation about 
dependent variable) 
(constant) 
1.242 
(0.000) *** 
1.136 
(0.000) *** 
Uncertainty 
0.331 
(0.000) *** 
0.114 
(0.000) *** 
Complexity 
0.138 
(0.016) ** 
0.047 
(0.014) ** 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.237 0.246 
Overall F 19.408 20.012 
p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
  Strategy 
  Cost Leadership 
Independent Variables Present Future 
(constant) 
1.535 
(0.000) *** 
1.604 
(0.000) *** 
Uncertainty 
0.218 
(0.012) ** 
0.161 
(0.082) * 
Complexity 
0.164 
(0.026) ** 
0.205 
(0.010) ** 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.174 0.151 
Overall F 7.490 6.137 
p-value 0.001*** 0.004*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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In the case of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the value of R² is lower than that of the 
Korean GTCs’ (present = 0.174, future = 0.151). Although the value of R² is lower than 
that for Korea, a regression model also explains that a cost leadership strategy is 
inversely associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity. (Uncertainty 
Present: R. C. = 0.218, p < 0.05; Uncertainty Future: R.C. = 0.161, p < 0.1; Complexity 
Present: R.C.= 0.164, p < 0.05; Complexity Future: R.C. = 0.205, p < 0.05). So, 
Hypothesis 1.2 receives full support.  
 
? Hypothesis 2.1: A Differentiation Strategy/Organisational Decentralisation 
 
Hypothesis 2.1 relates to a firm’s strategy and organisational structure (H.2.1: The 
GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a differentiation strategy will be positively 
associated with the delegation of power (decentralisation)). For Korean GTCs, a simple 
regression was used.  
 
(Table 5.16. Results of Simple Regression for H.2.1: Korean GTCs) 
  Strategy 
  Differentiation 
Independent Variables Present 
Future 
(sqrt transformation about dependent var) 
(constant) 
1.610 
(0.000) *** 
1.292 
(0.000) *** 
Decentralisation 
0.383 
(0.000) *** 
0.096 
(0.000) *** 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.226 0.119 
Overall F 36.866 17.157 
p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 
***p<0.01 
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The result shows that a value of Coefficient of Determination (R²) is 0.226 (22.6%) 
at present and 0.119 (11.9%) in the future. This supports the hypothesis that the Korean 
GTCs’ employment of a differentiation strategy is positively associated with 
organisational decentralisation in both the present and the future (Present: R.C. = 0.383, 
p < 0.01; Future: R.C. = 0.096, p < 0.01) 
 
For Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the Pearson coefficient of correlation analysis is used. 
With respect to the respondents’ feeling at present, a differentiation strategy is positively 
correlated with organisational decentralisation, as hypothesised (r = 0.341, p<0.01). 
However, the respondents expect that there will be no correlation between a 
differentiation strategy and organisational decentralisation in the future.  
 
(Table 5.17. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.2.1: Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas) 
Present Future  
 
 
Differentiation/Decentralisation Differentiation/Decentralisation 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.341 
 
0.124 
 
p-value 0.003*** 0.281 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
 
? Hypothesis 2.2: A Cost Leadership Strategy/Organisational Formalisation 
 
Hypothesis 2.2 relates to a cost leadership strategy and organisational formalisation 
(H.2.2: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a cost leadership strategy will be 
positively associated with formal controls (formalisation)). For Korean GTCs, the 
Pearson coefficient of correlation analysis is used. The result shows that a statistical 
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significance is found between the cost leadership strategy and organisational 
formalisation in both the present (r = 0.317, p<0.01) and the future (r = 0.374, p<0.01). 
 
(Table 5.18. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.2.2: Korean GTCs) 
Present Future  
 
 Cost Leadership/Formalisation Cost Leadership/Formalisation 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.317 
 
0.374 
 
p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
 
For Japanese Sogo Shoshas, a simple regression was used. The result shows that a 
value of Coefficient of Determination (R²) is 0.105 at present and 0.152 in the future. It 
supports a statistical significance between a cost leadership strategy organisational 
formalisation (Present: R.C. = 0.330, p < 0.01; Future: R.C. = 0.404, p < 0.01). So, 
Hypothesis 2.2 receives full support.  
 
(Table 5.19. Results of Simple Regression for H.2.2: Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
  Strategy 
  Cost Leadership 
Independent Variables Present Future 
(constant) 
1.578 
(0.000) *** 
1.320 
(0.000) *** 
Formalisation 
0.330 
(0.005) *** 
0.404 
(0.001) *** 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.105 0.152 
Overall F 8.567 12.738 
p-value 0.005*** 0.001*** 
***p<0.01 
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? Hypothesis 3.1: A Differentiation Strategy/Market Share and New Customers 
 
Hypothesis 3.1 predicted that the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a 
differentiation strategy will be positively associated with the gaining of market shares 
and new customers.  
 
In the Korean case, the value of Coefficient of Determination (R²) is 0.189 at 
present and 0.179 in the future. It was found that Korean GTCs’ employment of a 
differentiation strategy is positively correlated with gaining a new market share and the 
acquisition of new customers in both the present and future. (Market Share Present: R. 
C. = 0.161, p < 0.01; Market Share Future: R.C. = 0.204, p < 0.01; Acquisition of New 
Customers Present: R.C.= 0.165, p < 0.01; Acquisition of New Customers Future: R.C. 
= 0.155, p < 0.05).  
 
In the case of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, a value of Coefficient of Determination 
(R²) is 0.178 at present and 0.133 in the future. Their employment of differentiation 
strategies is positively correlated with gaining a new market share and the acquisition of 
new customers at present. (Market Share Present: R. C. = 0.173, p < 0.05; Acquisition 
of New Customers Present: R.C. = 0.153, p < 0.05).  
 
With respect to the respondents’ expectation for the future, a statistical significance 
was obtained between the differentiation strategy and the new market share (Market 
Share Future: R. C. = 0.276, p < 0.01). But there is no significance between a 
differentiation strategy and the acquisition of new customers, even though a statistically 
significant regression model is obtained (Acquisition of New Customers Future: R.C. = 
0.181, p > 0.1).  
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(Table 5.20. Results of Multiple Regression for H.3.1) 
Korean GTCs 
  Strategy 
  Differentiation 
Independent Variables Present Future 
(constant) 
1.838 
(0.000) *** 
1.526 
(0.000) *** 
Market share 
0.161 
(0.001) *** 
0.204 
(0.000) *** 
Acquisition of  
New customers  
0.165 
(0.004) *** 
0.155 
(0.020) ** 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.189 0.179 
Overall F 14.652 13.774 
p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 
** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
  Strategy 
  Differentiation 
Independent Variables Present Future 
(constant) 
1.898 
(0.000) *** 
1.782 
(0.000)***  
Market share 
0.173 
(0.032) ** 
0.276 
(0.001)***  
Acquisition of  
New customers  
0.153 
(0.045) ** 
0.181 
(0.138) 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.178 0.133 
Overall F 7.881 11.548 
p-value 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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? Hypothesis 3.2: A Cost Leadership Strategy/Profitability 
 
Hypothesis 3.2 anticipated that the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a cost 
leadership strategy will be positively associated with profitability. To analyse the data, 
the Pearson coefficient of correlation analysis is used.  
 
(Table 5.21. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.3.2) 
Korean GTCs 
Present Future  
 
 
Cost Leadership/Profitability Cost Leadership/Profitability 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.105 0.125 
p-value 0.237 0.163 
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Present Future  
 
 
Cost Leadership/Profitability Cost Leadership/Profitability 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.053 0.110 
p-value 0.650 0.353 
 
Contrary to what was predicted, Korean GTCs’ and Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ 
employment of a cost leadership strategy did not correlate with their profitability in 
either the present or the future. The values of the correlation coefficient in both the 
Korean GTCs (r = 0.105 (present), r = 0.125 (future)) and the Japanese Sogo Shoshas (r 
= 0.053 (present), r = 0.110 (future)) are less than 0.2, which denotes no correlation 
between variables. Hypothesis 3.2 is therefore not accepted.  
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? Hypothesis 3.3: A Hybrid Strategy/New Market Development 
 
Hypothesis 3.3 relates to a hybrid strategy and new market development (H.3.3: 
The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment of a hybrid strategy will be positively 
associated with new market development). For Korean GTCs, the Pearson coefficient 
for correlation analysis is used. According to the result, Korean GTCs’ employment of a 
hybrid strategy is positively correlated with a new market development at present (r = 
0.252, p<0.01). However, there is no statistical significance in the future (r = 0.140) 
 
(Table 5.22. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.3.3: Korean GTCs) 
Present Future  
 
 
Hybrid Strategy/New Market 
Development 
Hybrid Strategy/New Market 
Development 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.252 0.140 
p-value 0.004*** 0.118 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
 
For Japanese Sogo Shoshas, a simple regression was used. The result shows that 
the relationship between their employment of a hybrid strategy and new market 
development is statistically significant in both the present and the future (Present: R.C. 
= 0.108, p < 0.01; Future: R.C. = 0.362, p < 0.01).  
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(Table 5.23. Results of Simple Regression for H.3.3: Japanese Sogo Shoshas) 
  Strategy 
  Hybrid Strategy 
Independent Variables Present Future 
(constant) 
1.306 
(0.000) *** 
1.429 
(0.000) *** 
New Market  
Development 
0.108 
(0.000) *** 
0.362 
(0.000) *** 
Coefficient of 
Determination (R²) 
0.179 0.171 
Overall F 15.926 15.222 
p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 
***p<0.01 
 
? Hypothesis 4.1: Centralisation/Overall Performance 
 
Hypotheses 4.1~ 4.3 relate to organisational structure and a firm’s performance. 
Unlike previous hypotheses, these three hypotheses examined only the respondents’ 
feeling at present. Hypothesis 4.1 anticipated that the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ 
organisational centralisation will be inversely associated with overall performance. To 
analyse the data, the Pearson coefficient for correlation analysis is used.  
 
According to the result, Korean GTCs’ employment of organisational centralisation 
is statistically significant for their overall performance (r = 0.273, p<0.01). However, in 
the case of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, it shows that there is no statistical significance 
between their organisational centralisation and overall performance. Thus, Hypothesis 
4.1 receives only partial support.  
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(Table 5.24. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.4.1) 
Centralisation/Overall Performance  
 
 
Korean GTCs Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.273 -0.035 
p-value 0.002*** 0.765 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
 
? Hypothesis 4.2: Decentralisation/Employees’ Satisfaction and Retention 
 
To test Hypothesis 4.2, the Pearson coefficient for correlation analysis is also used. 
It hypothesised that the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational decentralisation will be 
positively associated with employee satisfaction and retention. 
 
(Table 5.25. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.4.2) 
Decentralisation/Employee’s Satisfaction and Retention  
 
 
Korean GTCs Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.352 0.324 
p-value 0.000*** 0.004*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01), 2-tailed 
 
Consistent with our prediction, both Korean GTCs’ and Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ 
employment of organisational decentralisation is positively associated with employee’s 
satisfaction and retention (Korean GTCs: r = 0.352, p<0.01; Japanese Sogo Shoshas: r = 
0.324, p<0.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 4.2 receives full support. 
 
? Hypothesis 4.3: Formalisation/Speed of Job Handling  
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 The last hypothesis,  4.3, predicted that the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational 
formalisation will be inversely associated with the speed of job handling. To analyse the 
data, the Pearson coefficient for correlation analysis is used.  
 
(Table 5.26. Results of Pearson Coefficient of Correlation for H.4.3) 
Formalisation/Speed of Job Handling  
 
 
Korean GTCs Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Pearson  
Correlation (r) 
0.063 0.248 
p-value 0.480 0.031** 
** Significant at the 0.05 level (p<0.05), 2-tailed 
 
In the case of the Korean GTCs, there is no statistical correlation between 
organisational formalisation and employees’ speed of job handling. However, in the 
case of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the result reveals a statistical correlation between 
their employment of organisational formalisation and employees’ speed of job handling 
(r = 0.248, p<0.05). Hence, Hypothesis 4.3 receives only partial support. 
 
5.6.4. Types of Competitive Strategy 
 
Separately, this study also investigated the competitive strategy which Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas are pursuing at this moment. The result is as follows:  
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(Table 5.27. Results of Frequency Analysis for Types of Strategy) 
Types of Strategy Korean GTCs Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
Differentiation 10  13 
Cost Leadership 45  26 
Hybrid (Differentiation +  
Cost Leadership) 
42*  27*** 
Multi-mixed (Differentiation 
+ Cost Leadership + Hybrid) 
32**  11**** 
Total (N) 129  77 
 
According to Porter’s (1985) argument of competitive strategies, firms can be 
successful only if they adopt either a cost or a differentiation strategy. This denotes that 
they should choose only one of the two. If they mix them, they end up with low 
perceived value and high price (i.e. stuck in the middle). However, this survey gave a 
different result. The result shows that some Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
choose more than one strategy at the same time. Of 129 respondents in Korea, 74 (* + 
**) of them answered that they adopted more than one strategy at once. In the case of 
Japan, of 77 respondents, 38 (*** + ****) said that they chose more than one strategy at 
once. Meanwhile, a cost leadership strategy prevails in both groups, followed by hybrid 
and multi-mixed strategies.  
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5.7. Interview Results 
 
The function of the interview survey, to allow cross checking, was vindicated by 
discovering that it obtained similar results to the questionnaire survey, as follows.  
 
? Hypotheses 1.1~1.2: Business Environment and Competitive Strategy 
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Consistent with our arguments, all the Korean interviewees answered that a 
differentiation strategy and environmental uncertainty and complexity are positively 
correlated. Two interviewees, for example, replied as follows:   
 
“If there is no differentiation, a company cannot overcome severe 
competition. It means that consumers will select the product which has 
attractiveness.”  
 
“Basically, I agree that our company’s differentiation strategy is 
positively associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity. I 
think every differentiation strategy is based on a different  
environmental uncertainty and complexity.”  
 
With respect to the relationship between a cost leadership strategy and 
environmental uncertainty and complexity, two interviewees answered that a cost 
leadership strategy is not always inversely associated with uncertainty and complexity, 
for example, due to high competition in the market. They answered as follows:  
 
“Due to high competition in the market, some of the cost leadership 
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strategy that we take is positively associated with uncertainty and 
complexity, e.g. high volume and low margin.”  
 
“I don’t agree that a company’s cost leadership goes well with 
environmental uncertainty and complexity. As a General Trading 
Company, our company would face some obstacles to achieving cost 
leadership in our business areas.” 
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
Like the Korean interviewees, the Japanese interviewees also felt that a 
differentiation strategy and environmental uncertainty and complexity are positively 
correlated. Two interviewees replied as follows:   
 
“Yes. We have many competitors. We have to consider how we can 
show our functions to customers. So, we need a differentiation strategy 
when the environment is uncertain and complex.”  
 
“The current environment uncertainty and complexity governs market 
strongly and we also implement our differentiation strategy 
considering such environmental factors.”  
 
? Hypotheses 2.1~2.2: Competitive Strategy and Organisational Structure 
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
All Korean interviewees agreed that their company’s differentiation strategy is 
positively associated with organisational decentralisation, in particular in the decision-
making process. Two interviewees replied as follows:  
 
“Yes. In order to respond in time to rapidly changing market 
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conditions, we cannot always go to top management for a decision.”   
 
“I agree that our company’s differentiation strategy is positively 
associated with decentralisation. There are many operational 
divisions/teams in our company. Every division/team should decide 
something from its own position.”    
 
In the relationship between a cost leadership strategy and formalisation, all 
interviewees felt that their companies secure cost savings and an efficient work flow 
through formalisation. Two interviewees, for example, said,    
 
“Yes. Many of our company’s cost leadership strategies have to take 
necessary procedures to get approval.”  
 
“Through formalisation, a company can get cost savings and an 
efficient work flow.”  
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
One interviewee answered that differentiation strategy is positively associated with 
organisational decentralisation. He also expressed his opinion regarding the relationship 
between cost leadership strategy and formalisation:  
 
“Yes. In our company, cost leadership strategy and formalisation are 
carried out at the same time. If our company’s situation gets worse, we 
try to cut costs and restructure our business portfolio.”  
 
The other interviewee also had a view of positive correlation between differentiation 
strategy and decentralisation. Regarding cost leadership strategy and formalisation, he 
replied,  
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“My organisation is highly developed in terms of formalisation. ~~~~ 
It is also applied to implement cost leadership strategy.”  
 
?  Hypotheses 3.1~3.3: Competitive Strategy and Performance 
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
All interviewees answered that a differentiation strategy is necessary for gaining 
market shares and new customers. Three interviewees said,  
 
“Agree. In the case of one of our business fields where the business 
model is quite general, differentiation in customer service, like 
information providing, will gain market share, in particular in the 
initial stage.”  
 
“We set up a differentiation strategy in order to improve our market 
share.”  
 
“We make some non-profitable decision to approach new markets or 
customers.” and,  
 
With regard to the relationship between a cost leadership strategy and profitability, 
three interviewees answered that a cost leadership strategy has no meaningful 
relationship with profitability, as the questionnaire survey did. But one interviewee 
expressed a different opinion: 
 
“I think that our company’s cost leadership strategy is positively 
associated with profitability.”  
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This was because the interviewee’s company has experienced a radical 
organisational reconstruction since the collapse of its parent group in 1999. Thus, it 
assumes that a company may use a stable marketing policy by emphasising profitability 
rather than focusing on an aggressive marketing policy.  
 
Like the differentiation strategy, adopting a hybrid strategy is also crucial for new 
market development and overall performance. Two interviewees, for example, replied 
as follows:  
 
“Agree that our company’s hybrid strategy is positively associated 
with new market development and overall performance. Especially in 
these days of severe struggle for existence, a hybrid strategy is 
essential for new market development.” 
 
“It is important to mix two strategies, i.e. have a hybrid strategy, in 
order to develop a new market properly and at the same time, enhance 
overall performance.”  
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
Both two interviewees replied that their companies’ differentiation strategy will be 
positively associated with gaining market share and new customers. Regarding the 
relationship between cost leadership and profitability, they said,  
 
“In the short-time, I agree. But from the long-time perspective, I don’t 
agree.”  
 
“Sometimes we are implementing our cost leadership strategy, 
balancing the expected return at the proper level.” 
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With respect to the correlation between hybrid strategy and market development, 
they answered,  
 
“Our company can’t grow without a hybrid strategy. So, we choose a 
hybrid strategy to develop new market and make good.”  
 
“It has to be considered by each case, but generally hybrid strategy is 
positively applied for overall performance.”  
 
As we see from this result, most Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas mix two 
strategies (i.e. have a hybrid strategy) in order to develop new markets and enhance 
overall performance under fierce competition.  
 
? Hypotheses 4.1~4.3: Organisational Structure and Performance 
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Two interviewees felt that organisational centralisation negatively influences overall 
performance, whereas another two interviewees felt the opposite. Two interviewees who 
believed in negative correlation between two variables, replied,  
 
“Don’t agree that our company’s organisational centralisation will be 
inversely associated with overall performance. Frequently, 
centralisation makes for efficiency in overall performance.”  
 
“Not always, depending on the product and market situation, 
centralisation is absolutely necessary to enhance work overall.”  
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With respect to the relationship between organisational decentralisation and 
employees’ satisfaction and retention, all interviewees agreed that decentralisation 
enhances employees’ motivation and, therefore, allowed the company to retain its 
employees. One interviewee said  
 
“~~~Such a big proportion of decisions are endorsed at a lower level 
to solve each specific situation, in the nature of my company (i.e. a 
General Trading Company).”  
 
In the last interview question on strategic management, all the interviewees agreed 
that formalisation reduces the speed of job handling and response to customers.  
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
Regarding the relationship between organisational centralisation and a firm’s 
performance, one interviewee said,  
 
“Because our company has several business fields like chemical, metal, 
automobile, basically centralised control is impossible. So, in order to  
perform well, we need decentralisation. However, we set put company 
rules in advance and have to follow these rules under 
decentralisation.” 
 
Regarding the relationship between formalisation and the speed of job handling, 
both two interviewees replied that two variables are inversely associated. One 
interviewee, for example, said,  
 
“We are considering how to speed up decision- making.”  
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5.8. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This chapter investigated the strategic management of Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas by analysing the structural relationships between business environment, 
competitive strategy, organisational structure and performance. To examine this, both 
questionnaire and interview surveys were conducted. Although there were small 
differences between questionnaire survey results and interview survey results, they are 
within acceptability.  
 
First, in the relationship between competitive strategies and business environments, 
this empirical study revealed that both Korean GTCs’ and Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ 
employment of a differentiation strategy is positively associated with environmental 
uncertainty and complexity, as many previous studies have found (Dess and Davis, 
1984; Miller, 1988; Govindarajan, 1988; Kwon et al, 1999; Kang, 2002). With respect 
to the relationship between their cost leadership strategy and environmental uncertainty 
and complexity, it was found that they are inversely correlated each other, as predicted 
here. However, as in previous studies (Miller, 1988; Kwon et al, 1999; Kang, 2002), 
those relationships do not reach high statistical significance, although a regression 
model is significant. This result denotes that the choice of a differentiation strategy 
rather than a cost leadership strategy would increase uncertainty in an SBU’s task 
environment, as Govindarajan argued (1986). The interview results also supported our 
predictions. All the respondents agreed that their firms’ employment of a differentiation 
strategy has always had a positive correlation with uncertainty and complexity, but a 
cost leadership strategy is not always inversely associated with them.  
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Second, the relationship between competitive strategies and organisational 
structure was investigated. A differentiation strategy is positively associated with 
decentralisation in the work process. As Porter (1980) argued, the implementation of a 
new product or market development (i.e. a differentiation strategy) is highly dependent 
upon creative ideas from the members of the organisation. It also requires cooperation 
and close contact among them (Miller, 1988). Such assembling of creative ideas and 
close contact among members can be achieved by organisational decentralisation or a 
delegation of power to lower levels in the decision-making process. Moreover, 
consistent with our arguments, a cost leadership strategy is positively associated with 
formalisation, since a firm pursuing this strategy normally tends to focus on an internal 
issue of cost reduction and controls rather than the development of new markets. In the 
interviews, all respondents answered that they do not always go to top management for 
a decision in order to respond in time to rapidly changing market conditions. This 
denotes that when they pursue a differentiation strategy, the decision is not always made 
at a higher level, but is sometimes is made at a lower level according to the situation. In 
the relationship between a cost leadership strategy and formalisation, all respondents 
felt that their companies get the cost saving and efficiency of work flow through 
formalisation.  
 
Third, an analysis was made between competitive strategies and a firm’s 
performance. The result shows that Korean GTCs’ and Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ 
employment of a differentiation strategy is positively correlated with the gaining of 
market share and new customers. The functions of differentiation strategy are to secure 
new markets and customers by diversified products and services (Miles and Snow, 
1978). In line with this argument, this study also gained the same result as previous 
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studies. It also found that a hybrid strategy is statistically correlated with new market 
development since the main purpose of this strategy is to pursue high-quality products 
or services with lower prices than those of competitors. To support this result, Japanese 
car firms entering into European market can be cited as a good example. In order to 
develop markets in Europe, Japanese car firms from the late 1980s pursued a hybrid 
strategy by producing competitively priced cars which were more reliable and of better 
quality than their rivals. However, contrary to our hypothesis, a cost leadership strategy 
is not positively associated with a firm’s profitability. Although the main purpose of a 
cost leadership strategy is to save cost, it is not always correlated with profitability, in 
particular in such highly diversified organisations as the Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas. The interviews here also revealed the same result. One respondent 
answered that a differentiation strategy in customer service, for example, information 
providing, would be very helpful for gaining market share at an early stage. In the case 
of a hybrid strategy, new market development is essential in the modern business 
environment as the market is so highly competitive. But most respondents felt that a 
cost leadership strategy has no meaningful relationship with profitability.  
 
Fourth, it investigated the relationship between organisational structure and a 
firm’s performance. In this analysis, some results from the Korean GTCs are different 
from those of the Japanese Sogo Shoshas. With respect to the relationship between 
centralisation and overall performance, the result shows that there is an inverse 
association between them in the Korean GTCs, but there is no statistical correlation in 
the Japanese Sogo Shoshas. According to previous literature, there were two views on 
this subject. The first was a negative or zero association between centralisation and 
performance (McMahon, 1976; Pennings, 1976; Dalton et al., 1980; Stathakopoulos, 
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1998; Johnson and Scholes, 2002; Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005) and the other was a 
positive association between them (Hage, 1965; Kim, 2000). The general understanding 
is that there is a negative or zero association between them. However, according to 
Hage (1965), organisational centralisation increases production and work efficiency 
since the centralised organisation tended to very quickly develop into a formalised 
procedure for passing messages. In the relationship between decentralisation and 
employees’ satisfaction and retention, the result fully supports our hypothesis in both 
Korea and Japan. It is the general understanding that decentralisation can stimulate 
employees’ motivation (Mintzberg, 1979) and the firm can thus attract and retain its 
staff. The last hypothesis examined the relationship between formalisation and the 
speed of job handling. The result reveals that formalisation is inversely associated with 
the speed of job handling in the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, but there is no correlation 
between them in the Korean GTCs. In the interviews, most respondents felt that 
centralisation had a negative influence on overall performance, but one respondent 
answered that centralisation often made work efficient in overall performance. 
Regarding decentralisation and employees’ satisfaction and retention, all agreed that 
they are positively correlated with each other.  
 
Fifth, it also examined what type of competitive strategy Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas are now pursuing as their main strategy. Against Porter’s (1985) 
advice, they both adopt more than one strategy at once. According to Porter’s original 
approach to competitive strategies, firms are successful only if they adopt either a cost 
or a differentiation strategy. Thus they should only choose one of the two, because 
mixing them results in low perceived value and high price (i.e. stuck in the middle). 
This is a third possible competitive strategy, but one which ultimately fails. He made the 
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assumption that a better product costs more to produce, but that consumers will pay 
more in some market segments for what they perceive to be better. This is the basis of a 
differentiation strategy. In other markets or segments, consumers may be interested only 
in getting something at the lowest price, subject to some minimum quality. This is the 
basis of a cost strategy. This approach was later modified to take account of what was 
happening in some markets in Japan: through Total Quality Management and the Kaizen 
philosophy products were getting better and simultaneously coming down in price. This 
is the basis of the fourth competitive strategy: cost and differentiation strategy (i.e. 
hybrid strategy). A firm may choose only one of these four generic strategies.  
 
However, this study found that Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas can in 
some cases adopt more than one strategy at a time from the four generic strategies. A 
similar result was found by Kang (2002) who researched the hotel industry in Korea. 
Some hotel firms in Korea chose more than one strategy at once. The result of this study 
implies that the business environment surrounding Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas is becoming more uncertain and complex and in consequence it seems that they 
mix two or more strategies to survive its rapid changes. 
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(Table 5.28. Questionnaire Survey Results Summarised for Korean GTCs’ and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas’ Strategic Management)  
Hypothesis Analysis  Result 
H.1.1: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a differentiation strategy will be positively 
associated with environmental uncertainty and 
complexity. 
Strategy/Environment 
(Differentiation / 
Uncertainty and 
Complexity) 
Supported in both 
Korea and Japan 
H.1.2: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a cost leadership strategy will be inversely 
associated with environmental uncertainty and 
complexity.  
Strategy/Environment 
(Cost leadership / 
Uncertainty and Complexity
Supported in both 
Korea and Japan 
H.2.1: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a differentiation strategy will be positively 
associated with the delegation of power 
(decentralisation). 
Strategy/Structure 
(Differentiation / 
Decentralisation) 
Mostly supported 
But no correlation 
in future for Japan 
Sogo Shoshas 
H. 2.2: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a cost leadership strategy will be positively 
associated with formalisation. 
Strategy/Structure 
(Cost leadership / 
Formalisation) 
Supported in both 
Korea and Japan 
H.3.1: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a differentiation strategy will be positively 
associated with the gaining of market shares and 
new customers. 
Strategy/Performance 
(Differentiation/Market 
shares and New customers) 
Mostly supported 
But no correlation 
in future for Japan 
Sogo Shoshas 
H.3.2: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a cost leadership strategy will be positively 
associated with profitability 
Strategy/Performance 
(Cost leadership / 
Profitability) 
Not Supported in 
both Korea and 
Japan 
H.3.3: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ employment 
of a hybrid strategy will be positively associated 
with new market development. 
Strategy/Performance 
(Hybrid/New market 
development) 
Mostly supported 
But no correlation 
in future for Korea 
GTCs 
H.4.1: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational 
centralisation will be inversely associated with 
overall performance. 
Structure/Performance 
(Centralisation/Overall 
Performance) 
? K: Supported 
? J:Not supported 
H.4.2: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational 
decentralisation will be positively associated 
with employee satisfaction and retention. 
Structure/Performance 
(Decentralisation / 
Employee’s satisfaction and
retention) 
Supported in both 
Korea and Japan 
H.4.3: The GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ organisational 
formalisation will be inversely associated with 
the speed of job handling. 
Structure/Performance 
(Formalisation/Speed of 
job handling) 
? K:Not supported
? J: Supported 
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5.9. Difference Analysis between the Two Countries 
 
According to the results, most of the hypotheses are accepted or some of them 
received partial support. Almost same results were obtained from Korea and Japan. But 
two hypotheses (H.4.1. and H. 4.3.) show results for Korean GTCs which are different 
for Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Although there were small differences in H.2.1, H.3.1 and 
H.3.3 between two countries, they were acceptable and understandable without further 
discussion. Thus, this section discusses why differences in H. 4.1 and H.4.3 should arise 
between the one country and the other.  
 
? Hypothesis 4.1.: Centralisation/Overall Performance 
 
As summarised in Table 5.28, people in Korean GTCs feel that organisational 
centralisation is inversely associated with a firm’s overall performance, whilst Japanese 
people think there is no statistical correlation between them.  
 
First, the corporate culture and decision-making culture may affect the different 
results. The typical Japanese firm’s decision-making culture is consensus-style 
decision-making which allows all the people to take part in the entire process of 
defining, solving and acting upon a problem. Thus, people in Japanese firms may feel 
that organisational centralisation is not closely associated with a firm’s overall 
performance because most decisions are made on the basis of opinions and information 
emanating from each of the responsible parties. However, in Korea’s case, most 
decision-making power is concentrated in the higher levels. Due to such a hierarchical 
system, top executives in Chaebols sometimes made poor decisions which led their 
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companies to the brink of bankruptcy. Ultimately, their short-sighted decisions were 
among the factors in the national’s financial crisis, as well leading to the government’s 
decision to restructure the organisation of the Chaebols. Consequently, people in 
Korean GTCs may feel that organisational centralisation has a negative influence on a 
firm’s overall performance.  
 
Second, the external environment may have played a part in the different results for 
the two countries. Both Korean and Japanese firms experienced rigorous economic 
conditions in the 1990s, following the financial crisis (Korea) and the collapse of the 
bubble economy (Japan). For this reason, many big business groups in Korea and Japan 
slimmed down their structure as part of their organisational restructuring. Although the 
firms in these countries restructured their organisational system, the extent of change in 
Japanese firms was much less than in the Korean firms. In Korea’s case, the government 
led the Chaebols’ organisational restructuring under the special programme named 
“Work-out ”, a very strict regulatory programme determining whether the Chaebols’ 
should continue in the market or be abolished. As a result, overall management system 
of most Korean big business groups was significantly changed by rationalising their 
decision-making process, decentralising their organisational structure and so on. Thus, 
employees in Korean GTCs feel that organisational centralisation may affect a firm’s 
overall performance inversely, whilst Japanese people feel that there is no statistical 
correlation between them.  
 
Third, the size of organisational structure may also have an effect. The 
organisational structure of Korean GTCs is much smaller than that of the Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas. The results of the result indicate that a smaller organisational structure can 
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adapt quickly to a new business environment in changing business situations. People in 
both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas may feel the need to decentralise these 
days, in the interests of greater effectiveness, because they have experienced such 
drastic environmental changes since the late 1990s. However, although middle-level or 
lower-level managers in Japanese firms feel that decentralisation is a highly  
appropriate system at present and one which may benefit a firm’s performance, they 
may find it psychologically beyond them to oppose the weight of the traditional huge 
organisational structure. Thus, it is possible that people in Japanese Sogo Shoshas may 
feel subjectively that organisational centralisation would not correlate significantly with 
a firm’s overall performance.  
 
? Hypothesis 4.3.: Formalisation/Speed of Job Handling 
 
According to the survey result, respondents in Korean GTCs also feel that 
organisational formalisation is not associated with the speed of job handling, whilst 
Japanese employees answer that there is an inverse correlation between these two.  
 
First, the corporate culture is one of the main factors to show a different result. 
According to Cho and Yoon (2001), there have been controversies over the corporate 
culture of Korean firms. Some Western scholars, such as Hofstede (1991) and 
Trompenaars (1994), argued that Korea was one of the most collectivist countries in the 
world and its corporate culture is even more collectivist than that of Japan. But Japanese 
scholars such as Hasegawa, Watanabe and Kusayanagi take a different view (Chang and 
Chang, 1994) and declare that Korean companies are more competitive, individualistic 
and dynamic than Japanese ones. Although Korean corporate culture has been built on 
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traditional collectivism, many Korean scholars disagree about its specific nature. For 
instance, young managers (e.g. the new generation) in Korean firms often egoistic and 
instrumental forms of behaviour to deal with their tasks. This argument was supported 
by Chung, Lee and Jung (1997). They argued that most Korean employees’ loyalty and 
life-time commitment to the company are not as strong now as they were in the past. 
While most employees respect group opinions, they now want the chance to express 
their own views. For this reason, these employees nowadays tend to disregard formal 
procedures in their work process. This, then, affects their response that formalisation has 
no significant correlation with the speed of job handling.  
 
Second, the different national culture may affect the different results from Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Because Korea and Japan are located in the same 
cultural region, there are some cultural similarities between them, such as collectivism, 
the seniority system and Confucianism. At the same time, there are obvious cultural 
differences. For instance, one of the features of Korean national culture is the “Be 
quick” spirit, which is reflected not only in people’s personal lives, but also in all the 
working processes of a company. Thus, most decisions and approvals in all Korean 
firms tend to be made very quickly. In comparison with Korea, Japanese national 
culture is very prudent, in particular in business. In Japan, any decisions, changes or 
modifications occur slowly and carefully, involving in the entire process of decision-
making all those who will be affected. In addition, an informal decision-making stage is 
generally necessary. In summary, employees in Korean GTCs may have a tendency to 
neglect strict formalisation, although most Korean firms put emphasis on basic 
principles and all instructions are prepared through formal documentation. Thus, they 
feel that formalisation is not closely associated with the speed of job handling. However, 
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in Japan’s case, although employees feel the need for informal processes in their work 
these days, they may find it psychological burdensome to think of opposing a 
traditionally established formalisation system. Thus, they may feel formalisation is 
inversely associated with the speed of job handling.  
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CHAPTER 6. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WITHIN 
 THE GTCs/SOGO SHOSHAS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Strategic management encompasses the strategic decision-making within any 
organisation. In the process of implementing strategic management, a firm may rely 
heavily for its success on its decision-making processes. Although a firm has a specific 
type of strategy, a competitive organisational structure and an amicable business 
environment, its irrational and incoherent decision-making may impede the 
accomplishing of its managerial goals. Therefore, a firm’s successful implementation of 
strategic management is intimately associated with its decision-making.  
 
The previous chapter investigated the strategic management of Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas with theoretical constructs of their environment, strategy, 
structure and performance. By extending the work of the previous chapter, this chapter 
examines in particular the decision-making process within the two groups with new 
constructs, questions and hypotheses. As mentioned, although a decision-making 
process is a part of strategic management, it is worth carrying out an in-depth 
investigation and comparison of the two groups’ decision-making processes themselves 
as a separate task. There are two reasons for this; i) both Korea and Japan have unique 
decision-making cultures which are quite different from those of Western countries and 
ii) there are cultural differences between Korea and Japan in the decision-making 
process, even though two countries are in the same geographical region.  
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This chapter will seek to identify i) who are the main decision-makers within the 
GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, ii) what factors influence the decision-making process, iii) 
whether there are corporate cultural differences in the decision-making process between 
the two groups and iv) whether any recent changes have been made in the decision-
making process within the two groups.  
 
The organisation of this chapter can be briefly summarised as follows. First, it 
describes the relationship between strategic management and strategic decision-making 
and the way in which they are interlinked with each other. Second, it reviews overall 
theories of organisational decision-making, such as the types, models and steps of 
decision-making. Third, it examines the major factors in organisational decision-
making: power and politics, corporate culture, ownership and corporate governance. 
Fourth, it reviews some empirical studies relating to the decision-making process within 
Korean and Japanese firms. Finally, it addresses the research objectives and questions 
and derives some hypotheses.  
 
6.2. Strategic Management as Strategic Decision-Making  
 
Decision-making is a fundamental activity of strategic management among 
managers. Managers all over the world must make decisions which significantly affect 
their organisations (Martinsons and Davison, 2007). Successful strategy emerges from 
effective decision-making process in which executives develop collective intuition, 
accelerate constructive conflict, maintain decision pacing and avoid politics (Eisenhardt, 
1999). However, today’s rapidly changing business environment complicates decision-
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making. Nevertheless, managers need to make effective decisions through consultation 
processes and choices as part of their firms’ strategic management.  
 
The distinguishing characteristic of strategic management is its emphasis on 
strategic decision-making. Strategic decision-making refers to non-programmed 
decisions typically made by high-level executives regarding the direction which their 
organisation should take to achieve its mission (Greenberg and Baron, 2008). As 
organisations grow larger and more complex in more uncertain situations, decisions 
become increasingly complicated and difficult to make (Wheelen and Hunger, 2007). 
Strategic decision-making necessitates an integrated understanding of the company’s 
marketing, finance, human resources, R & D and manufacturing functions. These 
functional areas interact over time and are essential for the successful implementation of 
a firm’s strategic management in the longer term.  
 
Regarding the Korean GTCs, irrational decision-making was one of the major 
reasons for the failure of their strategic management. Furthermore, the Chaebol groups’ 
easy decisions contributed to Korea’s economic crisis in 1997; they were not based on 
the real market situation but instead on company owners’ personal preferences or 
feelings. As decision-making power is concentrated in the top management in most 
Korean firms, including the GTCs, Korean subordinates are usually reluctant to express 
their opinions (Chen, 2004).  Kahal (2005) argued that in most Korean organisations 
decision-making, financial decision-making in particular, is centralised and tightly 
controlled by top executives. As for the Sogo Shoshas, they usually use the consensus 
decision-making style in strategic management. However, this has some drawbacks 
when it comes to effective strategic management. For instance, as Kahal (2005) argued, 
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consensus decision-making system is a weakness because Japanese people believe that 
there is always one right answer to a question and that authority should not be 
challenged. Chen (2004) stressed that the system is too slow and involves many 
unnecessary meetings.   
 
The strategic management and strategic decision-making within an organisation is 
never separated. The following figure illustrates the relationship between strategic 
management and the strategic decision-making process and how they are correlated. In 
the figure, strategic decision-making is central to the strategic management process and 
affects all strategic management activities, such as environment scanning, strategic 
choice and strategic action.   
 
(Figure 6.1. Strategic Management as Strategic Decision-making)  
 
 
The Strategic  
Position 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC  
DECISION-MAKING  
 
 
 
Strategic                                        Strategy into 
Choices                                           Action  
 
 
(Source: Developed by the author from Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2005), “Exploring Corporate 
Strategy”, 7th edition, Prentice Hall, p. 16). 
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More specifically, in the stage of the strategic position, decision-makers need to 
consider how the environment will affect the organisation and its future activities and 
what are the resources and core competence which may create competitive advantages 
and new opportunities. This process diagnoses an organisations’s external and internal 
environment, deciding on a vision and mission, developing overall goals and allocating 
human and capital resources to attain the managerial goals. In the strategic choices stage, 
managers need to make decisions with respect to a firm’s overall direction in terms of 
its general policy toward growth and the management of its diverse businesses and 
product lines (i.e. Corporate-level strategy). Decision-makers also consider how their 
company can improve its competitive position in the specific industry or market 
segment by competitive strategies (i.e. Business-level strategy). In the strategy into 
action process, managers are required to make effective decisions of ways to execute a 
strategic plan.  
 
Taken altogether, strategic management and the strategic decision-making process 
are not separated, but interact with each other in order to accomplish a firm’s goals. 
This relationship between the two elements could be called ‘strategic management as 
strategic decision-making’. 
 
 
6.3. Theoretical Background and Literature Review   
 
6.3.1. Types of Decision-making  
 
Many researchers  (Barnard, 1968; Daft, 2000; George and Jones, 2008; 
Greenberg and Baron, 2008) classify different types of decision-making. There are in 
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general three types of decision-making: i) programmed vs. non-programmed decision-
making, in accordance with established plans, procedures and systems or the lack 
thereof, ii) personal vs. organisational decision-making, in accordance with the main 
body of decision-making and iii) decision-making in conditions of certainty, risk, 
uncertainty and ambiguity created by current circumstances.  
 
? Non-programmed vs. Programmed Decision-making 
 
To the extent that decisions are repetitive, routine or made in accordance with an 
established procedure, they can be described as programmed. Decisions are non-
programmed to the extent that they are novel, unstructured and consequential. George 
and Jones (2008) established that non-programmed decision-making involves searching 
for the extra information needed to make the right choice. Greenberg and Baron (2008) 
defined non-programmed decision-making as decisions made about a highly novel 
problem for which there is no pre-specified course of action. Thus, the decision-maker 
confronts a unique situation in which the solutions are novel. However, programmed 
decisions are highly routine decisions made according to pre-established organisational 
routines and procedures (Greenberg and Baron, 2008). To make a programmed decision, 
the decision-maker uses a standard sequence of behaviours followed routinely by 
organisational members whenever they encounter a particular type of problem or 
opportunity (George and Jones, 2008).  
 
? Personal vs. Organisational Decision-making 
 
According to Barnard (1968), personal decisions cannot ordinarily be delegated to 
others, whereas organisational decisions can often if not always be delegated. In other 
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words, personal decisions are made by an individual within the organisation in order 
for him/her to achieve a personal purpose, whereas organisational decisions are made 
in order to achieve an organisational purpose. However, it is quite difficult to 
distinguish clearly between these two. For instance, if a personal decision contributes 
to or has the intention of cooperation in order to achieve an organisational purpose, this 
personal decision is regarded as relating to an organisational decision. In some cases, 
the purposes are compatible with each other and converge. More often than not, they 
are incompatible. 
 
? Decision-making under Certainty, Risk, Uncertainty and Ambiguity 
 
Daft (2000) classified four types of decision-making: those made in conditions of  
certainty, risk, uncertainty and ambiguity. Certainty means that all the information 
needed by the decision-maker is fully available. Risk means that a decision has clear-
cut goals and that good information is available, but that the future outcomes 
associated with each alternative are subject to change. With decision-making in  
uncertainty, managers know what goals they wish to achieve, but information about 
alternatives and future events is incomplete. In this case, the manager may have to 
come up with a creative approach to alternatives and use personal judgment to 
determine which alternative is best. Ambiguity is by far the most difficult decision 
situation. In this case, the goals to be achieved or the problem to be solved is unclear, 
alternatives are difficult to define and information about outcomes is unavailable.  
 
All organisational decisions involve some degree of risk, ranging from complete 
certainty (no risk) to complete uncertainty (high risk). Thus, one of the managers’ 
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important tasks is to try to reduce decision uncertainty. In this context, Greenberg and 
Baron (2008) argued that decision uncertainty can be reduced by establishing linkages 
with other organisations. The more an organisation knows about what another 
organisation will do, the greater certainty it will have in making decisions.   
 
6.3.2. The Models of Organisational Decision-making  
 
? Rational or Classical Model  
 
The rational model is an ideal pattern of decision-making; it is applicable to 
programmed decisions in which the goal and problem are well defined and information 
on alternatives is perfect. Simon (1976) defined the concept of rationality as one which 
is concerned with the selection of preferred behaviour alternatives in terms of some 
system of values whereby the consequences of the behaviour can be evaluated. 
Rationality is commonly associated with notions of logic, reasoning and sense-making 
(Stewart, 1994). This model assumes that decisions maximise goal achievement and that 
people strive to be economically rational. According to Daft (2000), the assumptions 
underlying this model are that: i) the decision-maker is rational and uses logic to make a 
decision which will maximise the attainment of organisational goals, ii) the criteria for 
evaluating alternatives are known and iii) the decision-maker strives for conditions of 
certainty, gathering complete information.  
 
However, there are in organisations a number of obstacles and limitations to 
making the best rational decisions. Managers seldom achieve complete rationality in 
managing. George and Jones (2008) stressed that the classical model is unrealistic. Its 
assumptions that decision-makers have all the information needed to make optimal 
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decisions bears little resemblance to the conditions facing most organisations. Further, 
although the decision-makers have all necessary information, they are not often able to 
use it all. 
 
? Bounded Rationality or Administrative Model 
 
As mentioned earlier, organisations present many obstacles and limitations to 
making the best rational decisions. It is in general unrealistic to expect managers to 
behave with a high degree of rationality in the organisational decision-making process. 
This is because many factors – limited information, time, certainty and limits on human 
intellectual capacities and on the availability of information – prevent such behaviour, 
even though managers try to be completely rational.  
 
Simon (1958, 1976 and 1979) pioneered the effort to understand how real decision 
situations are handled by individuals and organisations and in what ways such processes 
differ from the rational comprehensive model. Simon and March (1958) introduced the 
concept of bounded rationality – the concept that people have the time and cognitive 
ability to process only a limited amount of information on which to base decisions – to 
explain how managers realistically cope with baffling complexity. According to Simon 
(1979), rationality is bounded when it falls short of omniscience. And the failures of 
omniscience are largely failures of knowing all the options, uncertainty about relevant 
exogenous events and the inability to calculate consequences. He further emphasised 
that managers settle for a satisfactory rather than an optimal solution. Decision-makers 
have a set of criteria which describes minimally satisfactory alternatives and can 
recognise alternatives in questions which meet these criteria: this decision mechanism is 
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called satisficing. A satisficing decision is much easier to make than an optimal decision. 
However, in most decision-making situations, satisficing decisions are acceptable and 
are more likely to be made than optimal ones (Greenberg and Baron, 2008).  
 
According to this model, decision-makers choose how to respond to opportunities 
and problems on the basis of a simplified and approximate account of the situation. 
They do not take into account all the information relevant to a problem or opportunity, 
nor do they consider all possible alternatives and their consequences (George and Jones, 
2008).  
 
 
? Political Model 
 
Challenging the conventional rational model’s unitary view of organisations as 
consisting of well-structured, differentiated subsystems linked through a common goal, 
the political model regards organisations as pluralistic and divided into various subunits, 
each wedded to its own goals, interests and subcultures (Varman and Bhatnagar, 1999). 
The political model is useful for making non-programmed decisions when conditions 
are uncertain, information is limited and there is disagreement and conflict between 
multiple actors about what goals to pursue or what course of action to take. This model 
starts with an assumption that power arises inevitably and is a crucial variable in 
achieving organisational goals; managers engage in the push and pull of debate to 
decide goals and discuss alternatives. Viewing an organisational decision-making 
process from a political perspective started with Cyert and March (1963). According to 
them, the process of decision-making in organisations is a power game for multiple 
actors who all want to further their interests. Rex (1961) also argued that if there is an 
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actual conflict of ends, the behaviour of actors towards one another may not be 
determined by shared norms, but by the success each has in compelling the other to act 
in accordance with his interest. Power then becomes a crucial variable in the social 
systems. Etzioni (1967) noted that decisions reflect the interests of the most powerful, 
since partisans invariably differ in their respective power positions. 
 
Martin and Sims (1983) went further, presenting major elements – alliances, taking 
counsel, communication and compromising72 as power tactics in order to reach an 
organisational agreement among multiple actors. This concept is also described by 
Jones (1988) and Daft (2000), who emphasise coalition, defined as informal alliances 
among managers supporting a specific goal73. Unlike the rational model, the political 
model recognises that the preferences and values of managers differ and that conflict 
between managers and different stakeholder groups is inevitable. Without a coalition, a 
powerful individual or group could derail the decision-making process.   
 
                                            
72 Martin and Sims argued that every executive needs closer alliances with other executives, both on his 
own level and above him, if he is to protect and to enhance his status and to reach an organisational 
agreement. The executive also needs counsel, but he should be cautious about how he seeks and receives 
advice. He should take counsel only when he himself desires it, because it is often interpreted as a 
delegation of power if an executive allows his subordinates to provide advice when he does not 
specifically call for it. A manager also needs well-dredged communication channels and should accept 
compromise. 
 
73 According to Jones (1988), the political model views an organisation as a coalition of different interests, 
in which decision-making takes place through compromise, bargaining and negotiation between 
managers from different functions and areas of the organisation. Any solution chosen meets the approval 
of the dominant coalition, the collection of managers or stakeholders who have the power to select a 
solution and commit resources for implementing it. Daft (2000) argued that most organisational decisions 
involve many managers who are pursuing different goals and have to talk with one another to share 
information and reach an agreement. Under this situation, managers often engage in coalition building for 
making complex organisational decisions. Coalition building is the process of forming alliances among 
managers. In other words, a manager who supports a specific alternative talks informally to other 
executives and tries to persuade them to support the decision. When the outcomes are not predictable, 
managers gain support through discussion, negotiation and bargaining. Coalition building gives several 
managers an opportunity to contribute to decision-making, enhancing their commitment to the option 
which is ultimately adopted.  
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The characteristics of each of the three major organisational decision-making 
models, as reviewed above, can be summarised as follows: 
 
(Table 6.1. Comparison of Decision-making Models) 
 Rational Model Bounded Rationality 
Model 
Political Model 
Actors Single or multiple Single or multiple Multiple  
Goals  Clear-cut and shared  Vague and shared Conflicting and  
incompatible 
Information Perfect and full Imperfect and limited Ambiguous and imperfect
Decision 
Behaviour 
Problem-solving and  
making rational choices 
for maximising 
outcomes  
Constrained 
problem-solving  
Negotiation, bargaining 
and struggling  
Mechanism 
of the Choice 
Maximising  Satisficing  Domination  
 
6.3.3. Factors Affecting Decision-making  
 
• Power and Politics 
 
In organisational behaviour theory, it is generally accepted that any decision-
making process influenced by power and politics is non-ethical, but should be made on 
the basis of acceptable boundaries of rationality. However, to speak realistically, power 
significantly affects organisational behaviour in ways which, though not visible, can 
change or shift organisational decisions. Since Russell (1938) asserted that “the 
fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the 
fundamental concept in physics”, the concept of power has for decades stimulated 
intense debate. Simon and March (1958) claimed that politics is one of the 
organisational reactions to conflicting objectives. When there is inter-group 
disagreement on goals and bargaining is not used, inter-group conflict is resolved 
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through politics. This mechanism of decision-making has some potentially disruptive 
consequences. It almost necessarily places strain on the status and power system of the 
organisation. If those who are formally the most powerful prevail, the result is a more 
forceful perception of status and power differences in the organisation.  
 
Pfeffer (1992), who placed power at the centre of the organisational decision-
making theory stressed that it is essential to understand the decision-making process 
from a power and politics perspective, since it is hardly possible to reach an 
organisational decision on the basis of rationality in the real business world. He defined 
organisational politics as activities which attempt to influence decisions about critical 
issues. He viewed organisations as pluralistic and divided into various interests, 
subunits and subcultures. He further emphasised an inseparable relation between power 
and politics: the organisational politics is the exercise or use of power and power is 
defined as a potential force.  
 
When discussing power and politics in organisational decision-making, one of the 
important things to remember is identifying the source of power. Pfeffer (1992) pointed 
out that an individual’s power within an organisation comes from the subunit of which 
he or she is a member. In other words, the location in the organisational structure is one 
of the sources of power74. Not all subunits are created equal – some are more influential 
than others. The power of a subunit comes from its ability to act in a unified, consistent 
                                            
74 Besides the location within the organisational structure, Pfeffer presented other sources of an 
individual’s power: i) energy, endurance and physical stamina, ii) the ability to focus one’s energy and to 
avoid wasted effort, iii) sensitivity, which makes it possible to read and understand others, iv) flexibility, 
particularly with respect to selecting various means in order to achieve one’s goal, v) the willingness to 
engage in conflict and confrontation, or, in other words, a certain degree of personal toughness, vi) the 
ability to submerge one’s ego, at least temporarily and play the good subordinate or team player to enlist 
the help and the support of others.  
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fashion, from its proximity to critical issues and its ability to cope with those issues and 
from achieving a position of monopoly by means of its expertise and problem-solving 
ability. Varman and Bhatnagar (1999) identified seven sources of power: formal 
authority, rules and regulations, control of scarce resources, ability to cope with 
uncertainty, knowledge and information, counter-organisations and informal 
organisations75. Cohen and Bradford (2002) stressed that power comes from both 
position and personal skills – what people know and are able to do. Expertise has 
always been a source of power, but it will become even more important – and easier to 
recognise – in organisations where power is widely dispersed. Reputation, which 
derives from one’s character, abilities, collaboration and performance on the job, along 
with the ability to learn, becomes ever more important. When important tasks are on the 
line, people will want to work with others who can deliver. Power will accrue to those 
who deliver the desired results.  
 
? Corporate Culture 
 
An important influence on organisational behaviour is culture. Although people 
may not be consciously aware of culture, it has a pervasive influence over their 
behaviour and actions within the organisation (Mullins, 1996). Corporate culture, which 
is defined as the collection of beliefs, expectations and values learned and shared by a 
                                            
75 Detailed explanations of these sources of power are as follows. i) Rules and regulations: they are often 
created, invoked and used in either a proactive or retrospective fashion as part of a power play. ii) Control 
of scarce resources: those subunits or individuals within the organisation which can provide the most 
critical and difficult to obtain resources, come to have power in the organisation. iii) Ability to cope with 
uncertainty: a player’s power ultimately depends on the control he has over a source of uncertainty that 
affects the pursuit of the organisation’s aims and on the importance of this source as compared with other 
relevant sources. iv) Knowledge and information: these can help a person to systematically influence the 
definition of organisational situations and create patterns of dependency. v) Counter-organisation: 
whenever a group of people manages to build a concentration of power in relatively few hands, it is not 
uncommon for opposing forces to co-ordinate their actions to create a rival power block. For instance, 
unions develop as a check on management in industries. vi) Informal organisations: friends in high places, 
sponsors, mentors, coalitions, or people to trade support and favours to further their individual ends and 
informal networks – all provide a source of power to those involved.  
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corporation’s members and transmitted from one generation of employees to the next 
fulfils several important functions in an organisation and is one of the main factors 
affecting corporate decision-making. According to Slater (2003), corporate culture may, 
if appropriate, convey a sense of identity and belonging, generate employee 
commitment, add to organisational stability and serve as a frame of reference for 
decision-making. However, it may, if inappropriate, also give rise to alienation, 
demotivate employees, destabilise an organisation, frustrate communication and 
delegation and generate resistance to change.  
 
How much does corporate culture influence organisational decision-making? In his 
book, Cultures and Organisations, Hofstede (1991) stressed that organising always 
demands the answering of the question: who has the power to decide what? The answer 
to this is influenced by cultural norms of “power distance”76. The decision-making 
process is different in different cultures. Who makes a decision, when it is made and the 
importance placed on rationality vary in organisations around the world. For example, 
in high power-distance cultures, such as India, only very senior level managers make 
decisions. But in low power-distance cultures, such as Sweden, low-ranking employees 
expect to make most of their own decisions about day-to-day operations. Moreover, 
because Italians value the past and traditions, managers in that culture will tend to rely 
on tried-and proven alternatives to problems. In contrast, the US and Australia are more 
aggressive and now-oriented; managers in these countries are more likely to propose 
unique and creative solutions to their problems (Robbins, 1991).  
                                            
76 Hofstede defined the term Power Distance as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. 
Institutions are the basic elements of society like the family, school and the community; organisations are 
the places where people work”. 
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According to Pheysey (1993), there are major cultural differences between West 
and East. The West has tended to think, for example, that a cause precedes an effect and 
that things happen one after another. The West tends to perceive things in categories, is 
oriented towards mastery over nature and bases reality or ultimate truth on science and 
pragmatism. However, the East tends to perceive things in contexts, seeks harmony with 
nature and sees reality as more based on revealed truth than on empirical 
experimentation. Moreover, corporate leaders in the East, in particular in Korea, tend to 
depend on their intuition when they make decisions.  
 
Korean firms’ decision culture is quite different from those in other Western 
countries. The failure of the Samsung Motor Company offers a good example of a poor 
decision based on the owner’s intuition77. The owner of Samsung, Kun Hee, Lee who 
had an individual taste for collecting luxury cars, had an undue influence on the car 
industry. His interest in the car industry was one of the main triggers in his decision to 
invest in a luxury passenger car project and he reached the decision – when the luxury 
passenger car market was already overstocked – on the basis mainly of his intuition and 
whim, rather than on any real need for or competence in such automobiles. This same 
kind of poor decision-making by corporate leaders frequently occurs within the Korean 
GTCs, as well. For instance, when each SBU within the GTC establishes an integrated 
international marketing strategy, such as the selection of a target market, choice of 
market entry mode and of logistics and transportation partners, the decision-making 
                                            
77 There is an interesting unrevealed story behind the Samsung Car Project. During the period of the 
project feasibility study, the owner of Samsung, Kun Hee, Lee, fired many executive members who had 
opposed the project as unfeasible. These members were held to have betrayed the owner’s final decision. 
Yet when the project failed, Lee again fired most of the executive members who had agreed to the project 
and made no objection. These were also condemned as traitors who had forced the company to take risks 
without any managerial foresight. 
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process tends to rely on a SBU leader’s propensity without accepting opinions of all the 
members involved.  
 
In contrast, the typical Japanese corporate culture in decision-making is collective. 
Input from the bottom line of the organisational hierarchy is the starting point and this 
system ensures everyone’s commitment and involvement at all levels. The Japanese 
attach greater importance to implementation, unlike Westerners who give priority to the 
speed of reaching a decision. The time needed to reach a decision is increased in 
proportion to the number of people who have to be persuaded.  
 
? Ownership and Corporate Governance 
 
The other important factors influencing a firm’s decision-making and overall 
management are ownership, control, or corporate governance. A study by Pitelis and 
Sugden (1986) relating to the relationship between ownership and control within a firm 
defined control as “the ability to determine broad corporate objectives despite resistance 
from others.” The percentage shares required for control varies among firms because 
each firm has specifically placed interconnections between the principal shareholders, 
employees, directors and other firms (Lee, 1999). Pitelis and Sugden (1986) argued that 
the percentage of shareholding for control does not require ownership of 51% of the 
shares. According to them, only 20% of shares is necessary to maintain control, while 
Cubbin and Leech (1983) argued that well under ten percent, or even 1~2% may be 
sufficient to retain control.  
 
In this context, Korean big business groups are a good example. Ownership and 
management are not separated in most Korean business groups and group owners have 
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power much in excess of their shares. As Lemmon and Lins (2002) argued, this 
structure may cause lower performance when a firm is faces crisis.78
 
6.4. Decision-making Process within Korean and Japanese Firms 
 
6.4.1. Decision-making Process within Korean Firms 
 
The influence of hierarchical traditional family systems in Korea impacts on 
management behaviours, such as business strategies, organisational structure, decision-
making and HRM (Rowley and Bae, 2003). In most Korean firms, decision-making 
power and authority are concentrated in the higher echelons of managerial hierarchies. 
However, there is no visible resistance to this decision-making system, because of the 
Confucian ethical system, which entails paternalism, loyalty and respect for elders and 
seniors (Chung, Lee and Jung, 1997). Decision-making, in particular, financial decision-
making, is centralised and tightly controlled by top executives in most Korean 
organisations (Kahal, 2005). However, there is the process of establishing informal 
consensus (in Korean term sajeonhyupui) which is similar to the Japanese nemawashi 
(prior consultation), even though Korean subordinates are usually reluctant to express 
their opinion (Chen, 2004).  
 
In order to get approval from top management, all business issues should be 
reported in a specific written form in accordance with the strict formal procedure of 
Kyuljae (a strict formal procedure of decision-making) system, which requires much 
                                            
78 Lemmon and Lins (2002) argued that when firms’ controlling managers or insiders have more power 
than their ownership rights would justify, the performance of these firms is lower than that of other firms 
during the crisis period.  
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time until the final approval. In Korean terms, Kyuljae, means formal processing to get 
approval from those higher up in the firm. The major reason for following this is the 
unique culture of Korean organisations’ decision-making; top-down and centralisation 
to upper-level management. However, Chung, Lee and Jung (1997) stressed that the 
formal approval process could provide a mechanism for discussion and consultation 
among employees and various levels of managers throughout the organisational 
hierarchy, but it has not been used as such. Kyuljae is similar to the ringi system in 
Japanese firms, but the former is considered to be more of a means for exercising 
authority and control than for requesting consultation and participation which 
characterise the latter.  
 
? A Strict Formal Procedure of Decision-making (Kyuljae) 
 
No decision is made, even for minor issues, in Korean firms without passing 
through a strict formal procedure called Kyuljae. In Korean terms, Kyuljae, means the 
formal processing to get the approval of those higher up. The major reason for 
following this system in all Korean firms is the unique culture of decision-making in  
Korean organisations (i.e. top-down and centralisation to upper-level management). 
However, Chung, Lee and Jung (1997) argued that a formal approval process could 
provide a mechanism for discussion and consultation among employees and various 
levels of managers throughout the organisational hierarchy, although it has not been 
used in this way. Kyuljae is similar to the ringi system in Japanese firms, but the former 
is considered to be more of a means for exercising authority and control than the asking 
for consultation and participation which characterise the latter.  
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In accordance with the Kyuljae system, five persons are normally involved in any 
business matter until the final decision is made. The first step in Kyuljae is the drafting 
of report by someone in charge. Once the draft is prepared in a specific written by a 
person in charge (staff normally has five years of working experience), it is handed over 
to middle-level management (managers normally have more than ten years of working 
experience) which plays the most important role during the whole process of the 
Kyuljae. At this stage, the middle-level manager checks the entire draft with scrupulous 
care from typographical errors to the content of the draft, which help the report to be 
written accurately. If any inadequacy is found, the middle-level manager sends the draft 
back to the person in charge for him to revise. Once the draft is approved by the middle-
level manager, it is handed over to upper-level management, including the vice 
president, president and chairman and can be effortlessly approved by them, not 
rejected79.  
 
However, the situation is different in the case of reporting major business issues. In 
this case, the middle-level manager does not have much authority and upper-level 
management decides most issues. Furthermore, there is a unique institutional device in 
the Kyuljae system for obtaining consensus (the Korean term is Hapuye) from various 
levels of managers and business departments who are not directly connected with the 
issues reported. In this case, the final decision is made after a normal review by ten or 
more persons who are directly or indirectly associated. For instance, if a marketing 
department reports on the annual sales prospects in the EU market, it may need the 
agreement of some indirectly associated departments, such as strategic planning, legal, 
insurance and logistics and factory departments as well.  
                                            
79 From the author’s 9-year working experience at one of the biggest business groups in Korea, the author 
is very familiar with the decision-making process within Korean organisations.  
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? A Regulation of Mandated Arbitrary Decision 
 
One of the notable problems of decision-making through Kyuljae in Korean firms 
is the loss of efficiency caused by the strict formal procedure of securing the approval of 
upper levels of management. Although the general decision-making procedure in 
Korean firms is quicker nowadays and most firms recognise the need to increase  
decision-making efficiency, it still takes a significant amount of time for the final 
approval from the top management to emerge. In some cases, it needs a month or more, 
even for small issues, to get final approval if a final decision-maker is absent. In order 
to improve the efficiency of the decision-making process, an institutional device can be 
used. A typical example is the “Regulation of Mandated Arbitrary Decisions.” The 
purpose of this regulation is to promote work efficiency, increase the speed of work 
processes and establish a climate of responsibility-management by stipulating the matter 
to be arbitrated on in each position. According to this regulation, each matter of 
arbitration should be carried out in accordance with a standard table – a table stipulating 
details of the range of duties and the person in charge of arbitration. 
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(Table 6.2. A Sample of the Standard Table of Duty of Arbitrary Decision within 
Korean Firm)  
Person of Arbitrary Decision Job  
Specification 
Duty of Arbitrary 
Decision Mgr. * Team 
Leader
Vice 
President
President/ 
Chairman 
BOD**
1.Establishment of short 
medium and long-term 
strategies 
 
1) Medium and long term 
strategies 
2) Set up management 
philosophy  
3) Set up long-term vision 
    
 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
2. New investment and  
expansion 
 
1) Set up short, medium 
  and long-term plans 
2) Detailed investment 
  planning 
3) Finance planning  
    
 
 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
 
 
O 
Strategic 
Planning  
3. Capital (Stock)  
Management  
 
1) Shareholder and stock 
price management  
2) Stock option 
3) Payment of dividend  
   
 
 
O 
 
 
O 
  
 
 
 
 
O 
HRM 
 
 
 
 
1. Establishment and  
implementation of  
employment strategy  
 
1) Set up basic policy 
2) Periodic employment  
3) Trial employment  
  
 
 
 
 
 
O 
  
 
 
 
O 
O 
 
Expenditure 
 
 
 
1. General expenses 
 
1) Over KRW30 millions 
2) KRW5~30 millions 
3) Under KW5 millions 
  
 
 
 
O 
 
 
 
O 
 
 
O 
 
Marketing 
and  
Export 
1. Ordering and export-
related expenditures 
 
1) Issue offer sheet 
2) Issue contract sheet 
3) Fix commission rate 
4) Post settlements 
 
 
 
O 
O 
 
O 
 
 
 
 
 
O 
   
(* Mgr.: Manager, BOD: Board of Director) 
(Source: One manager from Korean GTC, 2006) 
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Once the arbitrary decision-maker approves any business matter with his/her own 
authority, he/she takes full responsibility for that matter and the decision has the full 
force and effect of the president’s approval. Although this system exists, middle or 
lower level managers normally do not have much authority to perform their job 
effectively and to decide major business issues because more than 80% of the authority 
resides at the upper management level.  
 
6.4.2. Decision-making Process within Japanese Firms80
 
The decision-making process in Japanese organisations is unlike the methods of 
Western decision-making, in which a quick decision, usually involving very few people, 
tends to be followed by implementation and then evaluation.  
 
The feature of Japanese firms’ decision-making culture is consensus-style and 
bottom-up decision-making. In most Japanese firms, decisions are made on the basis of 
opinions and information emanating from each of the responsible parties, which are 
subsequently collated and used to create what is considered to be the best possible 
proposal for adoption. The management system features a decentralised internal 
information structure which facilitates horizontal communication between functional 
units, whereby teams are able to resolve problems autonomously without the 
involvement of higher managerial levels (Debroux, 2003).  
 
In the process of decision-making, opinions are formed within the network of 
information exchange and a number of different pieces of information, judgment and 
                                            
80 Most of this section draws on two books, “Decision-making and Japan” by Taplin (1995) and “The Rise 
of the Japanese Corporate System” by Matsumoto, K. (1991). 
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opinions are then added to or subtracted from these as part of a process, which could 
aptly be described as self-refining. In Japan, any decisions, changes or modifications 
occur slowly, involving the participation of all those who will be affected in the entire 
process of defining, solving and acting upon a problem. Action or the implementation of 
ideas takes place before the formal decision is announced. The informal decision-
making stage in a Japanese organisation is a continuous process in which information is 
gathered or discussed. In the process of information gathering, each member of the team 
must have enough information to be able to determine his own role and position within 
the team and this information must be used so that all team members have a unified 
perception of the circumstances in which the team is placed.  
 
? Informal and Formal Procedure in Decision-making: Nemawashi and Ringi  
 
Japanese firms have different ways of conducting business meetings. Before a 
formal meeting starts, participants have already drawn their conclusions about the 
information to be presented at the meeting. This is what the Japanese term, Nemawashi, 
involves – prior consultation. As with the smoothing of the soil around roots before 
planting a tree, a secure basis helps the decision to grow. According to Tomlinson 
(1996), once the roots are secure the rest of the tree may then begin to grow. When the 
tree reaches maturity, the decision is made and everyone hopes that the outcome will be 
as desired. This system was developed to avoid discrepancies when taking a decision in 
formal conditions and to gain agreement from everyone in advance, thus keeping 
relationships harmonious. The most important feature of Nemawashi is that it is used to 
allow the free flow of ideas between people who might never have the opportunity to 
speak publicly about a proposal.  
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Once there has been a great deal of discussion at all company levels at the 
Nemawashi stage, issues are taken forward to top management for formal ratification 
(Ringi in Japanese). Ringi is a procedure for conducting administrative operations that 
has been widely used since before World War II in large Japanese organisations. In 
particular, in implementing some plan for which the cooperation of a number of 
divisions is necessary, or the results of which will influence many divisions, a Ringi is 
almost always produced. After being created by the division personnel responsible, the 
Ringi is approved by each division and climbs the ranks hierarchically from the plan 
initiators through every position of the upper-occupational structure: division chief, 
managing director, vice-president and finally the president (Noda, 1975). According to 
Yoshino (1975), the Ringi system operates in the climate of the traditional Japanese 
concept of organisation, characterised by ambiguity and elusiveness, where the group 
rather than individuals constitutes the basic unit of organisation, where the task is 
assigned to groups and where the functions and the role of each individual member of 
the organisation are virtually undifferentiated.  
 
? Counter Arguments to the Bottom-up system, Nemawashi and Ringi  
 
There are, however, a number of flaws associated with the Nemawashi and Ringi 
processes. Kahal (2005) argued that consensus in the Japanese decision-making system 
is not a virtue, but a weakness, since, traditionally, Japanese are led to believe that there 
is always one right answer to a question and that authority should not be challenged. 
Another flaw with the system is that it is too slow. Too many people and sections get 
involved. Too many meetings are held with many unnecessary questions and 
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suggestions raised. These may delay a business decision, which often requires a swift 
response (Chen, 2004).  
 
Thus counter arguments can be set against the Japanese typical decision-making 
process which is widely known as the bottom-up or consensus style. This involves top 
management in some Japanese organisations in every decision-making process from the 
very earliest stages.  
 
Ohtsu and Imanari (2002) studied the decision-making process at the highest level 
within Japanese organisations with specific reference to the use of ringi to analyse how 
the decision-making power is shared. They obtained data through intensive interviews 
of those who were members of the board of directors or above and who were directly 
involved in top-level decisions. Ten organisations were examined – three large 
companies, three subsidiaries, two medium-sized firms and two family-owned 
companies.  
 
According to one interviewee who worked as a managing director in charge of the 
overseas operations of a large diversified synthetic fibre company, although the ringi 
system is used in the decision-making process, its function is very different from what is 
described in the rest of the literature. It is not a consensus-building process but instead a 
process of spelling out the plans for implementing a decision which has already been 
made at management meetings.  
 
Another interviewee who worked in a large retail business replied that when a 
proposal is approved at the managing directors’ meeting, the department concerned 
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prepares implementation plans in the form of a ringi. According to the interview (Ohtsu 
and Imanari, 2002, p. 346),  
 
“The decision-making is “top-down,” not “bottom-up.” Here again, 
the role of the ringi is secondary, in that it is used only for making 
implementation plans after major decisions have already been made.” 
 
One managing director who worked in a medium-sized company also rejected the 
argument that Japanese-style decision-making is characterised by consensus and 
bottom-up decision-making. He said (Ohtsu and Imanari, 2002, p. 356),  
 
“Decision-making methods vary according to the issues involved and 
the circumstances surrounding the issues; therefore, it is wrong to 
assume that there is a uniform and uniquely Japanese style that is 
applicable to all cases.”  
 
Ohtsu and Imanari’s study, then, rejected the view that a uniform Japanese 
decision-making style always applies. Although the ringi system is used, it appears that 
it is used for different purposes at different levels. The ringi is often used for routine 
decisions, while a relatively small number of ringi are used for non-routine decisions. It 
is also used to spell out the plans for implementing a decision which has already been 
made at the top level. In total, the ringi plays a rather limited role in making firm-wide 
decisions at the level of top management. The dominant role, instead, is played by 
various kinds of executive meeting.  
 
In order to crosscheck and confirm the above arguments, the author had a separate 
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interview with one senior manager from a Japanese Sogo Shosha81. He said,  
 
“It is difficult to say that all Japanese companies follow a bottom-up 
decision-making process. We just follow a standard table of decision-
making which was already prepared and fixed by the planning and 
strategy department of the company. The standard table already 
specifies, for example, who makes decisions for asset investment and 
who makes minor decisions division level. So, it is hard to say that the 
decision-making system within all Japanese companies is bottom-up. 
Regarding the Nemawashi and Ringi systems, we, of course, use them 
But they are also controlled by the standard table.”  
 
? A Standard Table for Decision-making within a Japanese Company  
 
What is, then, the standard table for decision-making within Japanese firms? The 
table looks very similar to that of Korean companies. The functions and purposes are 
almost the same as those in Korea. During the interview, the senior manager briefly 
showed the standard table to allow the author a short glance through of it. The senior 
manager was not prepared to give the table to the author, because it is strictly 
confidential. The following table is based on the author’s memory of what he learned in 
this brief glimpse. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
81 A personal interview was arranged in October, 2008 during the senior manager’s business trip to Seoul, 
Korea. The senior manager has almost 20 years of working experience in one of the famous Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas.  
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(Table 6.3. An Example of a Standard Table for Decision-making within a Japanese 
Firm)  
Decision-maker Job  
Specification BOD Top 
Execut. 
Team 
Leader 
Mgr.-level Staff-
level 
Mutual 
Consultation 
Department
Asset Investment  
 
1) Over JPYOOOOOO 
 
2) Up to JPYOOOOO 
 
3) Less than JPYOOOO 
 
 
 
Approval 
 
Report 
 
 
Decision
 
Decision
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision
 
 
 
 
 
All asset 
investments 
need 
mutual 
consultation 
with the 
financing 
department
 
Establishment of  
Business Strategy  
 
1) Corporate-level 
 
2) Department-level  
 
3) Division-level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
 
Decision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draft 
 
 
 
Strategy, 
financing, 
marketing, 
insurance 
department 
 
 
Nemawashi or Ringi 
Nemawashi or Ringi 
(Source: A manager from a Japanese Sogo Shosha, 2008) 
 
(Note: The dotted arrow lines in the above table do not feature in the standard table shown by the 
Japanese senior manager. The author inserted these lines. This indicates that Nemawashi or Ringi are used 
contrary to a widespread belief, as a top-down device in the stage of making implementation plans) 
 
Overall, it seems that not all Japanese firms follow the principle of bottom-up 
decision-making. It depends, rather, on how important an issue is. As seen in the above 
table, the scope of decision-making is already fixed in the standard table, prepared and 
set up by the company. Some decisions are solely made by the top management and 
some are made by team leaders or at manager level. When team leaders made a decision 
on their own authority, they had to report it upwards. However, Japanese firms respect 
the consensus-oriented decision-making system. They use Nemawashi and Ringi, but it 
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seems that these systems are more common at the stage of implementation planning 
after major decisions have already been made, as Ohtsu and Imanari (2002) argued.  
 
6.5. Previous Studies of the Decision-making in Korean and Japanese Firms 
 
6.5.1. A Study of Korean Firm’s Decision-making  
 
Lee (1999) made a survey in order to analyse the decision-making procedures of 
Korean companies’ investment in the UK. The survey was conducted by mailed 
questionnaires sent to the 28 Korean manufacturing companies operating in the UK. 
The purpose of this survey was to identify the following major questions; i) the main 
driving force leading to investment in the UK, ii) the degree of top management’s 
involvement during the project investigation and decision-making process, iii) decision-
making authority at the board of directors meeting and iv) sources of the top 
management’s authority and power.  
 
According to the survey, first, the main driving engine of Korean companies’ 
investment in the UK originated in top management’s drive (61.9% of the respondents 
answered). This result implies that top management in Korean firms plays a conclusive 
role in the decision-making processes under a highly centralised hierarchy decision 
structure. Second, regarding the degree of top management’s involvement in the project, 
most respondents answered that top executives (chairman, president and CEO) were 
mainly involved (Mean 5.52 on a scale of 7) and they retained absolute power during 
the decision-making process of the project (Mean 6.38 on a scale of 7). Third, the 
survey also examined the decision-making authority at the board of directors’ meeting 
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by analysing the structure of board members of 14 selected sample companies at the 
Korean headquarters. The result showed that most board members in parent companies 
were inside directors, who were also members of the owner’s family or professional 
managers employed by the owners. But there were very few outside directors (the 
average number of board members from 14 surveyed companies was 9.4. Among these, 
the average number of outside directors in each company was only 1.3). Therefore, the 
board of directors merely ratified the top management’s decisions without real 
involvement. This result implies that the board members do not discharge their natural 
duty of supervising the activities and performance of the managers, since they tend to be 
controlled by the owner. Finally, this survey found that many respondents felt that top 
management’s work performance and contribution to the firm is the most influential 
factor in the source of authority and power in the decision-making process. Ownership 
was ranked as the third element, followed by managerial/work-related ability.  
 
Furthermore, Lee also carried out a case study of two Korean Chaebols, Daewoo 
and Kia Groups, in order to identify their decision-making processes. The case study 
also obtained a similar result to the above in that the important decisions, such as new 
investments and capital tie-ups with foreign companies, were made by the top 
management, centring on the group chairman.  
 
Consistent with our argument, Lee’s study found that the important decisions are 
made under a highly centralised hierarchy decision structure at the level of top 
management within Korean organisations. However, since the financial crisis there have 
been subtle signs of change in the decision-making processes within these organisations 
even though the top-down and highly centralisation system is still dominating corporate 
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culture across Korean firms. In this context, Lee’s study did not clearly explain this with 
reliable data, although he emphasised that the Korean government has been trying to 
decentralise decision-making power by increasing the role of the board of directors. One 
of the factors accelerating such changes in the decision-making process springs from the 
emergence of new generations equipped with advanced managerial insight acquired 
through a higher education overseas. For instance, most Korean Chaebols’ founders 
(first generation) withdrew or retired from office by transferring their power of 
management to their second or third generations. Another force to promote such 
changes is the government’s intervention to improve the distorted structure of corporate 
governance. As a way of restricting the concentration of economic power in the 
Chaebols and decentralising decision-making power by the few, the Korean government 
has been restricting the Chaebols with institutional devices since the financial crisis. 
According to the Fair Trade Law revised on December 2004, 49 big business groups 
were selected as groups with “no mutual investment allowed” – such companies were 
prohibited to hold cross-shares with their affiliates. Moreover, in order to consolidate 
the role of the board of directors and supervise the activities and performance of 
managers, the government changed the regulation in 1998 that all listed firms in the 
stock market must appoint outside directors (Fair Trade Commission, 2005). Therefore, 
in conclusion, it is worth examining what significant changes have been occurring in the 
decision-making process within Korean firms since the financial crisis.  
 
6.5.2. A Study of Korean Middle-level Manager’s Decision-making Process 
 
Jun (1996) undertook a study of decision-making among Korean middle-level 
managers . This research was carried out by direct observation in order to identify how 
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the sample group reaches decisions on designated issues provided by the researcher. In 
total, 706 middle-level managers from Samsung Corporation were selected as a sample 
group and divided into 110 small teams, each composed of 6~7 members. The average 
age of the sample group was 32 years and 98 percent of them possessed an 
undergraduate degree as educational background.  
 
According to the observation, more than 100 teams followed a similar process in 
their decision-making which were not compatible with the typical six steps of 
effectiveness; i) recognition of decision requirement, ii) diagnosis and analysis of 
causes, iii) development of alternatives, iv) selection of desired alternatives, v) 
implementation of chosen alternative and vi) evaluation and feedback (Daft, 2000). 
Most observed teams skipped over one or two of the opening steps in a typical decision-
making process. For instance, as soon as they recognised the decision requirement, each 
member of the teams immediately asserted his own individually preferred alternative or 
opinion, without diagnosing and analysing causes. They next entered the stage of 
evaluating and choosing alternatives, which took two-thirds out of the time involved in 
the decision-making process. One interested finding at this stage was that most 
individuals persisted in their own alternatives or opinions from the beginning to the end, 
even though sufficient information and opinion interchanged between attendances, but 
only 5% (35 managers) changed their original opinion by the end.   
 
In conclusion, this research suggested that Korean middle-level managers’ 
decision-making process was somewhat distant from the process presented in rational 
decision-making theory. The observed decision-making process of Korean middle-level 
manager can be summarised as follows: i) recognition of the decision requirement, ii) 
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assertion of individually preferred alternative or opinion, iii) evaluation and choosing of 
alternatives, iv) re-recognition of the problem through mutual evaluation, v) 
presentation of revised alternatives and vi) selection of compromised alternatives.  
 
6.5.3. A Study of Korean and Japanese Manager’s Ethical Decision-making 
Behaviour 
 
Park (1998) carried out research with Korean managers to identify how managers 
sub-divide when faced with ethical dilemmas and conflict in the decision-making 
process. First, in order to examine the level of Korean managers’ ethical consciousness 
compared with that of managers in foreign countries, the study surveyed the basis of 
ethical preference among Korean and Japanese managers.  
 
(Table 6.4.The Basis of Ethical Preference of Korean and Japanese Managers)  Unit: % 
Korean Managers Japanese Managers Item 
Composite Upper-
level 
manager 
Lower-
level 
manager 
Composite Upper-
level 
manager 
Lower-
level 
manager 
Profits of 
the firm 
61.4 61.3 61.8 42.2 56.0 20.0
Individual 
ethical 
value 
16.7 17.5 14.7 15.6 8.0 26.7
Depends on 
situation 
21.9 21.5 32.5 42.2 36.0 53.3
(Source: Park, H. J. (1998), “Ethical Decision-Making and Behaviour in Korea (Hankook 
Kyungyoungjauae Yoonrijeok Uaesakyuljeongkwa Hangdong)”, The Journal of Yonsei Management 
Research (Yonsei Kyungyoung Yeonku), Vol.35, No.2. pp. 206) 
 
As seen in the above table, Korean managers and Japanese managers have different 
ethical preferences when faced with ethical decision-making. Over half of Korean 
managers (61.4%) considered “profits of the firm” as the most important basis of ethical 
preference, while 42.2% of Japanese managers considered “dependence on the 
situation” as important as “profits of the firm” (42.2%). This result implies that 
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Japanese managers tend to follow situationism within the organisation. One notable 
thing here was that the phenomenon of situationism was found significantly in lower-
level managers’ groups. No less than 53.3% of lower-level Japanese managers replied 
that their ethical preference depended on the situations involved and only 20% of them 
considered “profits of the firm” as the most important ethical preference. However, the 
situation was totally different in the upper-level managers. Unlike lower-level managers, 
56% of Japanese upper-level managers replied that the firm’s profit was the basis of 
their ethical preference, whereas only 36% of them followed situationism. This result 
implies that lower-level managers tend to take a hesitant stance towards business issues 
until they become familiar with the organisation, but they become sensitive and loyal to 
all organisational issues once they have secured a firm position within the organisation.  
 
Second, Park undertook further research with 60 selected Korean managers in 
order to identify how managers subdivide in this process of ethical decision-making. 
The sample was selected from various business fields: GTCs (17), financial firms (11), 
manufacturing firms (12), government-owned firms (6) and other firms (14). The 
research found that four different types of managers can be observed in the process, 
namely: blind obeyingists, conscienceists, opportunists and adaptationists.  
 
? Type- I (Blind Obeyingists) 
 
Managers belonging to this type considered “the survival of the fittest” as the most 
important factor in business management. They put special emphasis on the firm’s 
survival and profit. When faced with an ethical dilemma or conflict, they tended to 
ignore quarrels over the rights and wrongs of the problem by treating them as secondary 
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issues. Most Korean managers belonged to this type and they are called “blind 
obeyingists” who were pursuing the firm’s survival and profits as a top priority. 
However, this study does not give any answer as to whether managers are unaware of  
ethical dilemmas or whether they ignore such dilemmas for the purpose of ensuring the 
firm’s survival and profits.  
 
? Type – II (Conscienceists) 
 
This type of managers considered conscience the most important virtue in business. 
They have strong power and interest in ethical behaviour and a high degree of ethical 
recognition. Therefore, they took a positive attitude in both the process of understanding 
ethical dilemmas and solving them. It is assumed that managers belonging to this type 
possess a coherent and consistent ethical insight in these situations.  
 
? Type- III (Opportunists) 
 
Although managers belonging to this type put special emphasis on conscience and 
behaviours based on principle, they were passive in addressing ethical conflicts, even if 
they were well recognised problems. Managers of this type have a tendency towards 
individualism and can change their attitude according to their personal situation, for 
example, their desire and intention.  
 
? Type- IV (Adaptationists) 
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A manager of this type was weak in taking action to solve any ethical conflict. He 
also took negative attitudes and did not have a clear and consistent direction. Although 
he fully recognised the problem, he lacked the will to settle it, but merely looked at the 
situation.  
 
(Figure 6.2. Four Types of Korean Managers in Ethical Behaviour)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong 
Conscienceist 
Blind 
Obeyingist 
The Power of Ethical  
Opportunist Execution 
Adaptationist 
Weak 
Low High 
The Degree of Ethical Recognition 
(Source: Adapted from Park, H. J. (1998), “Ethical Decision-Making and Behaviour in Korea (Hankook 
Kyungyoungjauae Yoonrijeok Uaesakyuljeongkwa Hangdong)”, The Journal of Yonsei Management 
Research (Yonsei Kyungyoung Yeonku), Vol.35, No.2. pp. 206) 
 
 
The implication of this study is that both Korean and Japanese managers’ ethical 
preference and behaviours are not immutable, but tend to change with the situation, 
even though there were slight numerical differences between two countries. Of the 
many factors influencing such a change, a manager’s individual position within the 
organisation would be a major factor. For this reason, lower-level managers in both 
Korea and Japan tend to take a hesitant attitude towards the organisation until they 
secure a firm position within it. Another factor would be the underlying levels of culture 
associated with nation, organisation, function and individual (Johnson and Scholes, and 
Whittington, 2005). Paradoxically, in conclusion, instead of managers devoting 
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themselves to the organisation in order to be able to take a firm position, the tendency of 
lower-level managers to hesitate in their organisational behaviour would seem to be 
increasing in the current business circumstances which no longer guarantee lifetime 
employment.  
 
6.6. Research Objectives and Questions 
 
This section examines the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas. The objectives are to investigate i) the main bodies in the 
decision-making process within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, ii) major 
factors affecting decision-makers and their sources of power and authority, iii) whether 
there are corporate cultural differences in the decision-making process between Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas and iv) the current trends in the  decision-making 
process within the two groups. In order to accomplish these  objectives, the following 
research questions are addressed.  
 
RQ 1. Who are main bodies in the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas?  
RQ 2. What are the major factors influencing decision-makers and what are their 
sources of power to undertake the decision-making? 
RQ 3. Are there any corporate cultural differences in the decision-making process 
between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas? 
RQ 4. Are there any recent changes in the decision-making process within the two 
groups? 
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6.7. Hypotheses 
6.7.1. The Main Body in the Decision-making Process 
 
It is a general understanding that decision-making in Korean firms is, typically, 
highly centralised in the hands of the top management. Korean firms generally make 
decisions with few people, because most of them are still run by the owner or founder of 
the firm and, consequently, decision-making tends to be more centralised. Hence, most 
decisions made by top management are rarely challenged and they are almost always 
accepted by all members without visible objection. Previous studies support this 
argument. Hofstede’s survey (1982, 1983 and 1991) of the five major dimensions of 
culture found that, Korea, not surprisingly, was one of the countries with the highest 
power distance between superiors and their subordinates. This implies that the decision-
making power is not distributed equally to lower-level members, but is centralised to a 
few upper-level superiors. Lee’s (1999) study analysing the decision-making of Korean 
firm’s investment in the UK also found that top executives were involved the most and 
they retained an absolute power during the process of decision-making for the project.  
 
In contrast, the striking feature of Japanese firms is their structured, hierarchical, 
group-oriented character, with strong emphasis on maintaining harmony between group 
members. But Japanese firms are less strongly hierarchical than Korean and are built on 
the expectation of cooperation amongst all the “core” employees (Whitley and Morgan, 
2001). Thus, group-oriented decision-making has been generally described as a bottom- 
up exercise rather than top-down. Japanese firms prefer to reach a consensus supported 
by all, but top management are capable of making tough decisions when necessary. 
However, according to the report of US and Foreign Commercial Service and US 
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Department of State (2005), family firms founded since World War II and smaller 
second-tier firms are exceptions to this rule. Most decisions in the large family firms are 
made by the top executives, but the process is usually managed so that company 
members have a sense of participation. In the context, this implies that the most 
important and the most sensitive decisions would be made by top executives, even in 
the Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
 
Given the above arguments, we can predict that important issues would be made 
by top executives in both Korean and Japanese firms. From the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ 
perspective, such a decision-making tendency would be apparent within the GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas since most of them are family-based firms and they still emphasise a 
hierarchical structure. Therefore, the following prediction can be made:  
 
H 1.1 In the process of decision-making for important strategic management within 
Korean GTCs, top executives (i.e. chairman, president and vice president) 
may have an absolute power.  
H 1.2 In the process of decision-making for important strategic management within 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas, top executives do not have an absolute power, but 
they may have more decision-making power than team leaders and middle 
managers. 
 
6.7.2. Major Factors Affecting Decision-making and Sources of Power  
 
Previous studies (Simon and March, 1958; Pfeffer, 1992; Cohen and Bradford, 
2002) asserted that power and politics significantly affect organisational behaviour and 
decision-making. In particular, Pfeffer (1992) argued that it is essentially important to 
understand the decision-making process from a power and politics perspective because 
most decisions in organisations are not ideally made on the basis of rationality. 
 358 
 
Corporate culture also influences the organisation’s decision-making. There is a big 
difference in the decision-making process between the Orient and the West. According 
to Hofstede’s survey (1983), most Oriental countries, such as Korea, Japan, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand, tend to have a large power distance with 
low individualism, while Western countries, such as the UK, the US, Germany, Canada, 
Denmark and Finland tend to take up small power distance and high individualism. 
Such differences may be caused by cultural reasons.  
 
Ownership and corporate governance are also important components affecting an 
organisation’s decision-making. The ideal percentage of shareholding for control is 51% 
of shares. However, the percentage of shares required for control varies between firms. 
According to Pitelis and Sugden (1986) only 20% of shareholding is enough to maintain 
control. Even 1~2% may be sufficient to retain control (Cubbin and Leech, 1983). For 
instance, the chairman of Samsung Group in Korea and his family held only 1.99% out 
of the total shares in 2002. With such a small percentage, however, the chairman had 
absolute power to control and decide all important issues. This example confirms that 
ownership may not be an essential factor in the control and decision-making of a firm. 
In the case of Japan, the separation of ownership from management does not allow 
shareholders and dominant families to actively participate in decision-making. From the 
example of the two countries above, it can be concluded that ownership and corporate 
governance may not be major factors influencing the decision-making process in either 
Korean or Japanese firms.  
 
Where, then, does decision-making power come from? People have different 
opinions on this question; location in the organisational structure (Pfeffer, 1992), ability 
to cope with uncertainty, together with knowledge and information (Varman and 
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Bhatnagar, 1999) and contribution to the firm (Lee, 1999). In particular, Cohen and 
Bradford (2002) stressed that expertise has always been a source of power and position 
within the organisation is also important as a source of power. Further, Lee’s (1999) 
study found that decision-makers’ work performance and contribution to the firm is the 
most influential factor in the source of decision-making power, not ownership, seniority 
or position within the organisation alone.  
 
Based on the above sets of arguments, the following hypotheses, relating to major 
factors affecting decision-making and sources of decision-making power, are derived:  
 
Within the Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, power and politics may 
most strongly affect the decision-making process rather than other factors (i.e. 
ownership, corporate governance and corporate culture).  
H 2.1 
H 2.2 Within the Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, ownership is not a 
main source of decision-making power over other factors (i.e. expertise, 
contribution to firm, managerial and working ability and seniority).   
 
6.7.3. Corporate Cultural Differences in the Decision-making Process between 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas  
 
The decision-making process varies depending on the culture. Who makes 
decisions, how decisions are reached and when they are made differ between 
organisations around the world. Previous studies found that there have been cultural 
differences in organisational behaviours between Korean and Japanese firms, even 
though they are culturally neighbouring countries. The characteristics of a Korean 
firm’s traditional culture are Confucianism, hierarchy, familism and individualism. 
Regarding individualism in Korean firm, there have generally been two different 
arguments. One, suggested by Hofstede (1982, 1983 and 1991), is that Korea is a low 
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individualism country with large power distance. The other, suggested by Chang (1983) 
and Chung, Lee and Okumura (1988), is that most Korean firms tend to take up high 
individualism centralised to top executives in their decision-making processes. From 
these two arguments, we can predict that low individualism is a dominant organisational 
behaviour within lower-level employees, because they do not have their own peculiar 
power to make decisions, but high individualism is a dominant phenomenon within 
upper-level managers because they have absolute power in decision-making. This 
implies that once people within Korean firms are promoted to higher levels, they 
manifest a high tendency towards individualism.  
 
In contrast, the striking feature of a Japanese firm’s corporate culture is 
collectivism and wholism. According to Ouchi (1981), Japanese firms form inclusive 
relationships between the employees and the employer. In their decision-making, input 
from the lower-level employees is the starting point and a consensus of collectivism and 
wholism allows all members to be involved in this process. Based on the above sets of 
arguments, the following two predictions can be made:  
 
H 3.1 In the process of decision-making within Korean GTCs, decision-makers may 
tend more towards high individualism than wholism (i.e. group decision-
making system). 
In the process of decision-making within Japanese Sogo Shoshas, decision-
makers may tend to have a more wholistic system than individualism. 
H 3.2 
 
6.7.4. Recent Changes in the Decision-making Process  
 
The financial crisis of 1997 fundamentally changed Korea’s economic structure as 
well as management style. The main responses to the financial crisis were two – one 
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was the government sector’s response and the other was the corporate sector’s. 
Regarding the government sector, it has tried to implement the IMF programme82. The 
monetary policy recommended by the IMF was to find a total solution for all foreign 
liquidity, debt and credit problems. As regards the corporate sector, firms have been 
trying to reduce corporate debt, use transparent accounting, improve standards in 
corporate governance and decentralise the decision-making power by increasing the role 
of the BODs. In order to strengthen the role of the BODs, the Korean government 
amended a regulation that all listed firms must assign outsider directors. Consequently, 
the consolidating of the BODs’ power may restrict the centralisation of decision-making 
power to a few top executives. Lee’s (1999) empirical study also supports this change in 
Korean firms’ decision-making processes. He found that there have been a few signs of 
change in the decision-making process within Korean firms since the financial crisis 
through increasing the role of the BODs although the top-down decision-making system 
is still dominant across Korean firms.  
 
In the case of Japan, the reform of the corporate governance has become an 
important issue since the crash of the bubble economy. As a way of reform, Japanese 
government has amended the Commercial Code and introduced a new system modelled 
after American-style boards of directors. To summarise the above sets of arguments, it 
is obvious that there have been changes in the decision-making process in both Korean 
                                            
82 The implementing of the IMF programme was done over two broad areas – tight macroeconomic 
policy and structural and institutional reforms. In more detail, the monetary policy recommended by the 
IMF was to work towards a total solution of foreign liquidity, debt and credit problem. In the area of 
financial sector restructuring, the programme seeks financial sector reform bills such as the revised Bank 
of Korea Act and a bill to consolidate the supervision of all financial institutions to be passed at the 
December special session of the national assembly. As for trade and capital account liberalisation, a 
timetable was set up in line with WTO commitments to eliminate restrictive import licensing and the 
schedule for capital account liberalisation was accelerated.   
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and Japanese firms since the 1990s. Based on this, the following two hypotheses are 
derived:  
 
 
H 4.1 After the financial crisis, the BOD’s power may increase in the process of 
decision-making within Korean GTCs. 
H 4.2 After the collapse of the bubble economy, the BODs’ power in the process of 
decision-making may increase within Japanese Sogo Shoshas. 
 
6.8. Research Design and Methodology  
 
6.8.1. Data Collection, Population and Sample Selection 
 
Like the strategic management analysis in chapter 5, the principal means of data 
collection for this section was a questionnaire survey and interviews with personnel in 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Data were collected only from Marketing 
and Sales SBUs. The population and sample selection procedures were also the same as 
the strategic management analysis in chapter 5.  
 
6.8.2. The Formulation of the Questionnaire and Measurement of Variables 
 
The questionnaire is divided into five sections. Section one is designed to examine 
who the main bodies are in the decision-making process. Ten questions were developed 
to investigate who mainly affects the decision-making process. The variables are top 
executives, team leaders, middle managers, general staff, boards of directors, labour 
unions and general meetings of shareholders. Section two measures the factors affecting 
the decision-making process and sources of power. As variables affecting decision-
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making, power and politics, ownership, corporate governance and corporate culture 
were selected on the basis of previous studies, such as Simon and March (1958), Pfeffer 
(1992) and Pitelis and Sugden (1986). As variables of a decision-maker’s source of 
power, expertise, ownership, managerial and working ability, contribution to firm and 
seniority are used, on the basis of Lee’s study (1999) . Section three attempts to measure 
cultural differences between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Variables are 
individualism and wholism (i.e. group decision-making). Section four is designed to 
measure whether there have been any recent changes in the decision-making process. As 
variables, it uses the degree to which top management changes its mind, the degree of 
free flow of opinion in the general staff, the degree of decentralisation and the degree of 
free expression of opinion by the board of directors/labour unions/general meeting of 
shareholder’s. Section five is designed to gather demographic information.  
 
6.8.3. Statistical Data Analysis Instrument 
 
The data analysis of this chapter is also dependent on statistical methods, using the 
SPSS for Windows. The survey data were analysed by Frequency Analysis and the Chi-
square test. The following table shows the variables and statistical techniques used for 
each hypothesis. 
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(Table 6.5. Statistical Techniques to be used for each Hypothesis) 
Hypotheses Variables to be tested Analysis Tool 
Frequency Analysis83H.1.1~H.1.2 Main body in the decision-making process within 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
(Variables: top executives, team leaders, middle 
manager, general staff, BOD, labour union and 
general meeting of shareholder) 
and Chi-square test 
H.2.1 Major factors affecting the decision-making process 
(Variables: power and politics, ownership, corporate 
governance and corporate culture) 
Frequency Analysis 
and Chi-square test 
H.2.2 Sources of decision-maker’s power (variables: 
ownership, expertise, contribution to firm, 
managerial and working ability and seniority) 
Frequency Analysis 
and Chi-square test 
H.3.1~H.3.2. Cultural differences in the decision-making process 
between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
(Variables: individualism and wholism) 
Frequency Analysis 
and Chi-square test 
H.4.1~H.4.2 Recent changes in the decision-making process 
within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
(Variables: the degree of top executives’ change of 
mind, the degree of BOD’s power, etc.)  
Frequency Analysis 
and Chi-square test 
 
6. 9. Statistical Data Analysis Results  
 
6.9.1. Testing of Hypotheses 
 
In order to know the ranking of variables in the decision-making process, Frequency 
Analysis was carried out first. Then a Chi-square test was undertaken to discover the 
relationship of each variable between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. 
 
? Hypotheses 1.1~1.2: The Main Body of Decision-making 
 
i) Frequency Analysis  
 
                                            
 
83 Frequency Analysis is the simplest method for analysing categorical data. It is often used as one of the 
exploratory procedures to review how different categories of values are distributed in the sample.  
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Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 relate to the main body of decision-making within the 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Hypothesis 1.1 predicted that top executives 
may have an absolute power in the decision-making process within Korean GTCs. 
Hypothesis 1.2 anticipated that top executives in Japanese Sogo Shoshas do not have an 
absolute power, but they may have more decision-making power than a team leader or a 
middle manager. Results of the frequency analysis are as follows;  
 
(Table 6.6. Results of Frequency Analysis for H.1.1~1.2)  
 
Korean GTCs 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Top executives 24 18.9 1 
Team leader 23 17.7 2 
Middle manager 20 15.0 3 
General staff 16 12.3 5 
BODs 19 14.7 4 
Labour union 13 9.9 7 
14 General meeting of shareholders 11.5 6 
Total  129 (N) 100  
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Top executives 12 16.4 3 
Team leader 15 18.4 1 
Middle manager 13 17.1 2 
General staff 10 14.1 5 
BODs 11 14.5 4 
Labour union 7 9.2 7 
9 10.3 6 General meeting of shareholders 
77 (N) 100  Total 
 
The above result shows that in Korean GTCs, 18.9% of the respondents said that 
top executives form the main body for decision-making in the process of carrying out 
important strategic management, followed by team leaders (17.7%) and middle 
managers (15%). Consistent with our belief, top executives are ranked at the top as the 
main body of decision-making. But one notable finding is that they do not exercise 
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absolute and decisive power in the decision-making process, unlike our prediction. 
Another notable thing is that some respondents (14.7%) replied that the power of boards 
of directors becomes increasingly important in the decision-making process. Yet just a 
few respondents (9.9%) answered that the labour union influenced the decision-making 
process. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 receives little support.  
 
Unlike Korean GTCs, top executives in Japanese Sogo Shoshas are not ranked at 
the top as the main body of decision-making, but ranked third. 18.4% of respondents 
replied that the team leader is the main decision-maker, followed by middle manager 
(17.1%), top executives (16.4%) and the board of directors (14.5%). The respondents 
felt that labour unions and the general meeting of shareholders were little involved 
compared to team leaders, middle managers and top executives. Contrary to our 
prediction, top executives in Japanese Sogo Shoshas not only do not have absolute 
power, but also have no more decision-making power than team leaders and middle 
managers. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.2 is not supported.   
 
ii) Chi-square Test 
 
In addition to Frequency Analysis, which reveals the ranking of variables, a Chi-
square test84 was also carried out in order to learn the relationship of each variable 
between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Here, not all the tables of variables 
are presented, only three selected sample tables (e.g. top executives, team leaders and 
general staff) to see whether they are independent or associated between Korea and 
Japan.  
 
                                            
84 The Chi-square test shows whether the variables are independent or whether they are associated with 
each other.  
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(Table 6.7. Chi-square Test for Top Executives) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Top Executives Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain 
uninvolved
Not 
involved
 
Never 
involved  
 
 
Count 87 28 10 2 2 129 Korea 
% of total 67.4% 21.7% 7.8% 1.6% 1.6% 100% 
Count 14 36 25 1 1 77 Japan 
% of total 18.2% 46.8% 32.5% 1.3% 1.3% 100% 
Count 101 64 35 3 3 206 Total 
% of total 49.0% 31.1% 17.0% 1.5% 1.5% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 50.980(a) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 53.777 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 32.190 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 206   
4 cells (40%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.12 
 
 
As seen in the above Chi-square test, the Pearson Chi-square value is 50.980 with 4 
degrees of freedom (df). In other words, it can be said that top executives’ involvement 
in the decision-making process is different between Korea and Japan ( x2 = 50.980, df = 
4, p (0.000) < 0.01). 
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(Table 6.8. Chi-square Test for Team Leader) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Team Leader Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain  
uninvolved
Not 
involved
 
Never 
involved  
 
 
Count 47 70 7 4 1 129 Korea 
% of total 36.4% 54.3% 5.4% 3.1% 0.8% 100% 
Count 25 46 5 1 0 77 Japan 
% of total 32.5% 59.7% 6.5% 1.3% 0.0% 100% 
Count 72 116 12 5 1 206 Total 
% of total 35.0% 56.3% 5.8% 2.4% 0.5% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 1.810(a) 4 .771 
Likelihood Ratio 2.212 4 .697 
Linear-by-Linear Association .008 1 .930 
N of Valid Cases 206   
5 cells (50%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37 
 
 
The Pearson Chi-square value is 1.810 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This means 
that the pattern of team leader’s involvement in the decision-making process is 
associated between Korea and Japan ( x2 = 1.810, df = 4, p (0.771) > 0.01). 
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(Table 6.9. Chi-square Test for General Staff) 
 
Crosstabulation 
General Staff Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain 
uninvolved
Not 
involved
 
Never 
involved  
 
 
Count 5 29 58 28 8 128 Korea 
% of total 3.9% 22.7% 45.3% 21.9% 6.3% 100% 
Count 6 18 45 6 2 77 Japan 
% of total 7.8% 23.4% 58.4% 7.8% 2.6% 100% 
Count 11 47 103 34 10 205 Total 
% of total 5.4% 22.9% 50.2% 16.6% 4.9% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 10.077(a) 4 .039 
Likelihood Ratio 10.814 4 .029 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.343 1 .021 
N of Valid Cases 205   
2 cells (20%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
3.76 
 
 
The Pearson Chi-square value is 10.077 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This means 
that the pattern of general staff’s involvement in the decision-making process is 
associated between Korea and Japan ( x2 = 10.077, df = 4, p (0.039) > 0.01). 
 
The involvement pattern of other variables – Middle manager ( x2 = 8.097, df = 4, p 
(0.088) > 0.01), BODs ( x2 = 6.484, df = 4, p (0.166) > 0.01), Labour Unions ( x2 = 
4.879, df = 4,  p (0.300) > 0.01) and General Meetings of Shareholders ( x2 = 7.736, df 
= 4, p (0.102) > 0.01) – in the decision-making process between Korea and Japan is also 
associated.  
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? Hypothesis 2.1: Major Factors Affecting Decision-making 
 
i) Frequency Analysis  
 
Hypothesis 2.1 examined the major factors affecting the decision-making process 
within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. It hypothesised that power and 
politics may most strongly affect the decision-making process rather than ownership, 
corporate governance or corporate culture. Results of frequency analysis are as follows;  
  
(Table 6.10. Results of Frequency Analysis for H.2.1)  
 
Korean GTCs 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Power and politics 29 22.4 4 
Ownership 35 26.9 1 
Corporate governance 32 25.2 3 
Corporate culture 33 25.5 2 
Total  129 (N) 100  
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Power and politics 18 24.1 3 
Ownership 17 23.0 4 
Corporate governance 20 24.8 2 
Corporate culture 22 28.1 1 
77 (N) 100  Total 
 
Contrary to our prediction, power and politics is not a major factor influencing the 
decision-making process in Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. In the case of 
Korean GTCs, power and politics received the lowest value of 22.4%. Of 129 
respondents, 35 (26.9%) felt that ownership is the major factor affecting the decision-
making process, followed by corporate culture (25.5%) and corporate governance 
(25.2%).  
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In the case of Japanese Sogo Shoshas, 22 respondents out of 77 (28.1%) answered 
that corporate culture is a main element influencing decision-making, followed by 
corporate governance (24.8%). As in the Korean GTCs, power and politics is not ranked 
at the top, but in third place. Therefore, Hypothesis 2.1 is rejected.  
 
ii) Chi-square Test 
 
Only two selected sample tables are presented (e.g. power and politics and corporate 
culture) to see whether they are independent or associated between Korea and Japan.  
 
(Table 6.11. Chi-square Test for Power and Politics) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Power and Politics Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain 
uninvolved
Do not  
influence
 
Never 
influence 
 
 
Count 8 43 54 22 2 129 Korea 
% of total 6.2% 33.3% 41.9% 17.1% 1.6% 100% 
Count 3 28 36 9 0 76 Japan 
% of total 3.9% 36.8% 47.4% 11.8% 0% 100% 
Count 11 71 90 31 2 205 Total 
% of total 5.4% 34.6% 43.9% 15.1% 1.0% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 2.991(a) 4 .559 
Likelihood Ratio 3.713 4 .446 
Linear-by-Linear Association .379 1 .538 
N of Valid Cases 205   
3 cells (30%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .74 
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The Pearson Chi-square value is 2.991 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This means 
that the effect of the pattern of power and politics on the decision-making process is 
associated between Korea and Japan ( x2 = 2.991, df = 4, p (0.559) > 0.01). 
 
(Table 6.12. Chi-square Test for Corporate Culture) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Corporate Culture Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain 
uninvolved
Do not 
influence
 
Never 
influence  
 
 
Count 14 69 40 4 2 129 Korea 
% of total 10.9% 53.5% 31.0% 3.1% 1.6% 100% 
Count 4 58 12 2 1 77 Japan 
% of total 5.2% 75.3% 15.6% 2.6% 1.3% 100% 
Count 18 127 52 6 3 206 Total 
% of total 8.7% 61.7% 25.2% 2.9% 1.5% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 10.103(a) 4 .039 
Likelihood Ratio 10.494 4 .033 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.235 1 .266 
N of Valid Cases 206   
4 cells (40%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
1.12 
 
 
The Pearson Chi-square value is 10.103 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This 
denotes that the effect of the pattern of corporate culture on the decision-making process 
is associated between Korea and Japan ( x2 = 10.103, df = 4, p (0.039) > 0.01) 
 
However, the pattern of influence of other variables – Ownership  ( x2 = 33.022, df 
 373 
 
= 4, p (0.000) < 0.01), Corporate Governance ( x2 = 15.054, df = 4, p (0.005) < 0.01 –on 
the decision-making process between Korea and Japan is different.  
 
? Hypothesis 2.2: Major Sources of Decision-making power 
 
i) Frequency Analysis  
 
Hypothesis 2.2 predicted that ownership is not a main source of decision-making 
power within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Results of the frequency 
analysis are as follows:  
 
(Table 6.13. Results of Frequency Analysis for H.2.2)  
 
Korean GTCs 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Expertise 29 21.2 1 
Ownership 26 20.4 3 
Managerial and working 
ability 
27 20.9 2 
Contribution to the firm 24 18.9 4 
Seniority 23 18.6 5 
Total  129 (N) 100  
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Expertise 17 21.5 1 
Ownership 13 17.1 5 
Managerial and working 
ability 
16 20.9 2 
Contribution to the firm 16 20.9 2 
Seniority 15 19.6 4 
77 (N) 100  Total 
 
In Korea, 21.2% of respondents marked expertise as a main source of decision-
making power, followed by managerial and working ability (20.9%), contribution to the 
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firm (18.9%) and seniority (18.6%). However, ownership is ranked third, receiving 
20.4%. Almost the same result was obtained from Japan. As in Korea, 21.5% of 
participants marked expertise as a main source of decision-making power, followed by 
managerial and working ability (20.9%), contribution to the firm (20.9%) and seniority 
(19.6%). But ownership received the lowest value of 17.1%, coming last. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2.2 receives full support.  
 
ii) Chi-square Test 
 
Only two selected sample tables (e.g. expertise and ownership) are presented as 
either independent or associated between Korea and Japan.  
 
(Table 6.14. Chi-square Test for Expertise) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Expertise Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain 
uninvolved
Do not 
influence
 
Never 
influence 
 
 
Count 33 78 15 1 2 129 Korea 
% of total 25.6% 60.5% 11.6% 0.8% 1.6% 100% 
Count 8 57 10 1 1 77 Japan 
% of total 10.4% 74.0% 13.0% 1.3% 1.3% 100% 
Count 41 135 25 2 3 206 Total 
% of total 19.9% 65.5% 12.1% 1.0% 1.5% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 7.175(a) 4 .127 
Likelihood Ratio 7.723 4 .102 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.778 1 .096 
N of Valid Cases 206   
4 cells (40%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .75 
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The Pearson Chi-square value is 7.175 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This denotes 
that the pattern of expertise as a source of decision-making power is associated between 
Korea and Japan ( x2 = 7.175, df = 4, p (0.127) > 0.01). 
 
(Table 6.15. Chi-square Test for Ownership) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Ownership Total  
Influence 
strongly 
Influence Neither 
influence 
nor remain 
uninvolved
Do not 
influence
 
Never 
influence 
 
 
Count 40 52 25 12 0 129 Korea 
% of total 31.0% 40.3% 19.4% 9.3% .0% 100% 
Count 3 17 46 8 2 76 Japan 
% of total 3.9% 22.4% 60.5% 10.5% 2.6% 100% 
Count 43 69 71 20 2 205 Total 
% of total 21.0% 33.7% 34.6% 9.8% 1.0% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 48.116(a) 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 52.480 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 32.488 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 205   
2 cells (20%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .74 
 
 
The Pearson Chi-square value is 48.116 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This means 
that the pattern of ownership as a source of decision-making power is different between 
Korea and Japan ( x2 = 48.116, df = 4, p (0.000) < 0.01). 
 
The pattern of other variables – Managerial and Working Ability ( x2 = 7.614, df = 4, 
p (0.107) > 0.01), Contribution to the Firm ( x2 = 7.021, df = 4, p (0.135) > 0.01) and 
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Seniority ( x2 = 10.731, df = 4, p (0.030) > 0.01) – as a source of decision-making 
power is associated between Korea and Japan.  
 
? Hypotheses 3.1~3.2: Corporate Cultural Differences  
 
Hypothesis 3.1 anticipated that Korean GTCs’ decision-makers may be more 
individualistic than wholistic and Hypothesis 3.2 predicted that Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ 
decision-makers may tend to be more wholistic than individualistic. The results are as 
follows:  
 
(Table 6.16. Results of Frequency Analysis for H.3.1~3.2)  
Korean GTCs 
 Answer Frequency Percent (%) 
Very high 10 7.8 
High 54 41.9 
Neither high nor low 50 38.8 
Low 9 7.0 
 
 
Individualism 
Non-existent 6 4.7 
Total  129 (N) 100 
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 Answer Frequency Percent (%) 
Very high 12 15.6 
High 47 61.0 
Neither high nor low 15 19.5 
Low 3 3.9 
 
 
Wholism 
Non-existent 0 0 
Total  77 (N) 100 
 
 
As anticipated, decision-makers in Korean GTCs tend to be more individualistic 
than wholistic in their decision-making. Of 129 respondents, 10 marked  “very high” 
(7.8%) and 54 marked as “high” (41.9%). In the case of Japanese decision-makers, 
unlike the Korean GTCs, they make decisions on the basis of a group decision-making 
 377 
 
system called wholism. Of 77 participants, 12 of them marked “very high” (15.6%) and 
47 marked as “high” (61.0%). Therefore, hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 received full support.  
 
According to the Chi-square test, the value is 16.434. This proves that the corporate 
culture in decision-making between Korea and Japan is different ( x2 = 16.434, df = 4, p 
(0.002) < 0.01) 
 
? Hypotheses 4.1~4.2: Recent Change in the Decision-making Process 
 
i) Frequency Analysis  
 
Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 examine recent changes in the decision-making processes 
in Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Results of frequency analysis are as 
follows:  
 
The result shows that there have been many changes in the decision-making 
process within Korean GTCs since the financial crisis. Although the BOD’s free 
expression of opinions is not ranked at the top, many respondents (16.5%) answered 
that the BOD’s power increased. In addition to this increase, respondents replied that 
other changes have also occurred. One of the notable changes was top management’s 
change of mind. Of 129 participants, 26 (19.7%) felt that there have been changes in top 
management’s way of making decisions. As a result, the decision-making power was 
also decentralised (17.5%) from top management to the lower ranks, such as team 
leaders and middle managers.  
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(Table 6.17. Results of Frequency Analysis for H.4.1~4.2)  
 
Korean GTCs 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Top management’s change of mind 26 19.7 1 
General staff’s free expression 
of opinion 
22 17.3 3 
Decentralisation 23 17.5 2 
Labour union’s free expression 
of opinion 
18 13.6 6 
BOD’s free expression of opinion 21 16.5 4 
General meeting of shareholders’ free 
expression of opinion 
19 15.4 5 
Total  129 (N) 100  
 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 Frequency Percent (%) Ranking 
Top management’s change of mind 15 19.2 1 
General staff’s free expression 
of opinion 
14 18.2 2 
Decentralisation 14 18.2 2 
Labour union’s free expression 
of opinion 
10 13.2 6 
BOD’s free expression of opinion 13 17.6 4 
General meeting of shareholders’ free 
expression of opinion 
11 13.6 5 
Total 77 (N) 100  
 
There also have been changes in Japanese Sogo Shoshas. The most significant 
change was top management’s change of mind. Of 77 respondents, 15 (19.2%) felt that 
there had been a change in top management’s decision-making process. The BOD’s 
power was also strengthened. 17.6% of the respondents answered that the degree of 
freedom in the BOD’s expression of its opinion in the decision-making process had 
increased. Therefore, Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 receive partial support.  
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ii) Chi-square Test 
 
Only two selected sample tables (e.g. top management’s change of mind and 
decentralisation) are presented to show whether they are independent or associated 
between Korea and Japan.  
 
 
 (Table 6.18. Chi-square Test for Top Management’s Change of Mind) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Top Management’s Change of Mind Total  
Totally 
changed 
Changed Neither 
changed 
nor 
unchanged.
Unchanged Totally 
un-
changed 
 
Count 21 82 25 1 0 129 Korea 
% of total 16.3% 63.6% 19.4% 0.8% 0.0% 100% 
Count 9 36 29 2 1 77 Japan 
% of total 11.7% 46.8% 37.7% 2.6% 1.3% 100% 
Count 30 118 54 3 1 206 Total 
% of total 14.6% 57.3% 26.2% 1.5% 0.5% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 12.000(a) 4 .017 
Likelihood Ratio 12.107 4 .017 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.170 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 206   
4 cells (40%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37 
 
 
The Pearson Chi-square value is 12.00 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). This means 
that the pattern of top management’s change of mind in the decision-making process is 
associated between Korea and Japan ( x2 = 12.00, df = 4, p (0.017) > 0.01). 
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 (Table 6.19. Chi-square Test for Decentralisation) 
 
Crosstabulation 
Decentralisation Total  
Totally 
changed 
Changed Neither 
changed nor 
unchanged 
Unchanged Totally 
un- 
changed 
 
Count 4 62 59 4 0 129 Korea 
% of total 3.1% 48.1% 45.7% 3.1% 0.0% 100% 
Count 1 40 30 5 1 77 Japan 
% of total 1.3% 51.9% 39.0% 6.5% 1.3% 100% 
Count 5 102 89 9 1 206 Total 
% of total 2.4% 49.5% 43.2% 4.4% 0.5% 100% 
 
Chi-square Test 
 Value df Asymp. Sig.   
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-square 4.250(a) 4 .373 
Likelihood Ratio 4.563 4 .335 
Linear-by-Linear Association .377 1 .539 
N of Valid Cases 206   
5 cells (50%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is .37 
 
 
The Pearson Chi-square value is 4.250 with 4 degrees of freedom (df). The pattern 
of decentralisation in decision-making process is also associated between Korea and 
Japan ( x2 = 4.250, df = 4, p (0.373) > 0.01). 
 
The pattern of other variable such as the General staff’s free expression of opinion 
( x2 = 4.199, df = 4, p (0.380) > 0.01) and the BOD’s free expression of opinion ( x2 = 
6.654, df = 4, p (0.155) > 0.01) is associated between Korea and Japan in the decision-
making process.  
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6. 10. Interview Results  
 
The interview results for the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas are given below.  
 
? Hypotheses 1.1~1.2: The Main Body of Decision-making  
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Two out of four interviewees replied that top executives still decide most important 
issues. One interviewee, for example, said,   
 
“Small day-to-day decision will be generated from team leaders and 
below but short- or mid- and long-term strategic decision-making is 
mostly influenced by top management.” 
 
However, the other two interviewees answered that team leaders and middle 
managers have more decision-making power than top executives do. Overall, top 
executives, team leaders and middle managers have the most decision-making power. It 
is moreover a general phenomenon that nowadays some portions of decision-making are 
delegated from top executives to middle management and many subordinates’ opinions 
are also accepted nowadays within Korean GTCs.  
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas  
 
One interviewee answered that the decision-making within Japanese firms depends 
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on the size of the risk.  
 
“It depends on risk size. If risk size is big (like investment), the general 
meeting of shareholders, executive officials or senior managing 
director are the decision-makers. If it is small, team leaders decide.” 
 
The other interviewee replied that the daily routine decisions are made by persons in 
charge. He answered,    
 
“We put priority for every decision we make. For the daily business 
decisions, the biggest involvement is put on the person in charge. Team 
leader’s control is limited when the person in charge is keeping the 
right process.” 
 
? Hypothesis 2.1: Major Factors Affecting Decision-making  
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Like the result of the questionnaire survey, the interview survey revealed that 
ownership, corporate culture and corporate governance are major factors affecting 
decision-making. All the interviewees felt that power and politics are not major factors. 
One interviewee replied,  
 
“Power and politics are not much related to our decision-making.” 
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas  
 
One interviewee ranked corporate culture, corporate governance, power and politics 
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as the main factors influencing the decision-making process. He further commented,   
 
“Even if I have a bright business plan which is not accepted by the 
corporate culture (i.e. not compatible with corporate culture), the plan 
will be rejected by the management.” 
 
The other interviewee also ranked corporate culture as the most important factor 
influencing the decision-making process. He replied, 
 
“~~~~~~ our corporate culture which especially gives authority to 
each responsible person in charge can be most influential. Other three 
factors are evaluated lower than corporate culture.”  
 
? Hypothesis 2.2: Major Sources of Decision-making Power 
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Here, also, almost the same results were obtained as in the questionnaire survey. 
Expertise and managerial and working ability and quality of contribution are the 
primary sources of decision-making power. Seniority is no longer an important 
component. One interviewee expresses it thus:  
 
“After the IMF crisis, more and more decisions are made on the basis 
of facts and data and no longer driven by the owner’s inclination.” 
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas  
 
One interviewee answered almost the same result obtained as in the questionnaire 
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survey. 
 
“I think the expertise and the working ability are most influential. 
Ownership is not mentioned often.”  
 
The other interviewee replied that all decisions within his company are made on the 
basis of seniority.  
 
“Every decision is made on the basis of seniority which is controlled 
by company rule. But decision-makers, every time, are concerned 
about expertise and the contribution to the firm.” 
 
? Hypotheses 3.1~3.2: Corporate Cultural Differences  
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Three interviewees replied that decision-makers tend to be individualistic in the 
process of decision-making. But one interviewee expressed the following quite different 
opinion: 
 
“Wholism. So not only one individual will be responsible, but the 
whole group will be responsible, at the same time. This will bring 
every one involved to strive to reach the goal, thus having the effect of  
synergy and driving force.” 
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas  
 
Consistent with our arguments, one interviewee answered,  
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“Decision-makers should always consider wholism, because they 
should stay in their position for a maximum of five years. If they want 
to find a new position, they have to consider that their decision-making 
will support the whole company’s profit.” 
 
The other interviewee answered that team-based decisions are not always made. He 
replied,  
 
“Team decision-making is not always taken, but the reporting of 
individual decision to the senior is common.” 
 
? Hypotheses 4.1~4.2: Recent Change in the Decision-making Process 
 
i) Korean GTCs 
 
Here, a quite different result was obtained from that of the questionnaire survey. In 
the latter, 26 respondents out of 129 replied that top management had changed its view 
of the decision-making process and 23 respondents ticked the answer ‘Decentralisation’. 
However, in the interview survey, three interviewees replied that they did not feel there 
had recently been changes in the decision-making process. One interviewee, for 
example, said,  
 
“There were no changes in the process of decision-making. Anyway, 
our company ultimately set a high value on shareholders’ opinions.” 
 
ii) Japanese Sogo Shoshas  
 
One interviewee indirectly answered that there have been some changes in the 
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decision-making process recently, in top management in particular. He answered,  
 
“The company rule for making decision is almost as same as the past. 
However, in the past top managements in each sales department have 
come from their original businesses. So, top managements never 
oppose other departments’ business plans. Now, our company has a 
rotation system for top management.”  
 
The other interviewee replied that there have been no significant changes. He 
answered,  
 
“General staff’s free flow of opinions has been existing as a tradition 
of my company. But there were no recent changes in other areas.”  
 
? Other Comments and Opinions  
 
A special space was provided to express comments from the interviewees or 
opinions related to the decision-making process. There were no additional comments 
from Japanese interviewees, but two Korean interviewees, for example, expressed the 
following opinions,   
 
“More and more decision-making is changing from mere cascading 
from top to bottom; now it’s bottom-up. But in order for this to be 
successful, not only do those at the bottom have to make a lot of 
suggestions, but those at the top also have to be open to hearing what 
the others have to say.” 
 
“Our company sets a high value on shareholders’ opinions and tries to 
listen in their decision-making to the opinion of those who are in 
practical working positions.” 
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6. 11. Conclusion and Discussion  
 
This chapter examined the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
 
First, in Korean GTCs, top executives are still key persons and the main bodies for 
decision-making, but they do not exercise absolute power. Instead, the power of the 
team leader and the middle manager has notably increased. This means that the structure 
of the decision-making process has decentralised to lower level managers compared 
with the past, rather than remaining highly centralised in the hands of the top 
management. Most previous studies argued that few people in Korean firms generally 
make decisions, because most of them are run by the owner or founder of the firm. A 
top-down decision-making system is still dominant in most Korean firms, because of 
the Confucian culture, which entails paternalism, loyalty and respect for elders and 
seniors (Lee, 1999). But it is possible for the GTCs to decentralise their decision-
making power to lower levels since they are consist of a number of different business 
divisions or teams. For an effective work process and to meet rapidly changing market 
situations, it is necessary to decentralise the decision-making power in highly 
diversified organisations such as the GTCs. Another notable finding is that the power of 
boards of directors has become increasingly important. This finding supports Lee’s 
(1999) study, which found that since the financial crisis there have been subtle signs of 
change in decision-making within Korean firms through increasing the role of the 
BODs. In the Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the team leader and middle manager are the main 
bodies, rather than the top executives. Consequently, the free flow of lower level 
personnel’s opinions in decision-making is possible. This system has arisen probably 
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because of Japanese firms’ unique decision-making culture of consensus.  In most 
Japanese firms, decisions are made on the basis of opinions and information emanating 
from each of the responsible parties.  
 
Second, it examined the major factors influencing the decision-making process and 
sources of decision-making power. In Korean GTCs, ownership is the main element 
affecting decision-making, followed by corporate culture and corporate governance. The 
important implication here is that top executives or owners of firms still dominate 
decision-making for important issues, even though the decision-making power is 
decentralised to lower level managers for minor issues. Another main factor affecting 
decision-making, corporate culture, is ranked second. Each firm has its own unique 
corporate culture which has a pervasive influence over its employees’ behaviour and 
actions within the firm. In Korean firms, corporate culture is normally associated with 
ownership, which is best expressed in the phrase ‘a system of centralisation to one 
person’. This result disproves the view that decision-making power and authority in 
Korean firms are normally concentrated in the higher echelons of managerial 
hierarchies, as Chung, Lee and Jung (1997) argued. Regarding the source of decision-
making power, expertise and managerial and working ability are ranked first and second, 
followed by ownership. It seems that ownership is an underlying factor in decision-
making, but Korean GTCs put emphasis on employees’ expertise and working ability to 
enhance business performance. In case of the Japanese respondents, they answered that 
corporate culture is a primary element influencing decision-making, followed by 
corporate governance and power and politics. Unlike the Korean GTCs, however, the 
respondents said that ownership is not an important element in the Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas’ decision-making process. This result clearly supports the existing literature 
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that ownership and management are normally separated in most Japanese firms. As a 
source of decision-making power, expertise and managerial and working ability are 
selected as primary and secondary factors.   
 
Third, we investigated the decision-makers’ inclination to take up individualism or 
wholism. In Korean GTCs, contrary to Hofstede (1982, 1991) argument which  defines 
Korea as a country of low individualism, a majority of respondents answered that 
decision-makers incline towards individualism rather than wholism in their decision-
making. This implies that once people in Korean firms are promoted to a higher level, 
they have a high tendency to prefer individualism, even though they practised low 
individualism when they were lower level employees. In the case of Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas, the result complies with expectation and conforms to the existing arguments 
(Ouchi, 1981; Keys and Miller, 1984; Pheysey, 1993). Most people answered that 
Japanese decision-makers put emphasis on a consensus of collectivism which allows all 
members to be involved in the decision-making process  
 
Fourth, the result shows that there have been some changes in decision-making 
process within Korean GTCs. The most significant change is that there has been a 
change of mind in top management. Other notable changes are increases in the power of 
the general staff and the BOD’s free expression of their opinion in the decision-making 
process since the financial crisis. Since 1997, there has been growing pressure to reform 
large conglomerates in Korea. Many people agree that the crisis stems from structural 
problems within Korean firms, such as the centralised decision-making power. In this 
regard, the Korean government has undertaken several reform measures, such as the 
introduction of the outside director system. Furthermore, in order to decentralise the 
 390 
 
decision-making, the Korean government needs to activate the role of the BOD and to 
seek diverse ways to grant the BOD the right to control management as a top decision-
making body (Lee, 1999). There also have been changes within the Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas since the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy. The most significant change was 
top management’s change of mind and the strengthening of power among the general 
staff and the BODs. Moreover, it found that there also have been changes in the degree 
of freedom for labour unions and the general meetings of shareholder to express their   
opinions in both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. In total, it implies that the 
financial crisis in Korea and the collapse of the bubble economy in Japan were 
significant turning points for most business organisations which allowed them to 
restructure their management style or decision-making system.  
 
Interview survey revealed almost the same as the questionnaire survey did. One 
difference between two surveys is, however, related to the recent changes in the 
decision-making process within Korean GTCs. Some of the questionnaire respondents 
replied that there had been changes in decision-making such as decentralisation and top 
management’s change of mind. However, three interviewees who took part in the 
interview survey indicated the opposite. But, paradoxically, one interviewee who 
expressed the opposite answer replied that his company tried to listen to the opinion of 
people who were in a practical working position.  
 
This result implies that nowadays there is indeed transformation in the decision-
making process within Korean GTCs. The traditional decision-making culture (i.e. the 
top-down decision-making system) always dominated Korean organisations in the past, 
but it has been challenged since the national economic crisis. Nevertheless, although 
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there have been slight and gradual changes in the decision-making culture within 
Korean GTCs, there was no likelihood of radical changes because of the underlying 
national and corporate culture.  
 
6.12. Difference Analysis between the Two Countries 
 
In the surveys of the decision-making process comparing Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas, some different results were obtained, as shown below.  
 
? Hypotheses 1.1~1.2: Main Body for Decision-making  
 
In Korea’s case, top executives are still major bodies in the decision-making 
although the power of team leaders and middle managers has increased, whilst, in 
Japan’s case, team leaders and middle managers are the main groups. Why, then, are 
there cultural differences between the two countries even though they are 
geographically very close? This may be discussed in terms of the macro-and micro-
aspects.  
 
First, there are historical socio-cultural differences; then the geographical 
characteristics of the two countries may affect the result. The Japanese Archipelago 
consists of four main islands; Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, each with its  
own typical cultural features. There are also several races: the majority Yamato and 
some minorities such as Ryukyu, Ainu, Uilta and Nivkh. Moreover, Japan forms one 
nation by combining each race’s cultural features and pursuing local diversity by mutual 
respect. This historical way of thinking would affect the consensus style of decision-
making in any organisation, because group consensus decision-making requires respect 
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for each member’s contribution to variety and diversity.  
 
Unlike Japan, Korea is a peninsula and it has only one race, the Han. Since the 
beginning of history, Korea has incessantly been exposed to foreign invasions from 
Mongolia, Manjujok, Yeojin, Malgal, China and Japan, etc. Under these continued 
external aggressions, the Korean people have putting their emphasis on the spirit of 
union to cope with the many challenges from outsiders. In order to strengthen the 
national solidarity, a strong and capable leader may be required to lead people as an 
effective unity. Such a historical background may affect Korea’s socio-culture as a 
whole, including its approach to decision-making.  
 
Second, corporate-level organisational structure and size may affect the result. 
Although the basic organisational structure of the two groups is similar, the degree of 
business diversification, the scope of the business area, the number of people involved 
and the size of the organisations are quite different. Hence, in Japan’s case, Group-level 
top managements have difficulties in managing, controlling and making decisions for all 
issues; many previous writers have pointed out that decentralisation is required when an 
organisation becomes very big. As a result, the functional experts (i.e. team leaders and 
middle managers) could in most cases be the major decision-makers rather than top 
management. In contrast, Korean GTCs’ business areas are not as diversified as those of 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Since the organisational structure of the GTCs more compact  
than that of the Sogo Shoshas, a tight and vertical control by upper-level management 
remains possible.  
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? Hypotheses 2.1~2.2: Major Factors Affecting Decision-making  
 
As for factors affecting decision-making, the staff of the Korean GTCs felt that 
ownership is more important than all the others, while the staff of the Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas’ answered that ownership is the least important factor of all. This result reflects 
well on the two groups’ basic management philosophy and it may also be affected by 
the historical socio-cultural difference between the two countries, as mentioned above.  
 
The characteristic of the Korean Chaebols is that group founders dominate the all 
affiliated firms with their minor shares through cross shareholdings; these impede the 
separation of ownership and management. Another feature is a succession of 
management power from founders to their blood relatives rather than to professional 
managers (Lee, 2006). Why is it then that most Chaebol owners cling to the succession 
by their second generation, not only in their ownership, but also in private possessions, 
to the extent in some cases of breaching the law? 
 
As is well known, Korea’s is a profoundly Confucian culture. The influence of 
Confucius is still felt today and this impacts also on business activity as on every area of  
behaviour, values and ways of thinking. Korean business groups tend to recruit 
employees on the basis of kinship from their own clan (chiban) or region (Rowley and 
Bae, 2004), counting on the loyalty of a junior relative to a senior. Moreover, Koreans 
are among the greatest believers in the importance of blood connections all over the 
world. For this reason, most Koreans are more reluctant to donate their property to 
society or the community than people in the developed countries. They seldom donate 
to society; rather they bequeathe their goods to their sons or daughters. Such widespread 
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traditional practices may influence other social decisions, including management 
decisions in business firms.  
 
In contrast, ownership and management are generally separated in most Japanese 
firms. Although founders or relatives involve themselves in the group’s general affairs, 
management issues are assigned to professional managers. Therefore, Sogo Shoshas’ 
people felt that ownership affected decision-making least of all factors,  while the  
corporate culture in such features as group consensus, nemawashi or ringi was the 
primary element.  
 
? Hypotheses 3.1~3.2: Corporate Cultural Difference 
 
Previous writers have generally suggested that both Korea and Japan are collectivist 
countries with low individualism. But according to the result, almost 50% (49.7%) of 
participants from the GTCs answered that decision-makers in Korea were 
individualistic when they made decisions – a quite inconsistent result with the previous 
literature, whilst 76.6% of the respondents from the Sogo Shoshas felt that Japanese 
decision-makers were wholistic - which echoes what many existing studies have found. 
This difference may have its origin in the following factors.  
 
Korea’s overall socio-cultural environment is collectivist in its emphasis on  
relationship with regions (yongo), schools (hakyon) and clans (chiban or hyulyon). But 
from the viewpoint of organisational behaviour, including decision-making in business 
firms or people’s family life, the situation is quite different. This may be because of the 
underlying culture of high patriarchalism in the family and the military. For instance, 
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heads of families in Korea (mostly males) have traditionally managed their family 
economy with a high degree of exclusive responsibility, based on strong paternalistic 
traditions. Needless to say, life in the armed forces which most Korean males 
experience for two or three years, is highly command-oriented. Both from family and 
military experiences where top-down decision-making and upper person-oriented 
management is dominant, then, Korean males may unconsciously learn how to adapt 
their expectations and how to act in an organisation. Such unique traditions and 
experiences may influence the individualism of Korean managers when they are in a 
position to make decisions. This is consistent with a previous argument suggested by 
Chung, Lee and Okumura (1988) most Korean firms when they make decisions tend to 
adopt high individualism centralised in top management .  
 
In Japan’s case, as the previous literature suggests, most decision-makers adopt 
wholism, collectivism or a consensus decision-making system. Even though the spirit of 
collectivism prevails in both countries, Japan lacks the dynamic factors that Korea has. 
Japanese people place more emphasis on harmony than Koreans and are conservative, 
prudent and slow to adopt a new system. In this context, Japan is a high collectivism-
oriented country (Cho, 2001). In contrast, the corporate culture of Korean firms is 
‘dynamic collectivism’ combining collectivism (oriented towards in-group 
harmoniousness and tolerant of human nature) and dynamism (rapid, aggressive and 
progressive) (Cho, 2001; Rowley and Bae, 2004).  
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CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
This final chapter has four main objectives. First, it summarises the principal 
findings throughout the study. Second, it presents an overall analysis of the difference 
between two countries in terms of strategic management and the decision-making 
process. Third, it discusses theoretical and practical implications for business managers, 
academicians and government policy markers. Fourth, it suggests a possible direction 
for future research in this area.   
 
7.2. Summary of Findings 
 
This study began by examining the nature of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas. Then it investigated and analysed their strategic management and decision-
making process. Therefore, the findings of this research can be summarised under  
three headings: a general profile of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, their 
strategic management and their decision-making process.  
 
7.2.1. General Profile of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
A wide literature review of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas produced the  
following findings. First, the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas are unique organisations which 
are not well-known in Western countries. They have a variety of business functions, 
such as trading and transaction intermediation, financing, distribution, project 
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organising and coordinating, information-gathering and new resource development, etc. 
With such diverse capabilities and functions, they have played a crucial role not only for 
their parent companies’ growth, but also for national economic development. Their 
alignment with their parent companies’ development and the government’s policy has 
been constantly developed from their foundation until the 1990s.  
 
Second, the financial crisis in 1997 shattered the Korean GTCs’ favourable 30-year 
reputation and image. Korean GTCs, as core members of the Chaebol groups, were 
treated as among the major agents in the national economic crisis, together with the 
government and financial institutions, because the GTCs acted as the Chaebols’ 
financial resources. They borrowed from international money markets to provide their 
parent companies with funds for internal use. Then the Chaebols diversified their 
business in various fields and even in non-profit areas using the loans taken out by the 
GTCs to achieve quantitative growth. When the national crisis no longer allowed them 
to pursue such business diversifications, they were forced to restructure their 
organisational system, on account of the fundamental problem in the ownership and 
corporate governance structure among Korean Chaebol groups. Although the GTCs 
have their own unique roles, they tended to act as financial arms of their parent 
company (the Chaebol) rather than focusing on their original functions. With a low rate 
of shareholding, the Chaebol owners exercised full power of control over every aspect 
of management, in which was called “a controlling minority structure” (Jeong, 2001). 
As ownership and management were not separated in the Chaebol groups, the 
Chaebols’ financial providers could only be the GTCs. Even if many Korean firms 
started to entrust their management to professional managers after the financial crisis, 
the tendency of the Chaebols’ owners to be involved in group-wide management still 
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prevailed in most big conglomerates. But to achieve the ultimate goal of having 
competitive advantage, it is time for Korean firms, including the GTCs, to concentrate 
on managing themselves, rather than retaining the parent companies’ group-wide 
management. 
 
Third, Japanese Sogo Shoshas were a good textbook example for Korean GTCs’ 
development in terms of business functions, management system, organisational 
structure and strategic planning. Although the Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ stable growth has 
suddenly turned into a drastic decline since the collapse of the bubble economy in the 
early 1990s, the fundamental reason was quite different from that of the decline of the 
Korean GTCs. For example, ownership and management are normally separated in most 
Japanese business groups, even though they were dominated by their founding families. 
Therefore, Sogo Shoshas were able to focus on their original functions of trading and 
transaction intermediation, financing, distribution, project organising and coordinating, 
information-gathering and new resource development, etc. Furthermore, their financial 
activities were geared to financing for customers, rather than for internal use by 
Zaibatsu and Keiretsu groups.  
 
Fourth, the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas are regarded as mediators in transactions 
between buyers and sellers, by minimising transaction cost. The issue of transaction cost 
is one of the key components in management (Mansfield, 1998; Bradley, 1995; Hennart, 
1991; Williamson, 1979). In modern business, a firm’s success or failure greatly 
depends upon whether it can reduce transaction costs. As one of the strategic ways to 
save transaction costs, the use of the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas is significant. The GTCs and 
Sogo Shoshas are information gathers who are economic agents supporting production, 
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exchange and utilisation in order to increase the value of the information for their end-
user or to reduce the costs of information gathering. They also have unique functions as 
international marketers and distributors for their customers, in particular for SMEs who 
do not have international business experience. As quasi-bankers, the GTCs and Sogo 
Shoshas also provide various financial services, such as extending credit, making loans, 
providing loan guarantees and financing projects.  
 
Fifth, since the 1990s both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas have been 
faced with management difficulties, due to the internal and external business 
environments. The environmental variables affecting their management difficulties can 
be summarised as: i) abolition of assistance from the government, ii) high competition 
among the existing GTCs/Sogo Shoshas, iii) manufacturers’ preference for their own 
direct business, iv) the birth of the WTO and v) the rapid growth of the Chinese market. 
Therefore, the future of the GTCs and Sogo Shoshas is not likely to brighten and they 
now need to retrieve their reputation through strategic management.  
 
7.2.2. The Strategic Management of Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
 
Through questionnaire surveys and interviews, this empirical study found the 
following major features in the strategic management of Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas. 
 
First, like many previous studies, it found that Korean GTCs’ and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas’ employment of a differentiation strategy is positively associated with 
environmental uncertainty and complexity. With respect to the relationship between 
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their cost leadership strategy and environmental uncertainty and complexity, there is 
inverse correlation, as anticipated. And, like previous studies (Miller, 1988; Kwon et al, 
1999; Kang, 2002), it found that these relationships do not reach high statistical 
significance. This denotes that a firm’s choice of a differentiation strategy rather than a 
cost leadership strategy tends to increase uncertainty (Govindarajan, 1986). However, 
according to the additional analysis to check the types of competitive strategy being 
currently pursued by Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, it found that some of 
them are adopting in their competitive strategy more than one strategy at the same time.  
 
Second, a positive association between differentiation strategy and organisational 
decentralisation was found. The result is consistent with Porter’s (1980) and Miller’s 
(1988) arguments. According to them, creative ideas, a free flow of opinions and a close 
collaboration among team members are necessary for a firm to carry out a 
differentiation strategy to secure new markets and customers. These may be achieved by 
delegating the decision-making power to lower level managers. Consistent with our 
arguments, a cost leadership strategy is positively correlated with organisational 
formalisation, since the main purpose of pursuing a cost leadership strategy is to put 
strong emphasis on formal profit and budget control in order to keep costs down.   
 
Third, this study also found that the employment by Korean GTCs and Japanese 
Sogo Shoshas of a differentiation strategy is positively associated with the non-financial 
activities of gaining both market share and new customers. As many previous studies 
revealed, a major aim in pursuing a differentiation strategy is, despite competitors, to 
develop new markets and customers with diversified products and services (Miles and 
Snow, 1978). A mixed strategy (i.e. hybrid strategy) is also positively associated with 
 401 
 
new market development. The success of the hybrid strategy depends on the ability both 
to understand and to deliver enhanced value in terms of customer needs, while also 
having a cost base which permits low prices and is sufficient for reinvestment to 
maintain and develop bases of differentiation (Johnson, Scholes and Whittington, 2005). 
However, one notable finding is that a cost leadership strategy is not positively 
associated with a firm’s profitability. This means that in highly diversified organisations 
such as Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the profit is not achieved by one 
factor or strategy alone, but by a combination of several factors or strategies.  
 
Fourth, with respect to the relationship between centralisation and overall 
performance, it found that there is inverse association between them in Korean GTCs, 
but there is no statistical correlation in Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Although there is this  
difference between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas, the finding is consistent 
with previous literature (i.e. a negative association and a positive between centralisation 
and overall performance). Needless to say, it also found that organisational 
decentralisation motivates and encourages employees’ satisfaction and retention, as was 
our expectation. Regarding the relationship between formalisation and the speed of job 
handling, the result reveals that formalisation is inversely associated with the speed of 
job handling in Japanese Sogo Shoshas, but that there is no correlation between them in 
Korean GTCs.  
 
7.2.3. The Decision-making Process within Korean GTCs and Japanese       
Sogo Shoshas 
 
In the part dealing with the decision-making process, this empirical study found 
some evidence to support the existing literature, the major finding being as follows. 
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 First, top executives in Korean GTCs still play important roles in the decision-
making process, even though the decision-making power of the team leaders and the 
middle managers is stronger than in the past. But unlike our hypothesis, the power of 
top executives is not decisive, although they still dominate important decision-making.  
The decision-making power is more decentralised to middle level managers but not 
altogether; there are two reasons for this. One is Korea’s general corporate culture. It is 
a general understanding that a top-down, highly centralised decision-making system is 
dominant in most Korean firms, due to the national culture of Confucianism. The other 
is ownership. Many respondents answered that ownership is the most important factor 
affecting decision-making, which recalls the fact that in Korean firms ownership and 
management are not completely separated. Unlike top executives in Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas, they do not play crucial roles, though team leaders and middle managers are 
positioned as the main bodies of decision-making. The increase of their power may 
allow the free flow of all members’ opinions in decision-making. Considering the 
characteristics of such highly diversified big business groups as general trading 
companies, it may not be effective to depend on a centralised decision-making system 
concentrated in the hands of only a few people, given the number of different 
operational departments.  
 
Second, as a primary factor influencing decision-making, it found that ownership 
and corporate culture are the most important elements in Korean GTCs. This result 
meets our constant belief that one of the most distinctive features of Korean firms is the 
high degree of centralisation to upper level management or a group owner. In Japan’s 
case, the corporate culture is a primary element influencing decision-making. However, 
ownership is not an important element here since ownership and management in most 
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Japanese firms are normally separated. In both Korea and Japan, it was found that 
expertise and managerial and working ability are primary sources of decision-making 
power.   
 
Third, this study found that Korean decision-makers are likely to be individualists 
in the decision-making process. Even if Korea is a low individualistic country (Hofstede, 
1982; 1991), people tend to be individualistic once they are promoted to a higher level 
of management. In Japan’s case, consistent with our arguments, decision-makers allow 
all members to express their opinions or comments by putting emphasis on a consensus 
of collectivism. 
 
Fourth, there have since the 1990s been significant changes in the decision-making 
process in both Korean GTCs and Japan Sogo Shoshas. The financial crisis in Korea 
and the collapse of the bubble economy in Japan were turning points for Korea’s and 
Japan’s business organisations to consider their strategic management, including their 
decision-making systems. The most significant change is top management’s change of 
mind over decision-making. Simultaneously, there have been general changes with the 
strengthening of the free expression of opinion by general staff, BODs, labour unions 
and general meetings of shareholders.  
 
7.3. Analysis of the Overall Differences between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas 
 
Some differences were found between the two groups both in strategic management 
and the decision-making process, as mentioned at the end of Chapters 5 and 6. From the 
results, this research concluded that both macro-and-micro factors influence the 
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differences, as illustrated in Figure 7.1.  
 
First of all, its culture (both national and corporate), which reflects a nation’s unique 
historical tradition and its people’s ways of thinking, values, norms and behaviour, is a 
major factor. Though Korea and Japan adjoin, the geographical position and the 
formation of the peoples are quite different. As Japan is a chain of islands and was 
originally peopled by several tribes, people historically recognise and respect 
heterogeneity, diversity and variety in one another in terms of culture, religion and 
ethnic. Religion is a good example. For instance, according to the statistical data of 
religion in 2005, many Japanese have more than one religion, but in Korea this would 
be an extraordinary phenomenon. The total population of Japan as of 2005 was 127 
million, but total number of people who state a religion is 211 million, many more than 
the total population (Statistics Bureau, Ministry of International Affairs and 
Communication, 2008).85 Therefore, the respondents in the Sogo Shoshas answered that 
organisational centralisation has no correlation with overall performance because most 
decisions are made on the basis of consensus.  
 
With respect to the corporate culture of the two nations, both Korea and Japan 
regard collectivism as important element in organisation behaviour. But it is a major 
difference that Korean people are more dynamic than Japanese. Based on “Be Rush” 
spirit, aggressive attitude and adoption of military practice, Korean firms observe a 
system of strict order with a more centralised structure than Japanese ones. For this 
reason, employees in Korean GTCs felt that centralisation has a negative influence 
                                            
85 According to the data, total number of Japanese people who have religion in 2005 was 211, 021,000. It 
divided them into four categories; Shintoism, Japan’s native religion, (107,248,000: 50.82%), Buddhism 
(91,260,000: 43.25%), Christianity (2,595,000: 1.23%) and others (9,918,000: 4.70%).  
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overall performance. As a result, decision-makers tend to be individualistic and 
ownership is the most important thing affecting decision-making.  
 
(Figure 7.1. Analysis of Overall Differences between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas) 
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The second factor is organisational structure in the two countries, including size, 
business scope, number of employees and business diversification. Most Sogo Shoshas 
started their business in the 1940s, which was around 25 years earlier than the Korean 
GTCs began. Since their foundation, Sogo Shoshas have diversified their businesses in 
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many directions. During the period of Japan’s economic booms, Sogo Shoshas with 
their various functions were one of the major beneficiaries, because they acted as a 
forerunner for national economic growth. As a result, their organisation grew, acquiring   
many employees and branch offices around the world which required decentralisation 
for their effective operation. For this reason, the functional leaders, such as team leaders 
and middle managers, by adopting wholism, play a crucial role in the decision-making 
process. Korean GTCs’ business history, however, is much shorter, their organisations 
are smaller and the scope of their business diversification is narrower than the Sogo 
Shoshas’, making it possible to have a centralising management.    
 
7.4. Theoretical Implications  
 
Substantial data and information about Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas 
have been examined or analysed through the literature and the field survey. As a result, 
some theoretical implications may be derived, as follows.  
 
7.4.1. The Rationales of the GTC’s/Sogo Shosha’s Existence 
 
The first theoretical implication is related to GTC’s/Sogo Shoshas’ existence as 
transaction cost reducer, international trader and distributor, financial provider, etc.  
 
To begin with, the GTC/Sogo Shosha are intermediaries pursuing transaction cost 
economies (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975, 1979; Mansfield, 1988; Hennart, 1991; 
Bradley, 1995; Chang, 2006). As the previous literature suggests, middlemen providing 
a variety of services between sellers and buyers are required for reducing transaction 
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costs from the inefficiency of the market and the imperfections of the individual’s 
knowledge and honesty. In this context, the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas have played significant 
roles as transaction cost reducers. For instance, before establishing the GTC system in 
Korea, each individual firm’s dispersed business activities in international trade suffered 
increased transaction cost due to its unorganised system, small size and lack of market 
information. The GTCs consolidated each firm’s trading business by reducing 
transaction costs, such as that of information-gathering, marketing, searching for new 
markets and customers’ expenses (Chang, 2006).  
 
Second, two theories state that economies of scale and informational economies of 
scale may be applied to the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas. Economies of scale are the cost 
advantages which a firm obtains due to expansion. In many production processes86, in 
particular those involving large fixed assets, average costs fall as production increases 
(Froeb and McCann, 2008). In addition, Wilson (1999) argued that better information 
justifies a higher scale of operations and vice versa.  
 
The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas utilised economies of scale by expanding their scale of 
purchasing or selling (e.g. bulk buying or selling of goods through long-term contracts), 
financing (e.g. borrowing money at lower interest rates) and marketing. Each of these 
factors reduced the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ long-term average costs of operation and 
perhaps gave them cost advantages. For instance, Sumitomo Corporation’s mineral 
resources and energy business unit has achieved constant earning by importing huge 
amounts of copper from Indonesia and coal from Australia under long-term contracts 
                                            
86 A theory of economies of scale is normally applied to production industry. However, this theory may 
also be applied to other industries including the GTC/Sogo Shosha industry where inputs (costs) decrease 
as outputs (productions) increase.  
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(Sumitomo Corporation Annual Report, 2008). The GTCs/Sogo Shoshas have also been 
pursuing informational economies of scale by matching end-user specific information 
needs with various information resources. Through highly diversified information 
sources such as global networks, they provide customers not only with micro 
information (e.g. information about market, prices, competitors, etc.), but also with 
macro information (e.g. information about political, social, economic factors, etc.)  
 
Third, the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ existence may be explained by a theory of 
international marketing. International marketing deals with differing markets in many 
different countries. These markets often vary greatly in their levels of economic 
development, cultures,  customs and buying patterns (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). 
For many companies, the multinational or global approach is a desirable management 
objective, But most of them have a relatively low level of internationalisation in terms 
of business experience and information about different cultures, customs and 
consumers’ buying behaviour, human resources, capital and networks. On their behalf 
(e.g. manufacturers, SMEs or ordinary trading companies) the GTCs/Sogo Shoshas have 
pursued business activities across national boundaries. Their well-planned and 
coordinated combination of marketing methods or tools have contributed in many 
different spheres; national economic development, SMEs’ business growth, the  
nation’s international competitiveness and the GTCs’/Sogo Shoshas’ own business 
growth. For example, 25.7% of Korean GTCs’ sales in the 1980s came from SMEs and 
35.3% in the 1990s (Chang, 2006).  
 
 
 409 
 
7.4.2. Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure  
 
A theory of corporate governance and ownership in organisations may be one of 
the theoretical implications of this research. It is generally understood that the key 
elements of good corporate governance principles include transparency, openness, 
performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, and commitment to the 
organisation. La Porta et al. (2000) argued that the laws of corporate governance and 
their enforcement are important factors in market development, firm value and investor 
protection. Lemmon and Lins (2002) suggested that when firms’ controlling managers 
or insiders have more power over their ownership rights, the performance of these firms 
is lower than that of other firms during the crisis period. Mitton (2002), however, 
suggested that firm-specific measures of corporate governance for example, higher 
disclosure quality, a greater degree of transparency and sound ownership structure 
influence firm value significantly during the crisis period.  
 
From the viewpoint of Korean GTCs, as Lemmon and Lins (2002) suggested, 
excessive control power from one person (e.g. the Chaebol owner) over a company  
has always caused problems in corporate governance, strategic management, decision-
making and organisational restructure. Parties involved in corporate governance 
normally include the CEO, BODs, management and shareholders. However, in the case 
of most Korean GTCs, controlling power is centralised in group owners without the 
appropriate sharing among regulatory parties. As a result, this unfair governance 
structure became one of the primary factors in the management problems of the GTCs 
during the financial crisis and even today. This implies the problem may recur unless 
the current governance and ownership is changed.  
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7.4.3. Strategic Management in Organisation  
 
First, even in the highly diversified and integrated trading industry (the GTCs/Sogo 
Shoshas), the existing theory works. In order to examine strategic management in 
organisations, the structural relationship analysis between environment, strategy, 
structure and performance has received much attention in the literature over time 
(Chandler, 1962; Mintzberg, 1979; Miller, 1988; Ketha and Nair, 1995; Kwon et al, 
1999; Kang, 2002; Chathoth and Olsen, 2007). The sample companies of previous 
research include manufacturing firms, service companies (e.g. restaurant and hotel 
firms), financial firms, un-diversified autonomous companies, subsidiaries of diversified 
big enterprises, etc. Consistent with the existing studies, each variable in the present  
study is found to be not independent, but interdependent with other variables. The 
business environment influences a firm’s competitive strategy and strategy affects 
organisational structure. Thus performance is influenced by strategy and structure.  
 
Second, an original theory of Porter’s (1985) competitive strategies works quite 
differently in the practice. According to Porter, firms can be successful when they adopt 
only one strategy out of three generic strategies. However, contradicting Porter’s 
argument, the present research found that both Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas adopt more than one strategy at a time. This implies that they may not create 
and sustain competitive advantage with a single specific strategy in today’s highly 
competitive market situations. As a result, they mix two or more strategies to cope with 
the rapidly changing and highly competitive business environment. Hence it is the main 
task of managers to seriously consider their strategic management.  
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7.4.4. Decision-making Process in Organisation  
 
According to organisational decision-making theories, managers need to make 
decisions under certainty, risk or uncertainty and even under ambiguity (Daft, 2000; 
George and Jones, 2008; Greenberg and Baron, 2008). Another theoretical issue is how 
much decision-makers follow rationality, which is associated with the concepts of logic, 
reasoning and sense-making (Stewart, 1994; George and Jones, 2008). But it is  
generally understood that there are a number of interruptions in managers’ rationality 
which lead them to adopt bounded rationality (Simon and March, 1958; Simon, 1979; 
George and Jones, 2008; Greenberg and Baron, 2008) or the political model. The next 
important academic theory related to organisational decision-making concerns what 
kinds of factors are affected. According to the literature, the major elements affecting 
decision-making or organisational behaviour are of three kinds; power and politics 
(Russell, 1938; Pfeffer, 1992), corporate culture (Hofstede, 1991; Mullins, 1996; Slater, 
2003) and ownership and corporate governance. With this in mind, this research draws 
the following theoretical implications from the GTCs’ and Sogo Shoshas’ perspectives.  
 
The first implication relates to the decision-making environment for managers. 
Compatible with the existing organisational decision-making literature, it assumes that 
managers in both GTCs and Sogo Shoshas make decisions under risk, uncertainty and 
ambiguity87. In other words, although managers know what goals they wish to achieve, 
they are confronted with limited information (e.g. a rapidly changing environment, 
severe competition among existing rivals, etc.), time and cognitive ability, which 
                                            
87 According to the questionnaire survey asking about the business environment in strategic management, 
most respondents answered that the business environment at present is uncertain. The mean value for 
Korea is 2.78 and of Japan is 2.86 on a five-point Likert scale (see Table 5.11. Mean and Standard 
Deviation of Variables). 
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prevents them from being purely rational. As a result, they tend to behave with a 
bounded rationality which hardly ever arrives at optimal solutions. For example, in the 
case of Korean GTCs, ownership most greatly affects the decision-making process, 
which is far from the model of rational behaviour. As the decision-making power was 
traditionally centralised in a few people without separating ownership and management, 
such short-sighted decisions with irrational behaviour led their companies to the edge of 
bankruptcy in the period of the national financial crisis.  
 
The second implication is related to the Japanese firms’ bottom-up decision-making 
system, which many previous writers have made well known. However, the recent 
literature has suggested some drawbacks associated with this system, including the 
Nemawashi and Ringi processes (Ohtsu and Imanari, 2002; Chen, 2004; Kahal, 2005). 
For example, these are often too slow, since many people are involved and numerous 
meetings are held. Another notable issue is that Japanese firms do not always follow 
bottom-up or consensus systems. Instead, top management is sometimes involved in the 
decision-making process from the very earliest stages and the Nemawashi and Ringi are 
only follow-up systems used for making implementation plans after major decisions 
have already been taken by top executives. This present research also supports the 
above argument. According to one manager of a Sogo Shosha, most Japanese firms have 
a standard table stipulating decision-makers for specific actions. From this, it can be 
assumed that most important issues are made by top executives and such decisions 
would be conveyed to lower levels for action planning.  
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7.4.5. Culture  
 
Both national and corporate cultural differences were found between the two groups. 
Hofstede (1991) suggested that Korea is one of the strongest collectivist countries, with 
low individualism, and that the corporate culture is more collectivist than Japan. 
According to more recent literature, Rowley and Bae (2004, pp. 306~307) argued that 
Korea’s corporate culture can exemplify the concept of dynamic collectivism, 
developed from the nation’s traditional view of collectivism. It strengthens the boundary 
between in- and out-groups by applying collectivist norms for in-group members and 
individualistic norms for out-group members.  
 
However, this research found that Korean decision-makers tend to adopt 
individualism in the process of decision-making rather than wholism or collectivism88. 
It seems to have two aspects. A company or top executive requests employees (normally 
lower-level staffs) to show collectivist norms by sacrificing themselves in order to 
extend a firm’s performance. At the same time, decision-makers (normally upper-level 
executives) tend to have individualistic norms when they make decisions.  
 
7.5. Practical Implications  
 
Some practical implications may also be derived for government policy makers and 
business managers.  
 
                                            
88 In the question asking whether decision-makers adopt individualism or wholism, 10 (7.8%) Koreans 
out of 129 answered “very high”, 54 (41.9%) replied “high”, but only 9 (7%) answered “low”  
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The first implication relates to the role of the government and its intervention in 
Korean GTCs. Korean GTCs were not the natural outcome of the evolution and 
expansion of Korea’s export-oriented trading firms, but were artificially established by 
the government and modelled on the Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Therefore, the main 
bodies of decision-making in the process of forming and developing the Korean GTCs 
have been government officials, rather than the management within the GTCs. As they 
were created to meet the government’s objectives, the government came to specify 
minimum export targets, capitalisation requirements, number of export items, number of 
overseas branch offices and the extent of public share ownership for each GTC. As a 
result, their own long-term tasks, such as developing and promoting sustainable 
resources, building and maintaining a strong marketing position in overseas markets and 
seeking various functional diversifications are often overlooked in favour of short-term 
programmes aimed at meeting necessary requirements to maintain their status as GTCs. 
Although the government’s intervention is weaker than before, requirements for 
designation as a GTC and requirements to maintain its status are still controlled by the 
government under the Foreign Trade Law. From the standpoint of policy considerations, 
this study has useful implications for government policy makers. A government-led 
policy and a short-term orientation programme are likely to hamper the creation, 
development and sustainability of the GTCs’ international competitiveness in today’s 
highly competitive global markets. At this point, the government may need to consider a 
radical liberalisation of Korean GTCs by relaxing its regulations.  
 
The second implication relates to Japanese Sogo Shoshas’ management in the 
future. Their foremost weakness is their high dependence on commodities transactions. 
Their traditional strengths in commodities businesses are rapidly reaching maturity. The 
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Sogo Shoshas in the future will not be mere middle-men; they should put investment in 
other businesses at the core of their activities and also function as global investors. The 
combination of various investments and the linkage between businesses through the 
trading business, which may be regarded as their mature main line, will create an overall 
synergy and support their status as business integrators. To enhance their ability to 
adapt to change, the Sogo Shoshas may be expected to make dynamic adjustments of 
their business portfolios through ongoing scrap-and-build programmes. At the same 
time, they should probably be concentrating their resources in several fields of 
particular strength and working to make their core competence even stronger. In fields 
where they are less competitive or less confident, they should turn more to outsourcing 
and expand their ties of global alliance and partnership with other firms. Furthermore, 
they need to become increasingly diverse by bolstering their activities in fields of 
special expertise and strength. As a priority, each should discern its field of core 
competence and allocate management resources to it. As a result of this process, some 
of them could come to resemble high-tech firms, while others could end up specialising 
in project engineering or financing business. In this sense, the future evolution of the 
Sogo Shoshas will be diversification in various directions from their conventional 
business as trading firms.  
 
The third is related to Korean GTCs’ reform of their management system. It is 
necessary for Korean GTCs to adopt a system which substantially separates ownership 
from management in order to promote effective business management and to meet a 
global standard. As the owners in the Korean Chaebols have absolute authority in their 
group’s management, they have always managed and controlled all the affiliated firms 
in their groups, including the GTCs. Consequently, the role of professional managers 
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was limited because of the influence of the group owners. All professional managers are 
reviewed on the basis of their yearly operation results at the annual meeting attended by 
all the group presidents. As a result, professional managers are highly sensitive about 
their short-term management performance, which is largely affected by profit 
maximisation. In this context, this study has an important implication from the 
viewpoint of strategic management. In contrast to the Korean GTCs, the main bodies of 
decision-making in strategic management within the Japanese Sogo Shoshas are their 
professional managers, rather than group owners or family members. Hence, effective 
management may always need a substantial separation between ownership and 
management and this would be one of the current sources of competitive advantage in 
the highly competitive markets.  
 
The fourth implication is for organisation designers. Designers of organisations 
need to pay special attention to building complementarities between their competitive 
strategy and its structural, environmental and performance context. For instance, a firm 
which wants to pursue a differentiation strategy may need to adopt organisational 
decentralisation by undertaking to delegate decision-making power to lower level 
managers, in order to cope with uncertain and dynamic environments. As a result of the 
decentralisation process, a firm may perform well, since decentralisation may encourage 
employees’ satisfaction. At the same time, a firm pursuing cost leadership needs to stay 
in predictable and stable environments with organisational formalisation, since the main 
way of implementing a cost leadership strategy is to put strong emphasis on formal 
profit and budget control. Finally, before designing a hybrid strategy, managers need to 
have the ability both to understand and to deliver enhanced value in terms of customer 
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needs, while also having a cost base which permits low prices and is sufficient for 
reinvestment to maintain and develop sufficient bases of differentiation.  
 
7.6. Limitations and Further Research  
 
There have been some limitations during this study and the following topics are 
recommended for future research.  
 
First, the major topic recommended for future research is more profound study of 
the Japanese Sogo Shoshas. This research started with the intention of examining the 
nature, history, characteristics, functions, financial performance and management 
system, strategic management and decision-making process of Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas and of comparing the two groups. The above research 
objectives called for vast amounts of factual information and data for both groups. 
During the field survey, the author could sense significant corporate cultural differences 
between Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. There have been no significant 
problems in the process of gathering information and data from Korean GTCs, both 
through primary sources (i.e. field surveys) and secondary sources (i.e. journal articles, 
books, government issued reports, etc.). However, there have been some limitations in 
gathering data and information from Japanese Sogo Shoshas, in particular through field 
surveys, such as questionnaires and interviews. As with Korean GTCs, secondary data 
for Japanese Sogo Shoshas are readily accessible, but the degree of participation in the 
survey and the response rate to the questionnaire survey was lower than for the Korean 
GTCs. Although the author followed the necessary steps to improve response rates (see 
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Bryman, 2004)89, most Japanese Sogo Shoshas refused to allow any individual visit to 
their companies, or showed a very cautious and conservative attitude to revealing 
confidential information. It is, therefore, worth recommending that future research on 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas should be undertaken, with more adequate primary data and 
information.  
 
Second, more profound field surveys are also needed of the executives of the 
Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. This study dealt with strategy at the business 
level of highly diversified organisations. There were difficulties in obtaining 
information and data from the heads of SBUs or divisions (all at the executive or a 
director level) during the field survey. Most of them were frequently not available at the 
office for various reasons, such as domestic or overseas business trips and business 
meetings with customers and some of them were reluctant to participate in the survey. 
Therefore, data were collected from four classes; general staff (working experience 
normally less than five years), assistant manager level (working experience normally 
five to ten years), manager level (working experience normally ten to 15 years) and 
senior manager level (working experience normally over 15 years). However, previous 
surveys (Miller, 1988; Govindarajan, 1988; Dess and Davis, 1984) were undertaken 
with executives such as CEOs, the most senior vice presidents, or general managers. To 
increase the degree of representation, further research, including surveys of top 
management, is recommended.  
 
                                            
89 Bryman (2004) suggests some steps to improve response rates to postal questionnaires survey. 
Frequently suggested steps are i) writing a good covering letter explaining the reasons for the research, 
why it is important and why the recipient has been selected, ii) accompanying postal questionnaires by a 
stamped addressed envelope or, at the very least, return postage and iii) providing clear instructions and 
an attractive layout to improve the response rate.  
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Third, the survey of this study was undertaken among only the Marketing and 
Sales SBUs of the Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. As these are both highly 
diversified organisations, the result of this study is not enough to represent the position 
of the whole organisation in any of the cases.  Future research is thus recommended 
with different SBUs or with every SBU (i.e. planning, sales, accounting, financing, 
logistics SBUs). There are numbers of different SBUs and divisions, which have their 
own unique roles and tasks within Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. However, 
this study can be called worthwhile, because it dealt with highly diversified 
organisations, whereas previous studies (Miller, 1988; Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005) 
dealt only with small or single-business undiversified corporations. Within small 
companies, structural issues of decentralisation and formalisation are simply not 
relevant, or there is no real difference between business-level and corporate-level 
strategies. According to Mintzberg (1979), simple structured organisations are 
characterised by centralisation and informality, because direct supervision is their key 
coordination mechanism. This denotes that significant results with such small or un-
diversified companies may have limitations.  
 
Fourth, another major topic for future research could be the analysis of Strategic 
Management with fractionisation and concretisation of the differentiation strategy. The 
literal meaning of differentiation is comprehensive and wide-ranging. Hence, it was not 
easy to examine the detailed relationship between the differentiation strategy and other 
variables. According to Porter (1985), the means of differentiation are peculiar to each 
industry. Differentiation can be based on the product itself, the delivery system by 
which it is sold, the marketing approach and a broad range of other factors. From the 
GTCs’ perspective, differentiation strategies may include product differentiation, 
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marketing differentiation, service differentiation, distribution differentiation, financing 
differentiation, etc. In some cases, a low cost strategy will also be included in the 
differentiation strategy, as low cost differentiation. It may provide new theories or 
hypotheses to undertake if future research with more specific types of differentiation 
strategy. Moreover, future research is required if the types of strategic behaviours are 
divided into various forms. For example, among firms pursuing a differentiation 
strategy, or cost-leadership strategy, some may adopt the posture of prospectors and 
others take up the posture of analysers or defenders (see Olson, Slater and Hult, 2005)90. 
From the GTCs’ perspective, the types of strategic behaviours may be divided into 
various forms, such as prospector with differentiation, prospector with low cost, 
analysers with differentiation, analysers with lowcost, defenders with differentiation and 
defenders with low cost.  
 
Fifth, research is also recommended on the decision-making process within Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. Of the many issues, some are related to the BOD and 
the labour union which play an important role in decision-making process within 
organisations. However, the survey in this study was of office workers only and we 
asked them to express their feelings on the BOD and labour unions91 issues. It will be 
significant if future research is undertaken including the members of the BOD and 
labour unions themselves.   
 
                                            
90 Olson, Slater and Hult (2005) divided the types of strategic behaviours into four categories: i) 
prospectors who are developing innovative new products and entry into a new market, ii) analysers who 
bring out either improved or less expensive versions of products which the prospector introduced while 
defending core markets and products, iii) low-cost defenders who are providing quality products or 
services at the lowest overall cost and iv) differentiated defenders who are providing premium services 
and/or high-quality products to select sets of customers who value and are willing to pay for them.  
 
91 In most Korean private firms, office workers are prohibited from joining the labour union. So, most of 
the labour union members are factory workers.  
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APPENDIX 1. COVER LETTER FOR THE SURVEY 
 
Dear Sir,                                               25 September, 2006  
  
 
My name is In Woo, Jun, a doctoral student at the Birmingham Business School, the 
University of Birmingham, UK and you have been selected to take part in my research 
study concerning the Strategic Management and Decision-making Process within 
Korean General Trading Companies (GTCs) and Japanese Sogo Shoshas.  
 
The primary purpose of this study is to compare the Strategic Management of Korean 
GTCs and Japanese Sogo Shoshas. In particular, I am analysing the relationships among 
environment, strategy, structure and performance. The second purpose of my study is to 
investigate and compare the decision-making process within Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas. 
 
Your cooperation in completing the attached questionnaire is required for my successful 
research study. Your responses to this questionnaire will be completely anonymous and 
all the information you give will be kept completely confidential. The final results will 
not be identified with any individual or firm.   
 
Please read carefully the directions at the beginning of each section and answer all the 
questions as accurately as possible. Your cooperation would be highly appreciated and 
will contribute to the growing knowledge about Korean GTCs and Japanese Sogo 
Shoshas. 
  
Sincerely yours, 
 
                               
In Woo, Jun  
Doctoral Student 
The Birmingham Business School 
The University of Birmingham 
 
Jim Slater                                  David Bailey 
Professor, The First Supervisor                 Professor, The Second Supervisor 
The Birmingham Business School              The Birmingham Business School 
The University of Birmingham                 The University of Birmingham 
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APPENDIX 2. SURVEY OF THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
This section attempts to gather information about the business environment surrounding 
your company. The modern business environment surrounding your firm can be 
characterised by the degrees of uncertainty and complexity. This section consists of two 
parts; i) your feelings at present about the business environment and ii) your  
 
expectations about the future. Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using 
the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
? Present: How do you feel about the business environment at present. 
Uncertainty 1. It is difficult to predict market trends.        
2. It is difficult to forecast customer’s needs and 
tastes.            
3. In our business, customers’ product 
preferences change a lot over time.  
4. Our customers tend to look for new products 
and services to satisfy their needs.  
5. Actions of competitors are difficult to predict.
6. The life cycle of our products and services at 
present is short. 
7. Competitors’ new products and services 
frequently come to market at present.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
SURVEY OF THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
① = Agree strongly                               ④ = Disagree 
② = Agree                                      ⑤ = Disagree strongly 
③ = Neither agree nor disagree  
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Complexity 8. In our business, the channel of distribution is 
complex. 
9. It is complex for us to develop new products 
and services. 
10. The market is highly competitive.  
11. There are many competing products and 
services.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
12. Potential entrants threaten the market.  
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
? Future: How do you feel about the business environment in the future. 
Uncertainty 1. It may be difficult to predict market trends in 
future.                        
2. It may be difficult to forecast customer’s 
needs and tastes in future. 
3. In our business, customers’ product 
preferences may change a lot over time in 
future.  
4. Our customers may tend to look for new 
products and services to satisfy their needs in 
future. 
5. Actions of competitors are difficult to predict 
in future. 
6. The life cycle of our products and services 
will be shorter in future.        
7. Competitors’ new products and services may 
come to market more frequently in future. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
Complexity 8. In our business, the channel of distribution 
may become more complex in future. 
9. It may be complex for us to develop new 
products and services in future. 
10. The market may become highly competitive 
in future.  
11. There may exist many competing products 
and services in future.  
12. Potential entrants may threaten the market 
in future.  
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
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SECTION 2. INFORMATION ABOUT THE STRATEGY 
 
This section is about the competitive strategy. Competitive strategy, often called 
business-level strategy, is about how to compete successfully in particular markets and 
how to improve the competitive position of a firm’s products or services within the 
specific industry or market segment.  
 
1. This part attempts to classify your company’s present strategy. Please tick one box 
only as Ⅴ that best describes the basic strategy that your company is now pursuing.  
 
Type of Strategy Features Tick Below
Differentiation ? We focus on securing new markets and 
customers with diversified products and 
services. 
? We actively develop new markets and 
products/services. 
? We focus on providing high quality and 
our pricing is at the high premium end of 
the market.  
 
Cost Leadership ? We focus on stable and predictable 
markets. 
? We focus on keeping our existing 
customers and markets. 
? We concentrate on high volume and low 
margins.  
 
 
 
? We compete on the basis of lower price 
than our competitors. 
Hybrid Strategy ? We combine differentiation and cost 
leadership strategy. 
 
(Differentiation + Cost 
Leadership) ? We focus on high-quality products and 
service with lower prices than 
competitors 
None of the above   
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2. This part attempts to measure your feeling on the strategies of differentiation, cost 
leadership and hybrid. Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using the 
following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
? Present: How do you feel about your firm’s strategy at present. 
Differentiation 1. We use product/service innovations as a means 
of competing. 
2. Our annual R and D costs for the development 
of products and services are high. 
3. Our annual percentage of sales spent on costs 
of initiating and implementing product-market 
innovation is high. 
4. We always try to be ahead of competitors in 
product novelty or speed of innovation.  
5. We pursue a tough “undo the competitors” 
philosophy.  
6. We rapidly respond to customers’ changing of 
needs and tastes. 
7. We continuously develop new products and 
services to meet customers’ needs. 
8. We invest heavily in advertising, sales 
promotion and public relations.  
9. We try to enhance our corporate image. 
10. We frequently analyse competitors’ strategy. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
Cost 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
11. We use cost centres and fix standard costs by 
analysing variances for cost control. 
12. We try to minimise advertising expenditures. 
13. We have a strong proclivity for low-risk 
projects with normal and certain rates of return. 
14. We try to control levels of inventory. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
① = Agree strongly                              ④ = Disagree 
② = Agree                                     ⑤ = Disagree strongly  
③ = Neither agree nor disagree  
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Cost 
Leadership 
 
15. All employees are appointed to their posts 
considering productivity.  
16. We try to cut administrative expenses. 
17. All employees fully understand the need for 
cost reduction. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
Hybrid 
Strategy 
(Differentiation 
and Cost  
Leadership) 
 
18. We use a high-quality and low price strategy 
when entering into new markets. 
19. We offer a wide range of good quality 
products and services at lower prices than 
our rivals.  
20. We always try to find suppliers who offer us 
high-quality products and services at lower 
price.  
21. We maintain long-term relationships with our 
regular suppliers who offer us high-quality 
products and services at lower price.  
22. Our regular buyers purchase our products 
and services on the basis of high quality and 
lower price.  
23. We are able to offer high-quality products 
and services to our customers based on our 
competitive distribution channel, logistics 
and transport systems that reduce costs.  
24. To deliver high-quality products and services 
to our customers at low-cost, we reinvest in 
R and D. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
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? Future: How do you feel about your firm’s strategy in future. 
Differentiation 1. We may use product/service innovations as a 
means of competing in future. 
2. Our annual R and D costs for development of 
products and services may become higher in 
future. 
3. Our annual percentage of sales spent on costs 
of initiating and implementing product-market 
innovation may become higher in future. 
4. We may try to be ahead of competitors in 
product novelty or speed of innovation.  
5. We may pursue a tough “undo the competitors” 
philosophy in future.  
6. We may rapidly respond to customers’ 
changing of needs and tastes in future. 
7. We may continuously develop new products 
and services to meet customers’ needs in 
future. 
8. We may invest heavily in advertising, sales 
promotion and public relations in future. 
9. We may try to enhance our corporate image in 
future. 
10. We may frequently analyse competitors’ 
strategy in future. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
Cost 
Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. We may use cost centres and fix standard 
costs by analysing variances for cost control. 
12. We may try to minimise advertising 
expenditures in future. 
13. We may have a strong proclivity for low-risk 
projects with normal and certain rates of return. 
14. We may try to control levels of inventory. 
15. All employees may be appointed to their posts 
considering productivity.  
16. We may try to cut administrative expenses. 
17. All employees may have full understanding of 
the need for cost reduction. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
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Hybrid 
Strategy 
(Differentiation 
and Low cost) 
 
 
18. We may use a high-quality and low price 
strategy when entering into new markets. 
19. We may offer a wide range of good quality 
products and services at lower prices than 
our rivals.  
20. We may try to find suppliers who offer us 
high-quality products and services at lower 
prices.  
21. We may maintain long-term relationship 
with our regular suppliers who offer us 
high-quality products and services at lower 
price.  
22. Our regular buyers may purchase our 
products and services on the basis of high 
quality and lower price.  
23. We may offer high-quality products and 
services to our customers based on our 
competitive distribution channel, logistics 
and transport systems that reduce costs.  
24. To deliver high-quality products and 
services to our customers at low-cost, we 
may reinvest in R and D.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
SECTION 3. INFORMATION ABOUT THE STRUCTURE 
 
This section is about the organisational structure of your company. Please tick one 
number as Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
Decentralisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. In your company, decisions tend not to be 
made at a high level. 
2. The individual decision-maker has wide 
latitude in the choice of means to accomplish 
goals. 
3. Middle-and lower-level managers are 
allowed flexibility in getting work done. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① = Agree strongly                              ④ = Disagree 
② = Agree                                     ⑤ = Disagree strongly  
③ = Neither agree nor disagree  
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Decentralisation 4. A person who wants to make his decision 
would not quickly be discouraged. 
5. Small matters are not referred to someone 
higher in your company for a decision. 
6. Many important decisions are made locally 
rather than centrally. 
7. Middle- and lower-level managers have 
substantial autonomy.  
8. Middle- and lower-level managers are 
allowed to increase the level of expenditure 
for advertising and promotion. 
9. Middle- and lower-level managers are 
allowed to change the selling price on  
major products or services. 
10. Middle- and lower-level managers are 
allowed to increase the number of employees 
in a business unit.   
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
Formalisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. If employees wish to make their own 
decisions, they are quickly referred to a 
policy manual.   
12. Individuals in your company frequently 
refer to it as a “bureaucracy”  
13. Your company attaches importance to basic 
principles and all instructions are made 
through formal documentation.  
14. Regardless of changing conditions, your 
company has faith in past management 
principles which have proven effectiveness.  
15. The communication channel in your 
company is very formalised.   
16. Employees have only restricted access to 
financial and management information.  
17. Your company persists with the same 
management style rather than diversifying 
its management style.   
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
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SECTION 4. INFORMATION ABOUT PERFORMANCE 
 
This section plans to gather information about performance. Please tick one number as 
Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
① = Agree strongly                              ④ = Disagree 
② = Agree                                     ⑤ = Disagree strongly  
③ = Neither agree nor disagree  
Overall 
performance 
1. The overall performance of our company met 
expectations last year. 
2. The overall performance of the business last 
year exceeded that of our major competitors. 
3. Top management was very satisfied with the 
overall performance of the business last year. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
Financial 
performance 
 
 
 
 
4. The sales of our company increased in the 
last financial year compared to the previous 
one. 
5. The profitability of our company increased in 
the last financial year compared to the 
previous one. 
6. The cash flow of our company is stable 
compared to last year.  
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
Non-financial 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The market share increased in the last    . 
  financial year compared to the previous one  
8.The number of new customers increased in 
the last financial year compared to the last 
one.  
9. Employee satisfaction and retention has 
increased.  
10. Employees’ speed of job handling has 
increased. 
11. Employees are more responsive toward 
customers. 
12. Employee empowerment has increased. 
13. Employee productivity has increased. 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
① ② ③ ④ ⑤
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SECTION 1. INFORMATION ABOUT THE BODY OF DECISION-MAKING 
 
This section attempts to know the main body for decision-making in your company. 
Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Only for Korean GTCs: In the process of decision-making for carrying out 
important strategic management in your company, to what extent do you think the 
following persons influence the decision-making process?  
Top executives (Chairman, President and 
Vice president) 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Team leaders ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Middle manager ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
General staff ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Board of directors ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Labour union ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
General meeting of shareholders ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
 
Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
2. Only for Korean GTCs: In the process of 
decision-making for carrying out important 
strategic management in your company, to what 
extent do you think that top executives accept 
their subordinates’ (team leader, middle 
manager and general staff) opinions?  
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
SURVEY OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
③ = Neither influence nor remain uninvolved  
② = Influence                             ⑤ = Never involved  
① = Influence strongly                      ④ = Not involved 
③ = Neither accepted nor ignored  
② = Accepted                                      ⑤ = Totally ignored 
① = Accepted without question                        ④ = Ignored 
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3. Only for Korean GTCs: In the process of 
decision-making for carrying out important 
strategic management in your company, to what 
extent do you think the Board of Directors 
express their opinions?  
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
4. Only for Korean GTCs: In the process of 
decision-making for carrying out important 
strategic management in your company, to what 
extent do you think the Labour Unions express 
their opinions? 
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
5. Only for Korean GTCs: In the process of 
decision-making for carrying out important 
strategic management in your company, to what 
extent do you think the General Meeting of 
Shareholders express their opinions? 
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
 
Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
③ = Neither influence nor become involved  
② = Influence                             ⑤ = Never involved 
① = Influence strongly                      ④ = Not involved 
6. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: In the process of decision-making for carrying 
out important strategic management in your company, to what extent do you think the 
following persons influence the decision-making process? 
Top executives (Chairman, President and 
Vice president) 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Team leaders ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Middle manager ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
General staff ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Board of directors ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Labour union ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
General meeting of shareholders ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
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Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
② = Accepted                                     ⑤ = Totally ignored
③ = Neither accepted nor ignored  
① = Accepted without question                       ④ = Ignored 
7. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: In the 
process of decision-making for carrying out 
important strategic management in your 
company, to what extent do you think the top 
executives allow their subordinates’ (team 
leader, middle manager and general staff) free 
flow of opinions? 
 
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
8. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: In the 
process of decision-making for carrying out 
important strategic management in your 
company, to what extent do you think the 
Board of Directors express their opinions? 
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
9. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: In the 
process of decision-making for carrying out 
important strategic management in your 
company, to what extent do you think that the 
Labour Unions express their opinions? 
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
10. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: In the 
process of decision-making for carrying out 
important strategic management in your 
company, to what extent do you think the 
General Meeting of Shareholders express 
their opinions? 
 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
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SECTION 2. INFORMATION ABOUT FACTORS AFFECTING DECISION-MAKING 
AND SOURCE OF POWER 
 
This section is about the factors affecting decision-making and its source of power. 
Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. In the process of decision-making for carrying out important strategic management 
in your company, to what extent do you think the following factors affect the decision-
making process? 
Power and politics ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Ownership ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Corporate governance ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Corporate culture ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
2. In the process of decision-making for carrying out important strategic management 
in your company, to what extent do you think the following factors influence the 
decision-maker’s source of power? 
Expertise ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Ownership ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Managerial and working ability ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Contribution to the firm ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
Seniority ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
 
SECTION 3. INFORMATION ABOUT CULTURAL DIFFERENCE 
 
This section is designed to gather information about cultural differences between 
Korean and Japanese GTCs. Please tick one number as Ⅴ in each statement using 
the following scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
③ = Neither influence nor remain uninvolved  
① = Very high                                      ④ = A little 
② = high                                          ⑤ = Never 
③ = Neither high nor low  
② = Influence                             ⑤ = Never influence  
① = Influence strongly                      ④ = Do not influence 
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1. Only for Korean GTCs: In the process of 
decision-making within your company, decision-
makers may tend towards individualism over 
wholism (i.e. group decision-making system). 
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
 
2. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: In the process 
of decision-making in your company, decision-
makers may tend towards wholism (i.e. group 
decision-making system) over individualism.  
 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤ 
 
SECTION 4. INFORMATION ABOUT RECENT CHANGE IN DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESS 
 
This section attempts to gather information as to whether there have been any recent 
changes in the decision-making process in your company. Please tick one number as 
Ⅴ in each statement using the following scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Only for Korean GTCs: After the financial crisis in the late 1990s, to what extent 
do you think that there have been any changes in the process of decision-making in 
your company? 
The degree of top management’s change of mind ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of general staff’s free expression of opinion ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of decentralisation ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the labour union’s free expression of 
opinion 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the BOD’s free expression of opinion ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the general meeting of shareholders’ free 
expression of opinion 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
2. Only for Japanese Sogo Shoshas: After the collapse of the bubble economy in the 
early 1990s, to what extent do you think that there have been any changes in the 
process of decision-making in your company? 
The degree of top management’s change of mind ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the general staff’s free expression of 
opinion 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
③ = Neither changed nor unchanged  
① = Totally changed                           ④ = Unchanged 
② = Changed                                 ⑤ = Totally unchanged 
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The degree of decentralisation ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the labour union’s free expression of 
opinion 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the BOD’s free expression of opinion ①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
The degree of the general meeting of shareholders’ free 
expression of opinion 
①   ②   ③   ④   ⑤
 
SECTION 5. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
Job Position ① General Staff ② Assistant Manager ③ Manager  
④ Senior Manager ⑤ Other (Please specify:          ) 
Working Experience ① Less than 5 years  ② 5~10 years ③ 10~15 years  
④ Over 15 years 
Job Duty ① Sales ② Planning ③ Accounting/finance  
④ Purchasing ⑤ Logistics 
 
 
I appreciate your time and effort in filling out this questionnaire. 
Please check that you have answered all the questions that you should have answered. 
If you have any comments or suggestions, please indicate them below. 
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APPENDIX 3. INTERVIEW MATERIAL  
 
 
 INTERVIEW MATERIAL ON 
THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT   
 
 
SECTION 1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT AND STRATEGY 
 
This section attempts to investigate the relationship between the business environment 
surrounding your company and strategy that your company is now pursuing. First, the 
modern business environment surrounding your firm can be characterised by the 
degrees of uncertainty and complexity. Second, among many strategies, competitive 
strategy, often called business-level strategy, is about how to compete successfully in 
particular markets and how to improve the competitive position of a firm’s products or 
services within the specific industry or market segment. The typical type of competitive 
strategy is differentiation and cost leadership.  
 
Questions 1.1~1.2. Do you agree that your company’s differentiation strategy is 
positively associated with environmental uncertainty and complexity? And do you agree 
that your company’s cost leadership strategy is inversely associated with environmental 
uncertainty and complexity? If you have any other opinions, please indicate them below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 
 
The purpose of building organisational structure is to generate and develop its strategies. 
It therefore is crucially important to examine the relationship between strategy and 
structure. In this study, two basic elements of organisational structure are selected: 
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centralisation/decentralisation and formalisation. Centralisation is the process by which 
the activities of an organisation, in particular those regarding decision-making, become 
concentrated within a particular location and/or group. Formalisation is to give formal 
standing or endorsement to make official or legitimate by the observance of proper 
procedure. Please answer how you feel about the following questions.  
 
Question 2.1. Do you agree that your company’s differentiation strategy is positively 
associated with decentralisation? If you have any other opinions, please indicate them 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions 2.2. Do you agree that your company’s cost leadership strategy is positively 
associated with formalisation? If you have any other opinions, please indicate them 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This section investigates the relationship between strategy and performance. Each firm 
may select a specific strategy to enhance its overall performance, because a firm’s 
strategy depends highly upon overall performance. On the other hand, business 
performance can be divided into two elements: financial and non-financial 
performances. The typical financial performance measurements are ROI, profitability 
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and productivity while non-financial performance measurements are gaining new 
markets share, acquiring new customers and employee satisfaction and retention etc. 
Please answer how you feel about the following questions. 
 
Questions 3.1~3.2. Do you agree that your company’s differentiation strategy will be 
positively associated with the gaining of market share and acquisition of new 
customers? And do you agree that your company’s cost leadership strategy will be 
positively associated with profitability? If you have any other opinions, please indicate 
them below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3.3. Do you agree that your company’s hybrid strategy is positively associated 
with new market development and overall performance? If you have any other opinions, 
please indicate them below. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURE/PERFORMANCE 
This section is about to examine how organisational structure (i.e. centralisation, 
decentralisation and formalisation) affects a firm’s performance (i.e. financial and non-
financial performance). Centralisation refers to whether decision-making authority is 
closely held by top managers or is delegated to middle- and lower-level managers. 
Formalisation is defined as the degree to which formal rules and procedures govern 
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decisions and working relationships. Rules and procedures provide a means for 
prescribing appropriate behaviours and addressing routine aspects of a problem. Please 
answer how do you feel about the following questions. 
 
Questions 4.1~4.2. Do you agree that your company’s organisational centralisation will 
be inversely associated with overall performance? And do you agree that your 
company’s organisational decentralisation will be positively associated with employee’s 
satisfaction and retention? If you have any other opinions, please indicate them below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 4.3. Do you agree that your company’s formalisation (formal control) will be 
inversely associated with the speed of job handling and of response toward customers? 
If you have any other opinions, please indicate them below. 
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INTERVIEW MATERIAL ON  
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
 
 
SECTION 1. THE MAIN BODY IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
This section attempts to know the main body of decision-making in the process of 
carrying out important strategic management in your company.  
 
Question 1.1. In the process of decision-making in your company, how much do you 
think the following persons are involved in the process? Please rank them and say why. 
(Top executives (i.e. Chairman, President and Vice-president), Team leaders, Middle 
managers, General staffs, Board of directors, labour union and General meeting of 
shareholders). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 1.2. In the process of decision-making process in your company, how much 
do you think that Top executives allow their Subordinates, Board of Directors, labour 
unions and general meeting of shareholders free flow of opinions?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
This section examines major factors’ influence on the decision-making process and 
seeks to know the source of the decision-maker’s power.  
 442 
 
Question 2.1. In the process of decision-making in your company, which of the 
following factors mostly influence the process? Please rank them and say why. (Power 
and politics, Ownership, Corporate governance and Corporate culture). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2.2. In the process of decision-making in your company, which of the 
following factors mostly influence the decision-makers’ power? Please rank them and 
say why. (Expertise, Ownership, Managerial and working ability, Contribution to the 
firm and Seniority). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KOREAN GTCs AND 
JAPANESE SOGO SHOSHAS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
This section aims to understand the cultural differences between Korean GTCs and 
Japanese Sogo Shoshas in the decision-making process.  
 
Question 3.1. In the process of decision-making in your company, do you think 
decision-makers tend towards wholism (i.e. group decision-making system) or 
individualism and why? 
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SECTION 4. RECENT CHANGES IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
This section is about whether there have been any recent changes in the decision-
making process in your company.  
 
Question 4.1. In the process of decision-making process in your company, have there 
been any recent changes? If so, which of the following things mainly changed? (Top 
management’s change of mind, General staff’s free flow of opinions, Decentralisation, 
Board of director’s free flow of opinion, Labour union’s free flow of opinion and 
General meeting of shareholder’s free flow of opinion).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 5. OTHERS 
 
This section is provided to express any of your comments and opinions related to the 
decision-making process in your company. If you have any comments or opinions, 
please indicate them below. Any comments and opinions would be highly welcomed.    
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APPENDIX 4. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
 Name Company Job Position 
Mr. Bo Keun, Kim Samsung Corporation Manager 
PTA/MEG Section 
Marketing and Sales 
Mr. Keun Ki, Lee Hyosung Corporation
 
Team Leader   
Fine Chemical Team 
Marketing and Sales 
Mr. Young Kyu, Sung Daewoo International 
Corporation 
Manager 
Chemical Team 3 
Marketing and Sales  
 
 
 
Korean 
GTCs 
Mr. Ki Sung, Cho 
 
Lotte Corporation Manager  
Petrochemical Team 
Marketing and Sales 
Mr. Kazuyuki Sasaki Marubeni 
Corporation 
Team Leader 
Chemicals Department  
Marketing and Sales 
 
Japanese 
Sogo 
Shoshas Mr. Keisuke Sasaki Tomen Corporation Senior Manager 
 Chemicals Department 
Marketing and Sales 
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